Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 ASHOK SAHU Digitally signed by ASHOK SAHU Date: 2025.05.08 11:54:25 +0530 2025:CGHC:20835-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1334 of 2017 {Arising out of judgment dated 28.06.2017 passed in Sessions Trial No.102/2015 by the learned First Additional Judge of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur} Anandram Yadav @ Anand Yadav, S/o. Late Ledga Yadav, Aged About 45 Years, R/o. Village Bithiya, Police Station Kharora, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station Kharora, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant For Respondent : :
Legal Reasoning
prima facie case ” (foundational facts) in 49. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the case or charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. 50. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the accused. 51. The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. 52. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case to make Section 106 of the Evidence Act applicable, we should refer to the decision of this Court in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad and ors. (2000) 8 SCC 382, wherein this Court has observed in paras 36 and 37 respectively as under: 9 “36. In this context we may profitably utilize the legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows: “When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” (Emphasis supplied) 53. We should also look into the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Gulam Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 311, wherein this Court made the following observations in paragraph 24 as under: “24. Even otherwise, in our view, this is a case where Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply. Krishnanand Chaudhary was brutally assaulted and then a chhura-blow was given on the chest. Thus chhura-blow was given after Bijoy Chaudhary had said “he is still alive and should be killed”. The appellants then carried away the body. What happened thereafter to Krishnanand Chaudhary is especially within the knowledge of the appellants. The appellants have given no explanation as to what they did after they took away the body. Krishnanand Chaudhary has not been since seen alive. In the absence of an explanation, and considering the fact that the appellants were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed the child of the 10 family of the appellants, it was for the appellants to have explained what they did with him after they took him away. When the abductors withheld that information from the court, there is every justification for drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy. Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the Court to draw a different inference. We, therefore, see no substance in this submission of Mr. Mishra.” (Emphasis supplied) 54. Cases are frequently coming before the courts where the husband, due to strained marital relations and doubt as regards the character, has gone to the extent of killing his wife. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, like in the case at hand, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. 55. If an offence takes place inside the four walls of a house and in such circumstances where the accused has all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at a time and in the circumstances of his choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. It is to resolve such a situation that Section 106 of the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this Court observed that a Judge does not 11 preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. The Court proceeded to observe that a Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character, which is almost impossible to be led, or at any rate, extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.” As such, in view of Anees (supra), the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. by applying Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. 13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further in the matter of Nagendra Sah (supra) held as under: - “19. In this case, as mentioned above, neither the prosecution witnesses have deposed to that effect nor any other material has been placed on record to show that the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was strained in any manner. Moreover, the appellant was not the only person residing in the house where the incident took place and it is brought on record that the parents of the appellant were also present on the date of the incident in the house. The fact that other members of the family of the appellant were present shows that there could be another hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded. Therefore, it can be said that the facts established do not rule out the existence of any other hypothesis. The facts established cannot be said to be consistent only with one hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant. 12 *** *** *** 22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 14. Now, coming to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that admittedly in the house of the appellant & deceased, apart from them, eye-witnesses Shriram (PW-1), Narayan Yadav (PW-2) & Jairam (PW-6), who are the sons of the appellant & deceased, were also present. The presence of PW-1, PW-2 & PW-6 would show that there could be another hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded. Therefore, it can be said that the facts established do not rule out the existence of any other hypothesis. The facts established cannot be said to be consistent only with one hypothesis of the guilt 13 of the appellant. As such, the prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the offence in question and, as such, the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. 15.
Arguments
Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, Panel Lawyer (Division Bench) Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Judgment on Board (07.05.2025) 2 Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 28.06.2017, passed by the learned First Additional Judge of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur in Sessions Trial No.102/2015, by which the sole appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine amount, 1 month’s additional rigorous imprisonment. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, in the intervening night of 16/17.02.2015, the appellant herein assaulted his wife Laxmi Yadav (now deceased) by Adze (Basula), by which she suffered grievous injuries and died; thereby, the offence has been committed. The matter was reported to the police, pursuant to which, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-1, Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P-10, Inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-4 and dead body of deceased Laxmi was subjected to post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr. Snigdha Jain (PW- 18), who proved the post-mortem report vide Ex.P-33, according to which, cause of death was stated to be head 3 injury caused by hard & blunt force impact and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-18), the weapon of offence i.e. Adze (Basula) was seized vide Ex.P-20, which was sent for chemical examination to FSL along-with the other seized articles, but as per the FSL report (Ex.P-32), no blood was found on the seized Adze (Basula). After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence before the jurisdictional criminal court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated. 3. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses and exhibited 36 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 4. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him for life 4 imprisonment against which the present appeal has been preferred. 5. Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act has wrongly been invoked by the trial Court, as admittedly Shriram (PW-1), Narayan Yadav (PW-2) & Jairam (PW-6) were present in the house of the appellant & deceased and, therefore, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar 1 , the appellant could not have been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. As such, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is liable to be set aside and the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. 6. Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offence and, as such, the appellant is not entitled for acquittal and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 1 (2021) 10 SCC 725 5 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. The first question, for consideration, as to whether the death of deceased Laxmi Yadav was homicidal in nature has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the post-mortem report Ex.P-33, proved by Dr. Snigdha Jain (PW- 18), according to which, cause of death was stated to be head injury caused by hard & blunt force impact and death was homicidal in nature, which in our considered opinion is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 9. The eye-witnesses Shriram (PW-1), Narayan Yadav (PW-2) & Jairam (PW-6) have turned hostile, they have not supported the case of the prosecution though they were present in the house of the appellant & deceased on the date and time of offence, but the trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and proceeded to convict the appellant. 10. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, which states as under:- 6 “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 11. The said provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 12. In the matter of Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier decision on the point of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, have held in paragraphs 47 to 55 as under:- “47. But Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no application to cases where the fact in question, having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable 2. 2024 SCC Online SC 757 7 of being known not only to the accused but also to others, if they happened to be present when it took place. The intention underlying the act or conduct of any individual is seldom a matter which can be conclusively established; it is indeed only known to the person in whose mind the intention is conceived. Therefore, if the prosecution has established that the character and circumstance of an act suggest that it was done with a particular intention, then under illustration (a) to this section, it may be assumed that he had that intention, unless he proves the contrary. 48. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence, which if believed by the court, would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused, if in a position, should go forward with counter-vailing evidence, if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might arise therefrom. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may, therefore, as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution [See: Balvir Singh 8 v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC OnLine 1261] ii. What is “ the context of Section 106 of the Evidence Act?
Decision
In view of the above, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.06.2017 is hereby set aside. The appellant stands acquitted giving him benefit of doubt from the charge framed against him for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. The appellant is already on bail, he need not surrender; however, his bail bond shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. In the result, this criminal appeal is allowed. Let a certified copy of this judgment along-with the original record be transmitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith for necessary information & action, if any. 16. 17. Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Ashok Judge Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge