Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:36908 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 628 of 2019 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja Chhattisagarh. ... Appellant 1 - Roopnarayan S/o Dharam Sai Rajwade Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Mendra, Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh. versus ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri Dilman Rati Minj, Govt. Advocate. For Respondent(s)
Legal Reasoning
15. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes — one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no 6 is acting with direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the provision in IPC that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concept of “culpable rashness” and “culpable negligence” into consideration in cases of road accidents. “Culpable rashness” the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). “Culpable negligence” is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person's negligent conduct. [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon's An Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1st Edn., 2010).]” 9. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the trial Court has assigned reasons after appreciation of the prosecution evidence that the prosecution has failed to establish identify of the driver at the time of the accident, as there is no clear evidence adduced by the prosecution as to who was the driver when the alleged accident has taken place. (PW-1) Santosh Gupta and (PW-2) Anil Kumar have reached the spot after the accident. (PW-3) Anand 7 Sharma and (PW-5) Tulsi Rajwade have also failed to explain as to in what manner the accident has taken place. (PW-4) Reeta Sinha has deposed that at the time of the accident she was in front of her house and the deceased rider of the TVS Moped on account of rain turned his moped to the right side of the road and also gave signal by his hand, but the offending vehicle dashed against the said TVS moped and the body parts of the deceased persons spread and also came in front of her house. In cross- examination, this witness has admitted that at the time of the accident, the offending vehicle i.e. the truck was also running in normal speed, as the other vehicles used to run on the said road. 10. From the statements of the witnesses, particularly, (PW-4) Reeta Sinha, it appears that there is no evidence available on record to show as to from what distance the deceased rider of the TVS moped has given signal for taking turn and whether there was sufficient time for the driver of the offending vehicle to control his vehicle. Further, the IO in such type of cases is an important witness, who has prepared the spot map. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the same was not proved, as the IO has not been examined. Moreover, (PW-4) Reeta Sinha has also not identified the driver of the offending vehicle. 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial Court has rightly recorded a finding that identity of the driver has not been established and the prosecution has failed to establish as to how the accident has occurred, as also for the said accident, how the 8 respondent/accused is solely responsible for culpable rashness and culpable negligence of the act. 12. Moreover, it is equally settled that when two views are possible, then the view which is favourable to the accused should be taken. {See : Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 9 SCC 731], V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala, [(2006) 10 SCC 617] & Constable 907 Surendra Singh & another vs. State of Uttrakhand, 2025 INSC 114.] 13. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the trial Court is possible one and no case is made out for interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court.
Arguments
: Shri Anuj Kumar Pandey appears on behalf of Shri Bhupendra Singh, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J Judgment on Board 29/07/2025 :- 1. The present Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.06.2018 passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambikapur District Surguja in Criminal Case No.4948/2011 whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 279 & 304-A of the IPC. 2. Case of the prosecution is that on the date of the accident i.e. 2.10.2008 the respondent/accused while driving the truck No.CG- KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Digitally signed by KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Date: 2025.07.29 17:00:00 +0530 2 15/ZC-0446 in a rash and negligent manner dashed against the TVS moped bearing registration No.CG-15/CA-0515, due to which Kushal Prasad, who was riding the said TVS moped and his wife Maheshwari, who was pillion rider, died on the spot. (PW-2) Anil Kumar, brother of the deceased, lodged an FIR vide Ex.-P/1 on the date of the accident itself at about 3.35 pm at PS Ambikapur. 3. Crime details form containing sketch map has been prepared which was not proved. The offending vehicle and the damaged TVS moped were seized from the spot, which were also not proved. During investigation, the registration and other papers were seized from the respondent/accused on 3.10.2008. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed. The respondent/ accused abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. 4. In order to prove the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 5 witnesses. However, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, the respondent/accused has pleaded false implication and has not adduced any defence evidence. The trial Court after evaluating the evidence acquitted the respondent/accused of the charges. Hence this Appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the State/appellant submits that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective, as the accident was witnessed by PW-4 Reeta Sinha in front of whose house the aforesaid accident occurred and the body parts of the deceased persons were spread and came in front of her 3 house. The offending vehicle was in a high speed and dashed against the TVS moped of the deceased persons and as such, finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is absolutely perverse, therefore, the Appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment may be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused would support the impugned judgment. He would submit that the I.O. is an important witness in the case, however, the sketch map prepared by him has not been proved and, therefore, the manner in which the accident occurred has not been properly explained by the prosecution. He would further submit that (PW-4) Reeta Sinha in her cross-examination has admitted that at the time of the accident the offending vehicle was also running in similar speed, as other vehicles normally run on the said route. (PW-4) Reeta Sinha has also stated that colour of the offending vehicle was brown, whereas the other witness namely, (PW-5) Tulsi Rajwade has stated that the colour of the offending vehicle was green, and the other witnesses reached the place of accident after the accident occurred. Considering the aforesaid infirmities, the trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused. The impugned judgment is well merited and does not call for any interference. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 8. In the matter of Ravi Kapur Vs. State of Rajasthan {(2012) 9 SCC 284}, it was held that even when one is driving a vehicle at a 4 slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to rash and negligent driving. So the manner in which the vehicle was being driven at the time of the accident is significant and the same has to be examined in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is wrong proposition that for any motorcycle accident negligence of the driver should be presumed because there is distinction between the rash and negligent act, and the culpable rashness and criminal negligence. Paras-11 to 15 of the said judgment read thus:- “11. In order to examine the merit or otherwise of Contentions (b) and (c) raised on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary for the Court to first and foremost examine (a) what is rash and negligent driving; and (b) whether it can be gathered from the attendant circumstances. (A) Rash and negligent driving 12. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly and negligently. Both these acts presuppose an abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to “rash and negligent driving” within the meaning of the language of Section 279 IPC. That is why the legislature in its wisdom has used the words “manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life”. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are 5 satisfied, the penalty contemplated under Section 279 IPC is attracted. 13.“Negligence” means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence. 14. The court has to adopt another parameter i.e. “reasonable care” in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrians happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others.
Decision
14. In the result, the Appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. Judge Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Barve