1 - High Court Of Chhattisgarh, Through Registrar, Bodri, Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur (C.G.) v. 1 - Jivesh Dewangan S/o Late T.R Dewangan Aged About 28 Years R/o Tikrapara
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:23749-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.06.13 19:20:27 +0530 WA No. 337 of 2025 1 - High Court Of Chhattisgarh, Through Registrar, Bodri, Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - District And Sessions Judge, Durg, District - Durg (C.G.) ...Appellants versus 1 - Jivesh Dewangan S/o Late T.R Dewangan Aged About 28 Years R/o Tikrapara, Raipur, Tahsil And District - Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Ku. Ruchi Dewangan D/o Late T.R Dewangan Aged About 26 Years R/o Tikrapara, Raipur, Tahsil And District - Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Bhumika Dewangan D/o Late T.R Dewangan Aged About 33 Years W/o Naveen Tarar, R/o Kurud, District - Dhamtari (C.G.) 4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Principal Secretary, Law Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondents For Appellants
Legal Reasoning
24.3.2025 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in WPS No.5715/2019, whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners / respondents No.1 to 3 herein was allowed. 5. Facts of the case in nutshell are that, writ petitioners’ father namely T.R.Dewangan was working as ‘Clerk of Court’ in the office of Family Court, Mahasamund, who died in harness on 14-5-2017. When he was posted as Clerk of Court (present designation ‘Administrative Officer’) in the office of District and Sessions Judge, Durg, he was placed under suspension vide 3 order No. 6/III-18-14/2008 dated 13.05.2008 (Annexure P-1 in writ petition) issued by respondent No. 2. Subsequently, his suspension was revoked vide order No. 7/III-18-314/2008 dated 8.7.2008 (Annexure P-2 in writ petition) issued by respondent No. 2 therein. Father of writ petitioners namely T.R. Dewangan was again suspended contemplating Departmental Enquiry vide order No.8/III-18-14/2008 dated 9.7.2008 (Annexure P-3 in writ petition). In the Departmental Enquiry, charges were held proved, delinquent employee was held guilty and he was imposed minor penalty by the District & Sessions Judge, Durg vide order dated 27.11.2014 (Annexure P-5 in writ petition) withholding of one increment with cumulative effect under Rule 10 (iv) of the CG Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Subsequently, vide order dated 8.5.2015 (Annexure P-6 in writ petition), his suspension was revoked by respondent No. 2 therein (appellant No.2 herein) and he was posted as Clerk of Court in the office of Family Court, Durg ‘without any back wages’ for suspension period. Representation
Arguments
: Ms.Akansha Jain, Advocate For Respondents : Mr.T.K.Jha, Advocate No.1 to 3 For Respondent : Mr.S.S.Baghel, Deputy Government Advocate No.4/State 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 13.06.2025 1. Heard Ms.Akansha Jain, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr.T.K.Jha, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3 and Mr.S.S.Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.4/State on I.A.No.01/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 05 days in filing the present writ appeal. 2. For the reasons mentioned in I.A.No.01/2025, same is allowed. Delay is condoned. 3. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ appeal is heard finally. 4. The present writ appeal is directed against the order dated
Decision
(Annmexure P-7) dated 25.05.2015 filed by the writ petitioners’ father has also been rejected by respondent No. 2 therein vide order dated 04.10.2017 (Annexure P-8), but prior to rejection of the representation, the delinquent employee T.R. Dewangan died on 14.05.2017 and after his death, his LRs. i.e. sons and daughter have challenged impugned order dated 04.10.2017 (Annexure P-8 in writ petition) passed by respondent No. 2. 4 6. By the impugned order, learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners, set-aside the order dated 04.10.2017 and directed the respondents to make full payment to the deceased employee /his LRs. for the period of suspension (from 13.5.2008 to 7.7.2008 and from 9.7.2008 to 10.5.2015) after deducting the subsistence allowance granted to the deceased employee during the aforesaid period within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which, the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum till its actual realization. Hence, this writ appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the circular dated 19.09.2013 issued by the General Administration Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, supersedes the earlier circular relied upon by the writ petitioners and vests discretion with the competent authority to decide whether full pay is to be granted for the suspension period in cases involving minor penalties, depending on the gravity of the misconduct. She further submits that the authority exercised its discretion judiciously, after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the proven misconduct of the deceased employee, and rightly denied full wages for suspension period. She also submits that learned Single Judge failed to consider the seriousness of the proven misconduct, which involved dereliction of duty relating to judicial examination proceedings 5 an issue affecting the functioning of the court and hence, denial of full wages during suspension period is justified. She submitted that no ground alleging denial of opportunity of hearing was ever raised by the writ petitioners in writ petition. Therefore, learned Single Judge erred in holding that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the deceased employee prior to issuance of the impugned order. The said order was not passed in exercise of any suo motu power or as an independent adverse action, but was in fact a reasoned decision rendered in response to the representation voluntarily submitted by the deceased employee himself during his lifetime, seeking reconsideration of denial of back wages. The representation constituted the very basis of the decision under challenge. In such circumstances, there arose no occasion or necessity to issue a separate notice or to summon the deceased employee afresh. 8. Learned counsel contended that learned Single Judge failed to correctly appreciate and apply the legal provisions contained in sub-rules (3) and (5) of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules. On perusal of the aforesaid rules, it becomes evident that sub- rule (3) is not applicable to the present case, as this provision is relevant only in instances where the competent authority forms the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the charges against the writ petitioners' father were found to be proven, and 6 consequently, a minor penalty was imposed. Therefore, this is not a case where the suspension was deemed wholly unjustified. Furthermore, the proviso to sub-rule (3) addresses circumstances where there has been a delay in the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, which is not relevant in the present situation. So far as, sub-rule (5) is concerned, this provision is designed to address scenarios not otherwise covered under sub-rules (2) and (3). In all other cases, the rule provides that the Government servant shall be entitled to such portion (not being the full amount) of the pay and allowances that he would have received had he not been suspended, as may be determined by the competent authority. This determination must be made after issuing a notice to the Government servant indicating the proposed quantum and after duly considering any representation submitted by him in response. The representation for full salary and allowances was made by the deceased employee on 08.05.2015, and the decision was taken based on this representation. Thus, as per the mandate of sub- rule (5), the decision on payment of full salary and allowances for the period of suspension was taken only after considering the representation. She further contended that the impugned order grants interest at the rate of 9% per annum, which is excessive, especially in light of the disputed nature of entitlement and the discretionary legal framework governing 7 such claims. She also contended that the impugned order overlooks the settled legal principles that in cases where the penalty has been imposed following due process, back wages for the suspension period are not automatic, and must be determined in accordance with the applicable service rules and government instructions. As such, the writ appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge deserves to be set-aside/quashed. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3 opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and submits that learned Single Judge considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners, which warrants no interference by this Court. 10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 11. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice sub-rule (3) and (5) of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules, which states as under:- "(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8), be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would 8 have been entitled, had he not been suspended: Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within sixty days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine. (4) xxx xxx xxx (5) In cases other than those falling under sub-rules (2) and (3) the Government servant, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (8) and (9), be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period (which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the notice has been served) as may be specified in the notice." 12. On perusal of the above-stated rules, it is evident that sub-rule (3) is not applicable to the present case, as this provision is relevant only in instances where the competent authority forms 9 an opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the charges against the deceased employee were found to be proven and consequently, a minor penalty was imposed. Therefore, this is not a case where the suspension was deemed wholly unjustified. Furthermore, proviso to sub-rule (3) addresses circumstances where there has been a delay in the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, which is not relevant in the present situation. 13. So far as sub-rule (5) is concerned, this provision is designed to address scenarios not otherwise covered under sub-rules (2) and (3). In all other cases, the rule provides that the Government servant shall be entitled to such portion (not being the full amount) of the pay and allowances that he would have received had he not been suspended, as may be determined by the competent authority. This determination must be made after issuing a notice to the Government servant indicating the proposed quantum and after duly considering any representation submitted by him in response. The representation for full salary and allowances was made by the deceased employee on 08.05.2015 and the decision was taken based on this representation. Thus, as per the mandate of sub- rule (5), the decision on payment of full salary and allowances for the period of suspension was taken only after considering 10 the representation. 14. Learned Single Judge overlooked the settled legal position that in cases where the penalty has been imposed following due process of law, back wages for suspension period are not automatic and must be determined in accordance with the applicable service rules and government instructions. As such, learned Single Judge has committed grave legal error in setting aside the order dated 04.10.2017 and issuing direction to make full payment to the deceased employee /his LRs. for the period of suspension (from 13.5.2008 to 7.7.2008 and from 9.7.2008 to 10.5-2015) after deducting the subsistence allowance granted to the deceased employee during the aforesaid period. 15. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 24.03.2025 (Annexure A-1) passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No.5715 of 2019 is hereby set aside and consequent thereto, writ petition filed by the writ petitioners stands dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu