SHAYNA v. State Of Chhattisgarh

the documentary proof of higher marks. The impugned order is 7 thus a non-speaking order and fails to meet the minimum standards of administrative fairness.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned action of the respondents, in refusing to properly place the petitioner above respondent No. 3 in the gradation list, despite clear evidence of superior merit, is arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory, and suffers from non-application of mind. The rejection of the claim of petitioner by a non-speaking order dated

11.09.2018, merely referring to an earlier rejection dated

28.03.2017, reveals complete lack of reasoning and is thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is settled law that arbitrary state action is antithetical to the guarantees of equality. The order under challenge is devoid of any analysis of the relevant facts or application of the governing service rules, specifically Rule 12(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter "the 1961 Rules"), which explicitly mandates that seniority of direct recruits shall be determined on the basis of the order of merit in which they are recommended, irrespective of the date of joining. The petitioner was selected through the same examination conducted by the MPPSC in 1992, and he scored 1278 marks, while private respondent No. 3, belonging to a reserved category, scored only 1091 marks. The petitioner, 8 though appointed from the wait-list in the unreserved category, is still a direct recruit as per law, and his placement in the merit list, being higher, entitles him to seniority over a candidate placed below in marks, irrespective of main list or supplementary list. Rule 12(1)(a) of the 1961 Rules is explicit in that seniority is to be determined based solely on the order of merit in which candidates are recommended. There is no distinction made therein between main list and wait-list candidates, provided that both were recommended through the same examination, as is the case herein. The respondents' act of giving precedence to administrative categorisation over statutory merit norms is unsustainable in law. The very concept of a wait-list is an administrative mechanism to fill vacancies due to non-joining of main list candidates. However, once a candidate from the wait- list is appointed, and the marks of all candidates are available, then seniority must follow the rule of merit. Moreover, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the State of Chhattisgarh, through their respective General Administration Department orders have affirmed the correct interpretation of Rule 12(1)(a), confirming that a candidate from the wait-list, if he has higher marks, should be placed above candidates with lower marks from the main list. This interpretation by the competent State authorities, in conformity with the rule and settled law, leaves no scope for 9 contrary administrative decisions. The petitioner was first made aware of his incorrect placement in the gradation list only in

2009. Thereafter, he immediately raised a representation in 2011. Upon denial due to lack of evidence of marks, the petitioner obtained relevant documents through RTI in 2012 which for the first time clearly established that he had secured higher marks than private respondent. He filed fresh representations in 2014 and 2015, all of which culminated in the impugned rejection dated 11.09.2018. Every gradation list which wrongly places the petitioner below private respondent No. 3 continues to perpetuate an illegality and causes recurring prejudice to the petitioner. The illegality is not cured by the mere passage of time. Promotions, pay fixation, and career advancement have all been adversely affected. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of R. Ranjith Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1009 has unequivocally held that seniority must be fixed solely on the basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination, and that any deviation from this norm is violative of Articles 14 and 16.

4. It is further submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that seniority in public service cannot be determined arbitrarily or based on administrative expediency when a statutory provision clearly prescribes merit as the sole criterion. Further, under 10 Section 69 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 1999, the conditions of service applicable prior to the appointed day (i.e., prior to state bifurcation) cannot be altered to the disadvantage of any employee without the prior approval of the Central Government. In the instant case, any departure from Rule 12(1) (a) to the prejudice of the petitioner is directly in violation of this statutory protection. The petitioner further submits that he is entitled to all consequential benefits including seniority, pay fixation, promotion, and all service-related benefits from the date his seniority would have been fixed had the rules been correctly applied. This is a clear case where the statutory rights of petitioner have been overridden by an arbitrary and mechanically passed order. When the rule is clear, and the facts undisputed, particularly the higher merit of petitioner, there is no justification for placing him below private respondent No. 3. In view of the foregoing submission, it is prayed that the impugned order dated

11.09.2018, being non-speaking, irrational, arbitrary, and illegal, is liable to be set aside by this Court. The petitioner is entitled to be placed above private respondent No. 3 in the gradation list based on his superior merit in the qualifying examination.

5. Learned State counsel opposes the submission made by learned counsel for petitioner and would submit that the instant writ petition, as framed and filed by the petitioner, is devoid of 11 substance and merit, and is therefore liable to be dismissed in limine. The contention of the petitioner that he had secured higher marks than respondent No. 3 and hence ought to have been placed above him in the seniority/gradation list is wholly misconceived, baseless and untenable in law. The said claim fails to consider the legal and factual position governing seniority under the relevant service rules. It is further submitted that respondent No. 3 belongs to the Scheduled Tribe category and was appointed through the main select list, whereas the petitioner was appointed from the waiting list in the General category. As per the settled position of law and the applicable rules, namely Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, the seniority of directly appointed candidates is to be determined based on the order of merit in which they are recommended for appointment, irrespective of the date of their joining. Furthermore, it is categorically provided that candidates selected in an earlier selection process shall rank senior to those selected subsequently. Therefore, the name of petitioner has rightly been placed below respondent No. 3 in the gradation list, and the same is in consonance with the statutory provisions. It is also submitted that the petitioner has approached this Court with inordinate delay. It is well settled in law that any claim relating to seniority must be raised within a reasonable time, typically within 12 3-4 years. In the present case, the petitioner has remained silent for over two decades despite the fact that respondent No. 3 has consistently been shown senior to him in all gradation lists issued since 1998. The petitioner did not challenge or raise any objection to these gradation lists at the appropriate time. In the gradation list as on 01/04/1998, the petitioner appears at Serial No. 142, and respondent No. 3 is at Serial No. 129. This list has attained finality and remained unchallenged for over 20 years. It is pertinent to submit that after the reorganization of the State and formation of Chhattisgarh, fresh gradation lists were issued from time to time. In each of these lists, the petitioner has continuously been placed below respondent No. 3. The petitioner has now sought to assail the settled seniority position after an inordinate and unexplained delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, has consistently held that delay and laches are valid grounds for refusing relief in writ jurisdiction. The belated claim of petitioner is, therefore, hit by delay and laches and deserves to be rejected on this ground alone. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the instant writ petition, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 11/12/2020 before the Director General of Jail & Correctional Services, Raipur, seeking correction of his position in the gradation list and consequential promotion. After due consideration and 13 examination of the service record of petitioner and prior representations, the said representation was rightly rejected by the competent authority vide communication dated 24/02/2021. It was clarified therein that the petitioner was appointed on 03/08/1995 from the wait-list of the General category in the State Services Examination, 1992, and as per the established norms, the seniority of wait-list candidates is to be fixed after all the candidates of the main list, including those from the reserved categories. The Jail Headquarters, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, had earlier also rejected a similar claim of the petitioner vide letter dated 03/03/2017. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is reiterated that the seniority of the petitioner has been determined strictly in accordance with the relevant service rules and judicial principles. There is no illegality, arbitrariness, or violation of rights in the action of the respondents. The writ petition suffers from gross delay, is devoid of merit and substance, and deserves to be dismissed with costs. Hence, it is prayed that this Court may kindly be pleased to dismiss the writ petition in the interest of justice.

6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 supports the submission made by learned State counsel and would submit that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, grossly delayed, and devoid of any merit. The petitioner challenges the action of the 14 respondent department in placing him below respondent no. 3 in the seniority list for the post of Assistant Jailor. The said challenge, however, is fundamentally flawed in law and on facts, as the petitioner was appointed from the wait list after the respondent no. 3, who was selected in the main merit list and was appointed and joined the post much earlier. It is submitted that the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission (MPPSC) issued an advertisement in the year 1992 for recruitment to 42 posts of Assistant Jailor, out of which 25 posts were for General category and 17 for Scheduled Tribe (ST) candidates. After conducting the recruitment process, a merit list dated 04.11.1993 was published, followed by a wait list of 10 candidates. Respondent No. 3 was placed at Sl. No. 27 in the merit list (in the ST category), while the petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 5 in the wait list. Respondent No. 3 was issued an appointment order dated 06.05.1994 and joined his duties at Central Jail, Raipur on

28.05.1994. On the other hand, due to the non-joining or resignation of one candidate, a vacancy arose in the General category, pursuant to which the petitioner was issued an appointment order only on 03.08.1995 and joined later on

30.08.1995. Both appointment orders clearly stipulated that seniority would be as per the merit list received from the Public Service Commission. As per Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, 15 seniority of direct recruits is determined by the order of merit recommended by the PSC, irrespective of the date of joining. It further stipulates that candidates appointed pursuant to an earlier selection shall rank senior to those appointed from subsequent selections. Therefore, as respondent no. 3 was selected in the main list and appointed earlier, he is rightly placed senior to the petitioner, who was appointed later from the wait list. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner accepted his placement in the seniority list below respondent no. 3 and remained completely silent for over 15 years. It was only in 2011 that he first raised a grievance regarding his seniority, which was rightly rejected by the department vide order dated 23.02.2012, and reaffirmed again on 28.03.2017. The belated claim of petitioner is, thus, hit by the doctrine of laches and acquiescence. Respondent No. 3 was promoted to the post of Jailor on 06.08.2009, much prior to the petitioner raising any grievance. Therefore, any change in the seniority list post-promotion is legally impermissible, especially when the petitioner himself has since been promoted and has never challenged his own promotion or the process. The petitioner has selectively arrayed only respondent No. 3 as a contesting respondent while deliberately omitting 15 other ST candidates from the merit list published on 04.11.1993, against whom he essentially seeks seniority. This amounts to 16 suppression of material facts and renders the petition liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. The petitioner relies on a document obtained under RTI (Annexure P/10) purportedly showing interview marks. However, this document lacks any official seal, covering letter, or authentication from the RTI authority and appears to be self-fabricated. The manipulation of official records cannot be the basis for seeking judicial relief. The issues raised in the present case have already been settled in Rajendra Kumar Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (W.P. No. 12845/2022, decided on 18.12.2023), wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that wait-listed candidates cannot claim seniority over candidates selected in the main merit list, and cannot seek retrospective seniority from a date prior to their entry into service. The entire writ petition proceeds on the misplaced premise that the petitioner, appointed from the wait-list after more than a year of the original selection, is entitled to be placed above regularly selected candidates. This claim is contrary to service rules, settled law, and administrative practice. Moreover, the reliefs claimed, seeking to amend a 1993 merit list and revise seniority after over two decades, are wholly untenable. The competent authorities, after due consideration of the merit list and applicable rules, have repeatedly rejected the claims of petitioner. The gradation lists were never challenged by 17 the petitioner until the filing of the present writ petition in 2018. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pawan Pratap Singh & Others v. Reevan Singh & Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 267 and further reiterated in Amit Singh v. Ravindra Nath Pandey (C.A. No. 8324–8327/2022) that seniority cannot be claimed from a date when the candidate was not even borne in the cadre and retrospective seniority is permissible only in exceptional circumstances which are absent in the present case. In light of the above, it is submitted that the petitioner has failed to make out any case for interference by this Court. The challenge to seniority is hit by delay, barred by settled rules, and contrary to judicial precedent. Respondent No. 3 has been rightly placed in the seniority list as per law and has already been promoted in 2009. The challenge made by petitioner at this belated stage is not only without merit but also mischievous and deserves to be dismissed with costs. It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to dismiss the writ petition in limine, and hold that the seniority of respondent No. 3 is legal, valid, and in accordance with the rules.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents enclosed along with the petition.

8. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 18

11.09.2018 (Annexure P/1), whereby the representation of the petitioner seeking rectification of his position in the seniority/gradation list was rejected by respondent No. 1 on the ground that the issue stood concluded by an earlier speaking order dated 28.03.2017. The petitioner contends that the impugned order is non-speaking, arbitrary, and passed without due consideration of relevant documents and facts, including his superior marks in the selection process conducted by the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission (MPPSC) in 1992. The primary relief sought is that the petitioner be placed above respondent No. 3 in the seniority list on account of his higher merit.

9. Upon perusal of the pleadings and documents placed on record, facts emerge as undisputed are that both the petitioner and respondent No. 3 were selected through the same selection process conducted by the MPPSC for the post of Assistant Jailer. Respondent No. 3, a Scheduled Tribe (ST) candidate, was selected from the main list under the reserved category and was appointed vide order dated 06.05.1994. The petitioner, a General category candidate, was placed at serial number 5 in the wait-list and was appointed later, vide order dated 03.08.1995, following the non-joining of another general category candidate. Respondent No. 3 secured 1091 marks and was placed at serial 19 number 3 in the main ST list, while the petitioner secured 1278 marks, but was not in the main list due to the higher cut-off of the general category. The grievance regarding incorrect placement in the gradation list was first raised in 2011 and has continued through various representations and proceedings until the filing of the present petition in 2018.

10. The determination of seniority in the present case hinges on Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, which reads as under : "The seniority of a person directly appointed to a post according to rules shall be determined on the basis of the order of merit in which they are recommended for appointment irrespective of the date of joining. Person appointed as a result of an earlier selection shall be senior to those appointed as a result of a subsequent selection."

11. From the plain reading of the rule, it is clear that seniority is to be determined on the basis of the order of merit in the respective list, i.e., the main or wait list, through which a candidate is recommended for appointment. Importantly, the rule does not prescribe inter se comparison of merit between candidates selected under different categories (General/ST) or between those from the main list and the wait list unless they form part of a common list of equal consideration. The argument raised by 20 petitioner that he had obtained higher marks than respondent No. 3 and is, therefore, entitled to seniority over him, overlooks a crucial legal distinction. While it is not in dispute that the petitioner obtained higher marks, it is equally admitted that he was placed in the wait list of the General category candidates, whereas respondent No. 3 was in the main list of the ST category candidates. Their selection was under distinct categories, with different merit thresholds. As such, the selection was not inter se but intra-category. Under the Rules of 1961, merit refers to the order of recommendation within the relevant category of selection. The recommendation from the wait list is not equivalent to that from the main list unless specifically stated by rule, circular, or binding authority.

12. The Supreme Court in Pawan Pratap Singh (supra) has held that retrospective seniority cannot be claimed by a candidate from a wait list, as they are not part of the original selection and are appointed only upon the occurrence of a vacancy. Relevant paragraph is quoted as under : “45. From the above, the legal position with regard to determination of seniority in service can be summarised as follows: (i) The effective date of selection has to be understood in the context of the 21 service rules under which the appointment is made. It may mean the date on which the process of selection starts with the issuance of advertisement or the factum of preparation of the select list, as the case may be. (ii) Inter se seniority in a particular service has to be determined as per the service rules. The date of entry in a particular service or the date of substantive appointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority inter se between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from different sources. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iii) Ordinarily, notional seniority may not be granted from the backdate and if it is done, it must be based on objective considerations and on a valid classification and must be traceable to the statutory rules. (iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. It is so because seniority cannot be given on retrospective basis when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre and by doing so it may adversely affect the employees who have been appointed validly in the meantime.”

13. It is further an admitted fact that the petitioner was appointed 22 only on 03.08.1995, more than a year after respondent No. 3 was appointed on 06.05.1994. His name was not part of the main merit list and his appointment was conditional upon a vacancy arising due to non-joining by a main list candidate. This administrative contingency reinforces that the petitioner was not originally "recommended" in the sense intended under Rule 12(1) (a), but was only recommended later due to subsequent vacancy. The attempt made by petitioner to claim seniority on the basis of higher marks fails to consider that the marks must be assessed within the framework of the respective category of candidate. The marks secured by a Scheduled Tribe candidate are not directly comparable to those secured by a General category candidate due to distinct reservation criteria, relaxed cut-offs, and category- wise merit determination. It is well settled that such cross- category comparisons for purposes of seniority are impermissible.

14. This Court also finds merit in the objection raised by the respondents regarding delay. The petitioner was appointed in

1995. The gradation list, reflecting respondent No. 3 as senior, was published as early as 1998. The petitioner first raised a representation only in 2011, nearly 16 years later, and filed the present writ petition only in 2018. By that time, respondent No. 3 23 had already earned promotions and served in higher posts.

15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amrit Lal Berry vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi & Others, reported in (1975) 4 SCC 714 has held as under : “17. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has relied on Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : (1970) 2 SCR 697] where, because rights of persons who had benefited from allegedly illegal seniority rules for a long time would be disturbed, this Court dismissed a petition under Article 32 on the ground of inordinate delay in seeking relief. This Court said there (at p. 712): [SCC p. 97, paras 32, 33] “It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and 24 promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years.”

16. In the matter of Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors. vs. State of Orrisa & Ors., reported in (2010) 12 SCC 471, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “18. The question of entertaining the petition disputing the long-standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [(1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] considered the effect of delay in challenging the promotion and seniority list and held that any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding seniority, rank and promotion which have accrued to them during the intervening period. A party should approach the court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, particularly in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , wherein it has been observed that the principle on which the court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches or delay, is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay. 25 The Court further observed as under : (Tilokchand case [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , SCC p. 115, para 7) “7. … The party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court.”

19. This Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar case [(1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] also placed reliance upon its earlier judgment of the Constitution Bench in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] , wherein it has been observed as under : (Rabindranath Bose case [(1970) 1 SCC 84] , SCC p. 97, para 33) “33. … It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years.”

20. In R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon [(1982) 1 SCC 379 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 77] this Court considered all aspects of limitation, delay and laches in filing the writ petition in respect of inter se seniority of the employees. The Court referred to its earlier judgment in State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 26 1006] , wherein it has been observed that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution can be measured. The Court observed as under : (R.S. Makashi case [(1982) 1 SCC 379 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 77] , SCC pp. 398-400, paras 28 & 30) “28. … ‘33. … we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. …’ [Ed. : As observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84, p. 97, para 33.] ***

30. … The petitioners have not furnished any valid explanation whatever for the inordinate delay on their part in approaching the court with the challenge against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of 1968. … We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by 27 the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of 22- 3-1968 ought to have been rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay and laches and the writ petition insofar as it related to the prayer for quashing the said Government Resolution should have been dismissed.”

21. The issue of challenging the seniority list, which continued to be in existence for a long time, was again considered by this Court in K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh [(1986) 4 SCC 531 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 6 : AIR 1986 SC 2086] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 532 & 536, paras 2 & 7) “2. … A government servant who is appointed to any post ordinarily should at least after a period of 3 or 4 years of his appointment be allowed to attend to the duties attached to his post peacefully and without any sense of insecurity. … ***

7. … Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst the government servants created by writ petitions filed after several years as in this case. It is essential that anyone who feels aggrieved by the seniority assigned to him should approach the court as early as possible as otherwise in addition to the 28 creation of a sense of insecurity in the minds of the government servants there would also be administrative complications and difficulties. … In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches.” (emphasis added)

22. While deciding K.R. Mudgal case [(1986) 4 SCC 531 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 6 : AIR 1986 SC 2086] , this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Malcom Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India [(1976) 1 SCC 599 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 115 : AIR 1975 SC 1269] , wherein it had been observed as under : (Cecil D'Souza case [(1976) 1 SCC 599 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 115 : AIR 1975 SC 1269] , SCC p. 602, para 9) “9. Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapses of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many 29 years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.” (emphasis added)

23. In B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab [(1998) 2 SCC 523 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 611] this Court while deciding the similar issue reiterated the same view, observing as under : (SCC p. 526, para 7) “7. … It is well settled that in service matters the question of seniority should not be reopened in such situations after the lapse of a reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition.” (emphasis added)

24. In Dayaram A. Gursahani v. State of Maharashtra [(1984) 3 SCC 36 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 341] , while reiterating the 30 similar view this Court held that in absence of satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay of 8-9 years in questioning under Article 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the seniority and promotion assigned to other employee could not be entertained.

25. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [(1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22] this Court considered the case where the petition was filed after a lapse of fourteen years challenging the promotion. However, this Court held that the aggrieved person must approach the Court expeditiously for relief and it is not permissible to put forward stale claim. The Court observed as under : (SCC p. 154, para 2) “2. … A person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion.” The Court further observed that it was not that there was any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor was it that there could never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after certain length of time. It would be a sound and wise exercise of jurisdiction for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief 31 and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claim and try to unsettle settled matters.