Praveen Kumar Jain v. Praveen Kumar Jain. 10.3) That & Ors.

1 - Praveen Kumar Jain S/o Late Shri Indrasen Jain R/o Lig 76, Housing Board Colony, R.P. Nagar, Korba, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Appellate Authority Under Payment Of Gratuity Act Cum Deputy Labour Commissioner Government Of Chhattisgarh, Mantralya, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Controlling Authority Under Payment Of Gratuity Act. Cum Assistant Labour Commissioner, Korba, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner For Respondent No.1 For Respondent(s) : Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, Advocate : Mr. Aashutosh Shukla, Advocate : Mr. Vivek Siddharth Ojha, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 25/08/2026

#1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for its kind perusal.

10.2) That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 10.06.2019 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, in appeal no. 208/PGA/2018 in case of Secretary, Vidyut Grih Vidyalaya Prabandhan Samiti Vs. Praveen Kumar Jain. 2

10.3) That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 12.07.2017 passed by Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, Korba in case No. 36/PGA/2016 in case of Praveen Kumar Jain Vs. Secretary Vidyut Grih Vidyalaya Prabandhan Samiti.

10.4) Any other relief or relief(s) which this Hon'ble Court may think proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted.”

#2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the Appellate Authority erred in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal on limitation without properly considering the application for condonation of delay and the explanation furnished by the petitioner. He would further submit that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 could not have been applied to the case of father of respondent No.1, late Shri Indrasen Jain, who died on 19.11.1992, prior to its applicability to the petitioner institution. He has placed reliance on the decision Ahmedabad Primary Teachers' Association v. Administrative Officer1. He would lastly submit that the interest awarded is excessive, being Rs.2,44,180/- against the principal gratuity amount of Rs.98,820/-; thus, he would pray to quash the orders dated 12.07.2017 and 10.06.2019.

#3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would support the orders passed by the authorities concerned and submit that the Controlling Authority, after considering the material available on record, the evidence led by the parties and the applicable provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, rightly allowed the claim of respondent No.1 and directed the petitioner to pay the amount of gratuity along with interest. He would further submit that the Appellate Authority has also acted strictly in accordance with Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The petitioner admittedly did not prefer the appeal within the prescribed period of 1 (2004) 1 SCC 755 3 limitation i.e. 60+60 days. Though an application for condonation of delay was filed, but the petitioner failed to establish any sufficient cause which prevented it from filing the appeal within the statutory period; thus, the Appellate Authority committed no illegality in rejecting the appeal treating it barred by limitation.

#4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on file.

#5. In the matter of Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers’ Assn (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.19 as under:- “19. It is not disputed that by notification dated 3rd April. 1997. issued in exercise of powers, under section l(3)(c) of| the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. the Gratuity Act is extended to educational institutions in which ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day preceding 12 months. The relevant part of the notification reads as under:- APPLICABILITY OF THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972 IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS “Notification No. 5-42013/1/95-SS II. dated 3rd APRIL 1997-In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (c) of sub-clause (3) of Section 1 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, l972, (39 of 1972), the Central Government hereby specifies the educational institutions in which ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day preceding 12 months as a class of establishments to which the said Act shall apply effect from the date of publication of this notification: Provided that nothing contained in this notification shall effect the operation of the notification of the Ministry of Labour S.O. No.239 dated 8th January. 1982.” 4

#6. Since the instant matter is confined to the question of delay in filing the appeal before the appellate authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, the law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the issue under consideration.

#7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record, this Court finds that the principal issue requiring consideration is whether the petitioner has made out any sufficient ground for interference with the order of the Appellate Authority rejecting the statutory appeal on the ground of limitation.

#8. Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act prescribes a period of sixty days for preferring an appeal and permits extension only for a further period of sixty days where the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period; thus, the statutory scheme itself places a definite outer limit on the appellate remedy. A party seeking condonation of delay is required to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay.

#9. In the present case, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate sufficient cause so as to justify the delay in preferring the statutory appeal. The petitioner had knowledge of the order of the Controlling Authority and failed to avail the statutory remedy within the period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Act. The explanation furnished by the petitioner is insufficient. Consequently, the Appellate Authority cannot be said to have committed any jurisdictional error in refusing to condone the delay and dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation.

#10. The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Zila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit Vs. Ram Briksha Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. and others, reported in 2016 (148) FLR 789 wherein after making reference of the Calcutta High Court in the matter of City College Vs. State of West Bengal & others, reported in (1987) 1 LLJ 5 41 (Cal) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Shri Gurudeo Ayurved Mahavidyalaya vs. Madhav Naraya Mahakode and others, reported in 1994 Lab.I.C. 1542 held that the appellate authority is powerless to condone the delay beyond sixty days. The High Court of Calcutta & the High Court of Bombay have held that in view of special provision under Section 7(7) of the PG Act, the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked by the Appellate Authority under the PG Act for condoning the delay beyond 120 days.

#11. Similarly in the matter of Western Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Controlling Authorities & others, reported in 2000(3) MPLJ 63 the Madhya Pradesh High Court also held that the Appellate Authority cannot condone the delay or extend the period of limitation beyond the period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the PG Act.

#12. The Andhra Pradesh High Court took a similar view in the matter of Warangal District Co-Operative Society Ltd. Vs. Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Ac, 1972, reported in (2002) III LLJ 616 and held that it is settled principle of interpretation of statutes that if there are two mandates, the general must give a way to the special and, therefore, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot apply in such cases and condonation of delay thereof shall be governed by the provisions of Section 7(7) of the PG Act.

#13. Taking into consideration the above discussed facts and law, no case is made out for interference.

#14. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Nadim Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE