Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:35881 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1671 of 2025 1 - Rajeshwar Prasad Dubey S/o Shri Lalta Prasad Dubey Aged About 54 Years R/o Sikatiha Dharwaha, Allahabad Karchana, District - Allahabad Uttar - Pradesh Police Station Podi Bachra Thana Through Power Of Attorney Holder Vivek Chaturvedi S/o Pradeep Chaturvedi Aged About 32 Years R/o M.I.G. 2/B Near A.H. Memorial School, Jawahar Nagar P.S. Supela, District - Durg Chhattisgarh. versus ... Petitioner 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Durg, District - Durg (C.G.). 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station In Charge Nandini, Thana Nandini District- Durg (C.G.). ... Respondents For Petitioner
Legal Reasoning
reliance on the decision of this Court in the matter of Narayan Sahu vs. State of C.G., passed in CRMP No. 234/2021 on 10.03.2021. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner and supports the impugned order, submitting that there are no valid documents about the transport of the said cattle, and there are also no documents with regard to the purchase or sale of the cattle. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the order impugned with utmost circumspection. 6. The Act of 2004 has been enacted in the interest of the general public and to maintain communal harmony and peace, for prohibition of slaughter of agricultural cattle. Section 6 of the Act of 2004 provides prohibition on transport of agricultural cattle for slaughter. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2004 which reads as under: - “6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural cattle for slaughter:— (1) No person shall sell, or transport or offer to transport or cause to be transported any Agricultural cattle from any place within the state to any place within the state or outside the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of 4 the provision of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so slaughtered. (2) Whenever any person transports or causes to be transported in contravention of provisions of sub-section (1) any agricultural cattle as specified in the Schedule, such vehicle or any conveyance used in transporting such animal along with such agricultural cattle shall be liable to be seized by such authority or officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf. (3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub-section (2) shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or surety before the expiry of six months from the date of such seizure or till the final judgment of the court, whichever is earlier and such vehicle shall also be liable for confiscation at the end of the trial.” 7. A focused perusal of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004, would show that the provision bars transport, possession and sale of cattle for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that the same may be slaughtered. Mere transport of cattle from one place to another for the purpose other than slaughter is not barred under the Act and in that case the provision under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 would not be applicable. 8. It is well settled law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. When a specific word has been inserted by the legislature, the provision cannot be given a different meaning. In the matter of W. H. King v. Republic of India and another1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court pertinently observed as under:- 1 AIR 1952 SC 156 5 “10. As the statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. We are not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with what has been actually said in and by the language employed.” 9. Similarly, in the matter of State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others2, the Supreme Court held as under: - “15. … when it is said that penal statutes must be construed strictly, what is meant is that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and it must not strain the words : “To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute”, and that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But I do not think that this rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in any way affects the fundamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test which can safely be applied is the language used in the Act and, therefore, when the words are clear and plain, the court must accept the expressed intention of the legislature. ...” 10. The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of Section 6(A) of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 14545 in which the Gujarat High Court considering the issue identical as involved in the present case held that clause (4) of Section 6(A) would apply only in a case where the animals are 2 (1982) 1 SCC 561 6 being transported for the purpose of slaughter. It has been observed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the report as under: - “10. The plain reading of section 6(A) clause (1) would indicate that the same is applicable in a case where it is found that the animals were being transported from any place within the State to any other place within the State for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. There is a proviso to section 6(A) clause (1) which provides that a person shall be deemed to be transporting such animal for the purpose of slaughter unless contrary is proved thereto to the satisfaction of the concerned authority or officer by such person or he has obtained a permission under sub-section (2) for transporting the animal for bona fide agricultural or animal husbandry purpose. 11. Clause (4) to section 6(A) puts a restriction so far as the release of the vehicle is concerned for a period of six months. 12. It is, therefore, manifest that section 6(A) clause (4) would apply only in a case where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. 13. It is not in dispute so far as the present case is concerned that no permit was obtained by the petitioner herein as the registered owner of the vehicle for the purpose of transport. However, at the same time, the prosecution has to, prima facie, show something that the transport of the cattle was for the purpose of slaughter. For such purpose, I inquired with Mr. Dabhi, the learned APP, regarding the materials collected by the police in the course of investigation. Mr. Dabhi has fairly submitted that there is nothing to show that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. It appears that there is no investigation in that direction. If it is the case of the prosecution that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter, then at least, it is expected from the investigating officer to investigate at which place they were being taken and were to be handed over to whom for the purpose of slaughter. There is nothing in that regard. In the absence of such material, in my view, the prosecution cannot straight way take recourse to the deeming fiction as provided under section 6(A)(1). In such circumstances, I am of the view that there should not be any legal impediment in releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the statutory time period i.e six months.” 11. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the 7 aforesaid legal position and the principle of law flowing from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava (supra), it is established legal position that if the agricultural cattle is being transported for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the Act of 2004, bar under Section 6(3) would apply and vehicle cannot be released on interim custody for a period of six months or till the judgment is pronounced whichever is earlier, but mere transportation of agricultural cattle from one place to another for the purpose other than slaughter is not an offence under the said Act and in case Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted, bar contained in Section 6(3) of the Act would not attract and interim custody can be granted without waiting for the period of six months as provided. 12. Similar stand has also been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai Vs. State of Gujarat & Another, reported in 2013 (3) SCC 240, wherein the Supreme Court has expressed that it is not advisable to keep the seized vehicle in the Police Station in open condition which is prone to natural decay on account of whether conditions for a long period. 13. A careful perusal of the order impugned and other documents annexed with the petition would show that the prosecution or the investigating agency at no place has alleged that the petitioner’s vehicle was being used to transport the cattle for 8 the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act, specifically Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. Case of the prosecution in sum and substance is that the petitioner’s vehicle was being used to carry the cattle from Navagarh (CG) to Maharashtra i.e. from one place to another and it was not in contravention of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. In the entire prosecution case, no specific place in Maharashtra has been mentioned where the cattle were being transported. 14. In the Animal Health Certificate dated 28.03.2025, the Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Block Dhamdha, District Durg (C.G.), has certified that all the 25 cattle (15 cows and 10 bulls) are in healthy condition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the agricultural cattle were in bad / injured condition to attract the definition of “slaughter” so as to apply the bar contained in Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004. 15. In the instant case, it is pertinent to mention the most important fact of the case that the offending vehicle bearing registration No. CG-12-AX-3032 was seized on 27.03.2025 and the petitioner has not been arrayed as an accused, and there has no objection to his ownership and he has a right to raise any other grounds and also reserving to submit all relevant documents and it is also necessary to note that no useful purpose would be served if the said vehicle is allowed to get exposed in the extreme weather conditions in the Police Station, rather the said vehicle can be released to the petitioner, who is claiming himself to be the owner of the article, so that he can 9 use it and the said vehicle does not become junk after some time. It is also pertinent to mention here that a letter has been written by the in-charge of Nandni Nagar Police Station to Superintendent of Police, Durg on 26.04.2025 for the action of confiscation of the vehicle, but it does not appear that the action of confiscation has been taken forward by the concerned collector and it also does not appear that a notice has been given to the petitioner for confiscation of the said vehicle. 16. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by the trial Court and affirmed by learned revisional Court are hereby set aside. It is held that bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not at all attracted. Hence, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matters of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283 and Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai (supra) the petitioner would be entitled for the custody of the vehicle till the conclusion of trial. Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to give the interim custody of the vehicle to the petitioner by imposing reasonable conditions. The vehicle shall be released within seven days from the date of complying with the conditions imposed by the trial Court.
Arguments
: Mr. Sudhanshu Upadhyay, Advocate. For Respondents/State : Ms. Pragya Shrivastava, G.A. Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Order on Board 24/07/2025 1. The petitioner has been preferred this instant petition under Section 528 of BNS, 2023 being aggrieved by the order dated 24.04.2025 passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District - Durg (C.G.) dismissing the Criminal Revision No. 116/2025 and affirming order dated 08.04.2025 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, C.G. in Digitally signed by HEERA LAL SAHU Date: 2025.07.26 15:27:04 +0530 2 Criminal MJC No. 462/2025 whereby Supurdnama application filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. 2. As per the charge sheet, the brief facts of the case are that on 27.03.2025, 25-26 cattle were being taken to a slaughter house in Maharashtra, stuffed in a Tata Ultra vehicle bearing registration No. CG-12-AX-3032 without air, fodder and water, in which 2-3 cattle died after being crushed. On the basis of secret information, the aforesaid vehicle was seized by the police of police station Nandani in connection with Crime No. 58/2025 registered at police station Nandani Nagar for the offence under Sections 2(c), 4, 6, 10, 11 of C.G. Agricultural Animal Protection Act, 2004, Section 11(1)(d) of Prevention of Cruelty to Animal Act, 1960, Section 54(1), (2), (3) 47 (A,C), 48, 49, 50, 52 of C.G. Animal Transport Act, 1987 and Section 325 of B.N.S., 2023. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is the registered owner of the offending vehicle, and he is having a valid and effective documents required for the said vehicle, therefore, he is entitled for the Supurdnama. He next submits that Petitioner Rajeshwar Prasad had handed over the vehicle to the accused Roshan Lal Dahriya on an 11-month agreement. He had no idea that the vehicle was being used to take cattle to the slaughterhouse. He has not even been prosecuted. He has not received any notice regarding the confiscation of the vehicle till now. According to the doctor's report, other cattle, except the dead cattle, have been declared healthy. The seized vehicle is machinery property and due to its lying idle in an open place, 3 its machinery parts are being deteriorated day to day, it is about 4 months since the vehicle has been seized, therefore, it will be appropriate to release the vehicle on interim custody. He placed
Decision
17. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. H.L. Sahu Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge