Smt. Chhaya Singh v. Bodri, Bilaspur

30 - Smt. Shyamwati Maravi I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balod Chhattisgarh. 31 - Smt. Sushma Lakra I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surajpur Chhattisgarh. 32 - Anil Prabhat Minj I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhamtari Chhattisgarh. 33 - Deepak Kumar Koshley I Civil Judge Class-I And Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh Chhattisgarh. 34 - Bhupendra Kumar Vasnikar I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanker Chhattisgarh. 35 - Damarudhar Chouhan I Civil Judge Class-I And Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jashpur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioner : Mr. T.K. Jha & Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, Advocates For Respondents No. 1 to 3 : Mr. Ashish Surana, Advocate 4 For Respondents No. 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 22, 29 & 30 : Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Advocate For Respondents No. 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25 & 34 : Mr. Gourav Singhal, Advocate For Respondent No. 9 : Mr. Aman Kesharwani, Advocate For Respondent No. 19 : Mr. Raja Sharma & Ms. Aditi Parakh, Advocates For Respondent No. 28 : Ms. Smriti Ekka, Advocate ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad CAV Order

1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the action of the respondents in deferring her promotion from the post of Civil Judge Class-II (Junior Division) to Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide order dated 14.08.2014 and subsequently denying her restoration of original seniority despite her later promotion vide order dated

12.08.2016. The petitioner further seeks grant of consequential seniority and all attendant service benefits. The petitioner has also prayed for appropriate directions to the respondents to consider her case for further promotion to the post of District Judge (Entry Level) by restoring her rightful seniority in accordance with the applicable service rules.

2. Subject matter in brief is that the petitioner was initially appointed as Civil Judge Class-II (Junior Division) on 26.12.2008 5 and was posted at District Court, Durg. In terms of Rule 5(2) read with Schedule-II of the Rules of 2006, the petitioner had completed the requisite qualifying service of five years with unblemished Annual Confidential Reports and without any adverse remarks, thereby becoming entitled for consideration for promotion to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division). However, vide promotion order dated 14.08.2014, the petitioner’s case was kept in the category of deferred candidates, whereas her juniors were granted promotion. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 15.04.2015 seeking grant of promotion and consequential benefits, but neither the said representation was decided nor was any communication made regarding its outcome. Subsequently, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide order dated 12.08.2016, though she was denied her original seniority despite the fact that her promotion had merely been deferred and she was never declared unfit. According to the petitioner, under Rule 12(D) of the C.G. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961, she was entitled to restoration of her original seniority, particularly when similarly situated judicial officers had been granted such benefit by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 17.05.2006. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to the next higher scale/post of Chief Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 6

02.07.2019, whereas her batchmates had already secured promotion to the post of Additional District Judge nearly two years earlier. It is further averred that during her posting as Civil Judge Class-I at Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa, certain adverse remarks and grading of “D” and “E” were recorded against her by the concerned District Judge in an arbitrary and mala fide manner, though subsequently the Hon’ble High Court was pleased to upgrade the Grade “E” to Grade “D”. The petitioner apprehends that despite availability of approximately 16 promotional posts of Additional District Judge in the near future, her present placement at Serial No. 23 in the seniority list may again deprive her of timely promotion on account of denial of original seniority.

3. Following reliefs have been prayed by the petitioner by way of this petition:- “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly allow this petition and call for the entire record of the case.

10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to allow the petition and direct the competent authority to restore the seniority of the petitioner from the date her batch mates (year 2008) were given promotion vide order dated

14.08.2014.

10.3 Deleted as per Hon’ble Court order dated 04.12.2025.

10.4 That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be 7 pleased to allow this petition and grant all the consequential benefits.”

4. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the case are that the petitioner was selected and appointed as Civil Judge Class-II (Junior Division) in the year 2008, having secured 14th position in the merit list amongst 60 selected candidates. Pursuant to such selection, the petitioner was appointed on 26.12.2008 and joined service at the District & Sessions Court, Durg. The service conditions of the petitioner are governed by the Chhattisgarh Lower Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,

2006. During the course of service, the petitioner discharged her judicial duties with sincerity, honesty and devotion, on account whereof she was confirmed in service by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 01.09.2012 maintaining her original merit position. After completion of five years of service as Civil Judge Class-II (Junior Division), the petitioner became entitled for consideration for promotion to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) under Rule 5(2) read with Schedule-II of the Rules of 2006. The petitioner’s ACRs for the relevant period were unblemished and there existed no adverse remarks against her. The petitioner consistently secured “C” grading from the year 2009-10 to 2012-13 and “B” grading in the year 2013-14. During her posting at Durg, one complaint was made against the petitioner by the then 8 Superintendent of Police in relation to judicial proceedings initiated on a complaint filed by one Virendra Kurre under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., arising out of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The petitioner, while functioning as the Presiding Officer, had passed judicial orders in accordance with law directing registration of FIR against the concerned officials. On the basis of said complaint, when an explanation was sought, the petitioner duly submitted her explanation to the said complaint on

04.03.2013. Thereafter, no communication, departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and, therefore, she bona fidely believed that the matter stood closed. Thereafter, the Hon’ble High Court issued promotion order dated

14.08.2014 promoting members of the 2008 batch from the post of Civil Judge Class-II (Junior Division) to Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division). In the said order, 45 judicial officers were promoted, 5 officers including the petitioner were kept in the category of “deferred”, whereas 3 officers were declared unfit. At the relevant point of time, the petitioner had no knowledge regarding the reasons for deferment and was not even aware of the implications of such deferment. Aggrieved by the said action, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 15.04.2015 seeking consideration of her promotion and grant of consequential benefits, however, the said representation remained undecided and no communication was ever made to her regarding the same. After 9 nearly two years, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide order dated 12.08.2016 and was posted at Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa. However, despite the fact that her case had merely been deferred and she was never declared unfit, the petitioner was denied restoration of her original seniority. As per Sub Rule 12(D) of the C.G. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961, an employee whose case was deferred and who is subsequently found fit is entitled to restoration of original seniority from the date his or her immediate junior was promoted. Denial of such benefit to the petitioner resulted in loss of seniority and adversely affected her future promotional prospects. Thereafter, the petitioner again submitted a representation dated

09.11.2017 seeking grant of original seniority and consequential benefits. However, the same came to be rejected vide memorandum dated 21.02.2018 by a non-speaking and unreasoned order communicated through the Registrar General. During her posting as Civil Judge Class-I at Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa, adverse remarks along with grading “D” were communicated to the petitioner for the period from 01.04.2016 to

31.03.2017. In the subsequent year also, the petitioner received adverse remarks along with grading “E” for the period from

01.04.2017 to 31.03.2018. The petitioner submitted detailed representations against the said adverse entries and grading. 10 Subsequently, the Hon’ble High Court was pleased to upgrade the grading from “E” to “D”, though the prayer for expunging the adverse remarks was rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate vide order dated

02.07.2019 and was posted at Surajpur and later transferred to Gariyaband. From the year 2014 till date, no complaint or disciplinary proceedings have ever been initiated against the petitioner and her subsequent ACR gradings have remained satisfactory, including “B” gradings in later years. In the year 2021, vacancies for promotion to the post of District Judge (Entry Level) under Rule 5(1)(a) and Rule 5(1)(b) of the Chhattisgarh Higher Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2006 were notified. However, due to denial of original seniority, the petitioner was placed at Serial No. 23 in the seniority list of eligible judicial officers and consequently could neither secure promotion nor effectively compete for selection. Similarly, in the eligible list issued in the year 2022 for promotion to the post of District Judge (Entry Level), the petitioner was placed at Serial No. 14 and her chances of promotion again became remote solely because of denial of restoration of her original seniority. The petitioner, despite suffering continuous prejudice in service career, initially lacked the courage to challenge the actions of her own department as she genuinely apprehended that pursuing legal remedies against the 11 department may further adversely affect her future promotional prospects. However, in view of recurring prejudice and continuous denial of legitimate service benefits, the petitioner has now been constrained to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by filing the present petition.

5. Mr. T.K. Jha & Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner submit that the petitioner had an unblemished service record till the year 2014 and there existed neither any adverse ACR nor any departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceedings against her. Despite such clean service record, her promotion to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) was deferred vide order dated

14.08.2014 without assigning any reason, which action is arbitrary, unjust and contrary to the provisions of Sub Rule 12(D) of the C.G. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961. It is further submitted that when the petitioner was subsequently promoted vide order dated 12.08.2016, she was legally entitled to restoration of her original seniority in terms of Rule 12(D), however the same was illegally denied, thereby causing serious prejudice to her future promotional prospects. Learned counsel further submits that similarly situated officers, including one Shri Pradeep Kumar Shrivastava, who had earlier been deferred, were granted restoration of original seniority by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 17.05.2006, and therefore denial of the same benefit to the 12 petitioner is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is also contended that during her posting at Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa, the petitioner was facing considerable personal and medical difficulties, including post- delivery health complications while simultaneously taking care of her two minor children aged about six years and six months respectively. Despite such circumstances, the petitioner discharged her judicial duties with utmost sincerity and dedication and maintained satisfactory judicial performance, including good disposal of old civil and criminal cases, Lok Adalat matters and legal aid activities conducted pursuant to directions of the Hon’ble High Court. It is submitted that the adverse gradings of “D” for the year 2016-17 and “E” for the year 2017-18, later upgraded to “D” by the Hon’ble High Court, were arbitrary and mala fide in nature and not reflective of her actual performance and integrity.

6. Learned counsel submit that due to denial of original seniority, the petitioner’s position in the gradation list drastically fell from 14th rank in her batch to 47th rank and presently she stands much lower in the gradation list than what she would otherwise have occupied. Such loss of seniority has seriously affected her service career, morale and chances of promotion to the Higher Judicial Service. It is argued that seniority is a valuable civil right having direct nexus with promotional avenues and service benefits. In support of the 13 aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat AIR 2010 SC 1714 wherein it has been held that seniority is a vital civil right affecting the future career progression of a government servant and that unsettling seniority causes bitterness, resentment and adversely impacts efficiency in administration. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 2020 (1) SCCD 272 (SC) wherein it has been held that disciplinary action against a judicial officer cannot be initiated merely because erroneous judicial orders have been passed unless there exists material to show that such orders were passed for extraneous considerations. Learned counsel submit that the complaint made against the petitioner arose purely from discharge of judicial functions and no departmental enquiry or misconduct was ever established against her.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submit that the petitioner was denied promotion without there being any plausible or justifiable reason, despite being fully eligible and entitled for promotion to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) when the cases of other similarly situated judicial officers were considered and promotions were granted vide order dated

14.08.2014. It is submitted that the petitioner’s case was merely 14 deferred by the Departmental Promotion Committee on the ground that a complaint had been submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Durg. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was called upon to submit her explanation and she duly furnished a detailed reply to the allegations levelled against her. Thereafter, neither any departmental enquiry nor any disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. Thus, the very basis on which her case was deferred stood completely diluted and ceased to survive. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was subsequently promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide order dated 12.08.2016. From the said promotion order itself, it is evident that the petitioner was found fit and suitable for promotion. According to learned counsel, once the petitioner was ultimately found fit and promoted, there remained no justification for denying her promotion from the date on which her batchmates and other similarly situated officers were promoted, namely 14.08.2014. It is contended that the petitioner was, in fact, entitled to promotion from the said date itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the objection raised by the respondents that the petitioner never challenged the rejection of her representation seeking promotion and restoration of seniority at par with other similarly situated judicial officers is misconceived. It is submitted that the representation was never decided on merits and no 15 reasons whatsoever were assigned while rejecting the same. The order merely states that the representation dated 09.11.2017 seeking grant of original seniority stood rejected after due consideration. Such a cryptic and non-speaking order, devoid of any reasons, cannot be treated as a valid adjudication on merits and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be non-suited on the ground that the said order was not separately challenged.

8. Learned counsel further submit that the objection regarding delay and laches is also unsustainable. The petitioner had been continuously pursuing her claim by submitting representations before the competent authorities seeking promotion and restoration of seniority at par with those officers who were promoted vide order dated 14.08.2014. It is argued that matters relating to promotion and seniority have recurring civil consequences throughout the tenure of service and, therefore, constitute a continuing cause of action. It is further submitted that owing to the intervening Covid-19 pandemic and certain personal difficulties, the petitioner could not approach this Court at an earlier point of time. However, the same cannot be a ground to deny her legitimate service benefits. Learned counsel argue that the sole reason for deferment of the petitioner's case by the Departmental Promotion Committee was the complaint made by the Superintendent of Police, Durg. Had any departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceedings been initiated 16 against the petitioner pursuant to the said complaint, the matter would have stood on a different footing. However, admittedly, no action whatsoever was taken on the said complaint and no enquiry was ever instituted. According to learned counsel, this clearly demonstrates that the respondents were satisfied with the explanation furnished by the petitioner and did not find any substance warranting further action. Consequently, the complaint could not have been relied upon to permanently deprive the petitioner of her rightful promotion and consequential seniority. In the aforesaid circumstances, learned counsel submit that once the petitioner was ultimately promoted in the year 2016 and no adverse action was ever initiated against her, she is entitled to be treated at par with the officers who were promoted on 14.08.2014. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition be allowed and the petitioner be granted promotion notionally with effect from 14.08.2014, along with restoration of her original seniority and all consequential service benefits, including consideration for further promotional avenues on that basis.

9. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370 to contend that independence of the judiciary and protection of honest judicial officers is an essential constitutional mandate under Article 235 of the Constitution of India 17 and that judicial officers should not be victimized on the basis of motivated or frivolous complaints arising out of judicial orders passed in discharge of official duties. Learned counsel therefore submits that the action of the respondents in deferring the petitioner’s promotion, denying restoration of original seniority and recording arbitrary adverse remarks is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and deserves to be interfered with by this Hon’ble Court. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgments in the matters of Krishnadatt Awasthy vs. State of M.P. (2025) 7 SCC 545, Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. vs. Union of India (2023) 13 SCC 401, S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594, Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496, Salik Ram Chandrakar vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 11503, Pushpa Kiran Bhagat vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 13914, Mahendra Kumar Shrivastava vs. Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited 2025 OnLine Chh 11506, Union of India vs, K.V. Jankiraman (1991) 4 SCC 109, Shatruhan Prasad Kurrey vs. The State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. SLP(C) Diary No. 33707/2022 and Union of India vs. Sangram Keshari Nayak (2007) 6 SCC 704.

10. Per contra, Mr. Ashish Surana, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 vehemently opposes the petition and 18 submits that the petitioner is not entitled to claim promotion with effect from 14.08.2014, i.e., the date on which other eligible judicial officers were promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division). It is submitted that at the relevant point of time, the case of the petitioner was specifically deferred by the Departmental Promotion Committee on account of a complaint received from the Superintendent of Police, Durg. The deferment was, therefore, based upon a conscious decision taken by the competent authority while considering the suitability of eligible officers for promotion. Learned counsel submits that although no departmental enquiry was ultimately initiated and no disciplinary action came to be taken against the petitioner on the basis of the said complaint, the fact remains that the petitioner was not found suitable for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee in the promotion exercise conducted in the year 2014. The petitioner accepted the said position and did not challenge either the decision of the Departmental Promotion Committee or the promotion order dated

14.08.2014 before any competent forum at the relevant point of time. It is further contended that the petitioner was subsequently promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) in the year 2016 and thereafter continued to avail the benefits flowing from such promotion without raising any legal challenge regarding her earlier non-promotion. According to learned counsel, the 19 acceptance of the subsequent promotion without protest clearly indicates that the petitioner had acquiesced in the decision taken by the authorities and had accepted her position in the service hierarchy. Having accepted the subsequent promotion and all consequential benefits, the petitioner cannot now seek to reopen issues which had attained finality long ago. Learned counsel further submits that the present petition suffers from gross delay and laches. The promotion order sought to be indirectly questioned was issued on 14.08.2014, whereas the petitioner has approached this Court after an inordinate lapse of several years. During this intervening period, not only was the petitioner promoted in the year 2016, but several other service-related developments and promotions also took place. Entertaining the petition at such a belated stage would unsettle the settled seniority position and adversely affect the rights of several officers who are not before this Court. It is also argued that the petitioner had submitted a representation seeking restoration of original seniority and grant of promotion from the year 2014, which representation came to be rejected by the competent authority vide communication issued in the year 2018. Despite rejection of her claim, the petitioner neither challenged the said order nor questioned its legality before any Court of law within a reasonable period. Consequently, the order rejecting her representation has attained finality and cannot now be 20 indirectly assailed through the present proceedings. Learned counsel submits that merely because the order rejecting the representation may not contain elaborate reasons, the petitioner was nevertheless required to challenge the same if she intended to dispute the decision of the authorities. Having failed to do so, she cannot be permitted to circumvent the effect of the said order by filing the present petition after several years. It is, therefore, argued that the petitioner is guilty of acquiescence, waiver and delay, and having accepted her subsequent promotions as well as the seniority position assigned to her, she is estopped from claiming retrospective promotion from 14.08.2014. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, learned counsel submits that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

11. Mr. Gourav Singhal, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25 and 34 submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold on account of gross delay and laches. It is contended that the petitioner has challenged actions pertaining to the years 2014, 2016 and 2018 by filing the present petition only in the year 2023 without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay. According to learned counsel, the petitioner is a judicial officer well acquainted with legal remedies and, therefore, cannot 21 seek indulgence after allowing her alleged grievance to remain dormant for several years. Learned counsel further submits that so far as the challenge to the Annual Confidential Reports for the years 2016-17 and 2017-18 is concerned, the petitioner has directly approached this Court without first availing the appropriate remedy before the competent authority for seeking upgradation of the gradings. In the absence of any material demonstrating that the petitioner had pursued the prescribed departmental remedy, the challenge to the ACR gradings is premature and not maintainable. It is also argued that the writ petition suffers from misjoinder of causes of action. The claim relating to restoration of seniority and grant of promotion from the year 2014 constitutes a distinct cause of action, whereas the challenge to the ACR gradings for the years 2016-17 and 2017-18 gives rise to a separate and independent cause of action. Both claims cannot be conveniently adjudicated in a single writ petition and, therefore, the petition is misconceived. It is accordingly prayed that the writ petition, being devoid of merit and suffering from delay, non-maintainability and misjoinder of causes of action, deserves to be dismissed.

12. Ms. Smriti Ekka, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 28 adopts the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and further submits that the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the grounds of delay, laches and 22 acquiescence. It is contended that the petitioner seeks restoration of seniority and consequential promotion from 14.08.2014, whereas the present petition has been filed only in the year 2023 after an unexplained delay of nearly nine years. Despite being aware that her promotion had been deferred in 2014 and that she was subsequently promoted in 2016, the petitioner neither challenged the deferment nor the promotion order dated

14.08.2014. It is further submitted that her representation seeking restoration of seniority was rejected on 21.02.2018 and the said order was also never challenged, thereby attaining finality. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner accepted her subsequent promotions, including promotions to higher posts in the judicial service, without protest and, therefore, is deemed to have acquiesced in the seniority position assigned to her. It is argued that entertaining the petition at this stage would unsettle the settled seniority of several judicial officers and adversely affect rights which have crystallized over the years. It is further contended that the petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties, as any direction regarding retrospective seniority would directly affect the service rights and promotional prospects of several officers who have not been impleaded in the present proceedings. Learned counsel also submits that retrospective seniority cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The petitioner was considered by the 23 Departmental Promotion Committee in the year 2014 but was not found fit for promotion at that stage, whereafter she was promoted in the year 2016. Since promotion is not a vested right and only consideration for promotion can be claimed, no legal right of the petitioner can be said to have been infringed. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has approached this Court only after failing to secure further promotional benefits and is seeking alteration of a long-settled seniority position for consequential advantages. It is lastly contended that Rule 12(D) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 does not confer an automatic right to restoration of seniority and the competent authority was justified in assigning seniority to the petitioner from the date she was found fit and promoted in the year 2016. On these grounds, it is prayed that the writ petition be dismissed.

13. She has placed reliance upon the judgments in the matters of Vijay Kumar Kaul vs. Union of India (2012) 7 SCC 610, Union of India vs. Chaman Rana (2018) 5 SCC 798, Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal vs. Mamta Bisht & Ors. [AIR 2010 SC 2613, Jitendra Naidu vs. Union of India & Ors (WPS No.1115/2017), Mrs. Lata Dadsena & Anr. vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.(WPS No.4027/2023), State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Akhouri Sachindra Narth & Ors. 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334, 24 Chandu Lal Thakur vs. State of Chhattisgarh (WPS No. 90/2016) and Kumar Lal Uikey vs. Chhattisgarh State Power Holding Co. Ltd. & Ors. (WPS No.583/2014).

14. Mr. Raja Sharma & Ms. Aditi Parakh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 19 oppose the writ petition and submits that the same is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay, laches, acquiescence and finality. It is contended that the petition has been filed in the year 2023 seeking to challenge matters relating to promotion and seniority arising in the years 2014, 2016 and 2018. Despite being fully aware that her case was deferred by the Departmental Promotion Committee in the year 2014 and that she was subsequently promoted in the year 2016, the petitioner never challenged either the deferment order or the promotion granted to her batchmates. It is further submitted that the petitioner's representation seeking restoration of original seniority was rejected on 21.02.2018 and the said order was also never assailed, thereby attaining finality. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on various judgments cited in the written submissions filed on behalf of respondent No. 19. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner, after accepting her promotion as Civil Judge Class-I in the year 2016 and subsequent promotions granted thereafter, cannot now seek to challenge the very process from which she has derived benefits. The conduct of the petitioner 25 clearly attracts the principles of acquiescence, waiver and approbate and reprobate. It is argued that any interference at this stage would seriously prejudice the rights of several judicial officers whose seniority and promotional prospects have crystallized over the years. It is also contended that the relief sought by the petitioner for grant of retrospective seniority from 14.08.2014 is legally impermissible inasmuch as on the said date she was admittedly not borne in the promoted cadre and had not been found fit for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee. According to learned counsel, seniority can flow only from a valid promotion and assumption of charge in the promoted post and cannot be granted retrospectively so as to unsettle the settled rights of others. Learned counsel further submits that Rule 12(D) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 does not confer any automatic or vested right upon the petitioner to claim restoration of original seniority. The said provision operates only in the realm of determination of seniority after promotion and cannot be invoked to reopen or nullify the decision of the Departmental Promotion Committee deferring the petitioner's promotion in the year 2014. It is argued that the petitioner is seeking to indirectly challenge a decision which has long attained finality. 26

15. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, inter alia: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152, State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh, (1986) 4 SCC 531, H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301, Shiba Shankar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 47, Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25, State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, (2014) 15 SCC 144, Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715, Government of West Bengal v. Dr. Amal Satpathi, 2024 INSC 906, Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu v. State of Orissa, 1995 Supp (3) SCR 419, Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 604; Ajay Kumar Shukla v. Arvind Rai, (2022) 12 SCC 579; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, (2001) 2 SCC 276, R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335; Ashok Ram Parhad v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 311; Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 and All India Judges' Association (3) v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247. On the aforesaid grounds, and placing reliance upon the various aforesaid judgments, learned counsel for respondent No. 19 submits that the writ petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 27

16. Mr. Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 22, 29 & 30 submits that the writ petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed. It is submitted that the petitioner, after an inordinate delay of nearly nine years, seeks to unsettle a long-settled position of promotion and inter se seniority which has attained finality and has been acted upon by several officers whose rights have crystallized. The petitioner was duly considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee in 2014 and her case was deferred in accordance with the applicable rules; she was subsequently promoted in 2016 and cannot now seek retrospective promotion from 14.08.2014. It is further submitted that the petition suffers from gross delay and laches, acquiescence and waiver, as the petitioner accepted her promotion in 2016 without protest and never challenged the 2014 or 2018 orders within a reasonable time. Entertaining such a belated claim would unsettle settled seniority and prejudice third- party rights of officers not before this Court. It is also submitted that the petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties. It is further contended that Rule 12(D) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 does not confer any automatic right to retrospective seniority from an earlier date of consideration, and seniority can only flow from valid 28 promotion and assumption of charge. On these grounds, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

17. Mr. Aman Kesharwani, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 9 submits that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed as being devoid of merit and suffering from gross delay and laches. It is submitted that the petitioner seeks to challenge the settled position of promotion and inter se seniority after an inordinate lapse of time, thereby unsettling the rights of several judicial officers who have been functioning on the basis of the promotion order dated 14.08.2014 and subsequent service developments. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner, having been duly considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee and having been subsequently promoted in the year 2016, cannot claim retrospective promotion or restoration of seniority from

14.08.2014, as such a claim is not recognized under the applicable service jurisprudence. It is further submitted that the writ petition is barred by acquiescence and waiver, as the petitioner accepted her promotion without protest and failed to challenge the relevant orders within a reasonable period. It is also contended that entertaining the present petition would adversely affect third-party rights of officers who are not before this Hon’ble Court and would lead to unsettling of a long-standing and settled seniority position. 29 On these grounds, learned counsel submits that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record carefully.

19. Upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the petitioner was not promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) in the promotion exercise undertaken in the year 2014 solely on account of a complaint submitted by the then Superintendent of Police, Durg. The Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC), instead of rejecting the petitioner's candidature, merely deferred consideration of her case on the basis of the said complaint. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the complaint, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner and she submitted her explanation thereto. However, thereafter no departmental enquiry was initiated, no disciplinary proceedings were instituted, and no adverse order was ever passed against the petitioner. Thus, the complaint never culminated into any finding of misconduct or any action prejudicial to the petitioner.

20. It is significant to note that the DPC did not declare the petitioner unfit for promotion. Her case was only kept in a deferred category. Subsequently, vide order dated 12.08.2016, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division). Nothing has been brought on record to demonstrate that between 30 the years 2014 and 2016 any new material emerged in favour of the petitioner or that any circumstance which rendered her unsuitable in 2014 had ceased to exist by 2016. Rather, the record indicates that the petitioner was promoted on the basis of the same service profile and ACRs which were available at the time when her case was initially considered. This clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was otherwise fit and eligible for promotion when her batchmates were promoted in the year 2014. The only impediment was the pendency of a complaint which ultimately resulted in no adverse action whatsoever. In such circumstances, the deferment of her case could at best have been temporary and precautionary in nature. Once the complaint did not culminate in any disciplinary proceedings, enquiry, punishment or adverse finding, the deferment ceased to have any legal significance. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer adverse service consequences merely because her case was temporarily deferred pending consideration of a complaint that ultimately proved inconsequential.

21. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner's claim is liable to be rejected because her representation stood rejected and the said rejection order was never challenged also does not merit acceptance. A perusal of the communication dated 21.02.2018 reveals that the representation 31 was rejected by a cryptic order merely stating that upon consideration the claim was not found fit to be accepted. No reasons whatsoever have been assigned. It is now well settled that reasons are the heartbeat of every administrative or quasi-judicial decision and ensure transparency, fairness and accountability in decision-making. An order affecting valuable service rights, such as seniority and promotional prospects, cannot be sustained when it is completely devoid of reasons.

22. Further, the claim raised by the petitioner pertains to promotion and consequential seniority during the subsistence of service. Such issues have recurring civil consequences affecting future promotional avenues and service benefits. Therefore, the objection regarding delay and laches cannot be examined in a purely technical manner, particularly when the petitioner continues to suffer the consequences of the impugned action throughout her service career. The subsequent adverse ACR gradings recorded against the petitioner for later years also cannot be relied upon to deny the relief sought in the present petition. The petitioner's claim relates to her entitlement for promotion in the year 2014 and is required to be assessed on the basis of the service record and material which were available at the relevant point of time. Admittedly, the petitioner possessed the requisite eligibility and satisfactory ACRs for consideration to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) when the promotion exercise of 2014 was 32 undertaken.

23. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that once the complaint, which formed the sole basis for deferment of the petitioner's case, did not result in any disciplinary action or adverse finding and the petitioner was subsequently found fit and promoted, the respondents were not justified in allowing the deferment to operate to her detriment for all future purposes. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be denied consideration for consequential service benefits solely on account of such deferment.

24. In the matter of Major General H.M. Singh v. Union of India 2014) 3 SCC 670, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “28. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the non-consideration of the claim of the appellant would violate the fundamental rights vested in him under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The answer to the aforesaid query would be in the affirmative... if the appellant was the senior most serving Major General eligible for consideration, he most definitely had the fundamental right of being considered against the vacancy, and also the fundamental right of being promoted if he was adjudged suitable. Failing which, he would be deprived of his fundamental right of equality before the law and equal protection 33 of the laws extended by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”

25. In the matter of Harpal Singh vs. State of Punjab and others 2026 SCC OnLine P & H 9451, it has been held as under:- “7. The Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar v. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary, (2009) 2 SCT 24, while referring to the issue of delay and laches, had held as follows: “8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (1964 SCC OnLine SC 1 : AIR 1970 SC 769). Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde, etc. [L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 at page 239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts (1967 SCC 34