Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.02.01 10:12:26 +0530 2025:CGHC:5663 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2724 of 2019 1. Murli Singh S/o Late Mahadev Aged About 52 Years R/o Village - Tikradhanora, Tahil, Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 2. Guni Singh S/o Late Mahadev Aged About 50 Years R/o Village - Tikradhanora, Tahsil - Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3. Trinath Singh S/o Late Mahadev Aged About 40 Years R/o Village - Tikradhanora, Tahsil - Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 4. Smt. Champa Wd/o Late Lalit Aged About 42 Years R/o Village - Tikradhanora, Tahsil - Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 5. Minor Kumari Mamta D/o Late Lalit Aged About 15 Years R/o Village - Tikradhanora, Tahsil - Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 6. Minor Kumar Hemlata D/o Late Lalit Aged About 13 Years R/o Village - Tikradhanora, Tahsil - Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 7. Minor Kumari Geeta D/o Late Lalit Aged About 12 Years R/o Village - Tikradhanora, Tahsil - Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Officer In Charge Seva Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Ghatdhanora, Tahsil - Jagdalur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 2. Manager Bastar Central Cooperative Bank Limited, Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3. Recovery Officer And Additional Tahsildar Cooperative Societies, Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 4. State Officer Through Bastar Central Cooperative Bank Limited, Jagdalpur, 2 District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 5. Mahendra S/o Late Laxminath Aged About 37 Years R/o Village - Singarpur, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 6. Minaxi D/o Late Laxminath Aged About 32 Years R/o Village - Singarpur, : Chhattisgarh., - Bastar, Jagdalpur, District District Tahsil Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 7. Nandini D/o Laxminath Aged About 30 Years R/o Village - Singarpur, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 8. Shobhina Wd/o Late Laxminath Aged About 57 Years R/o Village - Singarpur, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District - Bastar, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners For Respondent No. 2 For Respondents No. 6 to 8
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Varun Sharma, Advocate : Mr. Harshal Chouhan, Advocate : Mr. Rohan Shukla, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 30. 01.2025 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 To kindly call for the records of the case from the respondents. 10.2 To kindly quash the impugned order dated 25/03/2019 (Annexure P/1). 10.3 To kindly direct the Respondent Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Raipur to decide the appeal of the petitioners on merits in accordance with law. 10.4 To kindly make any other order that may be deemed fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.” 2. The father of petitioners No. 1 to 3, namely, Late Mahadev mortgaged his land bearing survey Nos. 1/4(ख), and 9/3 total admeasuring 4.90 acres and 3 1.56 acres respectively, with respondent No. 1/Seva Sahkari Samiti, Ghatdhanora and secured a loan of Rs. 1500/-. The petitioner re-paid Rs. 1300/-. 3. Respondent No. 1 approached the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Jagdalpur, who issued a removal order under Section 84 of the C.G. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1960”) against the father of petitioners No. 1 to 3. An auction proceeding was conducted in Execution Case No. 239/77-74 and the property was sold out to one Laxminath S/o Gopinath being the highest bidder on 25.02.1975. Late Mahadev filed a Civil Suit No. 94A/78 challenging the auction and the same was dismissed vide judgment dated 30.08.1980. The first appeal was dismissed on 10.11.1981 and the Second Appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 01.03.1989. 4. Late Mahadev approached the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Jagdalpur, who quashed the order of the Assistant Registrar vide Order dated 03.05.1995. An appeal was preferred by the auction purchaser before the Additional Collector, who set-aside the order passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer (Jagdalpur) vide order dated 31.03.1997. Late Mahadev preferred a Second Appeal before the Commissioner, Bastar Division and the same was dismissed vide order dated 20.09.1999. The petitioners preferred WP No. 1604/2000 challenging the order passed by Commissioner, Bastar Division dated 20.09.1999 and the said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 28.04.2014 and the petitioners were permitted to approach the competent authority. The Naib Tahsildar directed Late Mahadev to return the possession of the subject property to the auction purchaser vide order dated 17.05.2000 and that order was challenged by the petitioners by filing an appeal before the Sub-Divisional 4 Officer, Jagdalpur and it was dismissed vide order dated 29.06.2009. Thereafter, the petitioners approached the Board of Revenue and the revision was disposed of reserving liberty in favour of the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum vide order dated 23.08.2016. The petitioners approached the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Jagdalpur by filing an appeal under Section 78 of the Act, 1960 along with an application for condonation of delay sometime in the year 2017. The Registrar, Cooperative Society vide order dated 25.03.2019 rejected the application moved by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and consequently, the appeal was also dismissed. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and took a plea that the petitioners were pursuing their remedy before another
Decision
forum, they pleaded that the writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 28.04.2014, whereas the Board of Revenue disposed of the matter on 23.08.2016. He would further submit that the case of the petitioners has not been decided on merits. He would also submit that the ex-parte order was passed by the Assistant Registrar and late Mahadev was not afforded the opportunity of hearing. It is contended that the father of the petitioners and the petitioners have been pursuing the legal battle since 1975, and therefore, they could not prefer the appeal according to the provisions of Section 78 of the Act, 1960 within limitation due to insufficient funds. It is further contended that the learned Registrar, Cooperative Societies ought to have taken a liberal approach while deciding the application for condonation of delay. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mool Chandra vs. Union of India and another, (2025) 1 SCC 625 and the 5 judgment passed by this Court in the matter of Divisional Sports Officer and Another vs. Umashankar Sahu reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Chh 623. He would pray to quash the order passed by the said authority. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Harshal Chouhan, and Mr. Rohan Shukla, learned counsels appearing for the respective respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Sharma. They would submit that the order was passed by the High Court on 28.04.2014 and liberty was granted to the petitioners to approach the competent forum, but they failed to prefer the appeal before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies immediately thereafter. They would further submit that again an order was passed by the Board of Revenue on 23.08.2016 and liberty was reserved in favour of the petitioners to approach to competent forum and again the petitioners failed to file an appeal immediately thereafter. They would also submit that the petitioners have not explained the delay of more than 10 months properly; therefore, the learned Registrar, Cooperative Societies rejected the application for condonation of delay. It is argued that the petitioners should have explained the delay of each day in their application while filing the application for condonation of delay. It is further argued that the petitioners would not get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short “1963”) as after the disposal of the case by the Board of Revenue, they did not approach the Registrar Cooperative Societies immediately. They would submit that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 8. Initially, an order was passed by the Assistant Registrar on 13.03.1974, the auction proceeding was conducted on 25.02.1975 and the subject property was sold out to one Laxminath. The petitioner filed a Civil Suit on 6 30.08.1980. The writ petition, WP No. 1604/2000 was disposed of on 28.04.2014 whereby the petitioners were granted liberty to approach the competent authority and again the Board of Revenue granted liberty to approach the competent forum vide order dated 23.08.2016. 9. From a perusal of the documents and pleadings, it is apparent that the father of petitioners No. 1 to 3 and the petitioners have been pursuing their remedies since 1980. 10. It is evident from the documents that an ex-parte order was passed by the Assistant Registrar on 13.03.1974 and the lands of the petitioners were auctioned. The petitioners would be entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Act, 1963 for the period from 30.08.1980 till 28.08.2016, but the appeal was preferred by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies in the month of April or May of 2017. 11. A perusal of the application for condonation of delay would show that the petitioners have not explained the delay caused in filing the appeal before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, after the disposal of Revision, which was pending before the Board of Revenue. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mool Chandra (supra), held that the Court should take a liberal approach while dealing with the application for condonation of delay. Relevant para 23 reads as under :- “23. If negligence can be attributed to the appellant, then necessarily the delay which has not been condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if no fault can be laid at the doors of the appellant and cause shown is sufficient then we are of the considered view that both the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in not adopting a liberal approach or justice-oriented approach to condone the delay. This Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 has held: (SCC p. 51, para 6) “6. Incidentally this point of delay and laches was also raised before the High Court and on this score 7 the High Court relying upon the decision in Abhyankar case observed that it is not an inflexible rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must and necessarily refuse to entertain the petition filed after a period of three years or more which is the normal period of limitation for filing a suit. The Bombay High Court Abhyankar case stated that the question is one of discretion to be followed in the facts and circumstances of each case and further stated: (SCC OnLine Bom para 22)” 22.... The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.'” 13. This Court in the matter of Umashankar Sahu (supra) while dealing with the issue of delay in para 7 to 9 held as under :- “7. In the matter of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the sufficient cause has to be construed liberally especially when the delay is not deliberate and malafide. Relevant portion of the report held as under : - “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitation newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigatin). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilaory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must 8 be kep alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366 AIR 1972 SC 749)." 8. Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy has laid down the principles for deciding application for condonation of delay, which has been followed by this Court in the matter of Pradeep Majumdar v. Duvas Bal. Para 21 of the Esha Bhattacharjee (Supra) states as under: - 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms "sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public 9 mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude." 9. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that though affidavit was not filed in support of application for condonation of delay and option available to the first appellate Court was to direct the appellants therein to file affidavit in support of application for condonation of delay, but it could not have been rejected on sole ground without considering the merits of the condonation application for delay in filing the appeal.” 10 14. The petitioners are villagers, they have been contesting the case since 1980, they approached various forums for redressal of their grievances and ultimately approached the Registrar, Cooperative Societies. 15. The Registrar, Cooperative Societies in its order dated 25.03.2019 rejected the application on the ground that the petitioners could not explain the delay caused between the order passed by the Board of Revenue and the filing of the appeal. 16. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioners’ case has not been decided on merits, the petitioners have been pursuing their remedies since 1980, the petitioners are poor villagers, an ex-parte order was passed by the Assistant Registrar and the Court concerned/authority concerned should have taken a liberal approach while entertaining the application for condonation of delay; the order passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies dated 25.03.2019 is hereby quashed. Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby allowed. 17. The matter is remitted back to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies to decide the pending appeal afresh on merits after affording a due opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. d $iddhant Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge