Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.03.12 18:22:39 +0530 2025:CGHC:12170 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5217 of 2018
Legal Reasoning
3. Having considered the pleadings made in the writ petition and documents filed along with writ petition, it is quite vivid that the petitioner was eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar in the month of January, 2009 and his name was not considered. The petitioner got retired from services on 31.08.2012 and this petition was filed on 01.08.2018. 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, held as under:- “17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may 3 unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 5. Recently, the Apex Court, in the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, 2022 SCC Online SC 64, held as under:- “9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 4 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words: “ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” 6. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 7. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of 5 Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra), Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioner has approached this
Arguments
• Madhav Vinchunkar S/o Late Shri M.G. Vinchurkar Aged About 66 Years Retired Section Officer University, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, R/o House No. 403, Jivaji Heights, Muktidham Sarkanda, District- Bialspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya (Central University) Through- Vice Chancellor Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya Koni, Police Station- Koni District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2. Registrar Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya, Koni, Police Station Koni, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner For Respondents : None, even in the second round. : None, even in the second round. Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 11. 03.2025 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, the Hon'ble court be pleased to direct the respondent authority to the respondent authority to decide the pending application of the petitioner for promotion on the post of Assistant Registrar to be given promotion on the post of Assistant Registrar from 15/1/2009. (Annexure P/1) 2 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the respondent to grant consequential benefits to the petitioner on the post of Assistant Registrar from 15/1/2009. 10.3 That, any other relief which this Hon'ble court deems fit in the present facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be granted.” 2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Upper Division Clerk Grade – I in the Guru Ghasidas University, Bilaspur, on 23.11.1985. He was promoted to the post of Section Officer on 06.05.1991. The petitioner was eligible to get a promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar in the University in the month of January, 2009, but his name was not considered by the respondents. The petitioner got retired on 31.08.2012, whereas this petition was filed on 01.08.2018.
Decision
Court after a delay of 9 years and in para 7 of the writ petition, it is stated that the petition is well within limitation. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. No cost(s).Sd Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant