Vibhor Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh Through- The Station House Officer, Police

For Petitioners : Mr. Sunil Otwani, Senior Advocate with Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate. For State : Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 27-07-2026

1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer:- “It is therefore humbly prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the FIR bearing FIR No.- 225/22 and Crime No.- 225/22 dated 16/4/22, registered at PS- Civil Lines, Raipur, District- Raipur, CG against the present petitioners for offence u/s 420, 468, 471, 34 of 3 IPC, Charge Sheet No.- 23-A/26, dated 16/5/26 for offence u/s 420, 468, 471, 34 of IPC which on a reading of FIR would show that the registration of the said FIR, charge sheet is a gross abuse of process of law, miscarriage of justice and thus liable to be quashed. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order taking cognizance dated 21/5/26 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, District- Raipur, CG in the interest of justice. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the entire criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners bearing Criminal Case No.- 29259/26 pending before the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Raipur, District- Raipur, CG in the interest of justice. Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deem fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioners in the interest of justice.”

2. The facts, as mentioned in the petition, are that the present petition arises out of an FIR registered against the petitioners for offences punishable under Sections 420 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, to which Sections 471 and 34 IPC were subsequently added at the time of filing of the charge-sheet. The prosecution case is that, pursuant to an order dated 09.08.2021 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Police Station Civil 4 Lines, Raipur, registered the impugned FIR on 16.04.2022. It is alleged that the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development had issued an advertisement dated 23.02.2011 inviting applications through VYAPAM for recruitment to the post of Sub- Engineer, requiring candidates to possess the prescribed educational qualification and a valid registration with the Employment Exchange. According to the prosecution, although the petitioners did not fulfill the essential eligibility conditions on the relevant date, they submitted OMR application forms declaring that they possessed the requisite qualifications and valid Employment Exchange registration, appeared in the selection process, and were ultimately appointed as Sub-Engineers. On the basis of these allegations, the petitioners were accused of cheating and forgery. After investigation, the police filed a charge- sheet on 16.05.2026 adding offences under Sections 471 and 34 of the IPC, whereupon the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, took cognizance by order dated 21.05.2026 and transferred the case to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, where it is presently pending for consideration of charge. The petitioners contend that their appointments had earlier been challenged in Writ Petition (C) No. 3571 of 2025, which was dismissed by this Court on 11.07.2025. Although the said order was reversed in Writ Appeal No. 661 of 2025 by judgment dated 03.02.2026 and the appointments were set aside on the ground that the petitioners did not satisfy the prescribed 5 eligibility criteria on the relevant date, the Division Bench specifically observed that the appointments were void for want of eligibility and not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation. The petitioners further assert that the State Government had consciously permitted final-year candidates to participate in the recruitment process, as the advertisement did not prescribe any cut-off date for acquiring the requisite qualification, and therefore their participation was with the knowledge and approval of the authorities. It is also stated that the judgment of the Division Bench has been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6065 of 2026 by order dated

11.02.2026, thereby protecting the services of the petitioners. On these facts, the petitioners contend that the FIR, charge-sheet, cognizance order, and consequential criminal proceedings are wholly unwarranted and constitute an abuse of the process of law, warranting interference by this Court.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned FIR, charge-sheet, cognizance order and the consequential criminal proceedings are a gross abuse of the process of law, as the basic ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code are wholly absent. It is contended that the petitioners neither committed any fraud nor submitted any forged or fabricated document in the recruitment process. Their candidature was accepted pursuant to the clarification issued by the State 6 Government dated 17.11.2011, whereby candidates who had appeared in the final semester examination but whose degree certificates had not yet been issued were held to be eligible. Consequently, the petitioners participated in the selection process with the knowledge and approval of the competent authorities, and after verification of their documents, they were appointed as Sub-Engineers. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble Division Bench, while deciding Writ Appeal No. 661 of 2025 by judgment dated 03.02.2026, categorically held that the petitioners had not committed any fraud or misrepresentation and that the fault, if any, lay with the State authorities in relaxing the eligibility criteria. The Division Bench treated the appointments only as irregular and not fraudulent, and the operation of the said judgment has subsequently been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 6065 of 2026, with the petitioners being permitted to continue in service. It is therefore argued that, in the absence of any fraudulent intent or deception, the essential ingredients of the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC are not satisfied, while the allegations of forgery under Sections 468 and 471 IPC are equally unsustainable since the petitioners had submitted only genuine educational documents in their own names and no false document, as contemplated under Section 464 IPC, was ever created or used. It is further submitted that the entire prosecution is founded on a service dispute relating to eligibility, which has already been examined in departmental proceedings, writ 7 proceedings before this Court, and is presently subjudice before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The attempt to impart a criminal colour to what is essentially an issue concerning recruitment eligibility is wholly impermissible in law. Learned counsel contends that the FIR was initially registered against unknown persons on

16.04.2022, no effective investigation was conducted for more than three years, and despite the petitioners' full cooperation, the charge-sheet came to be filed only on 16.05.2026 without any material establishing criminal intent, forgery, or fabrication of documents. The allegations are stated to be unsupported by any documentary evidence and the cognizance order dated

21.05.2026 is assailed as having been passed mechanically and without proper application of mind. Placing reliance on the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, it is submitted that the allegations in the FIR, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence and that the present case squarely falls within the categories warranting exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, it is prayed that the FIR, charge-sheet, cognizance order, and all consequential criminal proceedings be quashed to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the petition and submits that the FIR in question was registered pursuant to the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class Raipur and 8 after completion of due investigation the charge-sheet has been filed 420, 468 and 471, 34 of the IPC before the competent Court. Learned State counsel would further submit that the allegations levelled in the FIR and the charge-sheet disclose the commission of cognizable offences, which require appreciation of evidence and determination of disputed questions of fact, and the same cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short ‘BNSS’). It is further submitted that the defence raised by the petitioners is matter of evidence which may be examined by the trial Court during trial and do not, by themselves, constitute a ground for quashment of either the FIR or the criminal proceedings at the threshold. Therefore, the petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be dismissed.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition.

6. In Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Apex Court has observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot inquire about the reliability, genuineness, or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.) is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to 9 be cautious. The Apex Court has emphasized that though the Court has the power to quash the FIR in suitable cases, the Court, when it exercises power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.), only has to consider whether or not the allegations of FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider the case on merit. Further, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.) , final conclusions are as under:- “i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled 10 at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known 11 procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, 12 the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/ disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 13

7. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- “20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- (i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted prosecution/complainant; and/or the material that justifiably refuted it cannot be by is by the such, the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, 14 besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. [(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]”

8. The law is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and reaffirmed in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra) that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is extraordinary in nature and is to be exercised sparingly, with great caution and circumspection, only in exceptional cases where the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose any offence or where the proceedings manifestly amount to an abuse of the process of law.

9. In the present case, from the material available in the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, it transpires that there is allegation that against 275 advertised posts, appointments of 383 persons have been made. Further, many other irregularities in the recruitment process have been alleged regarding cut-off date and eligibility critaria because of which many persons who were not eligible for the said post have been appointed. There are also allegation against some of the candidates that they had submitted false information to secure their eligibility for the subject posts. Though the petitioners have raised their defence by contending that they neither committed any fraud nor submitted any forged or 15 fabricated documents, that they were permitted by the State Government to participate in the recruitment process pursuant to the clarification dated 17.11.2011, that the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.661 of 2025 observed that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on their part, and that the operation of the said judgment has been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, all these submissions pertain to the defence of the petitioners and involve disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of evidence. At this stage, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, this Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations or adjudicate upon the veracity of the defence put forth by the petitioners.

10. In the light of the aforesaid facts and the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 482 Cr.P.C.), this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case does not fall within the exceptional categories warranting interference at the threshold. The allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation and available the charge-sheet, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences, the correctness, truthfulness and evidentiary value whereof can only be tested during trial. The contentions advanced by the petitioners regarding absence of fraudulent intent, validity of their candidature, the findings recorded in the writ proceedings, and the 16 effect of the interim order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, constitute matters of defence involving disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS. At this stage, this Court is not expected to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence or record findings on the merits of the rival claims.

11. In the facts of the present case, this Court does not find that the matter falls within any of the exceptional categories warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. Since the allegations contained in the FIR as and the material collected during investigation and available in the charge sheet disclose a prima facie case, and the issues raised by the petitioners require adjudication on evidence before the competent trial Court, no ground is made out for quashing the FIR, charge- sheet, taking cognizance order, or the pending criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil