High Court of Chhattisgarh
Case Details
1 YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2025.05.09 19:53:12 +0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR AFR Order Reserved on : 07.03.2025 Order Delivered on : 08.05.2025 WPS No. 1625 of 2024 Mamta Choudhary W/o Shri Surendra Choudhary Aged About 59 Years R/o Police Line Gharghoda Dist. Raigarh, C.G. --- Petitioner Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Urban Administration And Development Department, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhavan Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Dist. Raipur, C.G. 2 - Deputy Secretary Urban Administration And Development Department Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhavan Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Dist. Raipur, C.G. 3 - Under Secretary Urban Administration And Development Department Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhavan Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Dist. Raipur, C.G. 4 - Director Directorate Of Urban Administration And Development Indrawati Bhawan Block-4, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Dist. Raipur, C.G. 5 - Joint Director Directorate Of Urban Administration And Development Indrawati Bhawan Block-4, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Dist. Raipur, C.G. 6 - Joint Director Office Of The Joint Director Urban Administration And Development, Bilaspur Zone, Bilaspur, C.G. 7 - Chief Municipal Officer Municipal Council Kharsiya, Dist. Raigarh, C.G. --- Respondents 2 WPS No. 5182 of 2024 Mamta Choudhary W/o Shri Surendra Choudhary Aged About 60 Years Presently Posted As In-Charge Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Lailunga, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. ---Petitioner Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through its Secretary, Urban Administration And Development Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Additional Secretary C.G. State Nagariya Prashasan And Vikas Department Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Director Urban Administration And Development Department Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - The Collector Raigarh District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. 5 - (Deleted) Sanjay Dubey (As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 18-10- 2024) 6 - Chandra Prakash Shrivastava S/o Late Shri Chandra Kishore Shrivastava Aged About 51 Years Currently Posted As Community Coordinator At Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondents WPS No. 6781 of 2024 Smt. Mamta Choudhary W/o Shri Surendra Choudhary, Aged About 60 Years Posted As In-Charge Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat Lailunga, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. ---Petitioner Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through the Secretary, Urban Administration And Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 2 - Additional Secretary, C.G. State Nagariya Prashasan And Vikas Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Director Nagariya Prashasan And Vikas Department, B-Block, Fourth Floor, Indravati Bhawan, Nava Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Chandra Prakash Shrivastava, S/o Late Shri Chandra Kishore Shrivastava, Aged About 51 Years Currently Posted As Community Coordinator At Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate For Respondents-State : Mr. Ajit Singh, Government Advocate For Respective Respondents : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Mr. Anup Majumdar, Mr. Rishabh Bisen and Mr. Navoda Singh, Advocates Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge CAV Order 1. Heard Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate for the petitioner in all the writ petitions. Also heard Mr. Ajit Singh, Government Advocate for the State as well as Mr. N. Naha Roy, Mr. Anup Majumdar, Mr. Rishabh Bisen and Mr. Navoda Singh, Advocates for the respective respondents. 2. Since all the writ petitions have been filed by one and the same petitioner, namely Mamta Choudhary challenging the recovery order dated 27.04.2022, transfer order dated 21.08.2024 and suspension order dated 04.10.2024, as such, all the writ petitions are clubbed together, heard together and disposed of by this common order. 4 3. In WPS No.1625/2024, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):- “10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to call for the records of the case for its kind perusal. 10.2 That the Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to quash and set aside the letter dated 27.04.2022 issued by respondent no. 5 to respondent no. 7 or recovery of the amount to the tune of Rs.6,15,751/- with the finding that it is against the Doctrine of Double Jeopardy in the interest of justice. 10.2A That the Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to quash and set aside the letter dated 22/03/2024 (Annexure P/7-A) forwarded by respondent No.7 in the style and nature of an Order as it violates the basic principle of Natural Justice in the interest of justice. 10.3 That the Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow the petitioner to make a fresh representation before the concerned respondent which would be decided by the said respondent in a fixed time period in the interest of justice. 5 10.4 That the Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to grant any other relief as it may deem fit in the interest of justice.” 4. In WPS No.5182/2024, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):- “10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly allow this petition and quash the impugned order dated 21/08/2024 (ANNEXURE P/1) which relates to the petitioner and the respondent no. 6. 10.2 That, any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner in the interest of justice along with cost of the petition.” 5. In WPS No.6781/2024, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and quash the impugned order dated 04/10/2024 (ANNEXURE P/1) which relates to the petitioner, in the interest of Justice. 10.2 Any other relief, which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be allowed.” 6.
Legal Reasoning
By way of WPS No.1625/2024, the petitioner has challenged the letter No.4881 dated 27.04.2022 issued by the Joint Director, Directorate of Urban Administration and Development, Indrawati Bhawan, Block-4, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 6 to the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council Kharsiya, District Raigarh (C.G.) in the form of an order directing the said authority to recover the amount to the tune of Rs.6,15,751/- from the petitioner by way of monthly installments till its realization. 7. Brief facts of WPS No.1625/2024, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was working as Assistant Grade-II in the Municipal Council, Kharsiya. In the year 2016, she was working as In- charge Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Kharsiya (for short, ‘CMO’) and during the said capacity, a tender dated 19.01.2016 was invited for purchase of Dustbins under the Scheme of “Swachh Bharat Mission” amounting to Rs.10 Lacs. It was directed that if the concerned councilor of the Municipal Council also want to purchase Dustbins for their respective wards, they may also participate in the said Scheme, for which, a fund of Rs.2 Lacs was allotted to the Councilor, accordingly, a sum of Rs.17 Lacs was given to one “Om Sai Traders” for delivery of Dustbins on the basis of resolution dated 16.09.2016 passed by the President-in-Council. On the basis of aforesaid resolution, the orders were passed and the Dustbins were purchased as well as it were duly delivered by the supplier. The concerned Municipal Council has authorized the petitioner to pay the amount of Dustbins from the Council’s fund, therefore, on the basis of proposal dated 28.09.2016, a resolution was passed and a sum of Rs.14,25,751/- was paid on 29.09.2016 from the account of respective Councilor to the supplier, thereafter, vide a further sum 7 of Rs.1,90,000/- was paid on 30.09.2016 by the petitioner. The said purchase was made on the basis of request of respective Councilor as also on the basis of resolution for purchase of Dustbins. However, inspite of following due process of purchase of Dustbins and for the respective payment, a notice was issued along with charge-sheet dated 28.09.2018 against the petitioner after a lapse of about 2 years, to which, the petitioner filed a detailed reply while encountering the allegations levelled against her. The same was not considered by the respondent authorities and vide punishment dated 17.12.2019, the petitioner has punished while stoppage of one annual increment in the salary without cumulative effect in view of Rule 31 of the Chhattisgarh Nagarpalika Seva (Karyapalan) Niyam, 1973 (for short, “Rules of 1973”) without following Chhattisgarh Rajya Nagarpalika (Karyapalan/Yantriki/Swasthya) Seva Bharti Tatha Seva ki Shartein Niyam, 2017 (for short, “Rules of 2017”). As per Rules of 2017, there is provision to be followed by the Disciplinary Authority while conducting the disciplinary action i.e. show-cause notice, issuance of charge-sheet, supply of relevant documents, recording of evidence of the concerned parties and while giving proper opportunity of hearing was mandated under the Rules of 2017 and without of aforementioned Rules of 2017, order of punishment has been passed, which is perse illegal and deserves to be set aside. Since the order of punishment dated 17.12.2019 was passed under the Rules of 1973, which is not applicable and 8 Rules of 2017 is required to be followed, which vitiates entire action of the respondent authorities, the punishment order was palpably illegal, as such, the petitioner has preferred an appeal dated 25.01.2020 and in the appeal, the petitioner was provided some opportunity of hearing as per the Rules of 2017, however, in the appeal also, though some opportunity was granted to the petitioner, but full-fledged enquiry was not conducted while giving proper opportunity of hearing. 8. Brief facts of WPS No.5182/2024, are that respondent No.5 substantially holding the post of Samudayik Sangathak in Jila Sahakari Vikas Abhikaran. Though, somehow he managed to work as an In-Charge Chief Municipal Officer Nagar Panchayat Lailunga and for the aforesaid posting period, he has committed irregularities. After due consideration, his contractual appointment has been set aside and he has been directed to repatriate to the original post in the parent Department, as such, respondent No.5 has challenged the aforesaid order, but the Hon'ble Court has not found any irregularity in the order of repatriation of respondent No.5 and thereafter, in the year 2022, the petitioner has also challenged the order dated 27.11.2019, but the Hon'ble Court has summarily dismissed the petition holding that the post of Community Coordinator is not available for joining of respondent No.5 and earlier respondent No.5 has been terminated due to irregularities committed during his posting at Nagar Panchayat Lailunga, as such, his contractual appointment on the post of In- 9 Charge CMO has been set aside. Though, he has challenged the aforesaid order, but subsequently on 10.05.2024, the petition was dismissed as having rendered infructuous and on 08.08.2024 in WPS No.6106/2014, the present petitioner has been directed to hold the inquiry against respondent No.6, but in,spite of the fact that from the post of Community Coordinator, the petitioner having no right to appoint as In-Charge of Chief Municipal Officer by way of the impugned order, he has not only get an order for his posting as In-Charge CMO, Nagar Panchayat Lailunga, but also the petitioner whose name has been already in consideration for the post of Chief Municipal Officer in the State cadre list and who has recently in compliance of the order dated 07.03.2024 joined as In- Charge CMO, Nagar Panchayat Lailunga, she has been transferred from the aforesaid place of posting. Though, he hardly completed 5 months, as such, the Hon'ble Court has given the responsibility for initiating an enquiry against respondent No.6 and theraftere, respondent authorities have transferred the services of the petitioner vide order dated 21.08.2024. 9. Facts of WPS No.6781/2024, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner is challenging the order of suspension whereby the petitioner has been put under suspension by respondent No. 3, though the director is not the appointing authority of the petitioner as also respondent No.3 has no jurisdiction to pass the order of suspension. It is further case of the petitioner that before passing the aforesaid order, the respondent has not properly look into the 10 earlier order of suspension and also not look into the order dated 25.01.2022, by which, after due inquiry, the respondent has only withheld the two annual increments of the petitioner with cumulative effect and the aforesaid order does not reflect any kind of recovery. Respondent No.4, who somehow wanted to be posted in place of the petitioner at Nagar Panchayat Lailunga and the Hon'ble Court has stayed the order of transfer of the petitioner and respondent No.4 vide order dated 06.09.2024 and fixed the case on 14.10.2024, but respondent No.4 contrary to the relevant provision of Section 33 of C.G. State Municipalities Act (Executive/Health) Rules, 2017 as also without properly looking into the Section 53 of C.G. Municipal Council Employee (Appointment and Service condition), Rules, 1968 passed the impugned order though, from the order, it is duly clear that no any Departmental Enquiry has been contemplated. It is the case of the petitioner that in view of the fact that from the order dated 25.01.2022, nowhere it has been mentioned that in the departmental inquiry, any kind of recovery has been directed and in the year 2024, for the first time the recovery of Rs.25,000/- from the salary of the petitioner has been started, which was also challenged before the Hon'ble High Court. Inspite of the fact that respondent No.4 is an employee of the Municipal Corporation and his services cannot be transferred to the Nagar Panchayat not only got an order contrary to the provisions of Section 5 of the Municipal Corporation Act and only to harass and humiliate the 11 petitioner, who is a lady employee and is going to retire in the next year and who is a senior most employee in Nagar Panchayat and whose promotion is due for the post of Chief Municipal Officer, but the contractual employee who is in Municipal Corporation, he has been wrongly transferred in place of the petitioner and when the petitioner has got an order of stay, then in view of some old order, in which there is no order of recovery, gave the reference of the same order and passed the impugned order of the suspension without contemplating any kind of enquiry.
Legal Reasoning
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner in WPS No.1625/2024 submits that the punishment order has been passed without holding proper enquiry and without giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He further submits that at the time of allegation made against the petitioner, the petitioner was relieved from the work of In-charge CMO and one Gopal Dubey has been posted as In-charge CMO, the work order to the tune of Rs.13,50,323/- was issued for supply of 6318 Dusbins in the regime of Gopal Dubey, however, only the petitioner has been held guilty and the other person i.e. Gopal Dubey has not been held guilty. It has been contended that a proper procedure was not followed as per Rules of 2017 and further, no proper opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. As such, the order impugned is per se illegal and bad in the eyes of law. It has been further contended that for one allegation, two punishments are being imposed i.e., (i) stoppage of one annual increment without cumulative effect and 12 (ii) recovery of amount from the salary of the petitioner by way of monthly installments, which according to the Service Rules, both cannot rule together, hence, the order of recovery dated 27.04.2022 to the tune of Rs.6,15,751/- is required to be quashed. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner in WPS No.5182/2024 submits that the petitioner has hardly served her duty for about last 5 months and she is a senior most employee in the Department concerned and respondent No.6 whose service has been repatriated to his original Department and he has no right to be posted on the post of In-Charge CMO Nagar Panchayat Lailunga because earlier his contractual appointment on the post of In- Charge CMO Nagar Panchayat Lailunga has been set aside due to irregularities committed by respondent No.6. It has been contended that when respondent No.6 was the Community Coordinator has submitted his posting as Chief Municipal Officer, he himself passed a proposal that he will be paid the salary of Chief Municipal Officer whereas he is actually entitled to the salary of a Community Coordinator only, but he has been receiving the salary for the post of Chief Municipal Officer for his entire tenure at the aforesaid Department. It has been further contended that drawing and disbursing power is with the Chief Municipal Officer and insofar as respondent No.6 is concerned, he is not a Gazzetted Officer, as such he cannot be posted on the post of In-Charge CMO Nagar Panchayat, which is against the service rules. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner in WPS No.6781/2024 submits 13 that the impugned order has been passed mainly on the ground for one earlier order dated 25.01.2022 which relates to the excess purchase of the Dustbins in the year 2016-17, for which she has been earlier suspended and in the Departmental Enquiry dated 25.01.2022, two annual increments of the petitioner with cumulative effect have been withheld on the basis of the major punishment, as such, the suspension of the petitioner is not sustainable in the eyes of law in view of the C.G. Municipal Council (Executive/Health) Rules 2017 as well as C.G. State Municipal Employee (Appointment and Service Condition) Rules, 1968 as well as Rule 9(1)(a) of Civil Service Classification Control Rule 1966. It has been contended that before passing the order of suspension, any proposal relating to Departmental Enquiry has not been contemplated and the petitioner was highly surprised when she got the suspension order whereas when she has filed an application and sought time for filing of the reply of show cause notice. It has been further contended that insofar as the Director is concerned, he is not the appointing authority of the petitioner, as such, the order impugned has been passed without any jurisdiction. It has been argued that the order of suspension is double jeopardy because earlier the petitioner has already been suspended and punished. 13. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the impugned order has rightly been passed and there is no any 14 illegality or perversity in passing the said order. He further submits that the petitioner was found to be involved in purchase of Dustbins in an illegal manner. It has been contended that the petitioner was given charge of In-Charge CMO in the year 2016, who has been in the said capacity, she has committed an irregularity in purchasing of Dustbins, hence, a show-cause notice was issued to her and after giving due opportunity of hearing, it was found that the petitioner has been found guilty in committing irregularity in purchase of Dustbins, as such, punishment order was passed well as recovery order has been issued as the petitioner has committed misappropriation of funds. It has been further contended that the impugned orders have rightly been passed by the respondent authorities, which do not call for any interference. It has been submitted that subsequently, in the appeal, when the petitioner demanded that the opportunity of hearing has not been granted to her, the petitioner was accorded with opportunity of hearing and as such, the allegation to this effect is also not available to the petitioner and there is no double jeopardy. It has been further submitted that at the time of flouting of tender in the year 2016, Rules of 1973 was in-operation, as such, Departmental Enquiry was conducted on the basis of said Rules, however, in the appellate stage, when it was demanded, the proper procedure has been adopted while giving opportunity
Decision
of hearing to the petitioner, as such, the writ petitions deserves to be dismissed. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents 15 opposed the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and adopted the submissions advanced by learned State counsel and jointly submit that the financial illegalities committed by the petitioner is not only but on several occasions whenever she was posted as Chief Municipal Officer of Nagar Panchayat and the cases of financial embezzlement are reported against her, due to which Collector Raigarh as many as three occasions has charged the petitioner for committing corruption and financial embezzlement. They have further submitted that the petitioner being encroacher on Government land since last more than 20 years has sought lease of the encroached land from the revenue authorities and the conduct of the petitioner is worth unbecoming of Government servant and is a serious misconduct under the Service Rules. It has been contended that the petitioner misused her authority to avail the Government lease which is not appreciated under the Service Rules. It has been further contended that although the entitlement of respondent No.6 is nowhere questioned in the writ petition, but it has been argued that respondent No.6 is Class-IV employee and is not entitled to hold the post of Chief Municipal Officer. It has been lastly submitted that the impugned orders were rightly been passed by the respondent authorities, which do not call for any interference. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival contentions and perused the documents annexed along with writ 16 petitions. 16. In WPS No.1625/2024, on 15.01.2025, interim order was passed, which reads as follows :- “Mr. Awadh Tripathi, counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Yashwant Singh Thakur, Additional A.G. and Mr. Pratik Tiwari, PL for the State. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the departmental enquiry she was punished while imposing punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effects and thereafter by the impugned order the recovery order has been passed to the tune of Rs.6,15,751/- and at present Rs.25,000/- per month is being deducted from her salary due to which she is facing great hardship. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that they have filed their reply. However, since the petitioner has filed an application for amendment and that has been allowed, therefore, they wish to file an additional reply in this matter. Considering the aforesaid aspect the respondents are directed to file additional reply. Till the next date of hearing purely as an interim measure the effect and operation of impugned order dated 27.04.2022 is hereby stayed. 17 The petitioner is directed to explain the delay in filing this petition challenging the order dated 27.04.2022 supported with an affidavit with a period of 10 days. List this case in the month of April, 2025.” 17. In WPS No.5182/2024, on 06.09.2024, following interim order was passed :- “Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. S. P. Kale, Additional Advocate General for the State/respondents No.1 to 4. Mr. Anup Majumdar, learned counsel for respondent No.6. Heard. Issue notice to respondents. Mr. Kale and Mr. Majumdar accept notice on behalf of respective respondents. PF be paid only in respect of respondent No.5 by ordinary mode as well as registered post within a period of two weeks returnable in 3 weeks. Also heard on I. A. No.1, application for grant of stay. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that challenge in this writ petition is to the impugned transfer order dated 18 21.08.2024 passed by respondent No.1 by which the petitioner who is working as officiating Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat Lailunga has been repatriated to her original post (Assistant Grade II) at Nagar Panchayat Kharsia. By the impugned order respondent No.6 who is working as Community Coordinator at Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur has been transferred to Nagar Panchayat Lailunga. He submits that by an order dated 07.03.2024, the petitioner was posted as officiating Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat Lailunga which is contrary to the judgment of this Court passed in WPS No.6833/2021 in the case of Dileep Kumar Uranw Vs. State of CG and Ors. Order dated 14.01.2022. He further submits that the petitioner is a senior most employee in the department and respondent No.6 cannot be posted at place of petitioner as his earlier contractual appointment on the post of incharge CMO, Nagar Panchayat, Lailunga has been set aside due to irregularities committed by respondent No.6. Even his regularization on the post of Community Coordinator has been de-regularized. Though, in view of the interim order passed by this Court, he remained in his services on the post of community coordinator and serious allegations are leveled against the respondent No.6, therefore, he submits that interim order may be granted to the petitioner. Opposing the same, Mr. Kale, learned 19 Additional Advocate General submits that the petitioner is only being appointed at officiating capacity which is permissible and he has been repatriated to his original posting as some irregularities were found against her a departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and order of recovery was passed. He submits that transfer is an exigency in service, therefore, no interim relief can be granted to the petitioner. Mr. Majumdar supported the submissions made by State counsel. During course of argument, it is brought to notice of this Court that respondent No.6 has joined. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Though parties have leveled allegations and counter allegations against each other, the core issue involved in this petition as to whether any interim relief can be granted & in view of facts and circumstances of the case whether transfer of respondent No.6 in place of petitioner is in accordance with law. This Court in case of Dileep Kumar Uranw (Supra) in Para 15 observed as under:- “15. As such, no such power has been conferred to the State Government to transfer any officer or servant of Municipal Corporation to any Municipality or Nagar Panchayat so constituted under the Act of 1961. In absence of any enabling provisions in the Act of 1956 or 20 the Municipalities Act, 1961 in empowering the State Government to transfer any officer or servant from Municipal Corporation to Municipal Council or Nagar Panchayat, the impugned order of transfer of the petitioner from Municipal Corporation, Raigarh Panchayat, to Nagar Chandrapur is liable to be quashed.” It is not brought to the notice of this Court as to whether respondent No.6 is not the employee of Municipal Corporation but on perusal it appears that the respondent No.6 has been transferred to Nagar Panchayat Lailunga. Prima-facie it appears that the issue involved in this writ petition is covered by judgment of this Court in case of Dileep Kumar Uranw (Supra). This Court on 29.08.2024 directed the State counsel to seek instructions with regard to dispute in the case. It appears that during pendency of the lis, respondent No.6 was permitted to join in compliance of impugned transfer order. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on due consideration, this Court is of the opinion that prima-facie case of interim relief is made out by the petitioner. Therefore, the effect and operation of the impugned order with respect to petitioner is stayed till the next date of hearing. List this case in week commencing 14th October, 2024. In the meanwhile pleadings be completed.” 21 18. In WPS No.6781/2024, on 22.10.2024, interim order was passed to the following effect :- “Mr. Awadh Tripathi, counsel for petitioner. Ms. Shailja Shukla, Dy.G.A. for State- respondents No. 1 to 3. Mr. N. Naha Roy, counsel for respondent No.4 appears on instructions. Heard on I.A. No.1, which is an application for grant of interim relief. Petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order of suspension dated 04.10.2024. Submission of learned counsel for petitioner is that petitioner has been issued order of suspension (Annexure P-1) only to remove the petitioner from present place of posting i.e. Nagar Panchayt Lailunga. Petitioner was earlier posted at Kharsiya. She was transferred and posted at Lailunga on 07.03.2024 and within a short period of less than six months, again petitioner was transferred from Lailunga to Kharsia vide order dated 21.08.2024. Petitioner being a lady aged about 60 years has challenged the order of her transfer making a pleading that the order of transfer of petitioner is only to accommodate the private respondent therein in the writ petition. The Court considering the writ petition have considered the grounds 22 raised and passed an interim order in her favour vide order date 06.9.2024 in WPS No.5182/2024 staying the effect and operation of the transfer order of petitioner. The interim order passed was put to challenge by the private respondent therein by way of fling Writ Appeal No.640/2024. The writ appeal was disposed of making an observation to decide the pending writ petition at the earliest. On the date of disposal of the writ appeal without there being any order in favour of appellant therein, the respondents have issued the order Annexure P-1 on the same date i.e. 04.10.2024 suspending petitioner and further changing her headquarter from Lailunga to office of Joint Director, Town Administration and Development, Regional Office, Bilaspur. He also contended that from the contents of the order it appears that order of suspension is passed only to shift the petitioner if not by way of transfer but by way of order of suspension. Referring to the decision in case of Panchu Ram Thakur Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. In WP(S) No. 2062 of 2016, decided on 21.06.2021, he submits that as the shifting of an employee from one place to another even if by way of suspension will amount to transfer, change of head quarter without there being any specific reason assigned therein is not sustainable. Learned State counsel vehemently opposes the submission of learned counsel 23 for petitioner and would submit that petitioner is having alternate remedy of appeal under the Rules, 1966. She further submits that specific grounds has been pleaded for suspending petitioner as there is specific mention that the petitioner has committed misconduct and therefore, no interference is called for. Issue notice to respondents. Learned State counsel accepts notice on behalf of respondents No.1 to 3 and Shri N. Naha Roy appears on instructions and submits that he will accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.4. Therefore, process fee is not required to be paid for issuance of notice. Both the counsel pray for two weeks time to file reply. Considering the submission of learned counsel for petitioner, pleadings made therein, the facts and circumstances of the case, purely as interim measure it is directed that the order impugned dated 04.10.2024 (Annexur P-1) so far as it relates to change of head quarter of petitioner shall remain stayed, till the next date of hearing. List this case in the week commencing 18.11.2024.” 19. From perusal of the record would show that the petitioner was the In-charge CMO at time of alleged incident, though she has issued purchase orders, however, proper procedure has not been 24 followed, as such, show-cause notice was issued and thereafter, Departmental Enquiry was conducted. Under the Rules of 1973, there was no such provision to give a comprehensive detailed enquiry and as such, it was not conducted. However, when the petitioner demanded the same in the appeal, proper opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner, as such, so far as opportunity of hearing is concerned, it seems that it has been granted. 20. So far as applicability of Rules of 2017 is concerned, while conducting the Departmental Enquiry, the punishment is prescribed under Rule 28 of the Rules of 2017. Rule 28 of the Rules of 2017 reads as follows for easy reference:- “28.शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5)याँ- नि(cid:9)म्(cid:9)लि(cid:12)लि(cid:13)(cid:5) शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5)याँ समुचि(cid:18)(cid:5) (cid:5)था पया(cid:21)् कारणों से सेवा के सद(cid:4)यों पर आरोनिप(cid:5) की जा सकें गी अथा(cid:21)(cid:5):- (एक) िሪ(cid:9)दा (दो) वे(cid:5)(cid:9) वृचि) या पदो्ቐचि(cid:5) को रोक(cid:9)ा ((cid:5)ी(cid:9)) आदेश के भांग या उपे्ቌा के कार(cid:9) परिरषद् को हुई निकसी निव्ቈीय हानि(cid:9) की पूण(cid:21) या आं शिशक रूप में वे(cid:12)(cid:9) से वसू(cid:12)ी ((cid:18)ार) नि(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:12)े पद या समयमा(cid:9) अधवा समयमा(cid:9) में नि(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:12)े (cid:4)था(cid:9) में पदाव(cid:9)चि(cid:5) (पां(cid:18)) भनिवष्य में नि(cid:9)योज(cid:9) के लि(cid:12)ए अपा्ቔ(cid:5)ा के कारण सेवा से हटा(cid:9)ा व्याख्या- नि(cid:9)म्(cid:9)लि(cid:12)लि(cid:13)(cid:5) इस नि(cid:9)यम के अथ(cid:21) के अं(cid:5)ग(cid:21)(cid:5) शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) (cid:9)हीं होगी, अथा(cid:21)(cid:5):- (एक) नि(cid:9)म्(cid:9)लि(cid:12)लि(cid:13)(cid:5) की सेवाओं का समाप(cid:9) 25 (क) परिरवी्ቌा पर नि(cid:9)यु्ሹ शासकीय सेवक की उसकी नि(cid:9)युनि्ሹ की श(cid:5)B या ऐसी परिरवी्ቌा को शासिस(cid:5) कर(cid:9)े वा(cid:12)े नि(cid:9)यम और आदेश के अ(cid:9)ुसार उसके परिरवी्ቌा की का(cid:12)ावचिध की सम्पचि(cid:5) के दौरा(cid:9) या समानि् परः अथवा ((cid:13)) नि(cid:9)यु्ሹ अ(cid:4)थायी शासकीय सेवक की आगामी आदेश (cid:5)क, इस आधार पर की उसकी सेवाओं की आवश्यक(cid:5)ा (cid:9)हीं रह गई है. अथवा (ग) शासकीय सेवक की जो अ(cid:9)ुबंध के अ(cid:9)ुसार नि(cid:9)योसिज(cid:5) हो ऐसे अ(cid:9)ुबंध श(cid:5)B के अ(cid:9)ुसार । (दो) परिरवी्ቌाधी(cid:9) की सेवा से सेवामुनि्ሹ का उसकी परिरवी्ቌा की का(cid:12)ावचिध के दौरा(cid:9) या उसके अं(cid:5) में निवशिश्ቖ दोष के लि(cid:12)ए या सेवा हे(cid:5)ु उसकी अ(cid:9)ुपयु्ሹ(cid:5)ा के आधार पर इस नि(cid:9)यम के अं(cid:5)ग(cid:21)(cid:5) हटाए जा(cid:9)े के रूप में अथ(cid:21) (cid:9)हीं (cid:12)गाया जाएगा। ((cid:5)ी(cid:9)) शासकीय सेवक को उसके वे(cid:5)(cid:9) के समयमा(cid:9) में द्ቌ(cid:5)ावरोध पर अवरोध को पार कर(cid:9)े की उसकी अयोग्य(cid:5)ा के आधार पर रोके जा(cid:9)ा। ((cid:18)ार) सेवा के सद(cid:4)य की वापसी जो की उ्ሴ(cid:5)र पद में (cid:4)था(cid:9)ाप्ቐ रूप से काय(cid:21) कर रहा हो मू(cid:12) पद पर इस कारण से जैसे की नि(cid:9)यनिम(cid:5) पदधारी का ्ቚशिश्ቌण या ्ቚचि(cid:5)नि(cid:9)युनि्ሹ से वापसी या अचिधक उपयु्ሹ व्यनि्ሹ की उप(cid:12)ब्ध(cid:5)ा का पदाव(cid:9)चि(cid:5) के रूप में अथ(cid:21) (cid:9)हीं (cid:12)गाया जाएगा। नि(cid:9)यम 28 की व्याख्या यह नि(cid:9)यम इ(cid:9) नि(cid:9)यमों के अधी(cid:9) नि(cid:9)यु्ሹ अचिधकारी ्ቛाराम इ(cid:9) नि(cid:9)यमों के नि(cid:9)यम 21 में की गई निकसी घोषणा या राज्य शास(cid:9) ्ቛारा जारी नि(cid:9)दTशों के ्ቚचि(cid:5)कू (cid:12) काय(cid:21) कर(cid:9)े के लि(cid:12)ए उसे दቜኌUV(cid:5) निकए जा(cid:9)े वा(cid:12)ी शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) का उ्ቤे(cid:13) कर(cid:5)ी है। इस नि(cid:9)यम के (cid:13)ंV (एक), (दो) एवं ((cid:5)ी(cid:9)) सिजसमें परिरनि(cid:9)न्दा निकया जा(cid:9)ा वे(cid:5)(cid:9) वृचि) या पदो्ቐचि(cid:5) का रोका जा(cid:9)ा या निYर परिरषद् को हुई निकसी ्ቌचि(cid:5) की वसू(cid:12)ी निकया जा(cid:9)ा सቜኌम्मलि(cid:12)(cid:5) को सामान्य भाषा में (cid:12)घु शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) कहा जा(cid:5)ा है जबनिक (cid:13)ंV ((cid:18)ार) एवं (पाँ(cid:18)) में दቦኌश(cid:5) शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) को दीघ(cid:21) 26 शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) कहा जा(cid:5)ा है। निटप्पणी- (1) उ्ሴ(cid:5)म न्याय(cid:12)य ्ቛारा अ(cid:9)ेक न्याया(cid:12)यी(cid:9) ्ቚकरण में आदेशिश(cid:5) निकया है निक शासकीय सेवक को अचिधरोनिप(cid:5) दUV उसके ्ቛारा निकए गए कदा(cid:18)रण के अ(cid:9)ुकू (cid:12) हो(cid:9)ा (cid:18)ानिहए । दूसरे शब्दों में, The Penalty imposed on a civil servant should not be disproportional to the misconduct committed by him. (2) मा्ቔा असं(cid:18)यी ्ቚभाव से रोकी गयी वे(cid:5)(cid:9) वृचि)यां ही (cid:5)गुशाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) है, अन्यथा यह मुख्य शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) होगी। (3) मुख्य शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) इस नि(cid:9)यमों में (cid:4)थानिप(cid:5) एक अ)(cid:21)न्याचियक ्ቚनि\या अप(cid:9)ा कर ही अचिधरोनिप(cid:5) निक जावेगी, जोनिक संनिवधा(cid:9) के अ(cid:9)ुच्छेद 311(2) के ्ቚावधा(cid:9)ों के अ(cid:9)ुसार होगी। (4) (cid:12)घु शाቜኌ(cid:4)(cid:5) अचिधरोनिप(cid:5) कर(cid:9)े के पूव(cid:21) शासकीय सेवक ” को निवचिधव(cid:5) सु(cid:9)वाई का अवसर ्ቚदा(cid:9) निकया जावेगा। 21. In the present case, since the punishment which has been imposed upon the petitioner is major punishment, as such, before imposing the major punishment, the petitioner is required to be heard. According to the aforesaid Rules, a full-fledged enquiry is required to be conducted, in which show-cause notice, charge- sheet, examination of witnesses, proper opportunity of hearing are the procedures to be followed. If any punishment to be imposed, it has to be imposed as per Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. While imposing any punishment upon any delinquent employee, the first and foremost thing is that he should be given proper opportunity of hearing, which in the present case has not been followed. 22. Insofar as the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that 27 not only the petitioner, but one another In-charge CMO namely Gopal Dubey is also conducted some official work, as such, the petitioner alone cannot be held guilty for highly irregularity of funds. Had the petitioner has been given opportunity of hearing, these allegations would have been replied by the petitioner, however, since it has not been accorded to the petitioner, as such, the petitioner cannot opposed the allegations while conducting proper defence. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that in the case of imposition of any major penalty, the delinquent is required to be given proper opportunity of hearing, which in the present case, does not seems to have been given. Accordingly, the entire Departmental Enquiry is vitiated. 24. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In the matter of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant 28 : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the 29 adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’ (emphasis supplied)” 25. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in the matter of State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated as under in the matter of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:- “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723: (1964) 3 SCR 25: (1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of 30 the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be 31 based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. xxx 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference 32 of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64]. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do. Xxx 26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. 33 Parties will pay and bear their own costs.’ (emphasis supplied)” 26. In the matter of State Bank of India v. S K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, two learned Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held:- “28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]). The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] , the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable — a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : 34 1985 AC 374, HL] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing — applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called — that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding — which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post- decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of 35 natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate — take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66: (1963) 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid — or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980 AC 574: (1979) 2 All ER 440: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it would be a case falling in the latter category — violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice — in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct — in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such 36 facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.” 27. In the matter of Union of India v. K G Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794, it was opined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in following words :- “14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223: (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process 37 and not the decision. 15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.’ (emphasis supplied)” 28. The legal position was restated by two learned Judges in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310, by observing as follows :- “15. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. The court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the evidence as if it was a 38 court of appeal. The approach of the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court in accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the matter back to the High Court.” 29. In the matter of Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia and others, (2005) 7 SCC 764 while dealing with the similar issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre- decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten forbidden fruit. [See R.v. University of Cambridge, (1723) 1 Str 557]. But we are also aware that principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straight-jacket. 39 They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated ; "To do a great right after all, it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong". [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (Bhopal Gas Disaster); (1990) 1 SCC 613] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than 'precedential'.” 30. Taking into consideration the overall facts and circumstances of all the three cases in the light of aforementioned rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the petitioner has been issued order of suspension only to remove the petitioner from present place of posting i.e. Nagar Panchayat Lailunga. The petitioner was earlier posted at Kharsiya. She was transferred and posted at Lailunga on 07.03.2024 and within a short period of less than six months, again petitioner was transferred from Lailunga to Kharsia vide order dated 21.08.2024. It has been further reflected that the petitioner being a lady aged about 60 years has challenged the order of her transfer making a pleading that the order of transfer of petitioner is only to accommodate the private respondent therein and the Court considering the grounds raised, 40 passed an interim order in her favour vide order dated 06.09.2024 in WPS No.5182/2024, vide order dated 22.10.2024 in WPS No.6781/2024 and vide order dated 15.01.2025 in WPS No.1625/2024; staying the effect and operation of the transfer order of petitioner dated 21.08.2024, order of suspension dated 04.10.2024 as well as order of recovery dated 27.04.2022, respectively. 31. From the record, it seems that the interim order passed was put to challenge by the private respondent therein by way of fling Writ Appeal No.640/2024, which was disposed of making an observation to decide the pending writ petition at the earliest. On the date of disposal of the writ appeal without there being any order in favour of appellant therein, the respondents have issued the order on the same date i.e. 04.10.2024 suspending petitioner and further changing her headquarter from Lailunga to office of Joint Director, Town Administration and Development, Regional Office, Bilaspur and from the contents of the order, it appears that order of suspension is passed only to shift the petitioner if not by way of transfer but by way of order of suspension. 32. As a fallout of aforesaid discussions, it has been reflected that the petitioner has wrongly been transferred by order dated 21.08.2024 and respondent No.6 (in WPS No.5182/2024) who is working as Community Coordinator at Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur has been transferred to Nagar Panchayat Lailunga, 41 which is contrary to the judgment of this Court passed in WPS No.6833/2021 vide order dated 14.01.2022. It has been further reflected that the order of suspension dated 04.10.2024 has been passed only to shift the petitioner, if not by way of transfer, but by way of order of suspension. 33. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the cases, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has not been given proper opportunity of hearing while passing the order of recovery, as such, the impugned order of recovery dated 27.04.2022 is hereby quashed. As a consequence, transfer order dated 21.08.2024 as well as suspension order dated 04.10.2024, are hereby quashed. 34. In the result, all the three writ petitions being WPS No.1625/2024, WPS No.5182/2024 and WPS No.6781/2024 are allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. There shall be no order as to cost(s). Yogesh Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge