1 - Rai Singh S/o Samaru, Aged About 22 Years R/o Paradol, Stationpara, P.S v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Jhagrakhand, District- Korea Current District-M.C.B
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:12536-DB NAFR BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.03.18 10:17:47 +0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 521 of 2024 1 - Rai Singh S/o Samaru, Aged About 22 Years R/o Paradol, Stationpara, P.S. Jhagrakhand, District- M.C.B. (CG) 2 - Radheshyam @ Ravi S/o Kumar Sai Suryavanshi, Aged About 38 Years R/o Jilda, P.S. -Khadgawan, District- M.C.B. (CG) --- Appellants versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Jhagrakhand, District- Korea Current District-M.C.B. (C.G.) --- Respondent CRA No. 1169 of 2024 Reshmi S/o Jokhanlal Suryavansi Aged About 41 Years Sakin Jilda, Thana Khadagava, Zilla M.C.B. (Chhattisgarh) ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Jhagarakhand Zilla- Koria, Presently District- M.C.B. (Chhattisgarh) --- Respondent For Appellants For Appellant : : Mr.Hemant Kumar Agrawal, Advocate in CRA No.521/2024 Ms.Swati Verma, Advocate holding the brief of Ms.Priya Mishra, Advocate For Respondent : Mr.Sakib Ahmed, Panel Lawyer For Complainant : Mr.U.R.Koshley, Advocate 2
Legal Reasoning
48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- 10 "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his Article 21 of the constitutional right under Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 17. In the matter of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to 11 discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the 12 Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11 Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 18. Recently, in the matter of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC Online SC 846, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records 13 for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned 14 examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 19. Reverting to the facts of the present case and due consideration of the prosecution evidence, we find that no any clinching and legally admissible evidence have been brought by the prosecution to prove the fact that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident, yet the trial Court in the impugned judgment
Arguments
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 17/03/2025 1. Since the aforesaid two criminal appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge F.T.S.C. (POCSO), Manendragarh, District Koriya in Special Criminal Case No.79/2022, they were clubbed & heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Appellants-Rai Singh and Radheshyam @ Ravi have preferred Criminal Appeal No.521/2024 under Section 374(2) of the CrPC questioning the impugned judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge F.T.S.C. (POCSO), Manendragarh, District Koriya in Special Criminal Case No.79/2022, by which appellant-Rai Singh has been convicted for offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called as ‘IPC’) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offeces Act, 2012 (hereinafter called as ‘POCSO Act’) and sentenced to undergo RI for two years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month, RI for five years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month, RI for twenty years and fine of 3 Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one year and RI for twenty years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one year. The trial Court also convicted appellant No.2-Radheshyam @ Ravi for offences under Sections 363 and 370(4) of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for two years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month and RI for ten years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month. 3. Appellant-Reshmi has preferred Criminal Appeal No.1169/2024 under Section 374(2) of the CrPC questioning the impugned judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge F.T.S.C. (POCSO), Manendragarh, District Koriya in Special Criminal Case No.79/2022, by which she has been convicted for offences under Sections 363 and 370(4) of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for two years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month and RI for ten years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month. 4. Notice issued to father of the prosecutrix (PW-4) has been served to him and Mr.U.R.Koshley has appeared on his behalf to contest the case and stated that father of the prosecutrix (PW-4) has no objection if bail is granted to appellant Rai Singh or for his acquittal. 5. The prosecution story, in brief, is that the victim used to visit her 4 sister’s home where she met one woman namely, Reshmi who in turn introduced her to Ravi Singh and they both spoke to the victim victim about going to Bihar for work purposes and on 23.09.2022 at around 9 P.M. both Reshmi and Ravi Singh came to the house of the victim and took her to their home where she stayed till 27.09.2022, as on that date they both left her in Makunpuri jungle, thereform she went to the house of her aunt and later called appellant Rai Singh with whom she met at the banks of Makunpuri river at around 7 P.M. and from there, they both went to the house of appellant Rai Singh where he made physical relations with her and on 28.09.2023, he left the victim at the house of her aunt. 6. On 26.09.2022 upon the oral complaint made by the father of the victim (PW-4), police of Police Station Jhagrakhand registered the FIR under Section 363 of the IPC against unknown person vide Ex.P-8. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-1. Consent for medical examination was obtained from the victim and her mother vide Ex.P-2. Marksheet of class 7 and receipt of Aadhar card of the victim was seized vide Ex.P-4. The victim was recovered on 03.10.2022 vide recovery panchnama Ex.P-5. Statement of the victim has been recorded under Section 164 CrPC before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manendragarh vide Ex.P-6. Statement of the victim has been recorded under Section 161 CrPC vide Ex.P-7. MLC of the victim 5 was conducted by Dr.Archna Kumhare (PW-3) vide Ex.P-7 and opined that signs of sexual intercourse found, no recent internal and external injury seen and 2 slides of vaginal smears for chemical analysis were prepared. Motor-cycle was seized from appellant Rai Singh vide Ex.P-9. Another motor-cycle was seized from appellant Rashedhyam @ Ravi vide Ex.P-10. Underwear of appellant Ram Singh was seized vide Ex.P-12. Patwari also prepared the spot map vide Ex.P-13. Appellants Rai Singh and Radheshyam Suryavanshi were arrested on 28.10.2022 vide arrest memo Exs.P-16 & P-17. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-20), on Article A vaginal slides, Article B semen slides and Article C underwear of appellant Rai Singh, human sperm and semen stains were found. On the basis of statement of the victim, offence under Section 363, 366, 370, 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Sections 4 & 6 of the POCSO Act were registered against the appellant and upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted before the Court concerned. 7. The trial court has framed charges against appellant-Rai Singh under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) & 376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act, against appellant-Radheshyam @ Ravi under Sections 363 & 370 of the IPC and against appellant- Reshmi under Sections 363 & 370 of the IPC and Section 6 read with Section 17 of the POCSO Act. The appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded innocence. 6 8. In order to establish the charge against the appellants, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses. The statements of the appellants under Section 313 of the CrPC were also recorded in which they denied the material appearing against them and stated that they are innocent and they have been falsely implicated in the case. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trail Court has convicted the accused/appellants and sentenced them as mentioned in paras 2 and 3 of the impugned judgment. Hence, these appeals. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubts. There is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the prosecutrix that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. In absence of examination of author of the dakhil-kharij register, the same cannot be taken into consideration for determination of age of the prosecutrix. No dakhil kharij register or any Kotwari register or ossification report are produced by the prosecution to determine the actual age of the prosecutrix that on the date of incident she was below 18 years of age. It is further argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants have been made an accused only on the basis of statement of the prosecutrix/ victim, which has since always been shaky and unreliable. There was love affair between appellant Rai Singh and the victim and no external or internal injury was found on the person of the 7 victim during MLC examination. They also submitted that if the entire case of the prosecution is taken as it is, then also the alleged offences are not made out against the appellants and they are entitled for acquittal. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the prosecutrix was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident, which is proved by the progress report of class 7 (Article A1) which contains the date of birth of the victim as 03.05.2008. Therefore there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court. The prosecutrix was abducted by the appellants and kept away from the lawful guardianship. Appellant Rai Singh kept her in illegal confinement for a considerable period and forcefully committed sexual intercourse with her. As such, the impugned judgment needs no interference. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 12. In order to consider the age of the prosecutrix, we have examined the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution. The prosecution relied upon the progress report of class 7 of the victim. 13. At the time of admission of the prosecutrix in the school, the birth certificate or Kotwari Panji have not been produced by her father and on the oral information given by father of the prosecutrix the 8 entry was made in the School admission and discharge register. No other evidence of birth certificate or Kotwari register or ossification report are produced by the prosecution to prove the actual age of the prosecutrix. 14.After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution could not produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth or age of the prosecutrix so as to hold that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of progress report of class 7 it would not be safe to hold that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident. The statement of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence upon this Court to hold that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 03.05.2008. 15. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made 9 in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 16. In the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. It was observed as under “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded.
Decision
has held her minor, hence, we set aside the finding given by the trail Court that on the date of incident the prosecutrix was minor. 20. So far as the issue of forceful sexual intercourse by appellant Rai 15 Singh upon the prosecutrix is concerned, we have carefully perused the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 CrPC (Ex.P-6). In her 164 CrPC statement (Ex.P-6), the prosecutrix has stated that she used to go to her sister Prema’s house where she met Reshmi. Reshmi introduced her to Ravi. Ravi and Reshmi told her to go to Bihar for work. About two-three weeks ago, on Friday at around 9 P.M. Ravi and Reshmi came on a motorcycle to pick her up and told her not to tell anyone at home, so she went with them. Both of them took her to Jilda where her Aadhar card was to be made. Then both of them started telling her that she is not old enough yet, go to her home and bring her father’s Aadhar card, then they will change her age. The police came to Jilda on Monday searching for her. On finding out, Reshmi hide her near the pond, then the police went back. In para 3, she has stated that next day on Tuesday, Ravi and Reshmi came to drop her on their motorcycle and left. After this she went to her aunt Kusrain’s house from Makunpuri jungle from where she called Rai Singh on mobile at 7:00. After this Rai Singh took her to his house and at home Rai Singh raped her forcefully many times, then next morning Rai Singh left her at Sajapahad, from there she went to her aunt Kaushilya’s house from where her aunt called her home and informed about her reaching there. Then her family members came to pick her up. 16 21. In her 164 CrPC statement, she has not stated that the appellants allured or threatened her or used any force while travelling along with them and while making physical relationship with her by appellant Rai Singh against her will or consent. 22. In para 1 of her evidence, the prosecutrix (PW-2) has stated that she know accused Rai Singh but she does not know other accused Radheshyam and Reshmi. Reshmi of village Jilda along with Radheshyam came to pick her up near the river of her village at 9 o’clock at night. They took her on a motor-cycle to accused Radheshyam’s house. Accused Radheshyam and Reshmi told her that they would go far away to work. She met accused Reshmi at her sister’s house in Chanwaridand, before that, she did not know accused Reshmi. She met accused Radheshyam along with accused Reshmi. Accused Reshmi had brought accused Radheshyam. In para 3 she has stated that she did not know accused Radheshyam before. She met accused Rai Singh at her brother’s wedding and knew him since then. Accused Reshmi said at Radheshyam’s house that they will change her age and take her to work. Then the police arrived, accused Radheshyam and Reshmi brought her to the jungle of Makunpur and left her there. She did not go to her house and called Rai Singh near the pond. Accused Rai Singh took her to his house. Accused Rai Singh did bad things to her two-three times. Accused Rai Singh left her at Sajapahad the next morning. She went to her aunt’s house in Lamigonda. In the evening her 17 brother came to pick her up, then she went to her house with him and thereafter she went to the police station. In para 6 of her cross-examination, she had denied that she had come from her sister’s house to her aunt’s house. Voluntarily said that accused Rai Singh had dropped her at her aunt’s house. She has stated that she does not have any information as to who all lived in the house of accused Rai Singh. She has admitted that Rai Singh’s parents, brothers and sisters live together in his house. She has also admitted that Rai Singh’s house is a one-room house. She has denied that family members of accused Rai Singh were in one room and she and accused Rai Singh were in one corner of that room. Voluntarily said that they were in different rooms. She has admitted that there was only one door to enter the house of accused Rai Singh. 23. Mother of the prosecutrix (PW-1) has admitted in para 7 of her cross-examination that her age is 50 years at present. She has admitted that her husband is 5 years older then her. She has denied that she was married at the age of 15 years. She has admitted that she has been married for about 30–35 years. The witness now says that it has been more than 30–35 years since her marriage. She has 6 children. She has admitted that her first child was born about one and a half years after her marriage. She has admitted that all her children were born at an interval of one and a half years. She has admitted that the victim also studied in 18 Anganwadi before school. She has admitted that she did not go to Anganwadi and school for admission. 24.The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the prosecutrix. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the prosecutrix must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the prosecutrix is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 25. Considering the entire evidence available on record and the conduct of the prosecutrix, we are of the opinion that the prosecutrix was more than 18 years of age at the time of incident, further she was a consenting party with appellant Rai Singh. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, offence under Sections 363, 366 & 376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act would not be made out against appellant Rai Singh. The prosecution has also failed to prove the offence under Sections 363 and 370(4) of the IPC against appellants Radheshyam @ Ravi and Reshmi beyond reasonable doubt. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.02.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge F.T.S.C. 19 (POCSO), Manendragarh, District Koriya in Special Criminal Case No.79/2022 are set aside. The appellants stand acquitted from all the charges. The appellants are reported to be in jail. They be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 27. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC, the appellants are directed to furnish a personal bonds in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties each in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. The Trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Judge Bablu