Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 REKHA SINGH Digitally signed by REKHA SINGH NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 89 of 2022
Legal Reasoning
1 - M/s Ramakrishna Sharda Seva Ashram (Registered As Public Trust No. 16 Dt. 20-02-2006 By Public Trust And Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Jagdalpur) (Registered Under Mp Societies Registration Act Of 1959 No. 1959 Dt. 16-01-1970) Po Dharampura District Bastar (Cg) - 494005 Through - Its Secretary Shri Swami Vimuktananda, Aged 79 Years, S/o Shri Swami Vireswarananda (Guru) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Tribal And Scheduled Caste Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Naya Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Commissioner Officer Of Commissioner, Department Of Tribal And Scheduled Caste Development, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Assistant Commissioner Department Of Tribal Welfare Branch Jagdalpur, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 4 - Collector Office Of Collector Jagdalpur, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 5 - Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (Ii) Office Of The Employees Provident Fund Organization, Regional Office, Block - D, Scheme No. 32, I.G.V. Parisar, Pandri Raipur (C.G.) 492004 ---- Respondents For Petitioner For State for respondent No.5 : Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate : Mr. Topilal Bareth, Panel Lawyer : Mr. Vinay Kumar Pandey, Advocate -2- Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 08.07.2025 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to call for the entire record in respect of issuance of impugned order dated 22-04-2022 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Raipur. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside order dated 22-04-2022 Annexure P/1 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Raipur under section 7Q of the EPF & MP Act, 1952. 10.3 This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to hold that the petitioner is not liable to pay the interest on delayed payment of contribution of EPF particularly when the delay in depositing the EPF contribution of employees is not part of the petitioner. if there is any delay in delay in depositing the EPF contribution of employees/ employer only the state Government is liable to pay the interest as determined by the EPF Commissioner. 10.4 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstance of the case may also be awarded in favour of the petitioner.” 2. Mr. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5 would submit that according to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arcot Textile Mills Limited Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and others, 2013 (16) SCC 1, though an appeal would not lie against an order passed under the provisions of Section 7Q of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short ‘the Act of 1952’) but at the same time, the outcome of the appeal preferred by the petitioner under the provisions of Section 7(I) of the Act of 1952 against an order passed under Section 14(B) of the Act of 1952 would be decisive. He would further submit that if the appeal 3 preferred by the petitioner is allowed, the order passed under the provisions of Section 7Q of the Act of 1952 would go automatically
Decision
and if the appeal is dismissed, the petitioner has to pay the interest part too. Therefore, the petition is not maintainable. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Deshmukh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that an interim order is operating in favour of the petitioner. He would further submit that the appeal has already been preferred against the order passed under the provisions of Section 14B of the Act of 1952 before the Appellate Authority, which is pending consideration. He would contend that the petitioner may be permitted to move an application for the grant of stay before the Appellate Authority against the order passed under the provisions of Section 7Q of the Act 1952 and the Appellate Authority may be directed to decide it within a stipulated time frame. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 5. In the matter of Arcot Textile Mills Limited (supra), particularly in paras 18, 19 & 20, the following was observed:- “18. Presently we shall refer to 7Q of the Act. It is as follows:- “7Q. Interest payable by the employer.- The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment: Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank.” -4- 19. Ms. Aparna Bhat, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 would contend that the payment of interest by the employer in case of belated payment is statutorily leviable and a specified rate having been provided, the authority has no discretion and, therefore, it is only a matter of computation and there cannot be any challenge to it. Be it noted, it was canvassed by the said respondents before the High Court that an appeal would lie against an order passed under 7Q. 20. On a scrutiny of Section 7I, we notice that the language is clear and unambiguous and it does not provide for an appeal against the determination made under 7Q. It is well settled in law that right of appeal is a creature of statute, for the right of appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. This being the position a provision providing for appeal should neither be construed too strictly nor too liberally, for if given either of these extreme interpretations, it is bound to adversely affect the legislative object as well as hamper the proceedings before the appropriate forum. Needless to say, a right of appeal cannot be assumed to exist unless expressly provided for by the statute and a remedy of appeal must be legitimately traceable to the statutory provisions. If the express words employed in a provision do not provide an appeal from a particular order, the court is bound to follow the express words. To put it otherwise, an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law and that explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute.” 6. Taking into consideration the submissions made by the respective advocates, this petition is disposed of in light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arcot Textile Mills Limited (supra) reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to move an application for the grant of stay in pending appeal with respect to the order passed under Section 7Q of the Act of 1952 before the Appellate Authority and in turn, the authority concerned is directed to decide it within a period of 30 days from the date of its presentation. 5 7. The interim order granted earlier shall remain operative for a period of 60 days only. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is disposed of. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha