SHAYNA v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Ps Bagicha, Distt. Jashpur C.G. , Chhattisgarh

Judgment

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 14.10.2014, passed in Special Case No. 09 of 2014, whereby learned Special Judge, Jashpur, District – Jashpur (C.G.) convicted appellant for offences as under : 2 Conviction Sentence U/s 376(2)(k) of the I.P.C. U/s 376(2)(n) of the I.P.C. U/s 323 of the I.P.C. U/s 506(II) of the I.P.C. Rigorous imprisonment for 14 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 year Rigorous imprisonment for 14 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 year Rigorous imprisonment for 06 months and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 03 months Rigorous imprisonment for 02 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 03 months Note : All the sentence run concurrently.

2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are, that the case of prosecution revolves around a complaint filed by the prosecutrix on

18.06.2013, alleging that the appellant committed rape against her on

two separate occasions. The first incident reportedly occurred in January, 2013 when the prosecutrix was working at the house of appellant, engaged in plastering walls with soil. According to the prosecutrix, the appellant sent his wife away on an errand to the provision store, leaving her alone with him. He then allegedly caught hold of her and committed rape, threatening her that if she disclosed the matter to her husband or anyone else, he would kill her. Due to this threat, the prosecutrix did not immediately report the incident. The second incident took place on 16.08.2013, at about 5:00 am. The prosecutrix was collecting Mahua (a type of flower) under the Solgari Hill. The appellant allegedly reached the location at around 7:00 am and questioned her about why she had disclosed the previous incident to her husband. He then beat her with his hands and a stick (danda), causing her injuries. The appellant allegedly committed rape again, despite the resistance made by prosecutrix. As a result of this assault, 3 she sustained injuries on her thigh, near the knee, cheek, and elbow of her left hand, and on her back. After the appellant ran away, the prosecutrix returned home and informed her husband about the incident. Her husband then accompanied her to the police station, where a report was lodged on 18.06.2013, at about 7:45 pm. The Police registered the case as Crime No. 98/2013 under the aforementioned offences.

3. During the trial, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses in support of its case and have exhibited 17 documents, whereas, appellant has examined 01 witness in support of his defence. However, there were no eyewitnesses to the crime, and the case of prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of the prosecutrix and circumstantial evidence.

4. The trial Court, after considering the evidence and testimonies, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to imprisonment. The appellant has challenged this conviction and sentence in the present appeal, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defense adopted by appellant likely emphasized the lack of direct evidence, inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecutrix, and potential motives for false implication. The appeal seeks to overturn the conviction and sentence, claiming that the judgment of trial Court was not sustainable in law.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution story suffers from multiple inconsistencies and material contradictions which render the conviction unsustainable. It was submitted that according to the prosecution, the first alleged incident of rape occurred in January 2013 when the prosecutrix had gone to the house of appellant for labor 4 work related to plastering. However, despite this serious allegation, the prosecutrix did not disclose the incident to anyone, including her husband, for a prolonged period of approximately six months. During this time, rumors began circulating in the village regarding a purported love affair between the appellant and the prosecutrix. These rumors were the catalyst for the husband of prosecutrix becoming suspicious and hostile towards the appellant. The husband publicly assaulted the prosecutrix in front of villagers, as is clearly stated by Shankar Ram Yadav (DW-1) in his examination-in-chief, demonstrating the extent of the family and social turmoil caused by these rumors. Only after this incident of domestic violence husband of prosecutrix lodge a First Information Report (FIR) against the appellant on 18.06.2013. Learned counsel for appellant emphasized that these facts strongly suggest that the entire case was concocted with an intention to falsely implicate the appellant in a criminal offence, motivated by the rumors and the subsequent anger of husband. Further, it was argued that the learned trial Court erred in not giving due consideration to the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In his statement, the appellant had specifically asserted that the husband of prosecutrix harbored resentment against him due to the village rumors of an illicit relationship and had sought revenge by fabricating a false case. This defense version is corroborated by Shankar Ram Yadav (DW-01), whose deposition clearly indicated the animosity that existed within the family of prosecutrix, as well as the public beating inflicted upon her by her husband with a wooden stick near the village hand pump. This evidence significantly undermines the claim of prosecution that the injuries sustained by the prosecutrix were 5 inflicted by the appellant, establishing instead that the injuries were caused by the assault done by husband.

6. It is further pointed out that the medical evidence presented by the prosecution was also critically examined. The statement of PW-06, Dr. Smt. V. Bakhla, who conducted the medical examination of the prosecutrix, indicated in paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 that her opinion regarding forceful sexual intercourse was largely based on the presence of external injuries rather than any definitive internal examination findings. This raises substantial doubts about the conclusiveness of the medical evidence supporting the allegation of rape, as the external injuries alone cannot conclusively establish non- consensual intercourse. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses who were responsible for the seizure of alleged evidence presented a contradictory and unreliable version. Sukhnath Bhagat (PW-01) admitted during cross-examination that the wooden stick seized by the police was a common household item easily found anywhere and not an object uniquely linked to the appellant. He further revealed that he signed the seizure memo (Exhibit P/1) merely on the instruction of his senior officer, PW-11, casting doubts on the authenticity and voluntariness of his action. Similarly, Nakul Say (PW-02) stated in his cross-examination that he did not witness the seizure of the wooden stick from the possession of appellant, nor did he observe what items were handed over by the female constable PW-04 to PW-11. These discrepancies seriously question the validity of Exhibit P/1 and its relevance to the case, thereby weakening the evidentiary foundation of prosecution. The Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report further exposes significant gaps in the case of prosecution. The report is 6 vague and non-specific about whose semen was detected on the seized clothes of the prosecutrix. Importantly, no attempt was made by the prosecution to seize any clothing or biological samples from the appellant for comparative DNA analysis. This glaring omission means that the FSL report cannot conclusively link the appellant to the semen stains found, thus severely impairing the evidentiary weight of the forensic findings. The prosecutrix herself admitted in paragraph 19 of her testimony that she had slept with her husband on 17.06.2013, just a day before the FIR was lodged. This admission raises a plausible alternative explanation for the presence of semen on her clothes, further supported by the absence of DNA testing to differentiate between the genetic material of husband and the appellant. In light of these glaring discrepancies, contradictions, and evidentiary lacunae, it was submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The delay in filing the FIR, the motive to falsely implicate the appellant arising out of rumors and domestic disputes, the questionable medical evidence, the unreliable seizure and testimonies of prosecution witnesses, and the inconclusive forensic report cumulatively cast serious doubts on the case of prosecution. It is urged that these defects in the case of prosecution are fatal and thus warrant the acquittal of the appellant. Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Court deserve to be set aside in the interest of justice.

7. Learned State counsel opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant and would submit that the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is well-reasoned, based on the consistent and credible testimony of the prosecutrix, duly supported by medical 7 evidence, circumstantial corroboration, and the sequence of events, all of which establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that in cases of sexual assault, the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if found credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to sustain conviction, even in the absence of direct eyewitnesses. In the present case, the prosecutrix has clearly and consistently narrated the manner in which she was sexually assaulted on two separate occasions by the appellant, firstly, in January 2013 at his residence while she was engaged in labor work, and later on

16.08.2013 under Solgari Hill while collecting Mahua. The prosecutrix explained the delay in lodging the FIR by stating that she was threatened with death by the appellant if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Her fear and the socio-economic circumstances surrounding her clearly justify the delay in reporting, which cannot be held against her in a rigid or mechanical manner. It is further submitted that the defense theory of false implication on account of village rumors about an alleged affair is not only speculative but also appears to be an afterthought. The defense has failed to explain why the prosecutrix, a married woman from a modest background, would subject herself to the trauma of medical examination, social stigma, and cross- examination unless the allegations were true. The suggestion that the husband of the prosecutrix fabricated the entire case out of revenge is not supported by any concrete evidence. The testimony of Shankar Ram Yadav (DW-1), relied upon by the defense, does not conclusively establish that the injuries on the prosecutrix were caused by her husband. Even if such an incident of domestic violence occurred, it does not negate the possibility that she was also assaulted by the 8 appellant, especially when she has given a clear and detailed account of both sexual assaults, supported by medical findings. Regarding the medical evidence, it is submitted that Dr. Smt. V. Bakhla (PW-06), has confirmed the presence of multiple injuries on the body of the prosecutrix, including on sensitive parts such as the thigh, near the knee, cheek, elbow, and back. While it is correct that the opinion of doctor on forceful sexual intercourse was based on external injuries, such injuries are consistent with the account of resistance and force used by the appellant, as narrated by the prosecutrix. In cases of delayed reporting, internal injuries may not be visible, and absence of such findings cannot be construed to disbelieve the prosecutrix. The attack on the seizure of the wooden stick (danda) and the inconsistencies in seizure procedure pointed out by the defense are minor procedural lapses that do not go to the root of the matter. Even if the stick was a common article, its evidentiary value is supplementary. The case of prosecution is not solely dependent on the seizure of the stick, but primarily on the testimony of prosecutrix and the injuries noted during her medical examination. The alleged contradictions in the statements of Sukhnath Bhagat (PW-01) and Nakul Say (PW-02) regarding seizure are not significant enough to discard the entire prosecution case. These are minor inconsistencies which are natural in any trial and, in fact, lend credibility to the case of prosecution by showing that the witnesses were not tutored. As far as the FSL report is concerned, it is submitted that while the report does not specifically identify the origin of the semen, the absence of DNA profiling does not, by itself, render the account of prosecutrix untrustworthy. The lapse in obtaining the biological samples of accused for comparison, though 9 unfortunate, is not fatal in the face of consistent oral and medical evidence. The statement of prosecutrix that she slept with her husband the night before the FIR may raise a possibility of semen transfer from her husband, but that does not rule out the occurrence of rape on the morning of 16.08.2013, which was accompanied by physical injuries that independently corroborate her version of events. The failure to link the semen to the appellant through DNA analysis is not conclusive proof of innocence, especially where other evidence strongly supports the allegations.

8. It is also important to note that the learned trial Court had the advantage of observing the demeanor of the prosecutrix and other witnesses during trial, and after thorough appreciation of evidence, arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution had successfully established the charges. The trial Court has given detailed reasons for disbelieving the defense and convicting the appellant, and merely because another view may be theoretically possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with findings of fact unless they are shown to be perverse or wholly unsustainable, which is not the case here. In conclusion, it is submitted that the delay in FIR has been satisfactorily explained; the testimony of the prosecutrix is clear, consistent, and cogent; and the medical and circumstantial evidence supports her version. The defense has failed to establish any credible motive for false implication, and the minor contradictions highlighted are not sufficient to shake the core of the prosecution case. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is legal, just, and based on sound reasoning, and does not warrant 10 interference. It is prayed that the appeal filed by the appellant be dismissed in its entirety.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents enclosed along with the appeal with utmost circumspection.

10. Prosecutrix (PW-7), the victim testified about the two incidents of rape, stating that the accused committed forceful sexual intercourse. She described the injuries she sustained during the second incident. Her testimony is corroborated by other witnesses and medical evidence. She identified the accused as the perpetrator and described the threats he made to her. Her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC supports her testimony in Court. She withstood cross-examination, maintaining her account of the incidents. The Court found her testimony credible and reliable. Pushtam Ram (PW-4) is the husband of victim, who corroborated her testimony, stating that she informed him about the incidents. He testified that he accompanied her to file a report and witnessed her injuries after the second incident. His testimony supports the case of prosecution. He described the condition of victim after the incident and her disclosure to him. His evidence corroborates the account of victim. He withstood cross-examination, affirming his statement. Parmanand Ram (PW-9), this witness supported the account of prosecutrix, corroborating her testimony about the incidents. This witness has clearly stated that prosecutrix / victim has never disclosed about commission of any offence before 18.06.2013. Dr. V. Bakhla (PW-6) is the doctor, who has stated about the injuries suffered by victim, which were consistent with the alleged assault. The evidence of doctor supports the case of prosecution. The doctor described the 11 injuries of victim in detail. The testimony of doctor corroborates the account of victim of the assault. The medical evidence is crucial in establishing the nature of the injuries. Dr. Mithlesh Minz (PW-10), the doctor who examined the accused testified that he was physically capable of committing the offense. The evidence of doctor is relevant in the investigation. The testimony of doctor is part of the evidence of prosecution. The Court considered the evidence of doctor in evaluating the case. R.S. Maravi (PW-11), the investigating officer testified about collecting evidence and preparing the site plan. The evidence of officer is crucial in establishing the investigation process. The officer described the crime scene and the evidence collected. Larang Ram (PW-12), the Deputy Superintendent of Police testified about overseeing the investigation. The evidence of officer is relevant in ensuring proper procedures were followed.

11. Shankar Ram Yadav (DW-1) is examined as the defense witness, providing a detailed account of an incident that he claimed to have witnessed in June of the previous year. According to the witness, he visited the village of Sarai Pani (Ragra), he saw Pushtam Ram, the husband of the victim, Vimla Bai, arrive at the hand pump near the house of accused. The witness alleged that Pushtam was holding hand of Vimla and had a stick in his other hand. The witness claimed that Pushtam then hit Vimla 3-4 times with the stick, and he, Renku Ram, and nephew of Pushtam, Krishna, intervened, asking Pushtam why he was beating Vimla there and suggesting he take her home. The witness stated that Pushtam took Vimla away, holding her hand, and he left for his village. This testimony aims to support the accused's claim of false implication. 12

12. From the careful scrutiny of the entire evidence brought on record, it is noted that the first alleged incident of rape is said to have occurred in January 2013, yet no report was lodged until 18.06.2013, i.e., after an inexplicable delay of nearly six months. The prosecutrix has admitted that she did not disclose the incident even to her husband or any other person during this prolonged period. Subsequently, a second alleged incident was said to have occurred on 16.06.2013, which appears to have been introduced in the narrative only to justify the delayed FIR. This raises doubts about the genuineness of the allegations. It is apparent from the record that the second incident was a concocted event, added after a domestic dispute triggered by rumors of an affair between the appellant and the prosecutrix.

13. Though it is well-settled in law that the conviction for rape can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, the settled legal position also demands that such testimony must inspire the confidence of the Court and be of sterling quality. In the present case, the statement of the prosecutrix lacks consistency, naturalness, and spontaneity. Further, her husband (PW-08), whom she claimed to have informed about the incident, did not state that the first incident was ever disclosed to him prior to the second. Parmanand Ram (PW-09), brother of the husband, also categorically stated that the prosecutrix never disclosed any such fact prior to 18.06.2013.

14. The defense has led cogent evidence suggesting a false implication. The testimony of DW-1, Shankar Ram Yadav, a natural and independent witness, clearly indicates that the prosecutrix was beaten by her husband with a stick near the village hand pump just days before the FIR was lodged. This crucial testimony suggests that the 13 injuries attributed to the accused were likely inflicted by her husband during the public altercation, and not by the appellant. The motive for false implication is clearly evident, stemming from village rumors of an illicit relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant, leading to domestic strife and ultimately, the filing of the complaint as a retaliatory measure. It appears probable that the prosecutrix, under pressure from her husband after facing public humiliation and physical assault, lodged a false report. Her failure to disclose the alleged incident of January, 2013 to her husband or any other person over several months significantly undermines her credibility. In such a situation, the non- reporting of the earlier offence, combined with a sudden and delayed disclosure, creates serious doubt about the veracity of the allegations made by prosecutrix.

15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Ali Alias Guddu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 272 has held that a conviction for rape can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, but only if her evidence is of sterling quality and inspires confidence. Since the prosecutrix's version in this case was inconsistent and uncorroborated, the Court acquitted the accused, giving him the benefit of doubt. Relevant paragraph is quoted as under : “29. Be it noted, there can be no iota of doubt that on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is unimpeachable and beyond reproach, a conviction can be based. In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court have persuaded themselves away with this principle without appreciating the acceptability and reliability of the testimony of the witness. In fact, it 14 would not be inappropriate to say that whatever the analysis in the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 2006, decided on 25-3-2009 (All)] , it would only indicate an impropriety of approach. The prosecutrix has deposed that she was taken from one place to the other and remained at various houses for almost two months. The only explanation given by her is that she was threatened by the accused persons. It is not in her testimony that she was confined to one place. In fact, it has been borne out from the material on record that she had travelled from place to place and she was ravished a number of times. Under these circumstances, the medical evidence gains significance, for the examining doctor has categorically deposed that there are no injuries on the private parts. The delay in FIR, the non- examination of the witnesses, the testimony of the prosecutrix, the associated circumstances and the medical evidence, leave a mark of doubt to treat the testimony of the prosecutrix as so natural and truthful to inspire confidence. It can be stated with certitude that the evidence of the prosecutrix is not of such quality which can be placed reliance upon.”

16. As far as the medical and forensic evidence is concerned, Dr. Smt. V. Bakhla (PW-06) has stated that her opinion regarding forceful intercourse was based on external injuries, and there were no conclusive internal findings to support the charge of rape. Further, the FSL report merely states the presence of semen and spermatozoa on the clothes of prosecutrix, but no biological sample or clothing of the appellant was seized, and no DNA test was conducted. The prosecutrix herself admitted that she had intercourse with her husband the night prior to lodging the FIR, thereby casting doubt on the origin of the 15 semen. Hence, the failure to link the semen to the accused, due to absence of DNA profiling, is a significant lacuna in the prosecution case.

17. In the matter of Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 130, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the male semen found on the clothes of prosecutrix and the accused was medically capable of sexual intercourse, but no DNA test was conducted to conclusively link the accused, which weakens the case of prosecution. After the insertion of Section 53-A in CrPC (2006), DNA testing is mandatory in such cases to provide conclusive proof, and failure to do so results in the prosecution facing adverse consequences and has held as under : “40. The appellant was also examined by the doctor, who had found him capable of performing sexual intercourse. In the undergarments of the prosecutrix, male semen were found but these were not sent for analysis in the forensic laboratories which could have conclusively proved, beyond any shadow of doubt with regard to the commission of offence by the appellant. This lacuna on the part of the prosecution proves to be fatal and goes in favour of the appellant.

44. Now, after the incorporation of Section 53-A in the Criminal Procedure Code w.e.f. 23-6-2006, brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the respondent State, it has become necessary for the prosecution to go in for DNA test in such type of cases, facilitating the prosecution to prove its case against the accused. Prior to 2006, even without the aforesaid specific provision in CrPC the prosecution 16 could have still resorted to this procedure of getting the DNA test or analysis and matching of semen of the appellant with that found on the undergarments of the prosecutrix to make it a foolproof case, but they did not do so, thus they must face the consequences.”

18. The trial Court appears to have proceeded on the assumption that the testimony of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient, without appreciating the overall context, contradictions, and evidentiary shortcomings in the case. The benefit of doubt, as per settled criminal jurisprudence, must go to the accused where the prosecution fails to prove its case with clarity and coherence. The prosecution in this case has failed to discharge that burden.

19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Phool Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 74 has held as under :

8. In Ganesan [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 76] , this Court has observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, this Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments of this Court on conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix. In paras 10.1 to 10.3, it is observed and held as under : (Ganesan case [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 76] , SCC pp. 578-82) “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 639] , it is 17 observed in paras 9 to 14 as under : (SCC pp. 195-98) ‘9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under : (SCC p. 559, para 16) “16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of 18 law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.”

10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 780] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the 19 court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 597, para 12) “12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.”

11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant 20 discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 394- 96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) “

8. … The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of 21 rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. … Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … * * *

21. … The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit 22 reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.”

12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1080] , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non- examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence.

13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 674] , this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of 23 circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 9 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1208] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213 : AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 SCR 377] .

14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.’

10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] , it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality.

10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi). In para 22, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 29) ‘22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering 24 the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co- relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a 25 witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.’ ” (emphasis in original)

9. In Pankaj Chaudhary [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264] , it is observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of the accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It is further observed and held that sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be doubted by the court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In para 29, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 587) “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] ]. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is 26 not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 898] ].”

10. In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana [Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 129] , it is observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paras 6 and 7, it is observed and held as under : (SCC pp. 37-38) “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution 27 case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] (SCC p. 403, para 21).]

7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self- respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The 28 testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1725] .)”

20. In light of the foregoing discussion and decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court are not sustainable in law. The prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the material on record leads to a plausible alternative hypothesis of false implication.

21. The conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 376(2)(k), 376(2)(n), 323, and 506(II) of the Indian Penal Code are hereby set aside. The appellant is hereby acquitted of all the charges.

22. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed.

23. The appellant is reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of CR.P.C., the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Cr.P.C. of sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the trial Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with 29 an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

24. Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) Judge Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Shayna 30 Head-Note A conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the victim or prosecutrix, if her deposition is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, and of sterling quality, carrying inherent credibility.