Jashpur, Chhattisgarh v. 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Bagicha, District- Jashpur, Chhattisgarh., District
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:10423 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1248 of 2019 1 - Rajkumari Bai W/o Ramdev Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Charaidand Bhandartoli, Police Station- Kunkuri, District- Jashpur, Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Bagicha, District- Jashpur, Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Ashish Gupta, Advocate For Res./State : Ms. Isha Jajodia, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board 20.02.2025 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.04.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jashpur, District Jashpur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 31/2015 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction U/S Sentence Fine In default of payment of Fine U/S 363 of Indian R. I. for 03 Rs. 5,000/- Additional R.I. Penal Code with years for 6 months 2 respect to both the victims U/s 370(4) of Rigorous Rs. 20,000/- Additional R.I. Indian Penal imprisonment for 01 year Code with for 10 years respect to victim No. 01 All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that in the month of November, 2008 the present appellant alongwith another co-accused namely- Usha Kujur (absconding) have taken the two victims to Delhi for engaging them in domestic work. At the time, when they were taken the victims to Delhi, they assured the parents of the victims that their daughters shall come back very soon. Since the victims have not been come back to their parents’ house, on 12.10.2014, father of the victims namely Shanicharwa (PW06) made a written complaint Ex. P/12 before the Police against the present appellant- Rajkumari Bai and co-accused namely-Usha Kujur. On the basis of written report lodged by father of the victim (PW06), the
Facts
Police has registered FIR (Ex. P/11) for the offence under Sections 363, 370 and 371 of the Indian Penal Code (henceforth, 'IPC') and Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 against the accused persons. During course of investigation, the younger daughter of the complainant i.e. victim No. 1 was recovered when she came back from Delhi on 12.11.2014 and recovery Panchanama Ex. P/6 was prepared in presence of the witnesses in this regard. The elder daughter of the complainant i.e. victim No. 2 was also recovered on 27.11.2014 from village Bagai, Police Station Wajeerganj, Police Station Bagren, District Badaun (U.P.) from the house of one Avnesh and recovery Panchanama Ex. P/18 was prepared in presence of the witnesses in this regard. The appellant was arrested on 27.11.2014 and 3 her memorandum statement (Ex. P/7) was recorded. Based on her memorandum statement, one mobile phone and one notebook was seized from her vide seizure memo Ex. P/8. Another co-accused Usha Kujur was also arrested on 28.11.2014. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, the Police has seized the School Register from Government Primary School, Doomarpani and after retaining attested true copy of School register (Ex. P/18C) and (Ex. P/19C), respectively, the original Register Ex.P/18 and Ex. P/19 were returned back to the School. The birth certificates of both the victims were issued by the Headmaster of the School are Ex. P/2 and Ex. P/3, which have also been seized vide seizure memo Ex. P/4. The spot map Ex.P/15 was prepared by the police. 3. The statements of the witnesses were recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C. Statement of the victim No. 1 under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. has also been recorded. 4. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed for the offence under Section 363, 370 and 371 of Indian Penal Code and Section 23 of Juvenile Justice (Care and protection of Children) Act, 2000 against the present appellant and co-accused Usha Kujur before the learned Judicial Magistrate first Class, Bageecha. The case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Jashpur for its trial. The learned Trial Court has framed charges against appellant namely- Rajkumari Bai for the offences under Sections 363/34, 370/34 and 371/34 of IPC and against the co-accused person namely- Usha Kujur. The accused persons abjured their guilt and claimed trial. During trial, co-accused Usha Kujur remained absent from the proceeding from 10.05.2016 and arrest warrant was issued on 09.02.2017 and ultimately she was declared absconding vide order dated 07.02.2019 and, 4 thereafter, a permanent warrant of arrest was issued against her, however, the trial against the present appellant- Rajkumari Bai was concluded and the impugned judgment has been passed. 5. In order to establish the charge against the accused person, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses. The statement of accused person was also recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which she denied material appearing against her, plead innocence and stated that she is innocent and has falsely been implicated in the case. 6. After appreciation of oral & documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial court has convicted and sentenced appellant – Rajkumari Bai as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal.
Legal Reasoning
42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the 8 Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of 9 juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be 10 accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 13. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: 11 "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 12 14. The further piece of evidence laid by the prosecution is that victim No. 1 has stated in her evidence that when she was aged about 15 years, the present appellant took her to Delhi. In her cross-examination, she stated that she did not know that in which year or month, she had gone to Delhi. She did not disclose her date of birth or age when she had gone to Delhi. 15. The PW05, who is mother of the victims, has stated that at the time when the victim No. 2 had gone to Delhi she was aged about 18 years but she did not disclose the age of the victim No. 1. 16. The father of the victims (PW06) has also not disclosed any age of his daughters. 17. From the nature of evidence produced by the prosecution, it would not be safe to hold that the victims were minor on the date when they were taken to Delhi, as there is no exact date or year when they have been taken to Delhi by the present appellant. There is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to their age or date of birth by which their age can be determined. 18. So far as the allegation of offence of kidnapping or trafÏcking a person is concerned, I again examine the evidence of victim No. 1 who is examined as PW02. She stated in her evidence that the present appellant took her to Delhi on the pretext that she will get the higher remuneration and lavish life. She had taken her to Delhi in the house of co-accused Usha Kujur, she stayed there in her house for four to five days and, thereafter, she was engaged at a house at Punjabi Bagh, Ashoka Park where she was doing the domestic work. She worked there for about five years. After five years, co-accused- Usha Kujur @ Anita took her to her own house and she stayed there for about two days and thereafter, she engaged her at Rohni where she worked for about one month but she left the place after one month. Thereafter, co-accused 13 Usha Kujur engaged her in a house at Gudgaon, where she worked for about four months. The owner of the house, where she was working, has asked her about her past then she disclosed that she is working since five years and has not made any contact with her parents and then the person in whose house she was working have made a contact to Narayanpur Police Station and then she was sent by the said persons to her parents’ house. She further stated that she was engaged in employment in the house of one Vipin Kumar on the remuneration of Rs. 4,000/-pm, but she has not received any amount but she received her remuneration from working at Gudgaon. Co-accused Usha Kujur has also informed that her sister i.e. victim no. 2 were also brought to Delhi and she engaged at Noida when she made a telephonic call to her sister she disclosed that she is with one Aman Jhirla and she performed marriage and procured a child. In cross examination, she stated that her sister victim No. 2 had gone to Delhi alongwith the present appellant Rajkumari. She further stated that Rajkumari had taken her to Delhi on the pretext that she will earn well money there. She stuck in saying that she had gone to Delhi at the instance of the present appellant and she allured her that she would get higher remuneration at Delhi. She further admitted that she could get food and clothing but they were harassed her during her employment. She denied the suggestion that she on her own will, had gone to Delhi to earn her livelihood. She reiterated that she had gone to Delhi on the instance of appellant Rajkumari. From the evidence of this witness, nothing could be elicited by the defense which makes her evidence doubtful. 19. PW06, who is father of the victims, has stated in his deposition that both the victims are his daughter the appellant Rajkumari has taken her both his daughters to Delhi by alluring that they will get more remuneration 14 and she had taken them for one year, but they did not come back even after one year and then he lodged a report at Police Station, Bageecha. When the Police asked to the present appellant whereabout of his daughters, she disclosed that they are at Delhi and then the victim No. 1 was taken back from there. In cross-examination, he stated that whenever he made a telephonic call to his elder daughter i.e. victim No. 2 she disclosed that she is at Delhi and earning her livelihood. She also disclosed that she had performed marriage there. 20. PW05, who is the mother of the victims, has also stated that seven years back her daughters had gone to Delhi alongwith present appellant Rajkumari on her instance that her daughter would get more remuneration at Delhi and when she asked whereabouts of her daughters from the present appellant, she assured her that her daughters were in the safe place and they were earning their livelihood. When they made a complaint from the appellant Rajkumari she taken back her younger daughter and they took her from Raipur. From her cross- examination also there is no material brought by the defence, which could disbelieve her evidence. 21. Pratima Sharma (PW0-8), who is the social worker and running a NGO named and styled as “Jeevan Jharna Sanstha” has stated in her evidence that when she received the information about trafÏcking of the victims, she had gone to Delhi for their recovery. The family members of the victims had given the details of placement agency and on the basis of the which, when they had gone to the placement agency of co- accused Usha Kujur, they came to know about victims No. 2 but her whereabout could not be tressed-out, as she was not residing there. The Co-accused Usha Kujure gave a telephone number, to which they made a telephonic call to victim No. 2 and when they had gone to Bareli they 15 met with victim No. 2 and she disclosed that she had performed marriage and having a daughter also. In her cross-examination, she remained firm in saying that she came to know about the placement agency of Usha Kujur and ultimately reached up to the victim No. 2, who was at Bareli and had got married with a person. But so far as the victim No. 1 is concerned, she disclosed the entire incident, which she suffered at the instance of the present appellant Rajkumari. 22. From the evidence of victim No. 1(PW02), it has been proved that she was being kidnapped and subjected to trafÏcking by the present appellant who took her to Delhi and engaged her in an employment where she was being exploited by the persons with whom she was employed. Since her age could not be proved by the prosecution that she was minor on the day when she was subjected to trafÏcking by the present appellant, the offence of appellant- Rajkumari does not fall under the definition of 370(4) of IPC but it comes under the definition of 370(2) of IPC, as the victim was found to be major on the date of incident. 23. The learned Trial Court after considering the entire evidence available on record has come into conclusion that the appellant Rajkumari is guilty for the offence under Section 363 and 370(4) of the IPC with respect to the offence against the victim No. 1 for the offence under Section 363 of IPC with respect to the victim No. 2 but as stated herein above the victim No. 1 is found to be major, the offence of the appellant Rajkumari comes under Section 370(2) of IPC. The offence of Section 363 of IPC against both the victims is also found proved by the learned trial Court in which this Court is also in agreement with the said finding that both the victims were abducted by the appellant Rajkumari who took them to Delhi. 16 24. From the foregoing discussions, the conviction of the appellant Rajkumari for the offence under Section 370(4) of IPC is set aside and instead thereof she has been convicted for the ofence under Section 370(2) of IPC. However the conviction of the appellant under Section 363 of IPC for both the victims is hereby maintained. The sentence against the appellant for the offence under Section 363 of IPC is also maintained, however, the appellant is sentenced for the offence under Section 370(2) of IPC, RI for seven years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default of payment of fine further RI for 2 months. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 25. With the aforesaid modification/alteration, the appeal filed by the appellant- Rajkumari Bai is partly allowed. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 25.04.2019. She is entitled for set off his undergone period during the trial of the case as well as pendency of the present appeal. 26. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing her jail sentences to serve the same on the appellant informing her that she is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 27. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. amita Digitally signed by AMITA DUBEY Date: 2025.03.10 16:35:43 +0530 Sd/-Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge
Arguments
7. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the prosecution has failed to prove its’ case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts. There are material omission and contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which cannot be made basis to convict the appellant with the offence in question. There is no cogent and clinching evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to age of the victim No. 1, as she was minor on the date of incident. The victim No. 1 herself has admitted that she did not know as to when she was being taken to Delhi. There is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR by the father of the victims for which there is no explanation. From the evidence of the witnesses, it appears that the victims No. 2 was residing at Delhi after performing her marriage with another person and there was frequent conversation between the victim No. 2 and her father and there is no complaint that she was subjected to human trafÏcking by the present appellant. The evidence of victim No. 1 is not sufÏcient to hold the appellant guilty in the alleged commission of offence. He would further 5 submit that since the victims were the major girls at the time when they had gone to Delhi therefore, the offence under Section 370(4) of IPC has not been made out against the present appellant and the victims on their own will had gone there. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted of the alleged charges. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State while opposing the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant contended that from the evidence of victim No. 1 as well as her father (PW06), the guilt of the appellant is duly proved by the prosecution, but for the minor contradiction & omission, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The victims were minor on the date of incident when they were taken to Delhi and their age has been proved by the School record which is proved by the Headmaster (PW03) of the school. The birth certificate Ex. P/2 and Ex. P/3 have also been proved by the headmaster (PW03) and according to the school record, the victims were minor on the date of incident and there is allegation against the appellant that she has taken the victims to Delhi to engage them in domestic work, which does amount to offence of Human trafÏcking. Therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced her which needs no interference. 9. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. The core question arises for consideration would be the age of the victims as to whether on the date of incident, they were minor or not. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school Register Ex. P/18C and Ex. P/ 19C as well as birth certificate Ex. P/2 and Ex. P/3 issued by the Headmaster. The school register Ex. P/18C and Ex. P/19C are sought to be proved by Mukti Prakash Tirky (PW-3), who is Headmaster of the Govt. 6 Primary School, Doomarpani. He has stated in his deposition that the police has seized the school register with respect to confirmation of the date of birth of the victims vide seizure memo Ex. P/4 and after retaining the attested true copy of the School register Ex. P/18C and Ex. P/19C, original School Register Ex.P/18 and Ex. P/19 were returned back to the school. The police has also seized the birth certificates of the victims prepared by him and on the basis of the school Register vide seizure memo Ex. P/4 and the said birth certificate of the victim No. 1 is Ex. P/2 and birth certificate of the victim No. 2 is Ex. P/3. According to the school register, date of birth of victims No. 1 & 2 are mentioned as 31.01.1995 and 15.11.1992, respectively. In his cross examination, he admitted that he did not state as to what documents have been submitted with respect to the date of birth of the victims at the time of admission in the school. He would further submit that in the year part of the date of birth of the victim No. 2 recorded in the school Register, there is over writing. He admitted that at the time, when the victims have got admission in the school he did not posted there. He further admitted that who have got them admitted in the school he did not know. He also admitted that on what basis, the victims have been admitted in the school he did not know. With respect to the date of birth and age of the victims, there is no other documentary evidence produced by the prosecution. 11. The admissibility and evidencery value of the School Register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P-16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 7 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.