Sukalu Ram Purena v. State Of Chhattisgarh & Ors.

: Shri Varun Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer. (Single Bench) Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order On Board 27/02/2026 : KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Digitally signed by KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE 19:18:45 +0530

1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 29.4.2019 passed by 2 respondent No.2 i.e. the Director General of Police, Police Headquarter Raipur whereby the mercy appeal preferred by him against the order dated 30.12.2017 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Durg Range dismissing the original Appeal preferred by the petitioner, which, in turn, was preferred against the order passed by the Superintendent of Police, Durg dated 19.12.2002 whereby major punishment of Compulsory Retirement was imposed upon the petitioner, has been dismissed.

2. This is the second round of litigation. Earlier, this Court in WP No.4202/2005 had quashed the impugned order dated 29.4.2003 and the order passed by the Director General of Police deciding the mercy appeal was also quashed and the matter was remitted to the appellate authority for hearing and disposal. Thereafter, the Appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police, Durg Range vide order dated 30.12.2017 and the mercy appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed vide order dated 29.4.2019. Hence, this petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the disciplinary authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police disagreed with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer without assigning any reason, which is in violation of Rule 15 (2) of the Chhattisgarh 3 Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short ‘the Rules, 1966’) and, therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon the decision rendered by this Court in the matter of A.K. Shrivastava Vs. Indira Gandhi Krishi Vishwavidyalaya & Others {2017 SCC OnLine Chh 969}.

4. On the other hand, learned State Counsel would support the impugned orders.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

6. Admittedly, on 30.10.2002, the Enquiry Officer after due enquiry submitted report that all the charges levelled against the petitioner were not found proved, however, the disciplinary authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police, Durg, vide order dated 19.12.2002 disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and without assigning any reason and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner passed the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner.

7. It is not in dispute that for carrying-out the said departmental enquiry, the procedure envisaged in the Rules of 1966 are applicable in which Rule 15(2) provides for the procedure and further action to 4 be taken if the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Rule 15(2) of the Rules, 1966 states as follows: “Rule 15(2) - Further action if Disciplinary Authority if disagrees with the findings of Enquiry Authority. (2) The Disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for the such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.”

8. A focused glance of the aforesaid Rule would show that in the event the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, he has to record its separate reasons for such disagreement and he is also obliged to record its own findings pertaining to such charge and in that case the principles of natural justice have to be complied with by communicating the reasons of disagreement to the delinquent employee, and after reply is filed, the disciplinary authority has to record its own findings on all such charges on which the Enquiry Officer has assigned its reasons and in order to record punishment, such a procedure is imperative.

9. The point is no longer res integra and the Supreme Court in the matter of Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra1 has considered the issue and also considered the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj 1 (1999) 7 SCC 739 5 Behari Misra2 and State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit3 holding as under in paragraphs 29, 30, 31 and 34:— “29. … But the requirement of “hearing” in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before the disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority, it would give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the “TENTATIVE” reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiring authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of “not guilty” already recorded by the enquiring authority was not liable to be interfered with.

30. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Mishra (supra) relying upon the earlier decisions of this Court in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit (supra), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna4 as also the Constitution Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar5 and the decision in Ram Kishan v. Union of India6 has held that : (SCC p. 96, para 17) “It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the