State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramesh Kumar Patel) by
Case Details
1 ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.08.26 10:40:39 +0530 2025:CGHC:42900-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1120 of 2021 Ramesh Kumar Patel S/o Netram Patel Aged About 24 Years R/o Madwarani, P.S. Urga, District Korba, Chhattisgarh versus ... Appellant State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Urga, District Korba, Chhattisgarh (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) --- Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate For State/Respondent : Ms. Soumya Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 25.08.2025 1. Heard Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. Soumya Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent. 2 2. In this criminal appeal filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), the accused-appellant has called in question the legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.07.2018 passed in Sessions Case No.43 of 2017 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramesh Kumar Patel) by the learned Sessions Judge, District Korba (C.G.). By the said judgment, the appellant-accused has been convicted for the offences under Sections 302 and 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months; and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, with a direction that both the sentences shall run concurrently. 3. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 22.02.2017 at about 6:30 PM, at the residence of Smt. Anita Patel in village Jarve, the accused Ramesh Kumar Patel committed house trespass with the intent to outrage her modesty. On entering the house, he used criminal force on Anita Patel, held her hands and arms, and attempted to molest her. On her protest, the accused beat her and fled from the spot. On the next day, i.e., 23.02.2017 at about 11:00 AM, when Anita Patel was alone at home, the accused again trespassed into her house. He caught her from behind, held her hands and arms, and teased her, remarking that although she called him her son, he looked at her with a “different 3 eye.” When Anita protested, the accused assaulted her with kicks and punches, stuffed a cloth in her mouth, poured kerosene from a lamp kept in the house, set her ablaze, and thereafter fled from the spot. Due to the fire, Anita sustained extensive burn injuries on her thighs, stomach, chest, and both arms. Anita Patel was immediately shifted by her husband and others to Korba District Hospital through 108 ambulance services. After one day of treatment, she was referred to New Korba Hospital, where she remained admitted for another night. Thereafter, she was shifted to the Burns Unit of a private hospital in Bilaspur and treated for four days. Due to financial constraints, she was subsequently admitted to CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur, where she continued to receive treatment for about a week. Despite medical care, she succumbed to burn injuries on 08.03.2017 at about 5:00 AM. 4. On receiving intimation from the hospital regarding admission of a burn injury patient, Police Station Urga registered Rural Nalasi No. 0/17 under Sections 450, 354, 307 IPC. During treatment, Anita Patel’s dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate vide Ex.P/7.
Legal Reasoning
upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab [(1999) 6 SCC 545] wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on 19 the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier,we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 695] (at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that "in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration" has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind where after he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. Stateof Gujarat [(1999) 9 SCC 562].” 26. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT 20 of Delhi), (2019) 8 SCC 779 following the principle of law laid down in Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration, however, the requirement remains that the person who records dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration. 27. Further, in the matter of Irfan @ Naka (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind and observed in Para-63 as under: “63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. It is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant.” 28. Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 941 has clearly held that once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration and observed in Para-25 as under: 21 “25. The law relating to dying declaration is now well settled. Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration. However, before accepting such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any tutoring. Once such a conclusion is reached, a great deal of sanctity is attached to a dying declaration and as said earlier, it can form the sole basis for conviction.” 29. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned judgments, it is quite vivid that in the instant case as the prosecution’s case is projected totally on dying declaration (Ex.P/7), which is recorded by Executive Magistrate, namely, Smt. Karuna Aher (PW-12) as well as dying declaration (Ex.P/23), which is recorded by the Executive Magistrate, namely, Devsingh Uike (PW-15) wherein the deceased has clearly narrated the incident and implicated the appellant herein to be the author of the crime in question. 30. Before considering the submission raised on behalf of the appellant, it would be appropriate to notice few facts which are apparent on the face of record. 22 31. The dying declaration (Ex.P/7) was recorded on 23.02.2017 in presence of Smt. Karuna Aher (PW-12) who is Tahsildar after giving certification of the doctor that the victim was in fit state of mind to give dying declaration. Smt. Karuna Aher (PW-12) has deposed in her evidence that on 23.02.2017, upon doctor’s certification of fitness, she recorded the dying declaration of Anita (Ex.P.7) in presence of doctor, Sarpanch and Kotwar. Anita stated that on 22.02.2017, while whitewashing, the accused Ramesh Patel kicked her, tried to molest and assaulted her, and on 23.02.2017 again assaulted her, poured kerosene and set her ablaze. Furthermore, Dr. O.S. Kanwar (PW-3) certified Anita’s fitness (Ex.P/6) and was present at the time of recording of her dying declaration vide Ex.P/7, making endorsement therein. The dying declaration of Smt. Anita Patel states as under: - “ ej.kklUu dFku Ukke & vfurk ckbZ iVsy LFkku & ftyk vLirky] dksjck ifr & fo’oukFk iVsy le; & 5%00 p.m. fnukad & 23@02@17 mez & 30 o”kZ tkfr & iVsy fuokl & tosZ Fkkuk & mjxk ej.kklu dFku iz’u%& rqe dkSu gks vkSj bl le; dgkW gks \ mRrj%& esjk uke vfurk ckbZ iVsy gSA eSa vHkh vLirky esa gwWA iz’u%& rqEgs D;k gqvk gS \ mRrj%& eS ?kj dh fyikbZ dj jgh FkhA rc esjs cqvk lkl dk yM+dk usa tyk;kA iz’Uk%& ?kVuk dc vkSj dSls ?kfVr gqbZ \ 23 mRrj%& eS ?kj dh fyikbZ dj jgh Fkh] ?kVuk fnukWd 22@02@17 dh gSA tc eSa fyikbZ dj jgh Fkh rc esjs cqvk lkl dk csVk uke jes’k iVsy ihNs ls vk;k vkSj ihNs ls Ykkr ekjds fxjk fn;kA esjs lkFk tcjnLRkh djus dk dksf’k’k fd;k vkSj ekj&ihV fd;kA vkt fnukad 23@02@17 dh lqcg 11%30 cts fQj tcjnLrh djus dh dksf’k’k fd;kA ekjk&ihVk vkSj feV~Vh rsy Mkydj tyk fn;kA Ikz’u%& ?kVuk ds le; dkSu&dkSu mifLFkr Fks \ mRrj%& ?kj esa eSa vdsyh FkhA iz’u%& ?kVuk ds laca/k esa RkqEgsa vkSj dqN dguk gS \ mRrj%& eq>s ?kVuk ds laca/k eas vkSj dqN ugha dguk cl mls er NksM+uk mls ltk t:j nsukA i<+k] lquk Lohdkj fd;kA 32. From careful perusal of the dying declaration of the deceased, Smt. Anita Bai Patel (Ex.P/7), it appears that the same was recorded by the Naib Tahsildar Smt. Karuna Aher (PW-12) after due certification of the doctor that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, wherein she has given a clear and categorical statement implicating the appellant Ramesh Kumar Patel. She stated that while she was plastering the house, the appellant, who is the son of her aunt- in-law, came from behind, kicked her, made her fall, attempted to outrage her modesty, and assaulted her. She further disclosed that on the following day, i.e., on 23.02.2017 at about 11:30 AM, when she was alone in the house, the appellant again attempted to force himself upon her, and thereafter poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. In response to specific queries, she clarified that no one else was present at the time of the incident and expressed only one desire, namely, that the accused should not be spared and should be punished. The dying 24 declaration thus contains a consistent, voluntary, and truthful account of the incident and clearly attributes the act of setting her on fire to the appellant. 33. Another dying declaration (Ex. P/23) of the deceased was recorded on 01.03.2017 at about 11:30 AM by the Tahsildar Devsingh Uike (PW-15) at CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur. However, in the said dying declaration, there is no medical endorsement by the attending doctor certifying that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give her statement. In the absence of such certification, the sanctity and evidentiary value of this dying declaration is seriously impaired. It is a settled principle of law that while a dying declaration need not necessarily be recorded only in the presence of a doctor, yet the Courts have consistently emphasized that there must be satisfactory evidence to establish that the declarant was in a fit mental condition to make such statement. In the present case, Ex.P/23 does not bear any such endorsement of the doctor, nor is there any independent material on record to prove that the deceased was mentally and physically fit at the time of making the said statement. Therefore, the second dying declaration (Ex.P/23) cannot be treated as reliable or trustworthy and cannot be made the sole basis for conviction. 34. When a pointed query was put to learned counsel for the appellant–accused as to what necessitated the recording of a second dying declaration by another Executive Magistrate, namely Tahsildar Devsingh Uike (PW-15), and whether he was confronted with the fact of 25 the earlier dying declaration of the deceased recorded as Ex.P/7 during the course of the trial, he stated that no such question had been put to him. It is not in dispute that the first dying declaration (Ex.P/7) had already been recorded by the Naib Tahsildar Smt. Karuna Aher (PW-12) on 23.02.2017 in the presence of the doctor, after due certification by Dr. O.S. Kanwar (PW-3) that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make such statement. Once a dying declaration, duly certified by a medical officer and recorded by a competent Magistrate, was available, there was no justification for recording another dying declaration without following the same procedural safeguards. 35. The second dying declaration (Ex.P/23) recorded by Devsingh Uike (PW-15) on 01.03.2017 at CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur, does not carry any certification by the doctor regarding the mental and physical fitness of the victim to make such a statement. The absence of vital safeguard raises a serious doubt about its authenticity and reliability. The very fact that no convincing reason has been shown by the defence for bringing the second dying declaration on record lends credence to the prosecution’s contention that it was introduced only to create confusion and weaken the otherwise cogent and consistent version contained in the first dying declaration. 36. In the said context, it is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman (supra) that though medical certification is not an absolute necessity, the Court must be fully satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind while making the statement. In the present case, whereas 26 the first dying declaration is duly supported by medical certification and the testimony of independent witnesses, the second one suffers from the absence of such safeguards, thereby reducing its evidentiary value. Hence, the second dying declaration cannot be relied upon and is liable to be discarded. 37. Another aspect of the matter is that there is an eye-witness to the incident, who is none other than the son of the deceased, namely, Kundan Kumar Patel and from perusal of his statement, it is evident that he has categorically identified the accused Ramesh Patel in Court and stated that the accused is his uncle. He deposed that the incident occurred before Holi. On the date of incident, after leaving for school at about 9:30 AM and reaching at around 10:00 AM, he came back home at about 10:30 AM. to fetch his food plate. When he reached the road in front of his house, he heard commotion inside the house and could hear the sound of a quarrel between a man and a woman. He clarified that on that day, his father had gone to Madwarani for work at about 7:00 AM. He further deposed that after hearing the noise of quarrel, he remained on the road and, after about half an hour, he saw the accused coming out of their house. On seeing the accused, he hid himself behind a pile of bricks kept outside the house of one Chotu. He further stated that after the accused came out, his mother tried to catch hold of him but the accused fled from the spot. Immediately thereafter, he saw his mother in a burnt condition, crying in pain, and shouting to catch hold of the accused. At that time, his uncle Gagan and elder father Ramnath also came there and took his mother inside the house. On 27 being asked by them as to who had set her ablaze, his mother disclosed that it was Ramesh who had burnt her. He also stated that thereafter his uncle Raghunath called his father, who reached home, and soon thereafter an ambulance came and his mother was taken to Korba hospital. He also deposed that his maternal grandfather took him and his younger sister Kumkum to their house. He clarified that both he and Kumkum study together, and on the date of the incident, when he returned to take the food plate, Kumkum had not accompanied him. He also stated that in his police statement he had narrated that on the day before the incident, his elder mother Bindabai had questioned him about theft of her small box. Thus, the testimony of PW-8 clearly shows that he not only saw the accused coming out of the house immediately after the quarrel, but also corroborates the version of the deceased that it was the accused who set her on fire. His evidence, therefore, lends substantial corroboration to the prosecution case. 38. Considering the matter in its entirety, we are of the considered opinion that the first dying declaration (Ex.P/7), recorded by Naib Tahsildar Smt. Karuna Aher (PW-12) on 23.02.2017, after certification by Dr. O.S. Kanwar (PW-3) regarding the fitness of the deceased, is wholly credible. The declaration contains a clear, coherent, and voluntary account in which the deceased, Anita Bai Patel, explicitly implicated the appellant–accused Ramesh Kumar Patel for assaulting her on 22.02.2017 and subsequently setting her ablaze on 23.02.2017. The deceased stated that the accused had kicked her, attempted to outrage her modesty, and assaulted her, and thereafter poured 28 kerosene on her and set her on fire while she was alone in the house. The declarant further expressed her desire that the accused should be punished, thereby indicating the voluntary nature of her statement. The reliability of Ex.P/7 is reinforced by the testimony of PW-8, Kundan Kumar Patel, the son of the deceased, who witnessed the accused leaving the house immediately after the incident. He clearly identified the appellant in Court, described the sequence of events leading up to and immediately following the assault, and confirmed that his mother disclosed the identity of the perpetrator as Ramesh Patel. As such, the statement of Kundan Kumar Patel (PW-8) corroborates the version of the deceased in material particulars, providing strong support to the prosecution case. 39. The second dying declaration (Ex.P/23), recorded by Tahsildar Devsingh Uike (PW-15) on 01.03.2017 at CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur, suffers from significant infirmities. Unlike the first declaration, Ex.P/23 was recorded without any medical certification of the victim’s fitness to make a statement. No independent evidence exists on record to establish that the deceased was in a sound mental and physical condition at the time. The defence has offered no credible explanation for the recording of a second declaration when the first, duly certified by a medical officer and recorded by a competent Magistrate, was already available. The said circumstance raises serious doubts about the authenticity and reliability of the second declaration. 40. It is a settled principle of law that while a dying declaration need 29 not be recorded exclusively in the presence of a doctor, the Court must be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind to make a voluntary statement (See: Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710; Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22; P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 443). 41. In the present case, the first dying declaration (Ex.P/7) satisfies these legal requirements, being made in a fit mental state, in the presence of competent witnesses and medical certification. In contrast, second dying declaration (Ex.P/23), lacking medical endorsement and credible supporting evidence, cannot be treated as trustworthy. It is therefore liable to be discarded. 42. Considering the above, the conviction of the appellant rests upon the first dying declaration (Ex.P/7), fully corroborated by the eyewitness account of Kundan Kumar Patel (PW-8) and other material evidence. The prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused- appellant committed the acts as narrated by the deceased. 43. Accordingly, in view of afore-mentioned reasons, since the dying declaration (Ex.P/7) inspires confidence, as the same is voluntary and trustworthy, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted appellant and sentenced the appellant-accused for offence under Sections 302 and 450 of IPC on the basis of said dying declaration and as per the postmortem report (Ex.P/15), it has clearly been opined that the cause of death of the deceased is due to excessive burn injury and its complication. 30 44. Consequently, in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, we hereby affirm the conviction and sentence of the accused-appellant namely, Ramesh Kumar Patel, as awarded by the learned trial Court and the accused-appellant is not liable to be acquitted of the said charge on the basis of benefit of doubt. 45. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. It is stated that the appellant- Ramesh Kumar Patel is in jail since 24.02.2017. He shall serve out the sentence as awarded by the trial Court. 46. The Registry of this Court is directed to sent a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where is languishing, informing him that he is at liberty to assail this judgment before the Supreme Court by preferring an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India with the aid and assistance of the Chhattisgarh High Court Legal Services Committee or that of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 47. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu
Arguments
Statements of witnesses namely Smt. Vrindabai Patel, Harinam Das Mahant, Parmanand Kanwar, Dileshwar Patel and Rambai Patel were recorded. Later, on registration of Crime No. 44/17 under Sections 450, 354, 307 IPC, the case diary was maintained. Upon Anita’s death, the offence under Section 302 IPC was added. 5. During investigation, the site map of the house and the place of occurrence was prepared vide Ex.P/1. From the spot, a burnt saree 4 emitting kerosene smell, a one-litre Kinley bottle containing about 50 ml of kerosene oil, and a matchbox with seven matchsticks were seized in presence of witnesses Vrindabai and Harinam Das vide Ex.P/9. Statements of further witnesses namely Smt. Nagodibai @ Dhanpurhin, Bisnath Patel, and Amritlal Patel were also recorded. The accused Ramesh Kumar Patel was arrested, and his arrest memo was prepared vide Ex.P/21. A second dying declaration of Anita Patel was also recorded at CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur vide Ex.P/23. 6. On receipt of intimation regarding Anita’s death from CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur, a merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P/25. Inquest proceedings (panchnama) were conducted in presence of witnesses vide Ex.P/3. The postmortem of the deceased was carried out by Dr. Yogesh Kumar Gabel (PW-11). During the course of investigation, two sealed packets containing skin and hair samples of the deceased and her petticoat were seized vide Ex.P/27. Statements of Anita’s daughter Kumkum Patel (PW-16) as well as her son Kundan Patel (PW-8) were also recorded. 7. The seized articles, including the skin, hair, petticoat, kerosene bottle, matchbox, and burnt saree were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur vide Ex.P/28, and the FSL report was received vide Ex.P/30. 8. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba, who committed the case to the Court of Session for trial. The accused denied the charges. In his 5 examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he stated that he has been falsely implicated and that the incident was one of suicide. 9. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses, including PW-1 Vishwanath Patel, PW-2 Ravindra Das Mahant, PW-3 Dr. O.S. Kanwar, PW-4 Dilesh Banjare, PW-5 Vrinda Bai Patel, PW-6 Harinam Das, PW-7 Parmanand Kanwar, PW-8 Kundan Kumar Patel, PW-9 Dileshwar Patel, PW-10 Smt. Nagoi Bai, PW-11 Dr. Yogesh Kumar Gabel, PW-12 Smt. Karuna Aher, PW-13 P.L. Chandra, PW-14 Sitaram Raj, PW-15 Devsingh Uikey, PW-16 Kumkum Patel, PW-17 Yogesh Gupta, and PW-18 M.M. Minj and exhibited 30 documents from Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/30. In defence, the accused-appellant has not examined any witness, but exhibited two documents i.e. Ex.D/1 and Ex.D/2. 10. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to acquit the accused-appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 454 and 354 of IPC and convict him for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 450 of IPC and sentenced him as mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 11. Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Sections 302 and 450 of IPC, as the 6 prosecution has failed to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that there is no evidence available on record against the appellant to connect him with the crime in question except the dying declaration (Ex.P/9) as well as the second dying declaration (Ex.P/23). It is contended that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case and the entire prosecution story is concocted. It is argued that the prosecution has placed reliance upon two written dying declarations, Ex.P/7 and Ex.P/23, but both of them are contradictory to each other in material particulars and therefore, cannot be made the sole basis for conviction. It is further contended that the alleged oral dying declarations said to have been made before Vishwanath Patel (PW-1), Brinda Bai (PW-5), Harinam Das (PW-6), Parmanand Kanwar (PW-7) and Dileshwar Patel (PW-9) are also not reliable, as oral dying declaration is a weak piece of evidence and, in the absence of corroboration, cannot be the foundation of conviction. Learned counsel has also submitted that the evidence of Kundan Kumar Patel (PW-8), who has been projected as an eye-witness, does not inspire confidence. At the initial stage, there was no eye-witness in the case, but subsequently, the prosecution developed PW-8 as an eye- witness whose statement was recorded belatedly on 17.04.2017, much after the incident, and therefore, his testimony cannot be safely relied upon. It is next urged that the prosecution has also failed to establish any proximate or immediate motive for the appellant to commit the alleged offence, which further weakens the prosecution case. Thus, it is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond 7 reasonable doubt and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 450 IPC is liable to be set aside. 12. Learned counsel relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of: (i) State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar, (2005) 9 SCC 769; (ii) State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Khaja Hussain, (2009) 15 SCC 120; (iii) Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1358; (iv) Kamla (Smt.) v. State of Punjab, (1993) 1 SCC 1; (v) Suresh v. State, (2025) 4 SCC 794; and (vi) Irfan alias Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060 to bolster his submissions. Hence, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set aside and the appellant deserves to be acquitted from the said charge on the basis of benefit of doubt. 13. Per contra, Ms. Soumya Sharma, learned State counsel has supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt by leading cogent and reliable evidence. It is submitted that the deceased had given her written dying declarations, Ex.P/7 and Ex.P/23, which were duly recorded in accordance with law by the competent authority, and both clearly implicate the accused. Minor variations, if any, in the dying declarations do not go to the root of the matter and rather strengthen the prosecution case that the statements were made voluntarily without tutoring. It is further contended that apart from the written dying declarations, the deceased 8 had also made oral dying declarations before several witnesses, namely Vishwanath Patel (PW-1), Brinda Bai (PW-5), Harinam Das (PW-6), Parmanand Kanwar (PW-7) and Dileshwar Patel (PW-9), which corroborate the prosecution version. Learned State counsel would further submit that the testimony of Kundan Kumar Patel (PW-8), the son of the deceased, is natural and trustworthy, and merely because his statement was recorded at a later stage cannot be a ground to discard his evidence when his presence at the house is natural and his testimony is consistent with the other evidence on record. It is also urged that motive, though not proved with mathematical precision, is not an essential element when there is direct evidence of the crime coupled with dying declarations of the deceased. Thus, it is submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offences under Sections 302 and 450 of IPC and the appeal being devoid of substance deserves to be dismissed. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 15. Now the question for consideration before us would be whether appellant- Ramesh Kumar Patel is the author of the crime in question or not ? 16. In the instant case, the case of the prosecution is solely based on dying declaration (Ex.P/7) recorded by the Executive Magistrate, namely, Smt. Karuna Aher (PW-12) as well as dying declaration 9 (Ex.P/23) recorded by Executive Magistrate, namely, Devsingh Uike (PW-15), therefore, it would be appropriate to notice the principles governing the dying declaration. 17. At this stage, it is relevant to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus: “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.—Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:— (1) when it relates to cause of death.— When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. 10 xxx xxx xxx” 18. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and cross- examination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that “a dying man seldom lies” or in other words “truth sits upon the lips of a dying man”. The relevance of this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. 19. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the “dying declaration” section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter 11 of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of the transaction”: “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:- (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice. (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step 12 directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32. (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring. (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to 13 prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide. (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.” 20. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, such statement is relevant. The Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) clearly held that Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible, the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death or deals with circumstances leading to the death. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has further been followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324 reviewing the earlier authorities. 21. Thereafter, in the matter of Devinder alias Kala Ram and others v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 763, wherein the deceased, who sustained burn injuries while cooking meals on stove, had made a 14 statement to the doctor, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that statement of the deceased recorded by the doctor is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and observed as under: “14. In the facts of the present case, we find that PW 7, the Medical Officer of the Civil Hospital, examined the case of the deceased on 6-8-1992 at 6.30 a.m. and he has clearly stated in his evidence that on examination she was conscious and that there were superficial to deep burns all over the body except some areas on feet, face and perineum and there was smell of kerosene on her body. He also stated in his evidence that the deceased was brought to the hospital by her husband Kala Ram (Appellant 1). He has proved the bed-head ticket pertaining to the deceased in the hospital (Ext. DD) as well as his endorsement at Point ‘A’ on Ext. DD, from which it is clear that he was told by the patient herself that she sustained burns while cooking meals on a stove. This statement of the deceased recorded by PW 7 is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, are themselves relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into 15 question.” 22. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2010) 11 SCC 489, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: “21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:- 21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court. 21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. 21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. 16 21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement. 21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration. 21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. 21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.” 23. In the matter of Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 839, their Lordships of the Supreme Court 17 held that where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration made by the accused, one first in time must be preferred. 24. In a recent judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2022 SCC Online SC 1019, while considering the issue of multiple dying declarations, their Lordships have held as under: “9. It could thus be seen that the Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting. The dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required. In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon. However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a 18 decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance. xxx xxx xxx 20. We therefore find that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one (Ex. PE). In any case, the benefit of doubt which has been given to the other accused by the trial court, ought to have been equally given to the present appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused.” 25. In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. Their Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as under: “5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied