1 - Rajesh Agrawal S/o Shri Ravindra Agrawal, Aged About 52 Years, R/o Village v. 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Bhatapara
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:22291 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 619 of 2025 1 - Rajesh Agrawal S/o Shri Ravindra Agrawal, Aged About 52 Years, R/o Village Dhurabandha, P/s Bhatapara (Rural), District - Baloda Bazar - Bhatapara (C.G.) 2 - Pawan Agrawal S/o Shri Ravindra Agrawal, Aged About 50 Years, R/o Village Dhurabandha, P/s Bhatapara (Rural), District - Balodabazar - Bhatapara (C.G.) --- Applicants/Petitioners versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Bhatapara (Rural), District- Balodabazar - Bhatapara (C.G.) (Complainant) --- Non-applicant/Respondent 2025:CGHC:22292 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 642 of 2025 1 - Khorbahara Rajak S/o Shiv Bagas Rajak, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Village - Dhurabandha, P/s - Bhatapara (Rural), Dist. Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) ---Applicant/ Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station - Bhatapara (Rural), Dist. Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.), (Complainant) --- Non-applicant/Respondent (Cause Titles taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners/Applicants : Mr. Prakash Kumar Mishra and Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, Advocates For State/Respondent : Mr. U.K.S. Chandel, Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Ajay Pandey, Govt. Advocate. Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 22-05-2025 1. Both these criminal revisions arise out of the same crime number and same sessions trial, therefore, they are being heard and decided together. 2. These criminal revisions are arise out of the impugned order dated 22-04-2025 passed by the Additional Judge to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge Bhatapara, District Balodabazar (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.9/2023 whereby the applications filed by the petitioners under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. have been rejected and the charge against the petitioners under Section 186, 353, 147, 148, 294 and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC and Section 25 and 27 of Arms Act have been framed. 3. The brie facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings and documents annexed with the petitions are that on 23-11-2022 complainant Hemchand Verma lodged a report that his elder brother Hemant Kumar Verma who is Sarpanch of Village Dhurabandha was engaged in measurment of the Govt. land along with Engineer Nisha Dhruv, Employment Assistant Anand Kumar Verma for construction of Gothan in the village, at about 2:30 p.m. accused persons Nand Kumar Rajak, Jageshwar Rajak and Harsh Kumar Rajak raised quarrel and tried to stop them to work there and started assaulting. The accused Nand Kumar Rajak had assaulted by farsa, Jageshwar Rajak assaulted by axe and Harsh Kumar assaulted by lathi by which his elder brother Hemant Kumar Verma received injuries on his head, face, hands and
Facts
other parts of the body and they intervened in the assault. The FIR has been registered against three accused persons, i.e., Nand Kumar Rajak, Jageshwar Rajak and Harsh Rajak. The injured Hemant Kumar Verma has taken treatment from Agrawal Hospital from 23-11-2022 to 17-12-2022. After discharge from the hospital, statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. of the injured Hemant Kumar Verma was recorded on 12-01-2023 in which he disclosed that initially he was being assaulted by the aforesaid three accused 3 persons and thereafter the other accused persons, Khorbahara Rajak, Hridaypuri Goswami @ Raju, Rajesh Agrawal and Pawan Agrawal have also assaulted him by hands and fists and danda. The statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. of the injured Hemant Kumar Verma was also recorded on 16-01-2023. The statement of other witnesses have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation initially charge sheet was filed against five accused persons, namely, Nand Kumar Rajak, Jageshwar Rajak, Harsh Rajak, Rajesh Agrawal and Pawan Agrawal on 21-02-2023 and the supplementary charge sheet was filed against two more accused persons namely Khorbahara Rajak and Hridaypuri Rajak including accused Rajesh Agrawal on 20-08-2023 for the offence under Section 307, 34, 294, 186, 147, 148, 149 of the IPC and Section 25, 27 of Arms Act. The case was committed to the learned Sessions Judge from where the same was transferred to the learned trial Court for its trial. 4. The present petitioners filed their applications under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for their discharge, which have been rejected by the impugned orderr dated 22-04-2025 by the learned trial Court and the learned trial Court has framed the charge against the present petitioners for the offence under Section 186, 353, 147, 148, 294, 307/149 of IPC and Section 25, 27 of Arms Act on the same day, which is also under challenge in the present petitions. 5.
Legal Reasoning
only consider whether prima facie material is there or not to proceed with the trial. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record to find out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused had committed the offence : (Chitresh Kumar Chopra case [Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] , SCC p. 613, para 25) “25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has 6 committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.” 17. A two-udge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v State of U.P. [(2006) 4 SCC 51: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 209] noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” or there is ground for “presuming” that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur, J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) “9. In Stree Atyachar Viodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [(1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under:- ‘14. ..... Secton 227 ittself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that “the Judge shall discharge when he considres that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. The “ground” in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accsed on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime.’ 10. The High Court did not at all apply the relevant test, namely, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming 7 that the accused has committed an offence. If the answere is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that ‘as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit’ and further observing that ‘the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste’ set aside the order by which he charges had been framed agaisnt Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant critaria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside.” 9. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgment that:- “12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap [State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 286] . Relevant paras are extracted below : (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) “11. … 11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered 8 elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380] , one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [Hiremath v. State of Karnataka, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is 9 a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] , adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (N. Suresh Rajan case [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] , SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) “29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 10. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgment that:- “21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao [CBI v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 737 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1183] this Court, after 10 reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms : (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) “12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under : (SCC pp. 41-42) ‘4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If “the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing”, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, “the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which — … (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused”, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they 11 have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove 12 the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.’ 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] wherein it was held as under : (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) ‘10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his 13 judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.’ 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , this Court held thus : (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) ‘19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before 14 it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the 15 accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited 16 purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.’ ” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- “10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. 11. This Court in State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass 17 an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227CrPC is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. 13. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [State of 18 Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.” 12. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 13.
Arguments
Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners have not been named in the FIR which has been lodged by the brother of the injured, namely, Hemchand Verma who is the eye-witness to the incident. He has not stated about the presence of the present petitioners on the place of incident. In the first charge sheet though name of Rajesh Agrawal is there, yet the investigation was not concluded with respect to accused Rajesh Agrawal and in supplementary charge sheet which has been filed on 20-08-2023 his name is also there along with other co-accused persons. The statement of injured witness was recorded on 12-01-2023 which is after about more than 1 and 1 4 ½ months which itself creates doubt about the involvement of the present petitioners in offence in question. Prior to 12-01-2023 none of the witnesses have stated about involvement of the present petitioners in the offence in question. No weapon of offence has been seized from the present petitioners. He would further submit that in statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. of the injured there is no allegation of assault made by the present petitioners upon him. Therefore, there are material contradictions in the statements of the witnesses available in the charge sheet, for which the charge cannot be framed against the petitioners. Therefore, they are entitled for discharge. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and has submitted that from the statement of injured, the involvement of the present petitioners are very well there that they have assaulted the injured. Whether or not their involvement int eh incident or delay in lodging the statement of the injured or other witnesses are the disputed questions of fact which are to be decided after recording evidence of the parties. At this stage there is prima facie material available in the charge sheet against the petitioners and in the statement of witnesses, there are sufficient evidence against the petitioners for framing of charge and proceeding with the trial. The trial Court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence at this stage of framing of charge. By the assault made by the present petitioners along with other accused persons number of injuries have been found on the body of the injured on his vital part of the body, he remained in hospital from 23-11-2022 to 17-12-2022 and therefore, the petitions have no merit and the same are liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material produced along with the petitions. 8. At the stage of framing of charge, the court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence on record and nor conduct a mini-trial. The court would 5
Decision
In view of the above judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also in the facts and circumstances of the present case I examine the material produced along with the petitions. 14. From the statement of the victim/injured Hemant Kumar Verma recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. on 12-01-2023 it reflects that there is sufficient allegation against the present petitioners that they have also assaulted the injured by hands, fists and danda. From his statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. recorded on 16-01-2023 there are allegation against the petitioners and there presence on the place of incident. From the statemnt of the witnesses Nand Kishor Verma, Kishor Verma, Dilip Verma, Johan Yadu, the names of present petitioners are there as assailants. From the medical records and MLC report of the injured annexed with the charge 19 sheet it also reflects that a number of injuries have been found on the body of the injured which was reported to be grievious in nature and he remained hospitalized from 23-11-2022 to 17-12-2022. The material available in the charge sheet against the petitioners prima facie sufficient to frame charge against the petitioners and to proceed with the trial of the case. 15. In view of the above principles on examining the material available in the charge sheet which is filed along with the petitions, it prima facie gives sufficient material that the present petitioners being the members of unlawful assembly assaulted the injured by hands, fists and danda and other accused persons have assaulted by farsa, axe and lathi by which the injured Hemant Kumar Verma received grievous injuries on various parts of his body for which he remained hospitalized from 23-11-2022 to 17-12-2022, the names of the present petitioners are there in the statement of the witnesses including injured Hemant Kumar Verma. Therefore, this Court finds that there is sufficient material in the charge sheet against the petitioners to frame charges and proceed with trial. 16. It is a settled legal position that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial judge has to examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to prima facie satisfy as to whether or not the evidence is sufficient to proceed with the trial against the accused. The nature of the evidence collected during the investigation and the documents produced with it, which prima facie disclosed that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused persons, would suffice to frame the charge and to proceed with the trial. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage of framing of the charge. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of the material on record need not be gone into. 17. This court, therefore, is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has rightly rejected the applications filed by the petitioners under Section 227 20 of the Cr.P.C. and framed the charge against them, and there is sufficient prima facie material available in the charge sheet to proceed with the trial of the case. There is no ground to quash the charge framed by the learned trial court, and no illegality or irregularity is found warranting interference in the impugned order of framing the charge against the petitioners, as such, both these criminal revisions (CRR No. 619/2025 and CRR No. 642/2025) deserve to be and are hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil