12.09.2025 1 - Radha Bai W/o Sunil Kumar Bhargav Aged About 35 Years R/o v. State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police
Case Details
YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2025.09.15 11:09:50 +0530 1 2025:CGHC:46740 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 962 of 2019 Judgment Reserved on : 29.08.2025 Judgment Delivered on : 12.09.2025 1 - Radha Bai W/o Sunil Kumar Bhargav Aged About 35 Years R/o Village- Lawai, Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Shrikant S/o Dashrath Ram Bhardwaj Aged About 35 Years R/o Village- Lawai, Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellants Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent CRA No. 988 of 2019 1 - Raju @ Madhupal S/o Jeevanlal Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Lewai, Police Station Baloda, District- Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 2 - Akhilesh @ Banti S/o Shyam Lal Banjare Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Lewai, Police Station Baloda, District- Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ---Appellants 2 Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Baloda, District- Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 995 of 2019 1 - Sanesh S/o Budhwar Sai Sartan Aged About 24 Years R/o Levai, Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 2 - Milan Prasad S/o Late Gambhir Sai Aged About 62 Years R/o Levai, Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 3 - Manharan Lal S/o Vednarayan Banjare Aged About 40 Years R/o Levai, Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh ---Appellants Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent CRA No. 1004 of 2019 1 - Ramkumar S/o Dayal Prasad Ogre Aged About 56 Years R/o Village Levai, P. S. Balouda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 2 - Varun Kumar S/o Lakhanlal Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Levai, P. S. Balouda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 3 - Krishnakumar S/o Lakhanlal Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Levai, P. S. Balouda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 4 - Praveen Kumar S/o Ramkumar Ogre Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Levai, P. S. Balouda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 3 5 - Sashikala W/o Ramkumar Ogre Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Levai, P. S. Balouda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh ---Appellants Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Balouda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 1007 of 2019 1 - Jamuna Prasad S/o Muniram Aged About 56 Years R/o Village- Levai, Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh 2 - Amrika Bai W/o Jamuna Prasad Aged About 50 Years R/o Village- Levai, Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Madhu W/o Shri Vikesh Sartan Aged About 24 Years R/o Village- Levai, Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh ---Appellants Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir- Champa, Civil And Revenue District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 1038 of 2019 Sunilmari S/o Dashrath Ram Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Lawai, Police Station Balod, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh ---Appellant Versus 4 State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 1408 of 2019 Amrit Lal S/o Chheduram Satnami Aged About 50 Years R/o Village - Levai, P.S. Baloda, District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh ---Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir- Champa Chhattisgarh --- Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant (in CRA No.1004/2019) : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Advocate For Appellant (in CRA No.1007/2019) : Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Hrishabh Deo Shukla and Mr. Shashwat Rai, Advocates For Appellants (in CRA No.962/2019 & 1038/2019) Advocates
Legal Reasoning
observed by this Court in Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa where allegation is of rape by many persons and several times but no injury is noticed that certainly is an important factor and if the prosecutrix's version is credible, then no corroboration is necessary. But if the prosecutrix's version is not credible then there would be need for corroboration. (See Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana.) 12. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellants, a decision has to be considered in the background of the factual scenario. In criminal cases the question of a precedent particularly relating to appreciation of evidence is really of no consequence. In Aman Kumar case it was observed that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an 18 accomplice. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than the injured witness. In the latter case there is injury in the physical form while in the former both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of a prosecutrix on the face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial.” (emphasis added) 31. When we apply the above principles to the case on hand, we find the prevaricating statements of the prosecutrix herself in the implication of the accused to the alleged offence of gang rape. There is evidence on record that there was no injury on the breast or the thighs of the prosecutrix and only a minor abrasion on the right side of neck below jaw was noted while according to the prosecutrix’s original version, the appellants had forcible sexual intercourse one after the other against her. If that was so, it is hard to believe that there was no other injury on the private parts of the prosecutrix as highlighted in the said decision. When on the face value the evidence is found to be defective, the attendant circumstances and other evidence have to be necessarily examined to see whether the allegation of gang rape was true. 19 Unfortunately, the version of the so called eye witnesses to at least the initial part of the crime has not supported the story of the prosecution. The attendant circumstances also do not co-relate to the offence alleged against the appellants. Therefore, in the absence of proper corroboration of the prosecution version to the alleged offence, it will be unsafe to sustain the case of the prosecution.” 23. In the matter of Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2012 (7) SCC 171, rendered by the Supreme Court, rape was allegedly committed with the prosecutrix by the side of the road which was busy and well electrified, her version that nobody responded to her hue and cry was found improbable, her testimony that she did not know accused stood belied by other witnesses, her evidence as to place of injuries displaced by medical evidence, FSL report did not support prosecution case and the deposition of the prosecutrix did not inspire confidence. In these circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the Court has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In this case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes liable to be rejected. The prosecution has to prove its case case beyond reasonable 20 doubt and it cannot take support of weakness of defence. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal was allowed and the appellant was acquitted of the charge punishable under Section 376 of IPC. 24. Further in the matter of Raja (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraphs-26 to 37 as follows :- “26. To start with, the prosecutrix has contradicted herself qua the place of alleged kidnapping. In the complaint, she mentioned the spot to be near Richmond park, whereas in her evidence she referred to the same as opposite Johnson market. It is more or less authenticated by the evidence on record that after her abduction and on the way to the garage as narrated by her, she did not scream or cry for help. This is of utmost significance as it is not alleged by her that the abductors had put her under fear on the point of any weapon threatening physical injury thereby. This is more so, as admittedly the prosecutrix at the relevant time was a major and could very well foresee the disastrous consequences to follow. She has admitted in her deposition as well that while she was ravished inside the garage and even during the intermittent breaks, she did not shout for any help. Her version in the complaint with regard to the offending act and the number of persons, who had committed the same, is inconsistent with her testimony on oath at the 21 trial. Notably in the complaint she mentioned about four persons of whom three raped and out of them, two committed the act twice. She did not disclose in her complaint that the accused persons were known to her from before and disclosed that they during the time had been referring to themselves as Raju, Venu, Parkash and Francis. This, however has been denied by the investigation officer. On oath, she however introduced a fifth person as well. She accused all the four persons to have committed sexual intercourse with her for the second time. Though grudgingly, as admitted by her, she also consumed the food as offered to her by her molesters. 27. In cross-examination, she admitted that she was not married to Sarvana though she claimed him to be her husband in her examination-in-chief. She disclosed more than once that the accused persons used to tease her for about 5-6 months prior to the incident and that she used to talk to them as well. In view of this admission of hers , the identification by the prosecutrix of the accused persons in the TIP pales into insignificance. She contradicted herself in the cross-examination by stating that three of the four did rape her for the second time. She was also inconsistent with regard to the writer of her complaint. 22 28. PW 1’s conduct during the alleged ordeal is also unlike a victim of forcible rape and betrays somewhat submissive and consensual disposition. From the nature of the exchanges between her and the accused persons as narrated by her, the same are not at all consistent with those of an unwilling, terrified and anguished victim of forcible intercourse, if judged by the normal human conduct. 29. PW 1’s post-incident conduct and movements are also noticeably unusual. Instead of hurrying back home in a distressed, humiliated and a devastated state, she stayed back in and around the place of occurrence, enquired about the same from persons whom she claims to have met in the late hours of night, returned to the spot to identify the garage and even look at the broken glass bangles, discarded litter etc. According to her, she wandered around the place and as disclosed by her in her evidence, to collect information so as to teach the accused persons a lesson. Her avengeful attitude in the facts and circumstances, as disclosed by her, if true, demonstrably evinces a conduct manifested by a feeling of frustration stoked by an intense feeling of deprivation of something expected, desired or promised. Her confident movements alone past midnight, in that state are also out of the ordinary. Her testimony that she met a cyclist to whom she narrated her tale of woe and 23 that on his information, the Hoysala police came to the spot and that thereafter she was taken to successive police stations before lodging the complaint at Sampangiramanagara police station as well has to be accepted with a grain of salt. 30. PW 8, who medically examined her, opined in clear terms that she was accustomed to sexual intercourse and that no sign of forcible intercourse was discernible. This assumes great significance in view of the allegation of forcible rape by 3 to 4 adult persons more than once. The medical opinion that she was accustomed to sexual inter course when admittedly she was living separately from her husband for 1 and ½ years before the incident also has its own implication. The medical evidence as such in the attendant facts and circumstances in a way belies the allegation of gang rape. 31. The evidence of PW 2 Geeta who admittedly had offered shelter to the prosecutrix and her minor daughter, though had been declared hostile, her testimony as a whole cannot be brushed aside. In her testimony, this witness indicated that the prosecutrix used to take financial help from the accused persons and that she used to indulge in dubious late night activities for which her husband had deserted her. The defence plea of false implication as the accused persons had declined to oblige the 24 prosecutrix qua her demand for financial help therefore cannot be lightly discarded in the overall factual scenario. Her version therefore is a plausible one and thus fit in with the defence plea to demolish the prosecution case. 32. That the evidence of a hostile witness in all eventualities ought not stand effaced altogether and that the same can be accepted to the extent found dependable on a careful scrutiny was reiterated by this Court in Himanshu @ Chintu (supra) by drawing sustenance of the proposition amongst others from Khujii vs. State of M.P. (1991) 3 SCC 627 and Koli Lakhman Bhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat (1999) 8 SCC 624. It was enounced that the evidence of a hostile witness remains admissible and is open for a Court to rely on the dependable part thereof as found acceptable and duly corroborated by other reliable evidence available on record. 33. The seizures said to have been effected by the investigating agency also do not inspire confidence. Not only PW 4 Muthu denied that the seizure of ear studs had been made in his presence, DW 1 on oath had stated that this item of jewellery had in fact been purchased by the police from a local shop which he could identify on the basis of the symbol ‘MP’ inscribed thereon. In any view of the matter, the seized articles per se in absence of any evidence of corroboration 25 of charge would not, irrefutably prove the involvement of the appellants in the offence alleged. 34. This Court in Raju (supra), while reiterating that the evidence of the prosecutrix in cases of rape, molestation and other physical outrages is to be construed to be that of an injured witness so much so that no corroboration is necessary, ruled that an accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication. It was underlined that the testimony of the victim in such cases, though commands great weight but the same, cannot necessarily be universally and mechanically accepted to be free in all circumstances from embellishment and exaggeration. It was ruled that the presumption of absence of consent of the victim, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved as contemplated in Section 114A of the Evidence Act, was extremely restricted in its application compared to the sweep and ambit of the presumption under Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. It was exposited that insofar as the allegation of rape is concerned, the evidence of the prosecutrix must be examined as that of a injured witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be presumed that her statement should always without exception, be taken as gospel truth. The essence of this verdict which has stood the test of time proclaims 26 that though generally the testimony of a victim of rape or non- consensual physical assault ought to be accepted as true and unblemished, it would still be subject to judicial scrutiny lest a casual, routine and automatic acceptance thereof results in unwarranted conviction of the person charged. 35. Vis-a-vis the scope of interference with a judgment of acquittal, this Court in Sunil Kumar Shabukumar Gupta (Dr.) (supra) echoed the hallowed proposition that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not ordinarily interfere therewith though its view may appear to be the more probable one. While emphasizing that the trial court has the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses and is thus the best judge of their credibility, it was held that every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved and that his presumption of innocence gets reinforced with his acquittal by the trial court's verdict. It was reiterated that only in exceptionable cases and under compelling circumstances, where the judgement of acquittal is found to be perverse i.e. if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant materials or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material and are against the weight of evidence or are so outrageously in defiance of logic so as to suffer from the vice of irrationality, that 27 interference by the appellate court would be called for. 36. That the appellate court is under an obligation to consider and identify the error in the decision of the trial court and then to decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference was underlined by this Court in Shyamal Saha (supra). It was emphasized that the appellate court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the trial court and that it has to exercise its discretion very cautiously to correct an error of law or fact, if any and significant enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the trial court. 37. The prosecution case, when judged on the touchstone of totality of the facts and circumstances, does not generate the unqualified and unreserved satisfaction indispensably required to enter a finding of guilt against the appellants. Having regard to the evidence on record as a whole, it is not possible for this Court to unhesitatingly hold that the charge levelled against the appellants has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In our estimate, the view taken by the Trial Court is the overwhelmingly possible one. In contrast, the findings of the High Court are decipherably strained in favour of the prosecution by overlooking many irreconcilable inconsistencies, anomalies and omissions rendering the 28 prosecution case unworthy of credit. Noticeably, the High Court has exonerated the appellants of the charge of abduction under Section 366 IPC, which is an inseverable component of the string of offences alleged against them. Judged by the known parameters of law, the view adopted by the High Court is not a plausible one when juxtaposed to that of the Trial Court. We are of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellants to the hilt as obligated in law and thus, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt. The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgement and order is set- aside. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds are discharged.” 25. Prosecutrix (PW-6) : The prosecutrix has deposed that on 15.12.2013 at about 5:00 PM. she was returning home from Bilaspur when accused Krishna Kumar obstructed her near the pond, abused her, called her Tonhhi (witch), and assaulted her. She rushed back home and narrated the incident to her husband Reshamlal Ogre (PW-7). Later, around 7:00 PM, the accused persons entered her house by breaking open the door, tied her husband with a rope, damaged household articles, and dragged her by her hair to the Peepal tree platform where she was branded as a witch and compelled to put thumb impressions on blank papers. She further alleged that the accused persons thereafter committed gang rape upon her. In cross-examination, 29 she admitted existence of previous disputes with the accused party, and also admitted that she had made earlier complaints against them. 26. Reshamlal Ogre (PW-7), husband of prosecutrix : He has supported the version of the prosecutrix regarding house trespass, damage to property, tying of his hands, and assault on his wife. He also stated that the accused persons branded his wife as a witch in the public and dragged her out of the house. However, with respect to the allegation of gang rape, his testimony does not inspire full confidence, as he did not immediately report the matter to the Kotwar, Sarpanch, or any independent villager, which is conduct somewhat unnatural. 27. Anand Swaroop Ogre (PW-10) : This witness has corroborated the version of the prosecutrix and her husband insofar as the incident of dragging the prosecutrix, branding her as a witch, and compelling her to affix thumb impressions on blank papers is concerned. He too has spoken about the assault caused by the accused persons. His evidence lends support to the prosecution case on the charges of house trespass, assault, and humiliation of the prosecutrix. 28. Dr. Mamta Jagat (PW-1, Medical Officer) : who examined the prosecutrix, has deposed that on physical examination she found the following injuries on her body: 30 “Head Region – A contusion on the left temporal region, with swelling and tenderness. Face – Bruises and swelling over the right cheek and lower lip. Back – Multiple linear contusions across the scapular and lumbar regions, reddish in colour, consistent with beating by a stick. Chest and Abdomen – Diffuse tenderness on the anterior chest wall and left side of the abdomen. Upper Limbs – Swelling and contusion over the right forearm and left upper arm. Lower Limbs – Contusions on both thighs and a swelling over the right knee joint. According to the doctor, all injuries were simple in nature, caused by a hard and blunt object, and were recent in duration (within 24 hours of examination). The doctor has categorically stated that the injuries were consistent with an assault such as beating by lathi or fists. On genital examination, the prosecutrix was found to be a married woman with normal external genitalia. No signs of external or internal injury were detected. The hymen was old and torn, and there was no bleeding, abrasion, or swelling. Vaginal smear slides were prepared and sent for FSL examination. The 31 doctor opined that there was no evidence suggestive of recent forcible sexual intercourse. 29. Dr. Smt. Krishna Mittal (PW-15) : She also examined the prosecutrix and gave no definite opinion regarding rape. Her report did not record any positive findings of sexual assault. 30. Forensic Science Laboratory Report (Ex.P/46) : The FSL report did not detect semen or spermatozoa in the vaginal slides. Thus, scientific evidence did not support the allegation of rape. 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Santosh Prasad alias Santosh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443, while dealing with the sole testimony of the victim holding that solitary evidence is not sufficient for conviction, by observing as under :- “5.4.2 In the case of Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, this Court had an occasion to consider who can be said to be a “sterling witness”. In paragraph 22, it is observed and held as under: “22 In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what 32 would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be 33 applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 5.4.3 In the case of Krishna Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130, it is observed and held by this Court that no doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 5.5 With the aforesaid decisions in mind, it is required to be considered, whether is it safe to convict the accused solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix? Whether the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely 34 trustworthy, unblemished and is of sterling quality?” 32. Very recently, while dealing with the similar issue in the matter of Manak Chand alias Mani v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1397, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “8. This was reiterated by this Court in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra and Another (2006) 10 SCC 92: “It is true that in a rape case the accused could be convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of the court. If the version given by the prosecutrix is unsupported by any medical evidence or the whole surrounding circumstances are highly improbable and belie the case set up by the prosecutrix, the court shall not act on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix.” 9. Both the prosecutrix as well as the accused have a right for a fair trial, and therefore when the statement of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence and creates a doubt, the court must look for corroborative evidence. Relying upon the case of Gurmit Singh (supra) this court in Raju and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 133 held as under: “10. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence 35 of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court. 11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” 36 10. Does the testimony of the prosecutrix in the present case inspire confidence? We are afraid it does not. Let us appreciate the facts once again. Although, the first incident of rape is alleged to be of 12.09.2000, the prosecutrix does not disclose this to anyone immediately. She then alleges rape again on two or three different occasions later, though no date and time are disclosed. She only discloses it to her mother after one and half months. It has then come in the evidence led by none other but the prosecution (in the school register submitted in the court by PW- 2 i.e., Ram Sahay), that the prosecutrix had attended her classes in the school on 12.09.2000 at Dabwali, where she resides with her parents. We must note that she has alleged rape on the same day at village Sanwat Khera, where she was staying at the relevant time with her sister in her matrimonial house. This seems improbable, if not impossible. The other aspect is the admitted position of the prosecution itself that the FIR was ultimately filed as the initial proposal of marriage was then turned down. All these facts do cast a doubt on the story of the prosecution.” 33. Having gone through and considered the deposition of the prosecutrix, we find that there are material contradictions in her version of the incident. Not only are there internal inconsistencies, but even the manner in which the alleged 37 incident is said to have occurred appears highly improbable. In her examination-in-chief, the prosecutrix stated that the accused persons not only assaulted her and her husband, but also dragged her to a Peepal tree platform, branded her as a witch, compelled her to affix thumb impressions on blank papers, and committed gang rape upon her. Her husband Reshamlal Ogre (PW-7) and another witness Anand Swaroop Ogre (PW-10) corroborated aspects relating to house trespass, assault, and public humiliation, but the allegation of gang rape is not supported by their testimony, which, particularly in the case of the husband, is marred by the unnatural delay in reporting the alleged sexual assault to the local authorities or any independent witnesses. The medical evidence also does not support the prosecution’s case. The examination by Dr. Mamta Jagat (PW-1) revealed multiple simple injuries consistent with assault by a blunt object, but there were no signs of recent sexual intercourse. Similarly, Dr. Smt. Krishna Mittal (PW-15) recorded no definite findings of sexual assault. The Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ex.P/46) failed to detect semen or spermatozoa in the vaginal slides. As admitted, the prosecutrix had previous disputes with the accused and had made earlier complaints against them. 34. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the solitary version of the prosecutrix cannot be taken as gospel truth at face value. In the absence of any corroborating evidence regarding the allegation of rape, there is no scope to 38 sustain the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant, who is accordingly entitled to the benefit of doubt. 35. So far as the allegation of gang rape is concerned, the testimony of the prosecutrix is that accused Ramkumar, Sunilmani, Akhilesh @ Bunti, Raju @ Madhupal, Praveen Kumar, Krishnakumar, Amritlal and Varunkumar raped her in turns, after which she became unconscious. However, the medical examination did not reveal any external or internal injuries on her genitals, nor was there any positive finding of semen or spermatozoa in the vaginal slides. Dr. Mamta Jagat (PW-1) as well as Dr. Smt. Krishna Mittal (PW-15) did not give a definite opinion of rape. The FSL report (Ex.P/46) also did not confirm the presence of human sperm. 36. Further, though the prosecutrix stated that the alleged incident of gang rape was witnessed by PW-7 Reshamlal Ogre and PW-10 Anand Swaroop Ogre, their evidence on this aspect does not inspire confidence. The spot of occurrence was in the midst of the colony and in close proximity of houses. Yet, no independent witness has been produced. The surrounding circumstances render the allegation of gang rape doubtful. Moreover, certain admissions of the prosecutrix in cross-examination, such as prior disputes and earlier complaints against the accused party, create a possibility of exaggeration. In such a situation, the rule of prudence demands that conviction under Section 376(D) IPC 39 should not rest solely on her testimony, particularly when it is not corroborated by medical or scientific evidence. 37. On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecutrix, supported by her husband i.e. Reshamlal Ogre PW-7 and Anand Swaroop Ogre PW-10, and corroborated by medical evidence, clearly establishes that the accused had committed house trespass, assaulted her, branded her as a witch, and humiliated her in public. The number and nature of injuries sustained by her also show that the assault was in furtherance of common intention. 38. Upon a careful appraisal of the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered view that the conviction of the appellants, namely, Ramkumar (A1), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14) and Akhilesh @ Banti (A15) for the offence punishable under Section 376(D) IPC cannot be sustained, as the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of gang rape beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellants namely, Ramkumar (A1), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14) and Akhilesh @ Banti (A15) under Section 376(D) IPC are set aside and the appellants are acquitted of the said charge. 39. However, the prosecution has been able to prove beyond doubt that the appellants, in furtherance of their common intention, 40 committed house trespass, voluntarily caused hurt to the prosecutrix, and humiliated her by branding her as a witch. As such, the conviction of all the appellants, namely, Ramkumar (A1), Jamunaprasad (A2), Amrikabai (A3), Sanesh (A4), Radha Bai (A5), Shrikant (A6), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Milanprasad (A10), Manharan Lal (A11), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14), Akhilesh @ Banti (A15), Shashikala (A16) and Smt. Madhu (A17) for the offences under Sections 448 and 324/34 IPC and Section 5 of the Tonhi Pratadna Act is hereby upheld. 40.
Arguments
: Mr. Sumit Singh and Ms. Vaishali Jaiswani, For Appellant (in CRA No.988/2019) : Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. K.K. Pandey, Advocate For Appellants (in CRA No.995/2019 & 1408/2019) : Mr. Mirza Kaiser Baeg, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General 5 Hon'ble Smt. Rajani Dubey, Judge Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge C A V Judgment Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. Regard being had to the similitude of the questions of facts and law involved, as all these appeals are clubbed together being arising out of a common crime vide impugned judgment dated 06.06.2019 passed by the Special Judge (Atrocity), District Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No.88/2014, these appeals have been clubbed together, heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Appellants-Radha Bai (A5) and Shrikant (A6) have preferred CRA No.962/2019, appellant-Sunilmani (A14) has preferred CRA No.1038/2019, appellants-Raju @ Madhupal (A12) and Akhilesh @ Banti (A15) have preferred CRA No.988/2019, appellants- Sanesh (A4), Milanprasad (A10) and Manharan Lal (A11) have preferred CRA No.995/2019, appellants-Ramkumar (A1), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9) and Shashikala (A16) have preferred CRA No.1004/2019, appellants Jamunaprasad (A2), Amrikabai (A3) and Smt. Madhu (A17) have preferred CRA No.1007/2019 and Amritlal (A13) has preferred CRA No.1408/2019 under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) questioning the impugned judgment dated 06.06.2019 passed by the Special Judge 6 (Atrocity), District Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No.88/2014, by which they have been convicted and sentenced as under :- Appellants - Ramkumar (A1), Jamunaprasad (A2), Amrikabai (A3), Sanesh (A4), Radha Bai (A5), Shrikant (A6), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Milanprasad (A10), Manharan Lal (A11), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14), Akhilesh @ Banti (A15), Shashikala (A16) and Smt. Madhu (A17) Conviction Sentence Under Section 448 of the : Fine of Rs.500/-, in default of Indian Penal Code, 1860 payment of fine, simple imprisonment for 15 days to each of the appellants. Under Section 323/34 of : Fine of Rs.500/-, in default of the Indian Penal Code, payment of fine, simple 1860 imprisonment for 15 days to each of the appellants. Under Section 5 of the : Rigorous imprisonment for one Chhattisgarh Tonahi month and fine of Rs.500/-, in Pratadna Nivaran Act, default of payment of fine, 2005 additional rigorous imprisonment for seven days to each of the appellants. Appellants - Ramkumar (A1), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14) and Akhilesh @ Banti (A15) Conviction Sentence Under Section 376 (D) of : Rigorous imprisonment for 20 the Indian Penal Code, years and fine of Rs.500/-, in 1860 default of payment of fine, 7 additional rigorous imprisonment for seven days to each of the appellants It was directed that all the sentences were run concurrently. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, was that on 15.12.2013 at about 5:00 PM, the victim (PW-6) was returning from Bilaspur to her home. When she reached near the bank of the village pond, the accused Krishna Kumar intercepted her, hurled abuses at her, and assaulted her by alleging that she had ruined the village by practicing witchcraft. The victim somehow managed to escape and ran to her house. It was alleged that at about 7:00 PM, on the same day, the accused persons forcibly entered the house of the victim after breaking open the door, dragged her by pulling her hair, and took her to the village platform, where they compelled her to sit from 7:00 PM till 2:00 AM, branding her a witch in front of the villagers. Thereafter, the accused persons took her to Barcha, where they committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. Due to the said assault, the victim became unconscious. On regaining consciousness, she returned to her house and informed her husband Reshamlal Ogre (PW-7) about the incident. On the following day, the victim submitted a written complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Janjgir vide Ex.P/8. 4. On the basis of the said complaint, Gayatri Sharma, Sub- Inspector (PW-12), on the instructions of the Additional Superintendent of Police, Janjgir, registered an unnumbered FIR 8 vide Ex.P/9 and referred the victim for medical examination after obtaining her consent vide Ex.P/10 and that of her husband. Dr. Mamta Jagat (PW-1) examined the victim and submitted her report vide Ex.P/1. Bijendra Singh, Sub-Inspector (PW-13), subsequently registered a numbered FIR on the basis of the written complaint vide Ex.P/16 and Ex.P/16A, prepared the site map of the place of occurrence vide Ex.P/3, and conducted a panchnama of the damage caused to the house of the victim vide Ex.P/14. The statements of the witnesses were also recorded. 5. During further investigation, Inspector K.P. Markam (PW-16) arrested the accused persons vide arrest memos Ex.P/18 to Ex.P/35, and subjected the accused persons to medical examination vide Ex.P/36 & Ex.P/36A to Ex.P/45 & Ex.P/45A. The articles seized during the investigation were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur, for its chemical examination and the FSL report thereof was received vide Ex.P/46. Panchnama and Nazri map were also prepared after spot inspection. 6. After the proceedings of arrest of the accused, other necessary investigation was completed and the charge-sheet was presented in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh, who in turn committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Janjgir, from where the Special Judge 9 (Atrocity), District Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh received the case on transfer for trial. 7. After due investigation, all the appellants were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences in which they abjured their guilt and entered into defence stating inter-alia that they have not committed any offence and they have falsely been implicated in crime in question. 8. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses; such as PW-1 to PW-20 and exhibited 52 documents i.e. Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/52. In defence, the accused persons/appellants have not examined any witness, but exhibited statements of four witnesses i.e. Ex.D/1 to Ex.D/4 as also exhibited five documents; such as Ex.D/1 to Ex.D/5. 9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 06.06.2019, proceeded to convict the aforesaid accused persons for the aforesaid offences and sentenced them as aforementioned, against which, these seven criminal appeals have been preferred. 10. Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Ms. Sharmila Singhai, learned Senior Advocates assisted by Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Mr. Hrishabh Deo Shukla, Mr. Shashwat Rai, Mr. Sumit Singh, Ms. Vaishali Jaiswani, Mr. K.K. Pandey and Mr. Mirza Kaiser Baeg, learned counsel appearing for the respective appellants have vehemently 10 contended that the present cases are one of false implication and the appellants have been wrongly convicted by the learned trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 376(D) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) (previously Section 376(2)(g) IPC relating to gang rape). It is argued that the findings of conviction recorded by the trial Court are unsustainable as there is no cogent or reliable material on record to bring home the guilt of the appellants. It has been submitted that the medical evidence, which is a very important circumstance in cases of sexual assault, does not support the prosecution case. 11. Attention has been invited to the evidence of PW-1, Dr. Mamta Jagat, who had medically examined the prosecutrix. The said doctor has clearly stated that no external or internal injury was found on the body of the prosecutrix. Her private parts were normal in appearance and there was no evidence suggestive of forcible sexual intercourse. The doctor, in fact, referred the prosecutrix for further examination by a specialist, which itself shows that there was no definite opinion about the occurrence of sexual assault. Furthermore, the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory has also not corroborated the allegations against the appellants. Thus, both medical and scientific evidence are inconsistent with the prosecution story. It is next submitted that the prosecutrix herself is not a trustworthy witness. According to her version, she was allegedly dragged from her own house by the accused persons and subjected to rape. However, the 11 circumstances narrated by her appear highly improbable and unbelievable, inasmuch as several inmates and relatives were present in the house at the relevant point of time, yet none of them intervened or raised any alarm. This aspect alone renders the testimony of the prosecutrix doubtful. 12. Learned counsel have further urged that the testimony of the prosecutrix is full of material contradictions and omissions. She has admitted in her evidence that earlier also she had lodged a report against the appellants and that on previous occasions, relatives of the accused persons were also implicated by her. She has also admitted that there is long-standing enmity and dispute between the parties, particularly relating to land. Thus, the possibility of false implication on account of previous animosity cannot be ruled out. 13. It is also contended that the husband of the prosecutrix, who has been examined as a prosecution witness, has admitted that he did not inform the Kotwar or the Sarpanch or any other independent person of the village about the alleged incident, which conduct is wholly unnatural. In fact, there is no independent witness examined in support of the incident. All the witnesses produced are either close relatives or otherwise interested witnesses. In such circumstances, their testimony must be scrutinized with great caution. According to learned counsel, the prosecutrix appears to be in the habit of implicating as many 12 persons as possible, even women, in such cases, which shows her tendency of exaggeration and creates serious doubt about the veracity of her version. The entire prosecution case, therefore, is tainted with suspicion and does not inspire confidence. 14. On the aforesaid premises, it has been argued that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective and proceeded to convict the appellants without any legal evidence. The conviction of the appellants is based on conjectures and surmises rather than reliable proof. Hence, the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants are liable to be set aside and the appellants deserve to be acquitted of all the charges. 15. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Lalliram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 69, Raja and others v. State of Karnataka, (2016) 10 SCC 506 and Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 as well as the judgments rendered by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.546/2020 (Rajmu Kawde and others v. State of Chhattisgarh) decided on 06.09.2024 and Criminal Appeal No.1266/2019 (Dilesh Nishad v. State of Chhattisgarh) decided on 23.07.2025, to buttress their submissions. 16. Per contra, Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate 13 General, appearing for the State/respondent has opposed the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the appellants and supported the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court and has contended that the findings recorded therein are well reasoned, based on proper appreciation of evidence, and do not call for any interference by this Court. It is submitted that the testimony of the prosecutrix is natural, cogent, and consistent with the case of the prosecution. The law is well settled that in cases of sexual assault, the testimony of the victim, if found trustworthy and reliable, is sufficient to base conviction, even in the absence of corroboration by medical or other evidence. Minor discrepancies or omissions in her statement cannot be magnified to discard her entire version, particularly when she has withstood the test of cross-examination without material contradictions affecting the core of the prosecution case. Learned State counsel has further argued that absence of injuries on the body of the prosecutrix does not necessarily negate the allegation of rape, as medical jurisprudence itself recognizes that in several cases of forcible sexual assault, particularly when the victim is under threat or in fear, resistance may not always be offered. The medical evidence, therefore, cannot be treated as conclusive to disbelieve the testimony of the victim. Likewise, non-detection of semen or spermatozoa in forensic examination is not decisive, as the same may be due to lapse of time, washing of clothes, or other natural 14 causes. It has also been submitted that the prosecutrix has no reason to falsely implicate the appellants in such a grave and heinous offence, as doing so would bring stigma not only upon her but also upon her family. The allegation of prior enmity and land dispute, as suggested by the defence, is a feeble attempt to discredit her testimony and cannot be accepted as a plausible reason for falsely leveling such serious charges of gang rape against the appellants. 17. It has been next submitted that with respect to the conduct of the husband and other witnesses, learned counsel for the State has argued that different individuals react differently to traumatic incidents and there cannot be a straitjacket formula as to how a victim or her relatives must behave immediately after the occurrence. Delay or hesitation in lodging the report or informing village authorities is not fatal to the prosecution case when the core testimony of the prosecutrix inspires confidence. It is further argued that the learned trial Court, having had the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses, has rightly believed the version of the prosecutrix and rejected the defence plea of false implication. The findings are supported by the overall circumstances and material on record. As such, learned counsel for the State has urged that the conviction of the appellants under Sections 448, 324/34 and 376(D) IPC as well as under Section 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Act, 2005 is fully 15 justified and does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. Accordingly, the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 18. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of State of U.P. v. Chhoteylal, (2011) 2 SCC 550, B.C. Deva @ Dyava v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 12 SCC 122 and State of Punjab v. Dayal Sahu, (2005) 6 SCC 583, to buttress his submissions. 19. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 20. The question that falls for consideration would be whether the appellants are the perpetrators of the crime in question. 21. In the matter of Raju and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 133, the Supreme Court observed that it cannot be lost sight of that rape causes distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well and held in para 11 as under:- “11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly 16 where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” 22. Yet, in another matter rendered in the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu (supra), the Supreme Court, while dealing with the acceptance of version of a prosecutrix on the face value, has held in paras 29, 30 and 31 as under :- “29. As compared to the case on hand, we find that apart from the prosecutrix not supporting her own version, the other oral as well as forensic evidence also do not support the case of the prosecution. There were material contradictions leave alone lack of corroboration in the evidence of the prosecutrix. It cannot be said that since the prosecutrix was examined after two years there could be variation. Even while giving allowance for the time gap in the recording of her deposition, she would not have come forward with a version totally conflicting with what she stated in her complaint, especially when she was the victim of the alleged brutal onslaught on her by two men that too against her wish. In such circumstances, it will be 17 highly dangerous to rely on such version of the prosecutrix in order to support the case of the prosecution. 30. In the decision reported as Lalliram v. State of M.P. (2008) 10 SCC 69) in regard to an offence of gang rape falling under Section 376 (2)(g) this Court laid down the principles as under in paras 11 and 12: (SCC p. 72) “11. It is true that injury is not a sine qua non for deciding whether rape has been committed. But it has to be decided on the factual matrix of each case. As was
Decision
In the result, all the criminal appeals being CRA Nos.962/2019, 988/2019, 995/2019, 1004/2019, 1007/2019, 1038/2019 and 1408/2019, are partly allowed. Conviction and sentence of the appellants namely, Ramkumar (A1), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14) and Akhilesh @ Banti (A15) under Section 376(D) IPC are set aside. 41. Conviction and sentence of the appellants namely, Ramkumar (A1), Jamunaprasad (A2), Amrikabai (A3), Sanesh (A4), Radha Bai (A5), Shrikant (A6), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Milanprasad (A10), Manharan Lal (A11), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14), Akhilesh @ Banti (A15), Shashikala (A16) 41 and Smt. Madhu (A17) under Sections 448, 324/34 IPC and Section 5 of the Tonhi Pratadna Act are maintained. 42. The appellants, namely Ramkumar (A1), Jamunaprasad (A2), Amrikabai (A3), Sanesh (A4), Radha Bai (A5), Shrikant (A6), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Milanprasad (A10), Manharan Lal (A11), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14), Akhilesh @ Banti (A15), Shashikala (A16) and Smt. Madhu (A17) are acquitted of the said charges levelled against them. 43. The appellants are stated to be on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellants, namely Ramkumar (A1), Jamunaprasad (A2), Amrikabai (A3), Sanesh (A4), Radha Bai (A5), Shrikant (A6), Varunkumar (A7), Krishnakumar (A8), Praveen Kumar (A9), Milanprasad (A10), Manharan Lal (A11), Raju @ Madhupal (A12), Amritlal (A13), Sunilmani (A14), Akhilesh @ Banti (A15), Shashikala (A16) and Smt. Madhu (A17) are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant 42 of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 44. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action forthwith. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) Judge (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh