Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:32200 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3491 of 2025 1 - Abdul Quadir Razza S/o Late Abdul Shafik, Aged About 38 Years Sai Travels, R/o K.K. Road, Moudhapara, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Wrongly Mentioned Abdul Kadir In The Impugned Order And Revision Petition And Fathers Name Late Abdul Shafique In The Revision Petition) versus ... Petitioner(s) 1 - Regional Transport Authority, Nawa Raipur, Distt. Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Raja Nareshchandra Gupta, S/o Late Shri Mahesh Ram Gupta, R/o Sarangarh, District Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh 3 - State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ghadi Chowk, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s)
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. J. K. Gupta, Advocate For Respondent(s) For State : : Mr. Anshul Ranjan, Advocate Mr. Rishabh Bisen, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Order on Board 11/07/2025 1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: 2 10.1. That, petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the record of the petitioner and kind enough to quash the impugned order dated 04.06.2025 passed by Respondent no. 3 in Revision No. 74/2023 i.e. Annexure P/1 in the interest of justice. 10.2. Any other relief or reliefs that may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the respondent no. 3 is in utter violation of factual and legal aspect as well as settled principle of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts and therefore illegal by inception thus liable to be set aside.
Decision
The impugned order is per se illegal. 3. Leaned counsel for the respondents opposed the contentions of the counsel for the petitioner. 4. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 5. Record reveals that petitioner has applied for a permanent permit before the respondent no. 1 on route Dabhara to Raipur via Chandrapur, Sarangarh, Saraipali, Basna, Pithora, Tumgaon, Arang and back one returning trip daily covering more than 243 km in a single stretch. Application for grant of permit was allowed vide order dated 20.09.2023 and the permit was granted to the petitioner bearing no. CG 2023 SC 0505A. This order was challenged by the respondent no. 2 before the respondent no. 3 in revision no. 74/2025 wherein respondent no. 3 held 3 that the petitioner herein has not filled the clauses 10 and 15 of the application form submitted for granting permanent new permit. As a result of which the revision was allowed and the permit granted to the petitioner herein was rejected. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 17 and 18 of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Babu Goverdhan Regular Motor Service and Others (1970) AIR (SC) 1926: “17. The further question that arises for consideration, is as to whether the view of the High Court that the application of the appellant is defective and suitable to be dismissed inasmuch as columns 10, 14 and 15 in the application form have not been properly filled up, is correct. Here again, we are not inclined to agree with the reasoning of the High Court that under such circumstances the application filed by the appellant cannot., be treated to be an application under the Act. It is needless to state that an application must. furnish full and complete information that is within his knowledge or possession, in his application for the grant of a permit. The scheme of the Act is quite clear, viz. that an applicant must have a proper permit for operating transport services. To obtain that permit, certain formalities and procedure have to be gone through. Apart from the other applicants having an opportunity to make representations or objections to the claim made by a particular applicant, certain other persons and authorities, as will be seen under s. 57(3), have been given a right to make representations. Such filing of objections or making of representations can be 4 effective only if an applicant gives all the information which is in it.s power or control. The expression, 'as far as may be', occurring in s. 46 of the Act, must only mean that an applicant must give information on the various particulars and matters referred to in s. 46, in so far as those requirements apply to him and in respect of which it is possible to give information. In the absence of the expression 'as far as may be' in the old s. 46 of the Act, the Mysore High Court, in two of its decisions C.K.M. Services v. Mys. Revenue Board(1) and Sethuramachar v. Hiranayya(2) has taken the view that the provisions in s. 46 must be considered to be mandatory and non-compliance with those provisions will mean that there is no proper and valid application under the Act and that an authority would be justified in rejecting the same. In Sethuramachar's case('2) the High Court has indicated that in the section, as it now stands, the position may be different. 18. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in an unreported decision in S.H. Motor Transport Company v. The State Transport Appellate Authority(3) (a certified copy of which has been given to us) has held that when an applicant does not give some information on certain particulars required under s. 46, it must be understood that he does not intend to do the necessary things as mentioned therein. In our opinion, the matter has to be approached from a slightly different angle, viz., whether the authorities have got the power to reject an application summarily if it does not contain information on any matters or particulars referred to in the form. We are unable to find any provision in the 5 statute giving a power to the transport. authorities to reject an application summarily on that ground; but, we have already emphasized that the application must give the necessary information on the various particulars and matters enumerated in the form prescribed for such purpose. It is to the interest of the applicant himself to give full and clear information because he stands the risk of the permit not being granted to him for lack of information on certain matters. But this is quite a different thing from the power of the authority to reject an application forthwith on the ground that the application is defective. The only provision where such a power to reject summarily is given is under the proviso to s. 57(3). Under this proviso, the Regional Transport Authority, without following the procedure of publishing an application and inviting objections can summarily refuse the application in the circumstances mentioned therein. No doubt it may be asked that if an application lacks information on very vital matters, the whole object of publishing the same and inviting objections could not be achieved because the parties entitled to make objections and representations cannot effectively make the same. But, as we have already pointed out it is really in the interest of the applicant himself to give the information as far as it lies within his power, on all matters. What the High Court has done in this case, was really to reject the application of the appellant summarily, a power which even the Transport Authority does not, in our opinion, have under the Act. Probably the statute did not give power to an authority to reject an application summarily in cases not coming within the proviso to 6 s. 57(3) because when considering an application for grant of permit on merits, it may be open to the Regional Transport Authority, after giving reasons, under s. 57(7), to refuse the application for permit. In such a case, as the Regional Transport Authority is bound to give reasons, the sufficiency and validity of the reasons given may also be canvassed before the appellate authority in an appeal under s. 64 of the Act. But all this can be done only at the time of considering the grant of permit on merits, and not at an earlier stage, and the refusal to grant the permit will be not on the ground that the application is defective, but on the ground that the particulars or information and other matters given in the permit do not enable the Regional Transport Authority to take the view that a particular applicants claims are superior to those of others.” 7. In light of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the permit cannot be cancelled only on the ground of defective application. It is pertinent to mention here that when considering an application for grant of permit on merits, it may be open to the Regional Transport Authority, after giving reasons to refuse the application for permit but all this can be done only at the time of considering the grant of permit on merits, and not at an earlier stage, and the refusal to grant the permit will be not on the ground that the application is defective. But on the ground that the particulars or information and other matters given in the permit do not enable the Regional Transport Authority to take the view that a particular applicant’s claim is defective. 7 8. Accordingly, the order dated 04.06.2025 passed by Respondent no. 3 in Revision No. 74/2023 is hereby set-aside and the present petition is allowed. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE Madhurima