Afr High Court
Case Details
Page 1 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} SISTA SOMAYAJULU Digitally signed by SISTA SOMAYAJULU Date: 2025.06.12 18:52:57 +0530 2025:CGHC:23372-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6790 of 2017 Order reserved on: 30-4-2025 Order delivered on: 12-6- 2025 Prahlad Angure, S/o Late Shobha Ram Angure, Aged about 57 years, Former Head Constable, presently residing at New Police Line, Durg, Tahsil and District Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Mahanadi Bhavan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. Director General of Police, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Inspector General of Police, Range Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh 4. Superintendent of Police, Balod, District Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. T.K. Jha, Advocate. For Respondents/State : Mr. Arvind Dubey, Government Advocate. Division Bench: - Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, JJ. Page 2 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} C.A.V. Order Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner herein has called in question the constitutional validity of Regulation 270 of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations enacted under the provisions of the Police Act and also in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop: - 3. The petitioner herein was working as Head Constable. He was subjected to disciplinary proceeding by the Superintendent of Police/disciplinary authority and upon full-fledged disciplinary proceeding, by order dated 19-7-2016, the disciplinary authority has reverted him to the post of Constable. Feeling aggrieved against the order or reversion, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority i.e. the Inspector General of Police, however, the Department did not prefer any appeal against the imposition of penalty of reversion to the petitioner herein and in the appeal preferred by the petitioner, the Inspector General of Police issued notice for enhancement of punishment in exercise of power under Page 3 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} Regulation 270 of the Police Regulations exercising suo motu revisional power to which the petitioner submitted reply on 8- 10-2016 upon consideration of which, the Inspector General of Police exercising revisional power conferred under Regulation 270(1), dismissed the petitioner from service. His mercy appeal has also been dismissed by order dated 9-10-2017 passed by the Director General of Police.
Facts
4. In the aforesaid background, the petitioner herein has challenged the order of the disciplinary authority as well as the revisional authority who by exercising the revisional power dismissed him from service and he has also questioned the constitutional validity of Regulation 270(1) of the Police Regulations, especially vesting of revisional power with the appellate authority, as unconstitutional, and being discriminatory in nature. Prayer has also been made for grant of all consequential benefits as, in the meanwhile, the petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation. 5. Return has been filed by the State / respondents stating inter alia that the revisional authority – Inspector General of Police finding that the order of reversion is not commensurate to the charges of misconduct found proved in the departmental enquiry, in exercise of the provisions contained in Regulation Page 4 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} 270 of the Police Regulations, after affording due opportunity of hearing, dismissed the petitioner from service, however, though the constitutional validity of Regulation 270 of the Police Regulations has been questioned, but, no specific reply has been filed supporting the challenge to the constitutional validity of Regulation 270.
Legal Reasoning
authority is ex facie unconstitutional, as it confers unbridled power and unfettered jurisdiction to the revisional authority to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction, as the appellate authority also happens to be the revisional authority, but the petitioner’s departmental appeal against the order of reversion was not decided on merits and exercising the suo motu revisional jurisdiction, he has been dismissed from service, though opportunity of hearing has been given. In alternative, Mr. Jha, learned counsel, would submit that the petitioner had preferred appeal before the Inspector General of Police i.e. the appellate authority and the Department did not prefer appeal against the order of reversion branding the order of reversion to be inadequate and not commensurate with the misconduct Page 5 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} of the petitioner found proved against him, therefore, it was not open to the appellate authority / Inspector General of Police, who is appellate authority-cum-revisional authority, to invoke the suo motu revisional jurisdiction. In this regard, learned counsel would rely upon the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Makeshwar Nath Srivastava v. The State of Bihar and others1. He would also submit that without complying the provisions contained in Rule 27(2) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, the impugned order has been passed. He would finally submit that Regulation 270 of the Police Regulations be struck down and writ petition be also allowed. 7. Mr. Arvind Dubey, learned State counsel, would support the impugned orders and submit that considering the misconduct found proved against the petitioner, the punishment imposed upon him was inadequate, therefore, the revisional authority invoking the revisional power under Regulation 270(1) of the Police Regulations has rightly passed the order removing him from service which is strictly in accordance with law. He would further submit that Regulation 270(1) is also in the statute 1 1971(1) SCC 662 Page 6 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} book from fairly long time and it was enacted under the Police Act and also in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and the impugned Regulations were in operation in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and also now in the State of Chhattisgarh with effect from 1-11-2000.
Arguments
6. Mr. T.K. Jha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that Regulation 270 of the Police Regulations vesting the suo motu revisional jurisdiction to the appellate
Decision
As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on both the counts. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties, following two questions arise for consideration: - 1. Whether Regulation 270(1) of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations conferring suo motu revisional jurisdiction to the appellate authority is unconstitutional and liable to be struck down? 2. If not, whether, the order of the revisional authority enhancing punishment from reversion to dismissal is justified in facts and circumstances of the case? Answer to Question No.1 Page 7 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} 10.The principle of adjudging constitutional validity of a subordinate legislation has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the matter of Dental Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti and another2, in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. B.R. Gavai, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held in paragraphs 27 & 28 of the report as under: - “27. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28. It has further been held by this Court in the said case that for challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It has further been held that it cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant circumstances which the Court considers relevant.” 2 (2022) 6 SCC 65 Page 8 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} 11.Regulation 270 of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations provides as under: - “270. (1) Every order of punishment or exoneration, whether original or appellate shall be liable to revision suo-motu by any authority superior to the authority making the order. (2) Every appellate order by a final appellate authority shall be liable to revision by such final appellate authority on application made in that behalf by the person against whom the order has been passed. Explanation:-For the purpose of this clause the expression “final appellate authority” means the final authority empower to hear an appeal under Police Regulation 262. (3) The provisions of Regulation 266, 267, 268 and 271 shall be as nearly as may be apply to an application for revision. (4) The revising authority may for reason to be recorded in writing exonerate or may remit vary of enhance the punishment imposed or may order a fresh enquiry of the taking of further evidence in the case: Provided that it shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them for being heard.” 12.As such, the provisions contained in Regulation 270 of the Police Regulations are statutory in nature and thus the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations are statutory regulations. 13.A careful perusal of Regulation 270(1) of the Police Regulations would show that every order of punishment or Page 9 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} exoneration, whether original or appellate shall be liable to revision suo motu by any authority superior to the authority making the order. Regulation 270(3) provides that the provisions of Regulations 266, 267, 268 and 271 shall be as nearly as may be apply to an application for revision. By virtue of Regulation 270(4), the revising authority may for reason to be recorded in writing exonerate or may remit vary or enhance the punishment imposed or may order a fresh enquiry of the taking of further evidence in the case after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties interested. As such, suo motu power of revision has been conferred and exercisable only by the authority superior to the authority making the order, whether original or appellate. The object and purpose behind conferring the suo motu revisional jurisdiction upon the appellate authority is to have continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to met out justice and to prevent the miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior authorities in its juridical process, however, this suo motu revisional jurisdiction has to be exercised by the authority concerned sparingly and cautiously Page 10 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} in most appropriate cases and it should not be exercised mechanically. 14.These Regulations have been framed in exercise of powers under the Police Act and also in exercise of powers under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, these Regulations are statutory regulations. 15.The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya3 has considered the U.P. Police Regulations and held that the Police Act and the rules made thereunder constitute a self-contained code providing for appointment of police officers and prescribing the procedure for their removal. It has been further held that where the appropriate authority takes disciplinary action under the Police Act or the rules made thereunder, it must conform to the provisions of the statute or the rules which have conferred upon it the power to take the said action. It has been observed in paragraph 23 of the report as under: - “(23) xxx xxx xxx “Rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for 3 AIR 1961 SC 751 Page 11 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} all purposes of construction or obligation:” see Maxwell “On the Interpretation of Statues”, 10th edn., pp. 50-51. The statutory rules cannot be described as, or equated with, administrative directions. If so, the Police Act and the rules made thereunder constitute a self-contained code providing for the appointment of police officers and prescribing the procedure for their removal. It follows that where the appropriate authority takes disciplinary action under the Police Act or the rules made thereunder, it must conform to the provisions of the statute or the rules which have conferred upon it the power to take the said action. ...” 16.In the instant case, the petitioner has sought to challenge the constitutional validity of Regulation 270(1) of the Police Regulations conferring suo motu revisional jurisdiction to the appellate authority on the ground that it would deter the bona fide employees to file departmental appeal, as the enhancement of punishment exercising suo motu revisional jurisdiction is against the principles of natural justice, and it confers unbridled power to the appellate authority and instills sense of fear to the delinquent employee in filing appeal against the punishment, therefore, this provision is arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional. 17.The aforesaid argument of the petitioner that Regulation 270 of the Police Regulations is unconstitutional, deserves to be noted for rejection, as the appellate authority has also been conferred with the suo motu revisional jurisdiction to be Page 12 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} exercised in appropriate case, finding that the punishment awarded by the original authority or the appellate authority as the case may be, is wholly disproportionate to proven misconduct and shocks his conscious and that too after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee in accordance with Regulation 270(4) of the Police Regulations and not only this, further, though for exercising the suo motu revisional jurisdiction, no time limit has been prescribed in the Police Regulations, but in absence of provision in the Police Regulations, the provision contained in Rule 29(1) (iii) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, would apply by which a period of six months has been prescribed for exercising the review or revisional power from the date of the order proposed to be reviewed (see Union of India and others v. Vikram Bhai Maganbhai Chaudhari4). As such, merely because the appellate authority has also been conferred with the suo motu revisional jurisdiction to be exercised in appropriate case by the appellate authority, the conferment of suo motu revisional jurisdiction to the appellate authority cannot be declared unconstitutional and arbitrary as the sufficient checks have been prescribed by 4 (2011) 7 SCC 321 Page 13 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} Regulation making authority and, therefore, the suo motu jurisdiction has to be exercised after affording due opportunity of hearing to the employee concerned and that too within the time limit prescribed. 18.For the foregoing reasons, Regulation 270(1) of the Police Regulations conferring suo motu revisional jurisdiction to the appellate authority is intra vires and it is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and cannot be declared unconstitutional. As such, the first question is answered accordingly. Answer to Question No.2 19.Admittedly, in this case, the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct in regular departmental inquiry and he was reverted from the post of Head Constable to the post of Constable by order of the Superintendent of Police against which only the petitioner has preferred appeal before the Inspector General of Police and the Department did not take the matter in appeal before the appellate authority i.e. the Inspector General of Police. 20.The petitioner preferred appeal against the order of reversion dated 19-7-2016 passed by the Superintendent of Police, before the Inspector General of Police on 7-8-2016, but the Inspector Page 14 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} General of Police being the appellate authority did not consider the appeal filed by the petitioner herein on merits and straightway proceeded to issue notice on 21-9-2016 impliedly exercising the suo motu revisional jurisdiction to which the petitioner submitted reply on 8-10-2016 and ultimately, on 19- 10-2016, the Inspector General of Police dismissed the appeal of the petitioner herein and dismissed him from service. 21.At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Rule 27(2)(a) & (b) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, which provide as under: - “27. Consideration of appeal.-(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 10 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rules, the appellate authority shall consider— (a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non- compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and (c) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” Page 15 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} 22.The appellate authority was firstly required to consider the appeal of the appellant/petitioner herein in accordance with Rule 27(2) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and the appellate authority was required to consider as to firstly, whether the procedure laid down in the rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; and secondly, whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and if findings are recorded in negative, then the question as to whether the penalty imposed i.e. reversion on the proven misconduct is unjust and unreasonable warranting invoking of suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Regulation 270(1) of the Police Regulations has to be considered and thereafter, could have proceeded to issue notice under Regulation 270(4) of the Police Regulations for enhancing the punishment and after hearing the petitioner could have passed the order enhancing the punishment, but this procedure has not been followed at all and on filing of appeal by the petitioner herein on 7-8-2016, straightway, the Inspector General of Police issued notice for enhancing the punishment and imposed the penalty of Page 16 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} dismissal from service on 19-10-2016 and thus, appeal of the appellant/petitioner herein was not considered in accordance with Rule 27(2)(a) & (b) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 by which the petitioner has suffered great prejudice. 23.It appears that the appellate authority having conferred with the suo motu revisional jurisdiction has subjected the petitioner to enhanced punishment on the allegation of accepting the bribe which was found proved by the disciplinary authority. As the first appellate authority, he was required to act in the manner free from bias and prejudice and ought to have considered the appeal filed by the appellant/petitioner herein on merits as required under Rule 27(2) of the CCA Rules by recording the compliance of procedure laid down therein and whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record and if comes to the conclusion that the finding of misconduct of the disciplinary authority is in accordance with law, he could have considered the question of enhancement of punishment to the petitioner. Non-consideration of the appeal of the appellant/petitioner herein on merits and mechanically accepting the finding of the disciplinary authority as gospel truth without exercising the Page 17 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} appellate jurisdiction in terms of Rule 27(2) of the CCA Rules and without considering the appeal on merits has caused prejudice to the appellant/petitioner herein, as without considering the appeal on merits, suo motu revisional jurisdiction has been exercised by the appellate authority, even though no appeal or revision was preferred by the Department seeking enhancement of punishment. It is a case where the appellate authority has invoked suo motu revisional jurisdiction on appeal preferred by the petitioner herein, but at the same time, the appeal of the appellant/petitioner herein, which is statutory appeal preferred under the Police Regulations, ought to have been considered in proper perspective in accordance with Rule 27(2) of the CCA Rules and only after sustaining the finding of the disciplinary authority qua the misconduct having been proved, the question of enhancement of punishment in suo motu revisional jurisdiction could have been considered by the appellate authority conferred with the suo motu revisional jurisdiction, as such, by not following the said procedure, serious prejudice has been caused to the petitioner herein and his statutory appeal stands dismissed without being considered, more particularly, the Department did not prefer any appeal Page 18 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} against his order of revision branding the penalty as disproportionate to the proven misconduct. 24.Consequently, the order passed by the Inspector General of Police and the consequential order passed by the Director General of Police are hereby quashed and the matter is remitted to the Inspector General of Police to consider the appeal on merits in accordance with Rule 27(2) of the CCA Rules and if the appellate authority after hearing the appellant and the Department comes to the conclusion that the procedure laid down in the Rules have been followed and findings of the disciplinary authority are very well warranted by the evidence on the record, then he shall consider invoking suo motu revisional jurisdiction and question of enhancement of penalty by issuing notice and shall proceed in accordance with law. Since the matter is old one, it will be considered and decided by the appellate authority within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Accordingly, the second question is answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents/State. 25.For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is partly allowed to the extent sketched herein above leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s). Page 19 of 19 {W.P.(S)No.6790/2017} 26.It is made clear that this Court has not commented on the merits of the matter and it is open to the appellate authority to consider the appeal on its own merits strictly in accordance with law. Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) JUDGE Soma Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) JUDGE