1 - Satyendra Kumar @ Sonu Patel S/o Govind Patel Aged About 19 Years v. 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of Police Station City
Case Details
1 CRA No.706 of 2016 SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2025.07.16 10:33:03 +0530 2025:CGHC:32658 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 706 of 2016 1 - Satyendra Kumar @ Sonu Patel S/o Govind Patel Aged About 19 Years R/o Purani Basti, Police Station City Kotwali, Baloda Bazar, District Baloda Bazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of Police Station City Kotwali, District Baloda Bazar - Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant : Shri Tapan Kumar Chandra, Advocate appears on behalf of Shri Tarendra Kumar Jha, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer 2 CRA No.706 of 2016 Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 14.07.2025 1. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C is against impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.05.2016 passed in Special S.T. No. 01/2016 by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Baloda Bazar, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, (C.G.), whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence U/s 456 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 01 year along with fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment additional R.I. for one month U/s 354 of the IPC and Rigorous imprisonment for 03 Section 8 of the Protection of years with fine of Rs. 1000/-, and Children from Sexual Offence in default of payment additional Act, 2012 R.I. for 03 months. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. (Fine amount has already been deposited) 2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 12.12.2005 at about 04:00 am victim was going to answer the nature’s call, at that time appellant jumped from terrace into the courtyard of the prosecutrix and went towards the bathroom and thereafter caught hold of the 3 CRA No.706 of 2016 prosecutrix and tried to outrage her modesty. Victim cried and upon hearing her cry her parents came to the place of incident
Facts
and caught the appellant and subsequently FIR (Ex. P/7) was registered to Police Station City Kotwali, Baloda Bazar. 3. During investigation, Spot Map (Ex.P/2) was prepared. With regard to date of birth of the Victim, Dakhil Kharij register (Ex.P/5C) was seized. The mark-sheet produced by the Victim was seized vide Ex.P/1. Statement of the witnesses were recorded. Subsequently after completing the investigation, a charge-sheet under Section 354, 456 of the IPC and Sections 8 of the POCSO Act was submitted before the Court. 4. After framing the charges against the accused/appellant, the charges were read out and explained to the appellant, he denied committing the crime and demanded trial. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined 11 witnesses in its support. Statement of the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded, wherein he has pleaded his innocence and false implication in the matter. However, no evidence was adduced by him in his defence. 6. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 03.05.2016 convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in paragraph one of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 4 CRA No.706 of 2016 7.
Legal Reasoning
42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by 7 CRA No.706 of 2016 admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate for 8 CRA No.706 of 2016 unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 15. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: What "33. emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 9 CRA No.706 of 2016 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. age 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought the case is before the JJ Board when pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record to 10 CRA No.706 of 2016 and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would per Section 35 have to be considered as of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological 11 CRA No.706 of 2016 not examination. Such evidence is conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 16. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) 12 CRA No.706 of 2016 as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar 13 Pradesh & Ors that: CRA No.706 of 2016 "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 17. Thus, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution with regard to the age of the victim cannot be held reliable in absence of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. 14 CRA No.706 of 2016 18. Now, the questions comes whether the appellant jumped from terrace into the courtyard of the prosecutrix and went towards the bathroom and thereafter caught hold of her arm and has tried to outrage the modesty of the Victim or not?. 19. The Victim (PW8) in her statement has deposed that when she slept in her house with her mother and siblings at around 04:00 AM, she went to the bathroom in the house, at that time accused came into her bathroom from the roof and started pressing her breast by holding her arm then she shouted calling her parents, her parents came and caught the accused. She has admitted in her cross examination that during the recording of her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C she stated that when she got up to answer the nature’s call on the terrace, accused came and twisted her hand. 20. Mother of the Victim (PW-7) has deposed that she is uneducated and cannot tell the date. She stated that four months ago at 04:00 AM upon hearing her daughter’s voice, she looked up and saw the accused standing near the prosecutrix, on seeing them, the accused tried to run away, then they caught hold of the accused. She further deposed that her daughter told her that accused had come to her with a wrong intention. 21. Father of the Victim (PW9) has deposed in his examination-in- chief that he is sleeping in his room when he heard the scream of his daughter which was coming from the bathroom situated on the 15 CRA No.706 of 2016 first floor, he went there with his wife, the accused was trying to run away after seeing them. He further deposed that they caught the accused and asked him how he had come, but the accused did not answer. 22. After going through the statements of the Victim (PW8), the victim has categorically stated in her statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. that she got up to answer the call of nature and went to the terrace where the accused came and twisted her hand, thereafter she screamed and on which her parents came to the terrace. However, in the cross-examination of Court statement she has deposed that the accused came into the bathroom from the roof and started pressing her breast by holding arms. 23. On perusal of her statement, it is apparent that there are contradictions and creates doubt in the statement of the Victim because in the statement before the Magistrate she has stated that the accused came to the terrace and caught hold of her hand, but no statement has been given by the victim about the physical abuse and in her cross examination before the Court she has stated that the accused came to the bathroom and pressed her breasts by holding the hands. Thus, the act of the Victim does not inspire the confidence of this Court towards the guilt of the appellant because of the material contradictions in the statements and particularly there is doubt in respect of the place of incident. 24. Upon considering the entire evidence available on record, this Court 16 CRA No.706 of 2016 found that there are major contradictions and omissions in the statement of the Victim, which does not inspire confidence over the credibility of her statement because she had given statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C contradictory to her statement given before the trial Court, which in the opinion of this Court, seems unreliable. 25. It is the trite law that a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating statements made by witnesses in the committal court or even to contradict the same. The Supreme Court in the matter of R. Shaji v. State of Kerala1 has held as under:- “27. So far as the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 164 is concerned, the object is twofold; in the first place, to deter the witness from changing his stand by denying the contents of his previously recorded statement; and secondly, to tide over immunity from prosecution by the witness under Section 164. A proposition to the effect that if a statement of a witness is recorded under Section 164, his evidence in court should be discarded, is not at all warranted. 28. Section 157 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating statements made by witnesses in the committal Court or even to contradict the same. As the defence had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements are recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., such statements cannot be treated as substantive evidence. ” 1 (2013) 14 SCC 266 17 CRA No.706 of 2016
Arguments
Mr. Tapan Kumar Chandra, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case. He would submit that there is discrepancy between statement recorded u/s 164 of Cr.P.C. and statement given by the complainant in the court. In the evidence of the witnesses, it can be seen that there are material contradiction and omissions. Learned counsel would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial court is bad in law as well as facts available on record. 8. Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and submits that the conviction of the appellant is well merited which does not call for any interference. There is clear evidence regarding age of the prosecutrix, therefore, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question arises before this Court whether the victim was minor on the date of incident or not?. 11. The Victim (PW8) in her deposition has stated that her date of birth is 13.09.2000 and she has presented the progress card of 5 CRA No.706 of 2016 class 8th ( Ex.-P/1) in which the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 13.09.2000. 12. Satyaprakash Pandey (PW3) Principal has deposed in his statement that with regard to the date of birth of the Victim, the Dakhil Kharij Register was seized from him. Though this witness has accepted that the entries at serial No. 11092 in Ex.P/5 has not been made by him, he has also disclosed that he cannot tell who came to write down the date of birth of the victim. He further stated that admission is given on the basis of Transfer Certificate. however, there was no document with regard to the age of the Victim. The prosecution has brought on record Class- VIII report card of the victim to prove the age of the victim, however, there is no one examined to prove the entries made in the said report card. Even, there is no medical evidence with regard to actual age of the victim. 13. Perusal of the aforesaid statements of the witness would show that though there is entry regarding date of birth of the victim in the Dakhil Kharij register, but on what basis, the entry was made, is not mentioned in the register and even the class-VIII report card of the Victim. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: 6 CRA No.706 of 2016 "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, of birth who made the entry or who gave the date is examined.
Decision
26. For the foregoing reasons, the accused is acquitted of the charges for which he was tried. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of Section 481 of the BNSS. Accordingly, the Criminal appeal is allowed. 27. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib