1 - Amrit Singh, S/o Makkhan Singh, Aged About 32 Years, R/o Nepal Gate v. 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police of Police Station - Charcha, District- Korea
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:46806 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Judgment reserved on: 15.07.2025 Judgment delivered on: 12.09.2025 CRA No. 152 of 2013 1 - Amrit Singh, S/o Makkhan Singh, Aged About 32 Years, R/o Nepal Gate Charcha Colliery, Police Station - Charcha District - Korea C.G. ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police of Police Station - Charcha, District- Korea C.G. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Mahendra Dubey, Advocate For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Ajay Pandey, G.A. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey CAV Judgment 1. This appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.01.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, 2 Korea, (Baikunthpur) C.G., in Sessions Trial No. 88/2009 whereby the trial Court convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 7 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional RI for 6 months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that Paramjeet Kaur, wife of Amrit Singh Sardar, aged about 30 years, R/o near Nepal Gate Charcha New Market, was admitted to Regional Hospital Charcha for treatment on 30.12.2008 in a 90% burnt condition. On the hospital memo sent by Dr. Ashok Kumar Viraji, Senior Medical Officer, the dying declaration of the patient was recorded by sending it to Sub-Divisional Magistrate. In her dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate Baikunthpur on 30.12.2008, Paramjeet Kaur told that her husband doubted on her character,
Legal Reasoning
so she poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire. Thereafter, on 03.01.2009, Police Station Charcha received a memo for taking the patient out by her relatives for high level treatment. Thereafter, the injured Paramjit Kaur was admitted to the hospital in Sector-9, Bhilai for treatment, where she died during treatment on 07.01.2009. When the hospital management informed the Police Station Bhilai Nagar about the death of the deceased Paramjit Kaur, an unnumbered case was registered at Police Station- Bhilai. After the Panchnama of the dead body of the deceased Paramjit Kaur, the post-mortem was conducted and the body was handed over to the heirs of the deceased. 3 On the basis of the unnumbered case registered at Police Station- Bhilai, case No. 02/2009 was registered at Police Station- Charcha. After the inquest, Crime No. 89/2009 was registered against the accused. The accused was arrested. After completing all the formalities of investigation, a charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court against the accused under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code followed by framing of charge, to which appellant abjured his guilt and prayed for trial. 3. So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses. Statement of the accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and pleaded innocence and false implication in the case. However, he did not adduce any evidence in his defence. 4. Learned trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 04.01.2013 finding evidence adduced by the prosecution trustworthy, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment passed by learned trial Court is bad in law as well as facts available on record. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence and documents in its correct perspective. The 4 learned trial Court failed to appreciate that the ingredients of Section 107 of Indian Penal Code would not be attracted in the present case. The learned trial Court failed to appreciate that the dying declaration which was recorded by Nayab Tahsildar- Amit Gupta (P.W.-16) cannot be relied upon for convicting the appellant as a question put by the Nayab Tahsildar did not prove the guilt of the appellant. The learned trial Court failed to appreciate that in the dying declaration it has come that certain dispute took place in between husband and wife, but as to when the incident took place this question could not be put by the Nayab Tahsildar so in absence of the time in which certain quarrel took place, the appellant cannot be convicted on the ground of dying declaration as the same is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant. The learned trial Court failed to appreciate that the prima facie case u/s 306 of Indian Penal Code would not be made out against the appellant. The learned trial Court failed to appreciate that cruelty would mean any willful conduct which was of such a nature as was likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb of health (whether mental or physical) to provoke a person of common prudence to commit suicide and a difference of opinion within a family does not mean cruelty, so the finding with regard to the cruel treatment on the part of the appellant towards the deceased is bad in law as well as facts available on record. As such, the impugned judgment of conviction 5 and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court being illegal and perverse liable to be set aside and the appellant/accused may be acquitted of the charge levelled against him. In support of his contention, he would rely upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rohini Sudarshan Gangurde Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1701, Prakash and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3835 and the judgments passed by this Court in the matter of Poonam Ram Bargah (Yadav) Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Station House Officer; 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 4655, Kunwarlal Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, through: Police Station; 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 10965 and Dilip Rajak Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, Through: Station House Officer; 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 3843. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel supporting the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and also the complicity of the appellant. The dying declaration (Ex.P/4) was duly recorded by Executive Magistrate Amit Gupta (P.W.-16) in the presence of Dr. A.K. Pateria (P.W.-4) which is in accordance with law. The learned trial Court rightly appreciated oral and documentary evidence and convicted the appellant
Decision
accordingly. Hence, the impugned judgment is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. 6 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record including the impugned judgment. 8. It is clear from record of learned trial Court that the learned trial Court framed charge under Section 306 of IPC against the appellant and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 306 of IPC. 9. It is an admitted position before the learned trial Court that the deceased Paramjeet Kaur was wife of the accused/appellant and on 07.01.2009, during treatment, she succumbed to burn injuries sustained by her. 10. Executive Magistrate- Amit Gupta (P.W.-16) stated that he recorded the dying declaration of injured Paramjeet Kaur, wife of accused Amrit Singh who was admitted in regional hospital Charcha and before recording the dying declaration of the deceased, he had obtained certificate of doctor regarding the fit state of mind of the deceased to give dying declaration. Dying declaration of the deceased was recorded vide Ex.P/4 and he identified the thumb impression of the deceased Paramjeet Kaur. 11. Dr. A.K. Pateriya (P.W.-4) stated that he examined the deceased and found that she is in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration and the report given in this regard is mentioned from A to A part and B to B part of dying declaration (Ex. P/4) and admitted his signature on it from C to C part. 7 12. Learned trial Court relied upon the dying declaration of the deceased which reads as under:- 1. क्या(cid:3) ना(cid:3)म है(cid:7) ? 2. पतित कौ(cid:3) ना(cid:3)म ? 3. उ् तिकौतना(cid:11) है(cid:7) ? 4. कौ(cid:7) (cid:19)(cid:26) जीले(cid:26) ? 5. कौहै(cid:3)" पर ? 6. क्या% आग लेग(cid:3)या(cid:11) ? - - - - - - परमजी(cid:11)त कौ(cid:14)र अम(cid:17)त िሺ(cid:19)(cid:20)है 30 व्ቧ(cid:25) तिमሾኍ(cid:11) त(cid:26)ले डा(cid:3)लेकौर अपना(cid:26) कौ(cid:30) आग लेग(cid:3)या(cid:11)। र(cid:19)(cid:30)ई म$। पतित म(cid:26)र(cid:26) ऊपर शकौ कौरत(cid:3) था(cid:3), इ(cid:19)िሺलेए म+ना(cid:26) आग लेग(cid:3)या(cid:11)। 7. तिकौ(cid:19)(cid:11) ना(cid:26) आग लेग(cid:3)या(cid:3) ? - नाहै,, अपना(cid:26) (cid:19)(cid:26) आग लेग(cid:3)या(cid:11)। 8. तिकौ(cid:19)(cid:11) (cid:19)(cid:26) झग़(cid:3) है/आ था(cid:3) ? - पतित (cid:19)(cid:26)। 9. जीब आग लेग(cid:3)या(cid:11), तब घर पर कौ(cid:14)ना था(cid:3) ? - कौ(cid:30)ई नाहै,। 10. और कौ3 छ कौहैना(cid:3) है(cid:7) ? - नाहै,। 13. From perusal of the dying declaration (Ex.P/4), it transpires that the deceased committed suicide on the ground that the accused doubts on her character. 14. Prosecution witness- Mahendra Singh (P.W.-2) who is father of the deceased stated that the he cannot tell as to why his daughter Paramjeet Kaur set her on fire. Prosecution declared him hostile and cross-examined him then he admitted this suggestion that on 26.12.2008 Paramjit Kaur called us and told us that her husband Amrit Singh has started doubting on her character and has started beating her over small issues. 8 15. Gurbansh Kaur (P.W.-3) who is mother of the deceased stated that her daughter (deceased) had told her that the accused abused her and used to beat her. In her cross-examination, she admitted that despite knowing that the accused had abused her and beaten her and had burnt her by pouring kerosene on her, they did not report the matter. She further admitted that the police recorded her statement about 2- 3 months after the incident. 16. Manjeet Kaur (P.W.-7) stated that the behaviour of the accused towards her sister (deceased) was not good. He used to beat and doubt on her character. In her cross-examination, she stated that she talked to her sister a few days before the incident, but she does not remember as to how many days ago she talked to her. 17. Close scrutiny of statements of all witnesses, dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.P/4) clearly proved that the accused doubts on character of the deceased. 18. The learned trial Court relying upon the dying declaration of the deceased recorded its finding of conviction that the accused/appellant abetted the deceased to commit suicide, but Sections 306 and 107 of IPC provides as under:- “306. Abetment of suicide. - If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 9 107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First. — Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly. —Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. — Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 19. In the matter of Prakash (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 26, 27, 28 and 29 as under:- “26. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that instigation or incitement on the part of the accused person is the gravamen of the offence of abetment to suicide. However, it has been clarified on many occasions that in order to link the act of instigation to the act of suicide, the two occurrences must be in close proximity to each other so as to form a nexus or a chain, with the act of suicide by the deceased being a direct result of the act of instigation by the accused person. 27. This Court in the case of Mohit Singhal (supra) reiterated that the act of instigation must be of such intensity and in such close proximity that it intends to push the deceased to such a position under which the person has no choice but to commit suicide. This Court held that the incident which had allegedly driven the deceased to commit suicide had occurred two weeks prior and even the suicide note had been written three days prior to the 10 date on which the deceased committed suicide and further, there was he allegation that any act had been done by the accused- appellant therein in close proximity to the date of suicide. This Court observed as follows: "11. In the present case, taking the complaint of the third respondent and the contents of the suicide note as correct, it is impossible to conclude that the appellants instigated the deceased to commit suicide by demanding the payment of the amount borrowed by the third respondent from her husband by using abusive language and by assaulting him by a belt for that purpose. The said incident allegedly happened more than two weeks before the date of suicide. There is no allegation that any act was done by the appellants in close proximity to the date of suicide. By no stretch of imagination, the alleged acts of the appellants can amount to instigation to commit suicide. The deceased has blamed the third respondent for landing in trouble due to her bad habits. 12. Therefore, in our considered view, the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC was not made out against the appellants. Therefore, the continuation of their prosecution will be nothing but an abuse of the process of law." (emphasis supplied) 28. This Court in the case of Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana; (2024) 3 SCC 573, observed as follows:- 11 "20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. State [Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023) 15 SCC 560], after referring to the abovereferred decisions rendered in context of culpability under Section 306 IPC observed as under: (SCC para 45) "45.... It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable." (emphasis supplied) 29. Having discussed the law on the subject, we now proceed to consider the facts of the present case in view of the established principles.” 20. In light of above, it is clear that if taking the dying declaration as correct, it is impossible to conclude that the appellant instigated the deceased to commit suicide by doubting on her character. There is no allegation that any act done by the appellant was in close proximity to the date of suicide and there is no statement of the witness or deceased which shows that any act being done by the accused was to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. 21. As Hon’ble Apex Court held that merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or 12 compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 of IPC is not sustainable. 22. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the case in juxtaposition with the judgments referred to above and upon appreciation of evidence of the witnesses and other material adduced by the prosecution, this Court is of the opinion that the learned trial Court did not appreciate this fact that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of Section 107 of IPC and without proving essential ingredients of Section 107 of IPC, offence under Section 306 is not made out. Thus, the learned trial Court wrongly convicted the appellant under Section 306 of IPC. 23. In the result, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 306 of IPC cannot be legally sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. Consequently, the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 306 of IPC. 24. The appellant is reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the B.N.S.S., the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid 13 appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 25. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) JUDGE Ruchi RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV