Manoj Kumar Ratre S/o - Khedu Das Ratre Aged About 23 Years Caste v. State of Chhattisgarh Through Police of Police Station - Gandai, Tahsil - Gandai, Civil
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:15955 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR NAFR CRA No. 789 of 2016 Manoj Kumar Ratre S/o - Khedu Das Ratre Aged About 23 Years Caste - Satnami, R/o - Village - Sambalpur, Police Station and Tahsil - Gandai, Civil and Revenue District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police of Police Station - Gandai, Tahsil - Gandai, Civil and Revenue District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent For Appellant For Respondent/State : : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate. Mr. U.K.S. Chandel, Deputy A.G. Along with CRMP No. 879 of 2016 State of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O., P.S. Gandai, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. --- Petitioner Versus 1 - Manoj Kumar S/o Khedu Das Ratre Aged About 23 Years Caste Satnami, R/o. Village Sambalpur, Police Station Gandai, District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Dropati @ Durpati Lahre D/o Khemu Ram Lahre R/o Village Bagur, P.S. Gandai, Tahsil Gandai and District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh Prosecutrix, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent For Petitioner/State For Respondent No.1 : : Mr. U.K.S. Chandel, Deputy A.G. Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate RAJSHEKHAR SONI Digitally signed by RAJSHEKHAR SONI 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Judgment on Board 04.04.2025 1. Since the instant CRA No. 789 of 2016 and CRMP No. 879 of 2016 arise out of one and same Sessions Trial, they have been clubbed and heard together and decided by this common judgment. 2. Criminal Appeal No. 789 of 2016 is preferred by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.05.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 04/2014, whereby the appellant/accused has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Section 363 of the Indian Penal Rigorous imprisonment (for short, Code (for short, ‘IPC’) ‘R.I.’) for 4 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month additional imprisonment Section 366 of the I.P.C. R.I. for 4 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month additional imprisonment Section 376(2)(ज)(ड) of the IPC R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month additional imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3 3. CRMP No. 879 of 2016 is preferred by the petitioner-State under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. against the findings recorded at paragraph 46 of the judgment dated 18.05.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, in Special Case No. 04/2014 by which while convicting the accused-Manoj Kumar Ratre for commission of offence punishable under Section 363, 366, and 376(2)(j)(n) of the IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, the POCSO Act), the learned trial Court has ordered for compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- payable to the father of victim by the State. 4.
Facts
Brief facts of the case are that, on 02.09.2012, the complainant, Mabbhu, son of Latel Meher, aged 55 years, resident of Village Bagur, Police Station Gandai, District Rajnandgaon, appeared at Police Station Gandai and lodged a missing person report regarding his granddaughter (the victim), aged 14 years, daughter of Khem Meher, resident of Village Bagur, Police Station Gandai. She was studying in Class 8 at the Government Middle School, Bagur and was residing with her mother. The complainant reported that in the intervening night of 31.08.2012 and 01.09.2012, after watching television with her mother Premin Bai and her aunt Phirti Bai, the victim went to sleep and at around 1:00 AM, she left the house without informing anyone. Despite making inquiries with relatives, her whereabouts could not be traced out. Based on the said report, a missing person case bearing No. 09/15 was registered and her description was noted as: dusky complexion, height approximately 4.5 feet, round face, black hair and lean build and investigation was initiated. On 10.05.2014, during the investigation of the missing person report, an 4 FIR was registered against accused Manoj Kumar under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. On 17.05.2014, the victim was recovered from the custody of Manoj Kumar and a recovery panchnama was prepared. After her recovery, the victim’s statement was recorded, in which she stated that Manoj used to work as a daily wage labour at the house of Sukhnandan Shende, located near her house. She liked him and developed feelings for him, and they began talking, but neither of their families were aware of their relationship. Manoj told her that their families would not agree to their marriage and suggested to elope then they went straight to Pune and did not contact anyone. In Pune, they worked as labourers at various under-construction buildings. According to local customs, Manoj put bangles on her wrists, signifying marriage, and they began living as husband and wife, hiding the fact that they had eloped. She often missed her family and asked Manoj to return home and meet her parents, but he would scare her by saying that the family would not accept their marriage. Later, she gave birth to a baby boy, who at the time of her statement was four months old. During this period, she never returned to Chhattisgarh. She mentioned that Manoj’s brother-in-law had met him during Holi, but she did not know what was discussed between them. Based on her statement, Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code was added to the charges against the accused. To verify the age of the victim, her school admission register from Government Primary School, Bagur, was seized, which indicated her date of birth as 06.11.1999. Thus, on the date of the incident, the victim was found to be under 18 years of age, and therefore, charges under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, were also added. 5 5. A spot map was prepared. The accused was arrested and sent for medical examination. With the permission of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the victim was also medically examined, and a vaginal slide was prepared and seized. Statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. of the witnesses were recorded, and upon completion of necessary investigation, the charge sheet was filed before the trial Court against the accused. 6. Learned trial Court framed charges for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under Section 5(l) read with Sections 376(2)(j)(n) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Upon the charges being read over and explained to him, who abjured his guilt. 7. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 09 documents in support of case of the prosecution. The appellant has neither examined any witness in his defence nor exhibited any document. 8. Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the circumstances appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. The defence has neither examined any witness nor has exhibited any document. 9. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant-Manoj Kumar Ratre and sentenced him as mentioned in paragraph 02 of this judgment, and as per paragraph 46 of the impugned judgment, after convicting the appellant the learned trial Court has also 6 ordered the State Government for payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- payable to the father of victim. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant- Manoj Kumar Ratre submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case. The prosecution has completely failed to prove the guilt of the appellant. He further submits that there are so many contradictions and omissions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has completely failed to prove the age of the victim that on the date of the incident, the victim was minor. He further submitted that learned trial Court erred in reading MLC report and statement of Dr. Leela Ramteke (PW-14) and has also failed to consider that there is nothing in medical report to show that forcible sexual intercourse was committed upon the victim. Furthermore, Dr. Leela Ramteke (PW-14), who has examined the victim to prove her age through X-ray report, is not a radiologist, and therefore, she cannot be said to be a competent person to prove the age of the victim through X-Ray report and as such, the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was a minor on the date of incident. The learned trial Court had not considered the whole evidence in its totality and only appreciated the evidence of victim (PW-11). 11.
Legal Reasoning
in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of 11 the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- 12 "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 19. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:- 13 “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufÏcient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the 14 age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. 15 At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or ofÏcial document maintained in the discharge of ofÏcial duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 20. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : 16 “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue OfÏcial (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which 17 is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from 18 the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 21. Inspector Sanjay Pundir (PW-13) has stated in statement that in connection with verification of the age of the complainant (PW-11), he went to Government Primary School, Bagur and seized the dakhil kharij register (Ex. P-6) related to the complainant from the Head Master Vijay Kumar Merav as per the seizure memo Ex. P-7, in which the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 06.11.1999. 19 22. Vijay Kumar Headmaster (PW-04) Government Primary School Bagur, confirming the statement of Sanjay Pundir Inspector (PW-13), has stated that the police had seized the admission and dismissal register of his school from the year 1998 to 2005 vide seizure memo Ex.P-7, which is Ex.P-6 and in the said register, at Sl. No. 918, the date of birth of the victim has been mentioned as 06.11.1999 along with name of her father Khemu Ram and mother Premin. This witness has admitted in his cross- examination that he has no idea on what basis the age of the victim was recorded. 23. The incident is of 31.08.2012, thus according to the Dakhal Kharij register Ex.P-6, the age of the victim (PW-11) is 11 years on the date of the incident. The parents of the victim Premin Bai and Khemu Ram have also stated the age of the victim to be 13-14 years on the date of the incident i.e. 31.08.2012. 24. Dr. Leela Ramteke (PW-14) has stated that she had advised X-ray of the right knee of the victim to confirm her age. 25. The investigating ofÏcer Sanjay Pundir (PW-13) has admitted that he did not try to obtain the X-ray report regarding the age of the victim in the cross-examination, although the doctor had advised him to get an X- ray done. He has given an explanation for this in the same paragraph that as he had sufÏcient evidence regarding the victim's age being less than 18 years on the date of the incident, so he did not get the X-ray done regarding the victim's age. 26. Thus it is clear that the X-ray of the right knee of the victim was not 20 done as per the doctor's instructions to determine her age. But Dr. Leela Ramteke has admitted in her cross-examination that the age of the victim shown in her report may be two years less or more. The doctor has stated in her report Ex.P-9 that the age of the victim is 15 ½ years. 27. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution could not produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of school Dakhil-kharij register, it would not be safe to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident. The statement of the prosecution witnesses are contradictory to each other with regard to the age of the victim and does not inspire confidence upon this Court to hold that the date of birth of the victim is 06.11.1999. 28. The next question for consideration would be whether the appellant has committed rape upon the victim or not ? 29. The victim (PW-11) has stated in her statement that at the time of the incident she was living with her grandparents and mother Premin Bai in village Bagur and the accused lived near her house, due to which she became acquainted with him and liked him. One day she told Manoj that we should go to another place, then the accused Manoj was standing near Daihaan at night and at 12.00 in the night she went to him from home and both of them went to Narmada on feet, from there they came to Khairagarh by sitting in a truck and from Khairagarh they went to Rajnandgaon by sitting in a small elephant and from there they boarded a train and reached Baramati at 1.00 in the afternoon and from there they 21 boarded a train and went to Pune, where they lived with Manoj as husband and wife for one and a half years at Manoj's acquaintance's house. In the meantime they had a child whose age was two years at the time of recording her evidence, after that the police came to Pune and took her, her child and Manoj to Gandai police station. In the cross- examination also, she has accepted that she went to Pune with Manoj of her own free will and while going to and coming from Pune she did not complain to anyone that she did not like Manoj. 30. Premin Bai (PW-09), mother of the victim has deposed that the victim went somewhere without informing anybody at home, about which she has told that she had informed her husband Khemu (PW-10). Later, on receiving information from Gandai police station that her daughter, the victim (PW-11) has been brought to the police station and she has went to police station, where her daughter, the victim (PW-11) and her 1½ years old child were present and on questioning the victim (PW-11), she has told that she had gone to Nagpur with Manoj and was stayed with him. 31. Khemu Ram (PW-10), father of the victim has corroborated the statement of Preim Bai (PW-09) and narrated the same version as deposed by her. 32. From the statements of the above prosecution witnesses that the victim (PW-11) had gone to Pune (Maharastra) along with accused Manoj which has not been refuted in the cross-examination of these witnesses. The defence has not even suggested to these witnesses that the victim did not go with accused Manoj. Rather, in the cross-examination of the victim, the defence has suggested that she went with Manoj of her own free will and while going to and coming from Pune, she did not complain to 22 anyone that Manoj was taking her forcibly and had made a relationship without her consent. The victim has accepted all the above suggestions, thus, in such a situation, it is clear that the victim went with Manoj of her own free will. 33. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do so in the instant case. 34. Considering the entire evidence available on record and the conduct of the victim, I am of the opinion that the victim was more than 18 years of age at the time of incident and she was a consenting party with the appellant. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, offence under Section 363, 366 and 376(2)(ज)(ड) of the IPC would not be made out against the appellant-Manoj Kumar Ratre. 35. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. 36.
Arguments
It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that as per statement of the victim (PW-11), one day she told Manoj that they should go somewhere else. At that time, accused Manoj was standing near a haystack at night, and around 12:00 AM, she went to him from her house. Both of them went on foot to Narmada, from where they boarded a truck to Khairagarh. From Khairagarh, they took a shared vehicle (Chhota Hathi) to Rajnandgaon, and from there, they boarded a train and reached 7 Baramati at around 1:00 PM. Then they took another train to Pune, where they stayed together at the house of someone known to Manoj and lived as husband and wife for about one and a half years. During this period, they had a child who is currently two years old. In paragraph 5 of the cross-examination as well, she admitted that she went to Pune with Manoj of her own will, and during the journey, she did not complain to anyone that Manoj was taking her by force. She also admitted that she had physical relations with Manoj with her consent, and further stated that if the police had not brought her back, she would have continued to live with Manoj and that even now she wishes to stay with him. Thus, from the statements made by the victim, it is clearly reflected that she was a consenting party in the incident involving the accused, therefore, the conviction of the appellant is not sustainable and the appellant should be acquitted of the charges framed against him. 12. So far as CRA No. 789/2016 is concerned, learned State Counsel opposed the submissions of learned counsel for the accused/appellant and submitted that the offences committed by the appellant were heinous in nature and thus, the trial Court had rightly convicted him. He submitted that the trial Court had considered all the arguments made by the appellant and there was sufÏcient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident which is proved by the Dakhil-kharij register (Ex.P/6) which contains the date of birth of the victim as 06.11.1999. The evidence of the victim need not be required for any corroboration and on the sole testimony of the victim, the conviction can be made. Therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court and 8 the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence needs no interference. 13. So far as CRMP No. 879/2016 is concerned, it is submitted by the learned State counsel, that the respondent No.1/accused and the victim are residing together, and the compensation which has been ordered by the trial Court to be paid by the State, does not seems to be reasonable as the victim voluntarily eloped with the accused and she is also having a child with him, hence, the amount of compensation Rs.1,00,000/- as has been directed by the trial Court to be paid by the State to the father of the victim, must be set-aside. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 15. The first and foremost question arose for the consideration would be whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not ? 16. In order to consider the age of the victim, we have examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the entry in Dakhil-kharij Register, which was seized vide Ex.P/6, statements of the victim (PW-11), mother of the victim (PW-9), father of the victim (PW-10), Vijay Kumar (PW-08) Head Master of Government Primary School, village Bagur, Police Station and Tahsil - Gandai, District Rajnandgaon. According to the Dakhil-kharij Register (Ex.P/6), the date of birth of the victim is 06.11.1999. 17. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi 9 Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other ofÏcial book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his ofÏcial duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, has observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate 10 would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded
Decision
In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 789/2016 is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.05.2016 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. 23 37. The appellant-Manoj Kumar Ratre is reported to be on bail. He need not surrender, however, his bail bonds and sureties are not discharged at this stage and shall remain operative for a period of 06 months from today in light of the provision of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). 38. So far as CRMP No. 879/2016 is concerned, as the respondent No.1 (accused-Manoj Kumar Ratre) and the victim are residing together, and the compensation which has been ordered by the trial Court to be paid by the State, does not seem to be reasonable as the victim has voluntarily eloped with the accused and she is also having a child with him, thus, the present appears to be a fit case for interference by this Court for exercising the inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC. Hence, the instant petition is allowed, and the amount of compensation Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac only) as has been directed by the trial Court to be paid by the State to the father of the victim vide paragraph 46 of the impugned judgment dated 18.05.2016 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, District – Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Special Case No. 04/2014, is hereby set-aside. 39. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Rahul Dewangan / Rajshekhar Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice