Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:35862-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FAM No.13 of 2023 1 - The Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Division No.1, Raipur 2 - The Land Acquisition Officer and Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Digitally signed by RAMAKANT NIRALA Aarang, District Raipur (C.G.) versus Appellant (s) 1 - Vinay Meghani S/o Shrichand Meghani R/o Gudhiyari Krishak Village Riwa, P.H. No.24, R.N.M. Mandirhasaud, Tahsil Aarang District Raipur (C.G.) Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) For Respondent(s) : :
Legal Reasoning
terms of the order passed by this Court in Uttam Agarwal and Naya Raipur (supra) . 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. This Court in the matter of Uttar Agarwal (supra) relying upon the various judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court and considering the relevant provisions with regard to delay, held in para 15, 16 and 17 as under : “15. In light of above, it is clear that merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. Section 74 (1) of the Act provides maximum time period therefore, any appeal beyond 60 days from the date of award without reasonable cause for such delay cannot be entertained by the High Court as High Court has no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 60 days from the date of passing of the impugned award in absence of reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay. 16. In present case also, it is clear that the impugned award was passed on 17.04.2023 by 4 learned Tribunal and it is clear from the application filed by the appellant that first letter for seeking permission/saction was written on 01.12.2023 to file the instant appeal and no satisfactory explanation was offered by the appellant for such delay caused in filing the appeal. The instant appeal has been filed on 12.03.2024 which is beyond 120 days of award dated 07.04.2023. Therefore, looking to the proviso and the fact that this appeal has been filed beyond 120 days without any just and reasonable explanation therefor, no appeal is entertained by the High Court and High Court has no power to condone such delay. 17. In the light of above, the application (I.A.No.01/2024) to condone the delay in filing the appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the land acquisition appeal is also dismissed.” 7. Further, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Naya Raipur (supra) relying upon the decision of this Court and Hon’ble Apex Court and considering the provision of Section 74 of the Act, 2013 held in para 9 as under :- “9. It is clear from this provision that the appeal can be preferred before the High Court within a period of 60 days from the date of award. It is further mentioned therein that the appellant was presented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period allowed it to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. The legislature has provided specific time period for filing an appeal and it is also therein that the delay of further period of 60 days can be considered if there is a sufficient reason. This Court has also observed in FAM No.9/2024 in 5 paras 9, 10, 11 & 15 as under:- “9. Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in the matter of State of Kerala Vs. Kool Foam Pvt. Ltd.; 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 863 observed in para 2 as under:- “2. Proviso to Section 74(1) of the Act is clear as to the maximum time, within which an appeal can be entertained by the High Court. Section 74(1) of the Act states that an appeal has to be filed within 60 days from the date of the award. Proviso states that the High Court may entertain the appeal if there is sufficient cause is shown beyond 60 days, provided, the appeal is filed within a further period of 60 days. That means, the maximum period, within which the appeal can be entertained by the High Court, is 120 days. Any appeal filed beyond. 120 days from the date of award cannot be entertained by the High Court as the High Court has no power to condone the delay beyond 60 days after the expiry of 60 days reckoned from the date of award.” 10. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others reported in (2010) 5 SCC 23 held in paras 24, 25, 26, 29 and 32 as under:- “24. Sections 111(1) and (2) lay down that any person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer or an appropriate Commission under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of the order made by an adjudicating officer or the appropriate Commission is received by him. Section 111(5) mandates that the Tribunal shall deal with the appeal as expeditiously as possible and b endeavour to dispose of the same finally within 180 days from the date of receipt thereof. If the appeal is not disposed of within 180 days, the Tribunal is 6 required to record reasons in writing for not doing so. 25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 26. The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil 7 courts (Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction. 29.Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co; (2001) 8 SCC 470. The precise question considered in that case was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two-Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in Mangu Ram v. MCD; (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel; AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra; (1974) 2 SCC 133, Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai; (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held: (Popular Construction Co. case2, SCC pp. 474-76, paras 12 & 16) "12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter’ used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. * 16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself * * 8 provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award ‘in accordance with’ sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub- section (3) would not be an application 'in accordance with’ sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that: that ‘36. Enforcement- Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court." This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to 'proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow' (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of 9 curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis supplied) 32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory.” 11. This Court in the matter of The Superintendent Engineer Vs. ECI-Keystone passed in ARBA No. 51 of 2023 dated 10.06.2024 observed in paras 11 to 14 as under:- 11. For the sake of brevity the relevant part of Sections 31 (5) and 34(3) of the Act, 1996 are reproduced hereinunder:- 31. Form and contents of arbitral award.- XXX XXX XXX (5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.- XXX XXX XXX (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been 10
Arguments
Mr. Ankur Kashyap, Advocate Mr. Raza Ali, Advocate Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board Per Rajani Dubey J. 24.07.2025 1. Heard on IA No.2/2023, application for condonation of delay of 321 days in filing the appeal. 2. The State/appellants have preferred this appeal under Section 74 2 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 (for short ‘the Act, 2013’) being aggrieved by the impugned award dated 12.08.2022 (Annexure A-1) passed by the Presiding Officer, the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Tribunal, Raipur (C.G.), in Reference Case No.35/2018, whereby the learned Tribunal allowed the reference petition filed by the respondent. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the delay occurred in filing the appeal is bonafide. After obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case, the instant appeal has been prepared and filed before this Court, however, some delay occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery, which is bonafide. He further submits that the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected delay. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate and intentional. Therefore, the application may kindly be allowed and the delay caused in filing the appeal may be condoned. 4. Learned counsel appearing for respondent has opposed the prayer of the appellants/State and relying upon the decision dated 23.09.2024 of this Court passed in FAM No. 10/2024 3 (State of C.G. & Ors. Vs. Shri Uttam Agarwal & Ors.) and decision dated 06.05.2025 passed in F.A. No.187/2024 (Naya Raipur Atal nagar Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Sumeet Kumar Agarwal & ors.,) submits that the issue with regard to condoning the delay has already been considered and resolved by this Court, therefore, the aforesaid appeal may be disposed of in
Decision
made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. 15.In light of above, it is clear that merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. Section 74 (1) of the Act provides maximum time period therefore, any appeal beyond 60 days from the date of award without reasonable cause for such delay cannot be entertained by the High Court as High Court has no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 60 days from the date of passing of the impugned award in absence of reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay.” 8. Admittedly, in the instant case also, the award was passed by the SDO on 02.06.2017 in favour of the respondent. Against this award, a reference was filed by the Collector and respondent both before the learned Tribunal and on 12.08.2022, the learned Tribunal passed the award in favour of respondent, against which the aforesaid appeal has been filed by the appellants/State on 25.08.2023 i.e. after such a prolonged period, which cannot be said to be bonafide and the same is an inordinate delay. 9. Accordingly, I.A.No.02/2023 application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is hereby rejected, consequent upon rejection of delay application, the aforesaid appeal is also dismissed in terms of the order passed by this Court and the Co-ordinate 11 Bench of this Court in Uttam Agarwal and Naya Raiipur (supra). Sd/- Rajani Dubey Judge Nirala Sd/- Amitendra Kishore Prasad Judge