Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2025.08.25 10:30:23 +0530 2025:CGHC:40885 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 329 of 2016 1 - Agni Kumar Bijhwar S/o Bhuneshwar Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Pathiyapali, Thana And Tahsil Baramkela, Civil And Revenue District Raigarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Baramkela, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mrs. Sharmila Singhai, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Kanchan Kalwani, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri R.C.S. Deo, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 13/08/2025 1. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C is against impugned judgment of conviction and order 2 of sentence dated 26.02.2016 passed in POCSO Case No. 29/2015 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarangarh, District- Raigarh (C.G.), whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence U/s 8 of Prevention of Rigorous imprisonment for 03 Children from Sexual years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- Offence Act, 2012 with default stipulation. 2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that the prosecutrix, a resident of village Pathiyapali, lodged a written report at Police Station Baramkela on 26.08.2015. stating that she is about 16 years of age and a student of Class XI at Government Girls Higher Secondary School, Baramkela. On the said date, at about 07:00 a.m., she had gone to bath in the Furha Nala situated near her house. After bathing, while she was returning holding her clothes, the accused/appellant, a resident of the same village, suddenly came from behind caught hold of her waist and abdomen with intent to outrage her modesty. When she turned back, the accused disclosed his identity and upon raising an alarm, he released her and fled from the spot. She also cried out for her mother. At that 3 time, her grandmother, who had gone there to dispose of cow dung, witnessed the incident. On hearing her cries, both her mother and grandmother saw the accused running away and also raised alarm. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid written report (Exhibit P-3), Police Station Baramkela registered Crime No. 100/2015 against the accused under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (vide Ex. P-4) and took up the investigation. 4. During investigation, Spot Map (Ex.P/5) was prepared. With regard to date of birth of the Victim, Birth and Death reporting form (Ex.P/2) was seized. Statement of the Victim and the Statements of witnesses were recorded. Subsequently after completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted before the Court. 5. After framing the charges against the accused/appellant, the charges were read out and explained to the appellant, he denied committing the crime and demanded trial. 6. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined 08 witnesses in its support. Statement of the 4 accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded, wherein he has pleaded his innocence and false implication in the matter. However, he has examined one defense witness Khoblal (DW-1) in support of his defense. 7. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 26.02.2016 convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in paragraph one of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 8.
Legal Reasoning
recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth 10 as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for 11 the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 18. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. 12 XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufÏcient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub- section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay 13 down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or ofÏcial document maintained in the discharge of ofÏcial duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion 14 for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 19. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never 15 relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue OfÏcial (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or 16 juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 20. Very recently in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The 17 State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at 18 the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's ofÏce and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufÏcient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said 19 to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was 20 between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 21. Thus, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution with regard to the age of the victim cannot be held reliable in absence of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgment and from the perusal of the statements of the witnesses, it is evident that there is no consistency regarding the date of birth of the victim. Different witnesses have stated different dates of birth at different stages of the proceedings. While some witnesses have stated one particular date, others have either failed to remember or have asserted that the school records are incorrect. Such variations and contradictions in the statements clearly create doubt and establish that there is no certainty regarding the actual date of birth of the victim. 22. The next question for consideration would be whether the appellant has tried to outrage the modesty of the victim? 23. PW/2 victim in her statement has stated that that the incident 21 took place on 26.08.2015 between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. She stated that after taking a bath in the village stream, she was returning home when the accused came from behind and caught hold of her waist with ill intention. She further stated that thereafter she raised an alarm and started moving towards her house, upon which the accused ran away. The witness stated that after reaching home, she narrated the incident to her mother and grandmother. She further stated that when her father came home, she also informed him about the incident. The witness stated that the house of the accused is situated near her house, and after the incident, a quarrel took place between the family members of both sides. She further stated that thereafter, she along with her father went to the police station to lodge the report. 24. PW/ 2 is the grand- mother of the victim stated that on the date of the incident, in the morning, while she was going to throw cow dung, she heard cries of victim. On hearing this, she went there and saw the accused running away from the spot. The witness has further deposed that thereafter victim came home weeping and informed her that the accused had 22 caught hold of her waist. She further stated in her examination in chief that victim informed about the incident after she reached home. 25. (PW-4) Father of the Victim has deposed that victim had gone to the village stream for bathing. After bathing, when she was returning the accused came from behind and, with the intention to outrage her modesty, caught hold of her waist. The witness has further stated that at that time his daughter fell into the mud and her clothes also slipped off. Thereafter, victim’s grandmother rushed to the spot and asked his daughter what had happened. The witness has further deposed that thereafter he also went to the spot and chased the accused upon which the accused went towards his parents. The witness has further stated that thereafter he went to the police station along with the victim and lodged the report. In his cross examination, this witness has stated that about three to four years ago he had set up a brick kiln on the land belonging to the father of the accused. He further admitted that the said brick kiln has not been removed till 23 now. 26. (PW-5) Sister in law of the victim has deposed that about three months prior to the incident, the accused attempted to commit rape and to outrage the modesty of victim. She has stated that on hearing victim cries while bathing, she came out of her house and saw the accused running away from the spot. She has further stated that victim came weeping and informed her that the accused had caught hold of her hand. The witness has also stated that the place of incident is near her house and that thereafter victim narrated the incident to her mother and grandmother. In her cross-examination she has stated that when victim was returning, she did not see anyone else present there. The witness further admitted that victim had not told her about the accused catching hold of her hand. The witness also admitted that she had not mentioned the fact of hand-holding before the police. 27. (PW-6), Mother of the victim has stated that her daughter/victim had gone to stream for bathing. When victim was returning after bathing, the accused caught hold of her 24 waist with the intention of outraging her modesty, upon which victim started shouting loudly. The witness has further stated that she rushed to the spot and saw the accused running away. On asking her daughter what had happened, she told her that the accused had caught hold of her waist with ill intention. The witness has further deposed that thereafter they went home. At that time, her husband was not present, but after some time he returned, and she narrated the incident to him. 28. Having carefully considered the statement of the victim (PW-2) and other prosecution witnesses, the Court finds material contradictions and inconsistencies in the prosecution story. The (PW-2) victim, (PW-3) grandmother and (PW-6) mother consistently stated that the accused caught hold of the waist of the victim, however, the Sister in law (PW-5) has deposed that the victim informed her that the accused had caught hold of her hand. Further the victim has stated that after the incident she went to the house and narrated the incident to her mother and grandmother, however, mother and grandmother in their deposition stated that on hearing cries of victim, they reached the spot and saw the accused running 25 away. Sister in law (PW-5) in her deposition has stated on hearing victim cries , she came out of her house and saw the accused running away from the spot, however this witness in her cross-examination has stated that when victim was returning, she did not see anyone else present there. This witness further admitted that victim had not told her about the accused caught hold of her hand. (PW-2), and (PW-6) have stated that when father of victim came, then they narrated the whole incident, but (PW-4) father has stated that he himself reached the spot and chased the accused. 29. In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The depositions of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses suffer from material contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the nature of the alleged act, the sequence of events, and the disclosure of the incident. Further, admitted animosity between the families arising out of the brick kiln dispute also renders the possibility of false implication not improbable. 26 30. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court against the accused/appellant are hereby set aside. The appeal stands allowed. 31. The accused is acquitted of the charges for which he was tried. The appellants are reported to be on bail. His bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of Section 481 of the BNSS. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. 32. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Shoaib Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge
Arguments
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court are unsustainable in law. It is urged that the prosecutrix was never subjected to medical examination, thereby rendering the prosecution case doubtful. It is further submitted that the testimony of the prosecutrix is wholly unreliable in view of the admitted animosity between her father and the appellant, and on account of such animosity the appellant has been falsely implicated. A minute scrutiny of her statement makes the prosecution version appear fabricated, particularly as the alleged incident is stated to have taken place near her house. Learned counsel has also submitted that even if the 5 prosecution case is accepted in its entirety, the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, are not made out. It is further argued that the prosecution has failed to establish the age of the prosecutrix by producing any reliable documentary evidence. Attention has also been drawn to the major contradictions between the case diary statements and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. It is thus contended that there is no cogent evidence on record to prove that the appellant outraged the modesty of the prosecutrix, and therefore, the conviction and sentence as awarded by the learned Court below are liable to be set aside. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and submits that the conviction of the appellant is well merited which does not call for any interference. There is clear evidence regarding age of the prosecutrix, therefore, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 6 11. The first question arises before this Court whether the victim was minor on the date of incident or not?. 12. The Victim (PW/2) in her deposition has stated that her age is 16 years and she is studying in Class-11 and also stated that her date of birth is 10.08.1999. She further admitted that the date of birth stated by her is different from the date of birth recorded in the school. In Police Statement victim has stated that her date of birth is 20.08.1999. 13. Father of the victim (PW-4) has stated that his daughter age is 16 years and her date of birth is 20.08.1999. He further admitted in his cross examination that when he got his daughter admitted to the School, he does not remember what date of birth was recorded. In Police Statement he stated that he himself work as Kotwar and recorded the date of birth of the victim as 20.08.1999 in the kotwar Register. 14. Mother of the victim (PW-6) has stated in her deposition that her daughter age is 16 years. The witness voluntarily stated that the date of birth of her daughter is 10th August, 1999. The witness admitted that she had not mentioned this fact in her police statement (Ex.D-03). The witness voluntarily stated that the date of birth recorded in the school is incorrect. 15. The documentary evidence including oral evidence regarding 7 the date of birth of the victim (PW-2) being 20.08.1999. Kotwari Register (Ex.P/1) is on record in an irrefutable manner, which there is no reason to disbelieve. 16. In the matter of Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu & Kashmir and others1, the Supreme Court has held that a judicial notice can be taken that the margin of error in age ascertained by Radiological examination is two years on either side. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “9. Detenu was arrested and detained on Oct. 18, 1981. The report by the expert is dated May 3, 1982, that is nearly seven months after the date of detention. Growing in age day by day is an involuntary process and the anatomical changes in the structure of the body continuously occur. Even on normal calculation, if seven months are deducted from the approximate age opined by the expert, in Oct., 1981 detenu was around 17 years of age, consequently the statement made in the petition turns out to be wholly true. However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological 1 AIR 1982 SC 1297 8 examination is two years on either side. Undoubtedly, therefore, the detenu was a young school going boy. It equally appears that there was some upheavel in the educational institutions. This young school going boy may be enthusiastic about the students’ rights and on two different dates he marginally crossed the bounds of law. It passes comprehension to believe that he can be visited with drastic measure of preventive detention. One cannot treat young people, may be immature, may be even slightly misdirected, may be a little more enthusiastic, with a sledge hammer. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case the detention order was wholly unwarranted and deserved to be quashed.” 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under 9 Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts