Korba, Chhattisgarh v. 1 - Maniram S/o Santram, R/o Village Batari, Police Station Dipka, Tahsil Pali, District
Case Details
-1- 2025:CGHC:20988 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1167 of 2020 Jayadevi W/o Late Amar Singh Thakur, Aged About 55 Years R/o Vikas Nagar, Kusmunda, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba Chhattisgarh ...............Claimant, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ...Appellant (s) versus 1 - Maniram S/o Santram, R/o Village Batari, Police Station Dipka, Tahsil Pali, District Korba Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 2 - Nandkishor Agrawal, S/o Late Shri Matadin Agrawal, Aged About 65 Years R/o Kamal Traders, Pali Road, Dipka, District Korba Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) __________________________________________________________ For Appellant (s) : Mr. Dashrath Kushwaha, Advocate For Respondents Advocate : Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, For proposed respondent/ : Mr. Dashrath Gupta, Advocate United India Insurance Co. Ltd. _______________________________________________________ S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge 07/05/2025 Judgment On Board 1. Heard on IA No.4 which is an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC and IA No.2, which is an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 & 2. SHUBHAM DEY Digitally signed by SHUBHAM DEY -2- 2. Mr. H.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2 would submit that after passing of award and receipt of notice issued in appeal filed by claimant for enhancement of award of compensation awarded by learned Claims Tribunal, respondents No. 1 & 2 approached him and it was informed that counsel appearing before learned Claims Tribunal has not properly advised them and have not pleaded with regard to insurance of ill-fated vehicle on 16.06.2018. He contended that the owner of the vehicle has handed over the premium amount to Agent namely P.R. Damahe prior to date of accident, however, when owner of the vehicle after accident approached him for handing over the policy, he prepared proposal ‘Form’ on 16.06.2018 and have deposited in the office on the same day and policy was generated on 16.06.2018 at about 17:00 hrs. It is contention of learned counsel for respondents No.1 & 2 that 16.06.2018 was the Saturday and on all Saturdays of the month, the office of insurance company remains closed and, therefore, preparation of proposal form and generating the policy on the same day i.e. closed Saturday itself shows that the proposal form and the insurance policy was prepared after getting knowledge of the accident of vehicle. 3. He also contended that the amendment in the written statement/reply can be made at any time and at any stage of proceedings. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon the decision in the case of North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwan Das (Dead) by Lrs. (2008) 8 SCC 511. He next contended that respondents No. 1 & 2 -3- have also submitted an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC for bringing additional evidence on record i.e. copy of insurance policy issued by the proposed respondent/United India Insurance
Legal Reasoning
Company Ltd. It is contention of learned counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2 that copy of insurance policy could not be brought on record before learned Tribunal due to wrong advice of counsel representing respondent No.2, whereas, premium was paid prior to date of accident. 4. Mr. Dashrath Kushwaha, learned counsel for the appellant/claimant opposes the submission of learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 & 2. 5. Mr. Dashrath Gupta, learned counsel appearing for proposed respondent/United India Insurance Company, would submit that he has placed on record the copy of proposal ‘Form’ as Annexure R-1 along with reply to application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC and from perusal of the proposal form, it is apparent that proposal form was filled-up on 16.06.2018 at about 6:40 pm, whereas, date and time of accident is 16.06.2018 at about 5:30 pm. Proposal form was filled-up after the accident which also bears signature of respondent No.2. He next contended that copy of policy is filed along with cross-appeal and the effective date and time of policy is 17.06.2018 at 0:00 hrs i.e. midnight. Policy came into effect after the accident. The cash payment at the time of purchase of the policy, was also received after the accident and, therefore, there was no insurance policy of offending vehicle owned by respondent No.2 on the date and time of accident and it is for this reason, in -4- reply, there is no specific pleading with respect to purchase of policy against the ill-fated vehicle by respondent No.2. He also contended that amendment at the belated stage and that too after passing of award at appellate stage is not permissible in the facts of case. He also contended that in the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC also it is not specifically pleaded that as to even after due diligence, respondent No.2 could not able to produce the evidence which is sought to be produced as additional evidence under the provision of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. Hence, both the applications may be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties. 7. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the respective parties on application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC is concerned, provision under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC came to be amended w.e.f. 01.07.2002. Under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, a proviso is added which creates bar in allowing the amendment application, after the trial has commenced unless Court comes to conclusion that in spite of due diligence, party could not have raised matter before commencement of trial. Filling of application after commencement of trial has been discussed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidyabai & Ors. Vs. Padmalatha and Anr. (2009) 2 SCC 409 and it was held as under: “10. By reason of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 22 of 2002), Parliament inter alia inserted a proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, which reads as under: -5- “Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” It is couched in a mandatory form. The court's jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken away unless the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied viz. it must come to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. 11. From the order passed by the learned trial Judge, it is evident that the respondents had not been able to fulfil the said precondition. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is as to whether the trial had commenced or not. In our opinion, it did. The date on which the issues are framed is the date of first hearing. Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure envisage taking of various steps at different stages of the proceeding. Filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of the witness, in our opinion, would amount to “commencement of proceeding”. x x x x x x 19. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be allowed. However, proviso appended to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code restricts the power of the court. It puts an embargo on exercise of its jurisdiction. The court's jurisdiction, in a case of this nature is limited. Thus, unless the jurisdictional fact, as envisaged therein, is found to be existing, the court will have no jurisdiction at all to allow the amendment of the plaint.” -6- 8. In the case at hand, application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC has been filed at appellate stage before this Court. Perusal of application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC would show that respondent No.2 in the application has not specifically pleaded that the fact which is sought to be brought on record in reply to claim application by way of amendment, was not within his knowledge and it came to his knowledge only after the claim case was decided. No satisfactory explanation is offered as required under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gayathri Women's Welfare Assn. v. Gowramma, (2011) 2 SCC 330 has observed thus: “34. In Ishwardas [(1979) 4 SCC 163] , it has been observed as follows: (SCC p. 166, para 5) “5. There is no impediment or bar against an appellate court permitting amendment of pleadings so as to enable a party to raise a new plea. All that is necessary is that the appellate court should observe the well-known principles subject to which amendments of pleadings are usually granted. Naturally one of the circumstances which will be taken into consideration before an amendment is granted is the delay in making the application seeking such amendment and, if made at the appellate stage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial court. If the necessary material on which the plea arising from the amendment may be decided is already there, the amendment may be more readily granted than otherwise. But, there is no prohibition against an appellate court permitting an amendment at the appellate stage merely because the necessary material is not already before the court.” -7- These observations clearly indicate that one of the circumstances which will be taken into consideration before an amendment is granted is the delay in making the application seeking such amendment and, if made at the appellate sage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial court. In the present case, not only there is wholly untenable delay in the application but the appellants had a decree for permanent injunction in their favour. 36. In Revajeetu Builders [(2009) 10 SCC 84] this Court reiterated the very wide discretion the courts have in the matter of amendment of pleadings. These observations were in the context of an application filed by the appellant, seeking amendment of the original plaint including the prayer clause being rejected by the High Court upon coming to a definite conclusion that the appellant while seeking permission to amend the plaint is trying to introduce a new case, which was not his case in the original plaint and the proposed amendment, if allowed, would certainly affect the rights of the respondents adversely. It was also held that any such amendment, which changes the entire character of the plaint, cannot be permitted and that too, after a lapse of four years and after the institution of the suit. 38. In our opinion, the decision of the trial court is in conformity with the aforesaid principles. The trial court has clearly held that the cause of action for the relief of possession arose to the respondents many years ago. They may, therefore, have a cause of action, if any, for an independent suit. In the aforesaid case, the Court -8- further reiterated the principle in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar [(1974) 2 SCC 393] wherein it was rightly observed: (SCC p. 399, para 22) “22. … The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the court.” 10. In case of Shivshankara and Anr. Vs. H.P. Vedavyasa Char (2023) 13 SCC 1, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus: “24. We are not oblivious of the settled position that in dealing with prayers for amendment of the pleadings the courts should avoid hypertechnical approach. But at the same time, we should keep reminded of the position that the same cannot be granted on the mere request through an application for amendment of the written statement, especially at the appellate stage, where, what is called in question is the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and, in other words, after the adverse decree and without a genuine, sustainable reason. In short, the circumstances attending to the particular case are to be taken into account to consider whether such a prayer is allowable or not and no doubt, it is allowable only in the rarest of rare circumstances. x x x x x x -9- 43. In the totality of the circumstances, especially taking into account the relevant reasons assigned by the High Court for disallowing the prayer for amendment of the written statement and taking note of the delay and the failure to offer any reason therefor and the reasons mentioned hereinbefore we see no reason at all to hold any perversity or illegality with the rejection of the prayer for amendment of the written statement.” 11. In the case at hand, respondent No.2 being owner of vehicle was well aware of the fact that he has purchased the policy of the ill- fated vehicle, however, he has not made any pleading in the written statement, of his vehicle being insured by the insurance company. Respondent No.2 did not appear before learned Tribunal as witness. The impugned award passed by learned Tribunal would show that based on material available before it, liability to satisfy the impugned award was fastened upon respondent No. 1 & 2 therein. The award is dated 17.03.2020, however, respondent No.2 has not challenged the award before this Court on any of the ground but for filing of cross-appeal after receipt of notice in appeal filed by claimant seeking enhancement of amount of compensation. 12. Perusal of Annexure R-1 which is a copy of proposal ‘Form’ filed by agent of proposed respondent (insurance company) would show that proposal form was filled-up on 16.06.2018 at about 6:40 pm, whereas, copy of FIR produced before the Tribunal as Ex. P-2 would show that date and time of accident was 16.06.2018 at -10- about 5:30 pm and FIR was registered on 16.06.2018 at 8:25 pm (20:25 hrs.). Copy of final report is also placed on record as Ex.P-1 in which after investigation, charge sheet has been filed for alleged offence under Section 304 (A) of IPC and under Sections 3/181, 139/192, 246/196, 56/192 of Motor Vehicless Act. Charge sheet was filed for offence under Section 246/196 which is an offence under the Motor Vehicles Act for driving un-insured vehicle. Before the investigating agency also appellant has not brought to notice that vehicle was insured on the date of accident. Copy of insurance policy was also not produced and hence in seizure memo there is no mention of seizure of copy of insurance policy. 13. Under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, it is specifically mentioned that the application for amendment is to be allowed after commencement of trial, only when the applicant satisfies the Court that in spite of due diligence the party could not have placed the matter before the Trial Court. In the application, no such pleading is made but for the vague pleading that due to ill-advice of counsel said fact has not been pleaded in reply to claim application. In absence of the compliance of proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC and the aforementioned decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the opinion of this Court, respondent No.2 failed to make out a case that even after due diligence he could not raise the matter before the Trial Court. 14. For the foregoing discussions, I do not find any good ground to allow the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. The application being sans merit is liable to be and is accordingly -11- dismissed. 15. So far as the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC is concerned, perusal of application would show that no specific pleading is made as to why the additional evidence which is sought to be produced at the appellate stage could not be produced before learned Claims Tribunal. Provision under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC mandates that the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when decree appealed against was passed. There is no specific pleading as to the evidence which is sought to be produced was not within his knowledge or after due diligence such evidence could not produce before the trial Court. In absence of specific pleading and ground raised under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, it cannot be allowed in a routine manner. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Patel (Dead) through LR and Ors. v. Shivnath & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 82 has observed thus: “29. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, production of additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, is permitted only under three circumstances which are: (I) where the trial court had refused to admit the evidence though it ought to have been admitted; (II) the evidence was not available to the party despite exercise of due diligence; and (III) the appellate court required the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. An application for production of additional evidence -12- cannot be allowed if the appellant was not diligent in producing the relevant documents in the lower court. However, in the interest of justice and when satisfactory reasons are given, the court can receive additional documents. 30. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 362] , this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 167- 68 & 170, paras 36-37, 40 & 47) “36. The general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The appellate court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, the provision does not apply, when on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the Rule itself. (Vide K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy [K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526] , Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham [Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008] , Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal [Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal, (1975) 3 SCC 698] and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy [Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy, (1979) 2 SCC 601] .) 37. The appellate court should not ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali & Co. [Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali & Co., (1978) 2 SCC 493] .) *** -13- 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a “substantial cause” within the meaning of this Rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. *** 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record, such application may be allowed.” 17. For the foregoing discussions made, I do not find any good ground to allow the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC for taking additional evidence on record. Even otherwise copy of policy which is filed along with cross-appeal was in the possession of respondent No.2, however, he has not placed any material to show that the effective date of policy as mentioned therein was challenged by him in any manner before any of the authority mentioning any of the reason therein but for filing of application seeking amendment and the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. In absence of challenge to the date of issuance of insurance policy, more particularly, the effective date of issuance of policy, in opinion of this Court, submission of learned counsel for the respondent that respondent No.2 has deposited the amount prior to date of accident is not acceptable. The policy is to be read as it is and when the policy has been made effective from 17.06.2018 it will not give any benefit to respondent No.2 when the accident is of -14- prior to handling over money, filling of proposal Form is of16.06.2018 at about 6:40 pm and policy is made effective for 17.06.2018, 00.00 hrs. 18. In the case New India Assurance Co. v. Bhagwati Devi (1998) 6 SCC 534, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, in absence of any specific time and date, the insurance policy becomes operative from the previous midnight. But when the specific time and date is mentioned, then the insurance policy becomes effective from that point of time. 19. For the foregoing discussions, both the applications filed by respondents, one under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC and another under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC are hereby dismissed. 20. So far as the application (IA No.6) filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC is concerned, as the vehicle was not insured on the date and time of accident, and dismissal of application under Order 6 Rule 17 and application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, consequently, application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is also dismissed. 21. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, appeal filed by the claimant/applicant for enhancement of amount of compensation as also cross-appeal filed by respondent No.2 under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC r/w Rule 242 (3) of Rules of 1994 are heard finally on merit. 22. This is the claimant’s appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “Act of 1988”) seeking enhancement of amount of compensation awarded by learned First Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Katghora (CG) vide award dated -15- 17th March 2020 passed in Motor Accident Claim Case No.103 of 2018 whereby learned Claims Tribunal allowed the application in part, awarded Rs.10,77,816/- as compensation and liability to satisfy amount of compensation is fastened upon the respondents. 23. Facts relevant for disposal of this case are that claimant/appellant filed an application under Sections 166 of the Act of 1988 pleading therein that in the evening of 16.6.2018 at about 5.30 p.m., non- applicant No. 1- Maniram, driving a goods vehicle bearing registration number CG/12/AN 1986 rashly and negligently, dashed against the motorcycle of the applicant's son Kamal Narayan, due to which Kamal Narayan Singh died on the spot as a result of the injuries sustained by him. It was pleaded in the application that age of Kamal Narayan was 31 years at the time of the accident and Kamal Narayan was working as a Driver in G.V.K. Emergency Management and Research Institute and was earning Rs. 13,000/- per month. The claimant (mother of deceased Kamal Narayan) prayed for a total compensation of Rs. 30,00,000/- under different heads from respondents. 24. No written statement was filed by non-applicant No.1. 25. Non-applicant No.2 by filing his written statement denied the pleadings made in the claim application and stated that no accident was caused by vehicle of non-applicant No.2, hence, he is not liable to pay any compensation and claim application against him be dismissed. 26. Learned Claims Tribunal, on appreciation of pleadings and evidence brought on record by respective parties, held that on the -16- date of accident, offending vehicle was being driven by non- applicant No.1 rashly and negligently, due to which, said accident occurred in which Kamal Narayan suffered grievous injuries and died. Assessing income of the deceased as Rs.11,340/- per month on the date of accident and calculating the loss suffered by the claimant under different heads, awarded total compensation of Rs.10,77,816/ -. 27. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant would submit that this appeal is filed by the claimant seeking enhancement of amount of compensation on two grounds. First ground is with respect to application of wrong multiplier of 11 instead of 16, as on the date of accident deceased was aged about 31 years and secondly, that learned Tribunal has not awarded the amount of compensation under the head of ‘loss of consortium’. 28. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2 opposes the submission of learned counsel for the claimant/appellant. In cross-appeal filed by respondent No.2, the ground of ‘wrong advice given by counsel appearing before Tribunal, effective date of policy, payment of premium, insurance company not being a party before the Tribunal’ have been taken. 29. From perusal of the grounds taken by respondent No.2 in the cross-appeal, it is evident that these grounds are pari materia to those raised by the respondent in the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Both the said applications have already been dismissed by this Court as discussed herein-above. Furthermore, no other -17- substantial or persuasive ground has been advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that justify the entertainment of the present cross-appeal.
Decision
30. In view of the above, the cross-appeal filed by Respondent No.2 under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC stands dismissed. 31. Perusal of the impugned award would show that learned Tribunal considering the age of the deceased as mentioned in the postmortem report has assessed the age of deceased as 31 years, however, learned Tribunal has erroneously applied the multiplier of 11 overlooking the age of deceased on the date of accident. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC, has clearly specified as to the application of multiplier to be based on age of deceased. Undisputedly, in the case at hand, age of the deceased was 31 years and according to decision of Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), appropriate multiplier for age group of 31 to 35 years would be 16. It is ordered accordingly. 32. Award of compensation under the head ‘loss of consortium’ was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680. Further in the case of Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram & Ors. (2018) 18 SCC 130, Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained types of loss of consortium and it is held that the widow/husband is entitled for ‘loss of spousal consortium’, children are entitled for ‘loss of -18- parental consortium’ and parents are entitled for loss of ‘filial consortium’ . 33. In the case at hand, claimant is mother of deceased and, hence, she is entitled for compensation of Rs.40,000/-. under the head ‘loss of filial consortium’ . It is ordered accordingly. 34. In the aforementioned facts of the case and the discussions, I find it appropriate to re-compute the amount of compensation as under:- S. N. Heads Compensation 1. (A) Loss of Income/dependency 11340 x 12 = 136080 (B) Addition towards future prospects @ 40% (136080 x 40% =54432) 136080 + 54432 = 1,90,512 (C) Deduction of 50% personal and living expenses towards Rs. 15,24,096 (1,90,512 x 50% =95256) 1,90,512- 95256 = 95256 (D) Multiplier of 16 95256 x 16 = 15,24,096 4. Funeral Expenses 5. Loss of Estate 8. Loss of Rs.40,000/- to appellant/claimant Consortium of Filial : : : (+) Rs. 15,000 (+) Rs. 15,000 (+) Rs. 40,000 Total compensation : Rs. 15,94,096 35. Now the appellant/claimant is awarded total compensation of Rs. 15,94,096/- instead of Rs.10,77,816/- as awarded by the Claims Tribunal. -19- 36. Aforementioned total amount of compensation shall carry interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of claim application till its realization. Any amount of compensation already paid to the claimant shall be adjustable from the total amount of compensation which has now been calculated and awarded by this Court. Other conditions of impugned award shall remain intact. 37. In the result, appeal filed by by appellant/claimant is allowed in part. Impugned award is modified to the extent as indicated herein above. /--/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Praveen