Judgment Reserved on 13.08.2025 Judgment Delivered on 02.09.2025 1. Tuneshwar Lodhi, S/o Prem Lodhi v. • The State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Police Station Bemetara, Distt
Case Details
1 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR AFR AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2025.09.02 14:56:47 +0530 CRA No. 365 of 2014 Judgment Reserved on 13.08.2025 Judgment Delivered on 02.09.2025 1. Tuneshwar Lodhi, S/o Prem Lodhi Rajput, aged about 32 Years, R/o Vinayaka, Chowki, Maro, P.S. Nandghat, Civil and Revenue Distt. Bemetara, C.G. 2. Yogeshwar Lodhi, S/o Prem Singh Rajput, aged about 26 Years, R/o Vinayaka, Chowki, Maro, P.S. Nandghat, Civil and Revenue Distt. Bemetara, C.G. ---Appellants versus • The State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Police Station Bemetara, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G. --- Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Raj Kumar Pali, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Ruhul Ameen, Panel Lawyer. ACQA No. 141 of 2014 • Raju Rajput, S/o Komal Prasad Rajput, aged about 30 Years, R/o Samta Vihar Colony, Tikrapara, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur C.G. ---Appellant Versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, S/o Through Police Station Bemetara Civil and Rev. Distt. Bemetara C.G. 2. Tuneshwar Lodhi Rajput, S/o Prem Lodhi Rajput, aged about 32 Years, R/o Vinaika Chowki Maro, P.S. Nandgaon, Distt. Bemetara C.G. 2 3. Yogeshwar Lodhi Rajput, S/o Prem Singh Rajput, aged about 26 Years, R/o Vinaika Chowki Maro, P.S. Nandgaon, Distt. Bemetara C.G. --- Respondents For Appellant
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Adarsh Rajput, Advocate on behalf of Mr. R.S. Baghel, Advocate. For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Ruhul Ameen, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 : Mr. Raj Kumar Pali, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal & Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal C A V Judgment Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J 1. CRA No.365/2014:- This criminal appeal preferred by the appellants/accused persons herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.03.2014 passed in Sessions Trial No.21/2013 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara, District Bemetara, C.G., whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offence under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months to each appellant. 2. ACQA No.141/2014:- This acquittal appeal preferred by the Appellant/complainant arises out of the same judgment dated 29.03.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara, District Bemetara, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.21/2013, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused persons/respondents No.2 3 & 3 herein of the charge under Section 304-B read with 34 of IPC in alternative Section 302 read with 34 of IPC. 3. Since both the above captioned appeals arise out of the same Sessions Trial No.21/2013, they are being heard together and
Decision
disposed of by this common judgment. 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the marriage of appellant No.1- Tuneshwar and Parvati Bai-deceased was solemnized in the year, 2008 at village Binayaka. At the time of Tilak ceremony, an amount of Rs.50,000/- was allegedly given by the complainant's side to the appellants/accused persons at their behest. Soon after the marriage, deceased-Parvati Bai joined her matrimonial home and after about 3-4 months of marriage, appellants started torturing and harassing her mentally and physically for bringing insufficient dowry and also used to commit marpeet with her while demanding a four- wheeler (sumo) and cash, upon which, deceased- Parvati Bai brought a sum of Rs.2 lakhs from her parental home. On 25.11.2012, while she was at her parental home, her husband/appellant No.1 again demanded a four-wheeler (sumo). On 27.11.2012, Village Sarpanch and appellant No.1, informed the father of the deceased/PW-1 over telephone that deceased sustained burn injuries at her matrimonial home and after that, firstly she was taken to Baitalpur, Hospital and thereafter referred to a hospital at Bilapsur where during the course of treatment, she died on 28.11.2012. During treatment, dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Tehsildar (PW-16 P.K. Thakur) at Burn & Trauma Center, Bilaspur. It is alleged that being fed up with the persistent ill-treatment and 4 harassment made by appellants for dowry, deceased- Parvati Bai poured kerosene oil over her body and set herself ablaze. On receipt of information, panchanama of the dead body was prepared vide Exs.P-1 & 3 and FIR (Ex.P-14) was registered against the appellants, pursuant to which, merg intimations vide Exs.P-11 & 12 were recorded. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-2 and dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination where PW-14 Dr. A.S. Khan conducted the postmortem examination on 29.11.2012 and gave his report vide Ex.P-15. According to PW-14 Dr. A.S. Khan, cause of death of deceased was due to hypovolemic shock caused by burning of the skin of body to the extent of 90%. On 28.11.2012, Dr. M. Kumar (not-examined), Burn and Trauma Center, Bilaspur had prepared the MLC report of the deceased vide Ex.P-16 noting that the deceased was admitted in the hospital in accidental burn condition. During investigation, from the spot, burnt clothes of deceased, match stick, broken pieces of bangles, kerosene oil can and other articles were seized vide Ex.P-4. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-24), smell of kerosene oil was found on the articles marked as 'A to O'. 5. Statements of the witnesses were recorded, and after completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused persons/appellants before the JMFC, Bemetara under Section 304-B read with Section 34 of IPC. The accused persons/appellants abjured their guilt and sought trial. 5 6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents connecting the appellants/accused persons with the crime in question. However, in their defence, the appellants/accused persons did not examine any witness, but exhibited six documents, marked as Exs. D-1 to D-6. 7. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons of the charge under Section 304-B/34 of the IPC in alternative Section 302/34 of the IPC, but convicted and sentenced them for the offence as mentioned in paragraph 1 of this judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused persons and the complainant have filed separate appeals before this Court. 8. CRA No.365/2014:- Learned counsel for the appellants/accused persons would submit that the trial Court is unjustified in convicting the appellants for the offence under Section 498-A/34 of the IPC without properly appreciating the evidence and material available on record. He further would further submit that there is no evidence on record to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for the demand of dowry i.e. a motorcycle, four-wheeler (sumo) & cash, by the appellants. He would also submit that in her dying declaration (Ex.P-16) recorded by the Tehsildar (PW-16 P.K. Thakur), the deceased herself admitted that on the date of the incident, she was making tea on a stove and due to darkness in the house, her clothes accidentally caught fire, as a result of which, she sustained burn injuries and it was a mere accident and there was no fault on the part of anyone, however, the trial Court, while ignoring 6 this clear dying declaration of the deceased, proceeded to convict the appellants, which is per se illegal and contrary to law. Therefore, it is prayed that the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court be set aside and the appellants be acquitted of the charge leveled against them. 9. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the State would submit that conviction of the accused persons/appellants is strictly in accordance with law and there is no illegality or infirmity in the same warranting interference by this Court. 10. ACQA No.141/2014:- Learned counsel for the Appellant/Complainant would submit that the learned trial Court is wholly unjustified in acquitting the accused persons/respondents No.2 & 3 herein of said charge by recording perverse findings. He would further submit that the evidence available on record clearly shows that after the marriage of deceased and soon before her death, deceased- Parvati Bai was subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of dowry by the respondents No.2 & 3, due to which, she committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil and set herself ablaze and despite that the learned trial Court has committed grave error in acquitting the accused persons/respondents No.2 & 3 for the offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC in alternative 302/34 of IPC without appreciating the evidence on record in its correct perspective. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused persons/respondents No.2 & 3 would submit that it is not proved by the 7 prosecution that any demand of dowry was ever made by the respondents No.2 & 3 and even soon before the death of deceased. He would further submit that before the incident, no report has ever been lodged by the deceased or even by her relatives with respect to demand of dowry or harassment meted out by the accused persons. He would also submit that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of prosecution witnesses and the same does not corroborate with the each other and the contents of FIR (Ex.P-14). Thus, impugned judgment acquitting the accused persons for the offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC in alternative Section 302/34 of the IPC passed by the learned trial Court is well merited and needs no interference by this Court. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/respondent No.1 would support the contention made by learned counsel for the appellant/complainant. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 14. Now, the question would be whether the accused persons are the authors of the crime in question or not? 15. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is present with the idea of proximity test. 8 16. As regards the principles concerning the above-referred provisions, this Court wishes to refer to the decisions reported in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao 1 & Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. 2 . 17. In K. Prema S. Rao (supra) it has been held as under:- “16. … To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that 'soon before her death' she was subjected to cruelty and harassment 'in connection with the demand for dowry'.” 18. In Kaliyaperumal (supra) relevant portion reads as under:- “5. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to the expression 'soon before' used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to 1(2003) 1 SCC 217 2(2004) 9 SCC 157 9 indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 19. Now, the question is whether one of the ingredients of the offence is established that soon before the death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by accused persons in connection with demand of dowry? 20. In order to deal with the above question, it is necessary to examine the dying declaration (Ex.P-16) of the deceased, recorded by PW-16, P.K. Thakur, Tehsildar, on 28.11.2012 at the Burn & Trauma Center, Bilaspur. The contents of the dying declaration (Ex.P-16) are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- e`R;q iwoZ dFku eseks Øz- 203@12 fnukad 28-11-12 LFkku& cuZ ,oa Vªkek fjlpZ lsaVj] fcykliqj uke& ikoZrh] ifr rqus'oj jktiwr xzke& fcuSdk] Fkkuk ekjks] ftyk csesrjk eSa 'kiFk iwoZd c;ku nsrh gwW fd tks dgwaxh lp dgwaxh] ;g ?kVuk fnukad 27-11-2012 dks 4%00 cts 'kke dks ?kj ij gqvkA ?kVuk ds le; ?kj gj dksbZ ugha FkkA eSa ml le; pk; cuk jgh FkhA pqYgk eS pk; cuk jgh Fkh ?kj esa va/ksjk /kks[ks ls esjs diMs+ esa vkx idM+ yhA ;g ?kVuk ek= la;ksx blesa fdlh dh dksbZ xyrh ugh gSA eS vius vki tyh gwWA vkSj eq>s dqN ugha dgukA 1- feFkys'k jktiwr 2- jktw jktiwr 3- pUnzdqekj jktiwr 4- rqus'oj हसतत0/- dk;Zikfyd n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼lhy½ fcykliqj ¼N-x-½ ¼28-11-2012½ 10 21. At this stage, it is relevant to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus: “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.— Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:—(1) when it relates to cause of death.— When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. xxx xxx xxx”. 22. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the “dying declaration” section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of the transaction”: “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:- (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature 11 and character of ourpeople, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice. (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32. (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross- examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring. (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide. (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.” 23. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that 12 person's death comes into question, such statement is relevant. The Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) clearly held that Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible, the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death or deals with circumstances leading to the death. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has further been followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 2000 SC 2324 reviewing the earlier authorities. 24. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2020) 11 SCC 489, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: - “21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:- 21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court. 21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. 21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. 21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or 13 procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement. 21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration. 21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. 21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.” 25. When the dying declaration of deceased (Ex.P-16) is examined in the light of above referred judgments, it is clear that deceased voluntarily admitted that on the date of incident i.e. 27.11.2012, there was darkness in the house and while she was making tea on a stove, her clothes accidentally caught fire, due to which, she sustained burn injuries. She further clarified that incident was purely accidental and there was no fault of anyone and that no one was responsible for the incident. Further, PW-16 P.K. Thakur, Tehsildar, has stated that on 28.11.2012, he recorded the dying declaration of deceased at Burn & Trauma Center, Bilaspur in presence of witnesses. He has further stated that on being asked, deceased told him that on the date of incident, there was darkness in the house and while she was making tea, her clothes accidentally caught fire and she sustained burn injuries herself. He has also stated that deceased admitted that incident was accidental and that no one was at fault. In cross- 14 examination, he admitted that at the time of recording of dying declaration, the deceased was found to be in a fit state of mind. The statement of PW-16 P.K. Thakur, Tehsildar is also corroborated with the evidence of PW-4 Raju Rajput, PW-3 Chandrakumar and PW-18 B.L. Pal, I.O. This apart, PW-8 Smt. Jagbai, aunt of deceased, also admitted that deceased was speaking well in the hospital. 26. Thus, from perusal of the above evidence, it is clear that while making the dying declaration (Ex.P-16), the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had voluntarily described the manner in which the incident occurred. The names of the accused persons were not mentioned in the dying declaration, thereby indicating that they had not instigated or harassed her to commit suicide for dowry and, on the contrary, the above evidence unequivocally points to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was accidental in nature. 27. Now, it is to be seen whether the offence under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of IPC is made out against the appellants or not? 28. To attract the provisions of Section 498-A of the IPC against the accused persons/appellants, the following ingredients, as contained therein, are required to be examined, which read as under:- “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "cruelty means"— (a) anywilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or 15 (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 29. Now we shall deal with the evidence led by the prosecution one by one. PW-1 Komal, father of the deceased, has stated that four months prior to the marriage, appellant No.1 had demanded Rs.50,000/- from him and at the time of Tilak ceremony, he had given Rs.50,000/- to appellant No.1. However, on the contrary, in cross-examination, he admitted that he had actually given Rs.50,000/- to uncle of appellant No.1 as there was a gathering at Tilak ceremony. He further admitted that after marriage, his daughter/deceased and appellant No.1 had visited his house 50-60 times, but he did not give any money to appellant No.1. He also admitted that till date, appellant No.1 did not demand any money from him. In the FIR (Ex.P-14) also, there is no mention about the demand of “Rs.50,000/-” made by appellant No.1. This witness has further stated that after one year of the marriage, appellant No.1 had demanded motorcycle and that the deceased herself had informed him about this, however, on the contrary, in cross-examination, he admitted that appellant No.1-husband has his own motorcycle and he used to visit his village with deceased on it and that both of them would return together on the same motorcycle and in FIR (Ex.P-14) also, there is no mention about the demand of motorcycle by appellant No.1, rather it is mentioned in FIR (Ex.P-14) that appellant No.1- husband used to demand a Sumo vehicle (four- wheeler). He also admitted that they would give respect to the deceased and appellant No.1 equally. He also admitted that at the time of marriage, appellant No.1-husband had given five lockets of gold and 16 silver ornaments (Kardhan and anklets) to her daughter/deceased. He also admitted that prior to 3-4 years of the incident, he did not lodge any report to the police station against the accused persons for harassing the deceased. It is also admitted by him that during the lifetime of deceased, he did not lodge any report against the accused persons and after the death of deceased, they thought considerably and then reported the matter to the police. He also admitted that if they did not report the matter, then family members would have questioned them as to why no report has been lodged. 30. Apart from the above, PW-2 Smt. Dulari Bai, mother of the deceased, admitted in her cross-examination that during inquest proceedings, she was present and at that time, she did not inform anyone that the accused persons has caused the death of the deceased by setting her ablaze. She also admitted that the deceased and appellant No.1 used to visit the house by motorcycle and bus, however, PW-3 Raghav, brother of the deceased, in his cross-examination, stated that his sister/deceased and brother-in-law/appellant No.1 never came to the house by motorcycle, but would always visit and leave by bus. She also admitted that appellant No.1 and deceased used to visit the house and stay happily and they also used to give respect to appellant No.1. She further admitted that during the lifetime of the deceased, she neither lodged any report against the accused persons nor made any complaint before the community members and even after talking to the deceased in the hospital, she did not lodge any report at the police station against the accused persons. Likewise, PW-3, brother of the deceased, also admitted that he did not lodge any report against 17 the appellants regarding commission of marpeet or harassment. He further admitted that, in his presence, his parents did not give any money to appellant No.1. In addition to the above, PW-4 Raju Rajput, another brother of the deceased, stated that at the time of marriage, the accused persons had demanded 50,000/-, but this fact is not mentioned in the FIR ₹ (Ex.P-14). He further admitted that he attended the last rites of the deceased and even at that time, he did not make any complaint against anyone. He also admitted that during the lifetime of the deceased, he neither lodged any report against the accused persons nor made any complaint before the community members. He further admitted that the Tehsildar and the Doctor had recorded the statement of the deceased. It is also admitted by him that when appellant No.1 came to know that the deceased has been burnt, he came from the field and extinguished the fire, due to which, his hand was also burnt, meaning thereby, appellant No.1 was not present at the time of the incident, but was in the field. 31. Thus, from perusal of the above evidence, it is quite vivid that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of PW-1 Komal, father of the deceased, PW-2 Dulari Bai, mother of the deceased, PW-3 Raghav, and PW-4 Raju, brothers of the deceased, with respect to the alleged demand of dowry made by the accused persons and their statements do not corroborate with each other and with the contents of the FIR (Ex.P-14) and on the contrary, it appears that the allegations leveled by them are casual, bald, and omnibus in nature, therefore, the credibility of their evidence is doubtful. 18 Furthermore, there is no mention anywhere in the FIR (Ex.P-14) regarding any demand of Rs.50,000/- and a motorcycle by the accused persons. In addition, even in the dying declaration (Ex.P-16), the deceased did not level any allegation against the accused persons with respect to harassment on account of dowry demand. That apart, the family members of the deceased (PW-1 to PW-4) also admitted that during the lifetime of the deceased, they neither lodged any report with the police station nor made any complaint before the community members regarding the alleged dowry demand by the accused persons. Although, at the time of the inquest proceedings, PW-2 Dulari Bai, mother of the deceased, was present, but she did not lodge any report against the accused persons alleging that they had caused the death of the deceased by setting her ablaze. Furthermore, there is no cogent or clinching evidence on record to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused persons in connection with demand of dowry. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants/accused persons ever harassed the deceased in connection with demand of dowry and in absence of such evidence, the learned trial Court was not justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants/accused persons under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of IPC. Accordingly, the appellants are entitled to be acquitted of the offence under Section 498-A read with 34 of IPC. However, with regard to offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC, the learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence led by the prosecution and after analyzing the entire evidence minutely, rightly acquitted the accused persons of the offence under Section 304-B/34 19 of IPC in alternative Section 302/34 of IPC. 32. For the foregoing discussions, the acquittal appeal filed by the complainant, being without any substance, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed, whereas the criminal appeal filed by the appellants/accused persons is allowed and the impugned judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants under Section 498-A/34 of IPC is set aside and they are acquitted of the offence under Section 498-A/34 of IPC. 33. Appellants are reported to be on bail, therefore, their bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the same shall remain operative for a further period of six months in light of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. 34. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary information and action. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh