Station Mohan Nagar, Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh v. State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Stati
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:43833-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1047 of 2021 Babalu @ Raj @ Chitranjan Sahu S/o Kishor Sahu Aged About 24 Years R/o Kailash Nagar Titurdih, Police Station Mohan Nagar, Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Supela, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) For Appellant For Respondent/State : : Mr. Aman Tamrakar, Advocate. Mr. Swajeet Ubeja, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per . Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 29.08.2025 1. Mr. Aman Tamrakar, learned counsel, submits that he has filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of the appellant today itself, which is taken on record. 2. Heard Mr. Aman Tamrakar, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Swajeet Ubeja, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.09.01 11:13:29 +0530 respondent/State. 2 3. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.08.2021, passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Second Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act), Durg, District Durg (C.G.) in Special Session Case No. 40 of 2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Section 363 of the the Indian Rigorous imprisonment (for short, Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) ‘R.I.’) for 03 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 03 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. Section 6 of the Protection of R.I. for life and fine of Rs. 5000/-, in Children from Sexual default of payment of fine, 03 months Offences Act, 2012 (for short, R.I. more. ‘POCSO Act’) All the sentences shall run concurrently. 4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 09.07.2017, at about 12:00 p.m., the victim (PW-1) went to swing at Sheetla Talab, Arya Nagar, Kohka, but did not return for a long time. When she could not be found despite searching in the neighborhood and at relatives’ houses, a 3 report was lodged at Supela Police Station by the victim’s maternal cousin, namely, Chandraprakash Sahu (PW-5) alleging that an unknown person had enticed the victim away from the custody of her parents and abducted her. 5. On the basis of the said complaint, an offence was registered against the unknown person and investigation commenced. During investigation, on 30.07.2017 at about 14:45 hours, the victim (PW-1) was recovered from the custody of the appellant, Bablu @ Raj @ Chitranjan at Gondia Railway Station, Platform No. 1. A recovery panchnama was prepared, statements of the victim and witnesses were recorded, a site map of the place of incident was drawn, and the medical examination of the victim and the appellant was conducted. Vaginal slides of the victim were taken, and for determination of her age, her school documents, birth certificate, and admission-discharge register were seized. The undergarments of the victim and the appellant were also seized, and seizure memos were prepared. 6. During investigation, the appellant was taken into custody and interrogated. A memorandum statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act was recorded. On the basis of the information provided therein, the motorcycle used in the incident was seized and a seizure memo was prepared. Finding sufficient evidence against the appellant, he was arrested and an arrest memo was prepared. 7. The statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded by the Police. Upon completion of the investigation, a 4 charge-sheet was filed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act), Durg, District Durg (C.G.) against the appellant. 8.
Facts
The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the IPC and under Section 5(l) of the POCSO Act, punishable under Section 6 of the said Act. The charges were read over and explained to the appellant, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses and produced 28 documents on record. The appellant, in his defence, examined Ex.D/1. 10. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and claimed that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated. 11. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him in the manner detailed in paragraph 02 of this judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 12.
Legal Reasoning
reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. xxx xxx xxx 54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated 15 that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. 55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a car was available. She made no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi 16 Police Station that they had already been married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. 56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.” 27. Recently, in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh vs. The State of Uttarakhand4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping 4 2025 INSC 226 17 of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub- Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that 18 this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable 19 to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 28. The victim (PW-1) deposed that whenever her parents were not at home, the appellant used to visit her, profess his love, and express his desire to marry her. On such occasions, he forcibly had physical relations with her two to three times despite her resistance. She further stated that when the appellant’s wife, Radha, came to know of the matter, she visited the village, at which stage the victim realized that the appellant was already married and had two children. Thereafter, her parents sent her to stay at the house of her aunt’s son, Chandraprakash Sahu, at Arya Nagar, Kohka. She further deposed that on 09.07.2017, at about 12 noon, the appellant called on her aunt’s phone and asked her to meet him at Sheetla pond. Around 2.00 p.m., she went there along with her niece, Chinki. The appellant arrived on a motorcycle and asked her to accompany him. On her initial refusal, he assured her of 20 his love and intention to marry her, whereupon she agreed to go with him. The appellant then took her to Power House Railway Station and thereafter by train to Raigarh. From there, they proceeded to Chandrahani Temple, where he applied vermilion in her hairline, again professing his love. They spent the night on the steps of the temple and, on the following day, travelled via Bilaspur to Nagpur, where they stayed in a rented house for about twenty days. During this period, she alleged that the appellant had forced physical relations with her against her will. On 27.07.2017, she contacted her mother by mobile phone and informed her that she was in Nagpur with the appellant. On being asked by the appellant, she requested her mother to come to Gondia. The appellant then brought her to Gondia, and upon alighting at platform No.1, the Police, along with her mother and brothers, apprehended the appellant and took him to the GRP police station. In her cross- examination, the victim admitted that it was incorrect to say that the appellant had not called her to Sheetla pond. She denied that she had left her niece Chinki at the pond to accompany the appellant. She categorically admitted that the appellant did not forcibly pull her onto his motorcycle, and that she did not scream or raise any alarm while accompanying him. She could not recall the name of the train they travelled in or the precise sequence of travel. She insisted that the appellant had married her by applying vermilion in her hairline, though she admitted that she neither knew the name or location of the temple nor raised any objection in the presence of people at the temple. She also admitted that she did not inform anyone at Nagpur Railway Station 21 or the Nagpur Police that the appellant had taken her against her will. Similarly, she initially did not know the name or address of the person in whose house they stayed at Nagpur, but later stated that his name was Sonu Marathi. 29. Scrutiny of the entire evidence reveals that there is no material on record to establish that the appellant, at any point of time, compelled or coerced the victim to leave her home or hostel against her will. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant, and thereafter both stayed together at different places for several days. 30. Applying the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment referred to above, and considering the medical evidence of PW-7 along with her report (Ex.P/15) in conjunction with the testimony of the victim herself, it becomes clear that material contradictions and omissions create a serious dent in the prosecution case. In such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. On the basis of the material available on record, it cannot be held that the prosecution has proved the offences under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act beyond reasonable doubt. 31. As a consequence of the aforesaid legal analysis, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the judgment dated 19.08.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act), Durg, District Durg (C.G.) in 22 Special Sessions Case No. 40 of 2020 convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offences under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act is set aside. The appellant–Babalu @ Raj @ Chitranjan Sahu is acquitted of all the said charges. He is in jail since 31.07.2017 and shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case. 32. In compliance with Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount before the Court concerned. The bond shall remain effective for a period of six months, together with an undertaking that in the event of filing of a Special Leave Petition against this judgment, or an application for leave being granted, the appellant shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court upon receipt of notice. 33. The learned trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be transmitted forthwith to the Court concerned for information, compliance, and necessary action. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Brijmohan
Arguments
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case and that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is urged that the prosecution version suffers from material contradictions and omissions 5 which cast serious doubt on its veracity. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is contrary to the facts, evidence, and settled principles of law, and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and unsupported by the evidence on record. It is further contended that the conviction rests merely on assumptions and presumptions in the absence of any cogent or clinching evidence against the appellant, and hence, the same is bad in law. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has completely failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the victim herself accompanied the appellant voluntarily; she was never forcefully taken away; nor did she lodge any complaint either with her family members or with the police during the period in question. Even when she was taken to Nagpur, she neither resisted nor raised any protest against the appellant. It is further submitted that the evidence on record clearly demonstrates that the victim was a consenting party throughout and had willingly stayed with the appellant for nearly 20 days, thereby ruling out any element of coercion or force. It is further urged that there are material contradictions and omissions in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses as well as the statement of the victim herself, which falsify the prosecution case. Learned counsel also points out that the victim and the appellant were known to each other for the last 6–7 months and were in a relationship; that there was an unexplained delay of three days in lodging the FIR; and that the medical examination (MLC) revealed no injuries on the private parts of the victim. In these circumstances, it is contended, the impugned 6 judgment of conviction and sentence dated 19.08.2021 is unsustainable in law and on facts, and therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant acquitted of all charges. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant after due appreciation of the evidence on record. It is contended that the victim was a minor, aged 17 years and 25 days at the time of the incident, which is established by the victim’s birth certificate (Ex.P/25), wherein her date of birth is recorded as 14.06.2000. Therefore, her consent, if any, is wholly immaterial in view of the provisions of Sections 361 and 363 of the IPC. It is further urged that the testimony of the victim is consistent, cogent, and reliable, and finds due corroboration from the statements of other prosecution witnesses as well as the surrounding circumstances. Learned State counsel further submits that the conduct of the appellant in taking the victim away from her lawful guardianship, travelling with her to different places, keeping her with him for nearly 20 days, and subjecting her to sexual intercourse, clearly establishes his guilt. Minor contradictions or omissions in the statements of witnesses, it is argued, do not go to the root of the case and cannot be a ground to disbelieve the otherwise trustworthy evidence of the victim. As regards the delay of three days in lodging the FIR, learned State counsel also submits that in cases involving sexual offences, such delay is natural and cannot be treated as fatal, having regard to the trauma, hesitation, and social stigma attached to such incidents. Similarly, the absence of injuries on the 7 person of the victim does not, by itself, discredit the allegation of sexual assault, particularly when the victim has consistently deposed about the commission of the offence. Learned State counsel, therefore, contends that the findings of the learned trial Court are well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation of the evidence, and do not call for interference by this Court. Accordingly, the appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 15. The first question for consideration would be, whether the learned trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC ? 16. The appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 363 of the IPC, which is punishable for kidnapping. Kidnapping has been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section 359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as under:- “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.- Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the 8 consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.” 17. The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane persons. Section 361 of the IPC has four ingredients:- (1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. (2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female. (3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. (4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian. So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is concerned, the ingredients are : (i) that the girl was under 18 years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful guardian, and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the consent of the lawful guardian. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the object of Section 361 of the IPC in the matter of S.Varadarajan v. State of Madras1, took the view that if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active 1 AIR 1965 SC 942 9 part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so and held that if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking, it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian and held as under:- “It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. If evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. But that part falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.” 19. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the ingredients of the offence under Section 361 of the IPC, punishable under Section 363 of the IPC, and having regard to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.Varadarajan (supra), it emerges that on 10 09.07.2017, the appellant telephoned the victim on her elder mother’s phone around 12.00 p.m. and asked her to meet him at Sheetla Talab. The victim went there at about 2.00 p.m. along with her brother’s daughter, Chinki. The appellant thereafter arrived on a motorcycle and persuaded her to accompany him on the assurance that he loved her and would marry her. He first took her to Railway Station Power House, then to Raigarh by train, and thereafter to Chandrahansini Temple, where he applied sindoor in her hair. The parties spent the night at the temple and subsequently travelled to Bilaspur and Nagpur, where they resided in a rented house for nearly 20 days. During this period, the victim alleges that the appellant had physical relations with her against her will. On 27.07.2017, the victim contacted her mother, who, along with the police and her brother, apprehended the appellant at Gondia Railway Station. However, in her cross-examination, the victim categorically admitted that she did not raise any protest either at Nagpur Railway Station or before the Police at Nagpur, nor did she disclose that she had been taken away forcibly. She further admitted her inability to furnish the name and address of the person in whose house they stayed at Nagpur, later identifying him as one Sonu Marathi. 20. On a careful evaluation of the evidence, it is clear that there is no material to suggest that the appellant compelled, coerced, or induced the victim to leave her lawful guardianship. On the contrary, the record demonstrates that the victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant, travelled with him to different places, and resided with him. In such circumstances, the essential element of “taking” within the meaning of 11 Section 361 of the IPC is absent. As held in S.Varadarajan (supra), where a minor voluntarily leaves her guardian and joins the company of another person without inducement or enticement, the act cannot amount to kidnapping. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant by the learned trial Court under Section 363 of the IPC is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. 21. The next question for consideration is, whether the learned trial Court was justified in convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 366 of the IPC ? 22. In this regard, Dr. B.N. Wahne (PW-7), who conducted the medical examination of the victim, has opined in Ex.P/15 that there was no fresh injury on the body of the victim. Thus, there is no corroborative medical evidence brought on record by the prosecution to establish the charge under Section 366 of the IPC. 23. On a perusal of the testimony of the victim, it is evident that she merely accompanied the appellant voluntarily, without being enticed, influenced, or induced. Mere voluntary companionship without inducement or enticement cannot constitute an offence under Section 366 of the IPC. Although learned State counsel has strenuously argued that the prosecution has established the victim’s minority as on the date of the incident, mere proof of age is not sufficient to attract Section 366 of the IPC. For a conviction under Section 366, two essential ingredients must be satisfied: (i) that the victim was induced by the accused to go from a place or to do any act; and (ii) that such 12 inducement was with the intent or knowledge that she may be, or is likely to be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse by another person. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove these essential ingredients. 24. As regards the age of the victim, the prosecution has produced reliable documentary and oral evidence, including the birth certificate (Ex.P/25), duly proved by victim (PW-1), showing her date of birth as 14.06.2000. There is no reason to disbelieve this documentary evidence. Thus, the victim’s age at the time of the incident is proved to be 17 years and 25 days. In such circumstances, even if it is assumed that she consented to the sexual act, the same would not constitute an offence under the POCSO Act, as the victim had attained the age of consent under law. 25. In the matter of Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu & Kashmir and others2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a judicial notice can be taken that the margin of error in age ascertained by Radiological examination is two years on either side. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “9. Detenu was arrested and detained on Oct. 18, 1981. The report by the expert is dated May 3, 1982, that is nearly seven months after the date of detention. Growing in age day by day is an involuntary process and the anatomical changes in the structure of the body continuously occur. Even on normal calculation, if seven months are 2 AIR 1982 SC 1297 13 deducted from the approximate age opined by the expert, in Oct., 1981 detenu was around 17 years of age, consequently the statement made in the petition turns out to be wholly true. However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side. Undoubtedly, therefore, the detenu was a young school going boy. It equally appears that there was some upheavel in the educational institutions. This young school going boy may be enthusiastic about the students’ rights and on two different dates he marginally crossed the bounds of law. It passes comprehension to believe that he can be visited with drastic measure of preventive detention. One cannot treat young people, may be immature, may be even slightly misdirected, may be a little more enthusiastic, with a sledge hammer. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case the detention order was wholly unwarranted and deserved to be quashed.” 26. In Alamelu and Another vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police3, where the facts and circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 51 to 56 observed as under: “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, 3 (2011) 2 SCC 385 14 Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been