1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The In- Charge, Police Outpost- Birejhar, Police Station v. 1 - Gangaram Dhruw S/o Beniram Dhruw Aged About 55 Years R/o Near Girls
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:37590 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 563 of 2019 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The In- Charge, Police Outpost- Birejhar, Police Station- Kurud, District- Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh., ... Appellant versus 1 - Gangaram Dhruw S/o Beniram Dhruw Aged About 55 Years R/o Near Girls School, Madir Hasaud, Police Station- Mandir Hasaud, District- Dhamtari, Chhattiasgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant
Legal Reasoning
: Shri Dilman Rati Minj, Govt. Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri Rohan Sharma appears on behalf of Shri Shailendra Dubey, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J Judgment on Board 31/07/2025 : 1. The present Appeal has been preferred under Section 378 (1) of the CrPC against the judgment dated 17.01.2019 passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kurud District Dhamtari in Criminal Case No.1147/2012 whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 279, 338 (3 counts) & 304-A (2 counts) of the IPC. KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Digitally signed by KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Date: 2025.07.31 18:31:48 +0530 2. Case of the prosecution is that on the date of the accident i.e. 2 31.08.2012 at about 7.30 am deceased Vinod Jain was going from Dhamtari to Raipur in his Wagon R Car bearing registration No.CG-04/HC/0596 and from the opposite side i.e. from Raipur side, the respondent/accused while driving the truck bearing registration No.CG-04/JB/4459 in a rash and negligent manner dashed the said Wagon R car from the front side, as a result of which driver of the said car namely, Vinod Jain died on the spot. In the said accident, Manju (PW-6), Vimla Baid (PW-7) and Mohita Jain (PW-13) also sustained injuries. Another occupant of the car namely, Ashok also died on his way to the hospital. The deceased persons namely, Vinod Jain and Ashok were subjected to postmortem examination. The injured persons namely, Manju (PW-6), Vimla Baid (PW-7) and Mohita Jain (PW-13) were also medically examined. 3. One Ramlal Sahu, resident of Kodapar, has given information to the Police Chowki Birejhar, pursuant to which an FIR was registered at ‘0’ and thereafter numbered FIR was registered at Police Station Kurud vide Ex.-P/8 against the driver of the offending vehicle i.e. truck No.CG-04/JB/4459. Merg intimation was recorded vide Ex.-P/7. In the postmortem report of deceased Vinod Jain (Ex.-P/6) and Ashok (Ex.-P/10), accidental nature of the injuries were found and accordingly, cause of death has been reported. 4. Crime details form containing sketch map has been prepared vide Ex.-P/1. Death inquest was prepared vide Ex.-P/2. The 3 offending truck and its registration papers & other papers were seized vide Ex.-P/2 & P/3 respectively. Both the vehicles were examined by the mechanical expert vide Ex.-P/4 & P/5 respectively. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed. The respondent/accused abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to prove the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses and exhibited 13 documents (Ex.-P/1 to P/13). However, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, the respondent/accused has pleaded false implication and has not adduced any defence evidence. The trial Court after evaluating the evidence acquitted the respondent/accused of the charges. Hence this Appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the State/appellant submits that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. He has drawn attention of the Court towards the statement of Mohita Jain (PW-13), who has deposed that at the time of the accident, the driver of the offending vehicle came in the side of the car and dashed the vehicle. So, there is clear evidence and the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and the finding recorded by the trial Court is perverse. Therefore, the Appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment may be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused would support the impugned judgment. He would submit that there is variation in the statement of Mohita Jain (PW-13), as in 4 the Court evidence, she has deposed that the driver of the offending vehicle came in their side, however, the said fact is omitted in her police statement. She has also not stated as to what was the speed of the car in which she was occupant. At the time of the accident, the driver of the car was in drunken condition and the said fact was found by Dr. JP Diwan (PW-11), who has conducted postmortem and found that smell of alcohol was coming. He would further submit that the other witnesses have reached the spot after the accident and as such, there is no clear evidence as to the manner in which the accident has taken place. The trial Court has rightly acquitted the
Decision
respondent/accused of the charges. The impugned judgment is well merited and does not call for any interference. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 9. In the matter of Ravi Kapur Vs. State of Rajasthan {(2012) 9 SCC 284}, it was held that even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to rash and negligent driving. So the manner in which the vehicle was being driven at the time of the accident is significant and the same has to be examined in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is wrong proposition that for any motorcycle accident negligence of the driver should be presumed because there is distinction between the rash and negligent act, and the culpable rashness and criminal negligence. Paras-11 to 15 of the said judgment read thus:- 5 “11. In order to examine the merit or otherwise of Contentions (b) and (c) raised on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary for the Court to first and foremost examine (a) what is rash and negligent driving; and (b) whether it can be gathered from the attendant circumstances. (A) Rash and negligent driving 12. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly and negligently. Both these acts presuppose an abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to “rash and negligent driving” within the meaning of the language of Section 279 IPC. That is why the legislature in its wisdom has used the words “manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life”. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated under Section 279 IPC is attracted. 13.“Negligence” means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into 6 consideration by the court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence. 14. The court has to adopt another parameter i.e. “reasonable care” in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrians happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others. 15. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes — one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the provision in IPC that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concept of “culpable rashness” and “culpable negligence” into consideration in cases of road accidents. “Culpable rashness” is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). “Culpable negligence” is acting without 7 the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person's negligent conduct. [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon's An Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1st Edn., 2010).]” 10. Reverting to the facts of the present case, admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the accident. Mohita Jain (PW-13), who also suffered injuries in the accident, has deposed in her Court evidence that the driver of the offending vehicle came to their side and dashed their vehicle, but the said fact was omitted in her Police Statement. She has also failed to state that at the time of the accident, what was the speed of the car. Further, (PW-11) Dr. JP Diwan, who has conducted the postmortem on the dead body of Vinod Jain and proved his report (Ex.-P/6), has admitted that at the time of examination, smell of alcohol was coming from the body of the deceased. 11. Moreover, the prosecution has not examined the I.O. for the reasons best known to it and other witnesses namely, Jitendra Kumar (PW-2) and Shailendra (PW-3) have stated that they had reached the spot after the accident and they only admitted their signatures on sketch map (Ex.-P/1) and not stated as to how the accident has taken place. They have categorically admitted 8 that they are not aware as to on whose fault the accident occurred. 12. Ramlal Sahu (PW-1), who has lodged the FIR (Ex.-P/8), has also reached the spot after the accident. (PW-4) Anil and (PW-5) Mahesh, who are relatives of the deceased persons, reached the spot after the accident. Manju (PW-6) and Vimla Baid (PW-7), who were the occupants of the vehicle, have not stated anything as to the manner of the accident. (PW-8) Yashwant Yadav has only stated that the respondent/accused has taken the offending vehicle, but he is not aware that at the time of accident who was driving the said vehicle. He has only proved the employment certificate which were seized vide Ex.-P/2 & P/3. 13. (PW-10) Bhagwati, a mechanical expert, has stated that at the time of examination of the vehicle, radiator pipe and suspension of the vehicle were broken. He has proved the report (Ex.-P/5). However, he admits in cross-examination that the radiator pipe gets burst in case the vehicle gets excessively heated and the suspension of the vehicle is broken when the wheel of the vehicle falls into the pit. 14. From scanning of the entire evidence, it is not clear as to how the accident happened. 15. In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial Court has rightly recorded a finding that the prosecution has failed to establish as to how the accident has occurred, as also for the 9 said accident, how the respondent/accused is solely responsible for culpable rashness and culpable negligence of the act. 16. Moreover, it is equally settled that when two views are possible, then the view which is favourable to the accused should be taken. {See : Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 9 SCC 731], V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala, [(2006) 10 SCC 617] & Constable 907 Surendra Singh & another vs. State of Uttrakhand, 2025 INSC 114.] 17. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the trial Court is possible one and no case is made out for interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court. 18. In the result, the Appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. Barve Judge Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari)