Durg, Chhattisgarh v. 1. Steel Authority Of India Ltd., Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, Through Chief Executive Officer
Case Details
Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.02.20 13:56:36 +0530 1 2025:CGHC:8640 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 158 of 2018 Ramchandra S/o Shri Tufani Ram Aged About 63 Years Ex. Junior Manager, Bhilai Steel Plant, Quarter No. 3-A , Street - Emr, Sector -4, Bhilai Township Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) Versus 1. Steel Authority Of India Ltd., Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, Through Chief Executive Officer, Bhilai Steel Plant Bhilai Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 2. State Industrial Court Of Chhattisgarh , At Raipur , District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Labour Court Durg , District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner
Legal Reasoning
9) From the above proposition of law, it is well settled that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority. The limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority only in cases where such a penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 10) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of S. Vasanthi (supra), I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Ajinkya Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE
Arguments
: Mr. Malay Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No. 1 : Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pandey, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 19/02/2025 1) The petitioner has filed this petition assailing the order passed by the State Industrial Court, Chhattisgarh at Raipur in Civil Appeal No. 16/ C.G.I.R. Act/A/11/2016 dated 22.06.2017 whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. 2) Facts of the present case are that the petitioner was appointed under respondent No. 1 in the year 1981 to the post of Senior Operative Trainee. In the service record of the petitioner, the date 2 of birth was entered as 15.07.1955. On a complaint, a domestic inquiry was initiated against the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner has manipulated his date of birth. Thereafter, the high- school mark-sheet of the petitioner was sent by the Vigilance Department of respondent No. 1 to the Board of Secondary Education, Bhopal (M.P.). It was informed vide Exhibit D/19 that the petitioner’s correct date of birth is 15.07.1948. The petitioner participated in the domestic inquiry and thereafter his services were terminated vide order dated 23.12.2009. The petitioner challenged the order of termination before the Labor Court, Durg which was dismissed vide order dated 02.07.2016. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the State Industrial Court and the same was also dismissed vide order dated 22.06.2017. 3) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the service record, 15.07.1955 is mentioned as the date of birth and there was no manipulation or over-writing on the part of the petitioner and the department has recorded an incorrect finding with regard to the date of birth of the petitioner. He further submits that sufficient opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner in the domestic inquiry. He contends that in the High-School mark-sheet of the petitioner, the date of birth is entered as 15.07.1955 and the department could not prove the contrary. He prays to set-aside the orders passed by the Labor Court, Durg as well as the State Industrial Court. 4) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of 3 respondent No. 1 opposes. He submits that the Vigilance Department of respondent No. 1 vide Exhibit D/19 sent the mark- sheet of the petitioner to the Board of Secondary Education, Bhopal and vide Exhibit P/2, it was informed that the correct date of birth of the petitioner was 15.07.1948 but it is wrongly mentioned as 15.07.1955. He further submits that the petitioner himself admitted in the inquiry that his correct date of birth is 15.07.1948 and thus the learned Courts below have recorded concurrent findings. He contends that this Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not interfere with the concurrent findings arrived at by the courts below, particularly in the case of departmental inquiry. 5) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 6) Evidently, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Senior Operative Trainee in the year 1981 under respondent No. 1. After the receipt of a complaint, the Vigilance department of respondent No. 1 sent the High-School mark-sheet of the petitioner for verification vide Exhibit D/19 to the Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Pradesh and in its report (Exhibit P/2), it was found that the correct date of birth of the petitioner was 15.07.1947. The petitioner was examined as a witness in the domestic inquiry wherein he admitted that his correct date of birth was 15.07.1948. 7) As there is admission on the part of the petitioner himself before 4 the domestic inquiry, there is no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the Courts below. 8) Further, the scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was the subject matter of discussion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. S.Vasanthi [(2014) 9 SCC 315] wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- "10. The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106, the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) "7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist…. 5 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarized as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank . v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 ( SCC p.382, , para 19):- "19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent rt authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the 6 doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable."