Durg Chhattisgarh v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:43365 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1061 of 2023 Shankar Sen S/o Suresh Sen, Aged About 35 Years R/o Shiv Chowk, In Front Of Naga Temple, Gali No.13, Ward No.18, Contractor Colony, Police Station Supela District - Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Supela, District- Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant For Respondent/State : Mr. Shrestha Gupta, Advocate : Mr. Topilal Bareth, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Judgment on Board 26.08.2025 1. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘CrPC’) questioning the impugned judgment dated 24.04.2023 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Fourth (F.T.S.C.) Special Judge POCSO Act, Durg, District – Durg (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 127/2022, whereby the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant with a direction to run all the sentences concurrently in the following manner : RAJSHEKHAR SONI Digitally signed by RAJSHEKHAR SONI CONVICTION SENTENCE 2 U/s 506-B of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 1 year with fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 1 month U/s 10 of POCSO Act Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years with fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 1 year 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 16.09.2022, the com- plainant (P.W.-07) who is father of the victim, lodged a written report (Ex.P-08) at Police Station – Supela, stating that whenever his daughter/victim, aged about 12 years, used to visit a nearby grocery shop situated at a short distance from their house for purchasing milk or other articles, the appellant/accused had on several occa- sions behaved in an inappropriate manner towards her, in other words, he always tried to molest the victim. It is further alleged that on 11.09.2022 at about 7:30 p.m., and earlier on 14.08.2022 at about the same time, he repeated such conduct and used to out- rage the modesty of the victim. The complaint also records that the accused/appellant attempted to take undue advantage of the fact that the victim is mentally weak girl. Due to threats and intimidation by the accused, the victim could not earlier disclose the incident to her family; however, on the date of complaint she gathered courage and narrated the matter to her mother (PW-08). On the basis of the said written report (Ex.P-08) lodged by the complainant, an First In- formation Report (Ex.P-09) was registered against the accused and the matter was taken into investigation. 3. During the course of investigation, the statements of witnesses were 3 recorded in writing as per their version. A requisition (Ex.P-07A) was issued to the Government Hospital, Supela, for the medical exami- nation of the victim (PW-01). On production by the father of the vic- tim, her 5th Class progress report was seized under seizure memo (Ex.P-10) in the presence of witnesses. A spot map of the place of occurrence was prepared as per witnesses’ description (Ex.P-02). The accused was arrested under arrest memo (Ex.P-14), and arrest intimation (Ex.P-15) was duly given to his family members. For preparation of a revenue map of the spot, a requisition (Ex.P-16) was sent to the Revenue Officer, Municipal Corporation, Bhilai. 4. Furthermore, during the course of investigation, a requisition (Ex.P- 04) was issued to the Headmaster, Osho Public School (Primary & Middle), Supela, Bhilai for production of the admission/withdrawal register of the victim, which was seized under seizure memo (Ex.P- 05). For recording the statement of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., an application (Ex.P-17) was moved before the Court of Ju-
Facts
dicial Magistrate First Class. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the trial Court against the accused. 5. So as to prove the complicity of the accused/appellant in the crime in question, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 prosecution witnesses and exhibited 22 documents in support of its case. Statement of the accused/appellant under Section 313 CrPC was also recorded in which he pleaded his innocence and false implication in the case. The accused did not give any defense 4 evidence in his defence. 6. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 24.04.2023 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been preferred by them calling in question the impugned judgment. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution and has wrongly convicted the appellant. It is further submitted that there is no independent witness present in the case and further there are hardly any reliable evidence to warrant the conviction of the appellant beyond reasonable doubts. The prosecution failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The statement of the victim is full of conjectures and surmises and is highly unreliable. Hence, the conviction is liable to be set aside. 8. On the other hand, learned State counsel for the State/respondent submitted that the appellant has committed a heinous crime of molestation against minor girl/victim, aged about 12 years 6 months and 07 days and the same has been duly proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is just and proper warranting no interference. 5 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question for consideration before this Court would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victims were minor? 11. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 12. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows : “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee 6 referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose.
Legal Reasoning
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. 7 (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the victim VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect 8 over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 13. In the present case, the prosecution has presented victim’s progress report of Class 5th, and Dakhila Kharij Register of the victim, which were seized as per seizure memo (Ex.P-10 and Ex.P-05). In both the documents, the date of birth of victim is mentioned as 04.03.2010. The defence has not presented any oral or documentary evidence to refuse the said date of birth, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the date of birth of the victim, as 04.03.2010, hence, I am of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held that the date of birth of the 14. 15. 9 victim is 04.03.2010 and his age on the date of incident i.e. 04.03.2010 was 12 years 06 months and 7 days. The next question for consideration is whether the appellant has committed sexual assault on minor victim ? In this regard, the statement of the victim (PW-1) is of much im- portance. The victim (PW-1) in her statement recorded by the trial Court, she has stated the accused/appellant, who lived nearby, had on the relevant night touched her chest and made her touch his private part inappropriately, and he tried to molest the victim and threatened to kill her if she disclosed the matter to anyone. Frightened, she later narrated the incident to her par- ents. 16. The father of the victim (PW-07) has deposed that his daughter is mentally weak and has difficulty in reading and writing. A medi- cal report (Ex.P-12) supports this contention. The mother of the victim (PW-08) similarly testified that the understanding of her daughter is much less compared to normal children, and that an IQ test had been conducted by Dr. Neeta Goswami. These state- ments were not challenged in cross-examination; on the contrary, the defense suggested to the grandmother of the victim (PW-03) that the victim is mentally weak in studies, which was admitted. 17. Furthermore, during the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, the Court noted that she was not mentally mature. Similar observations were recorded during her examination before the trial Court. Thus, it stands established that the victim (PW-01) 10 was a mentally weak child. 18. The father of the victim (PW-07) further stated that when he re- turned home at about 7:30 p.m., his wife informed him that the accused had been misbehaving with the victim and making inap- propriate demands for outrage the modesty of the minor victim girl. Thereafter, he lodged a written complaint (Ex.P-08) at the Po- lice Station concerned, which led to registration of the FIR (Ex.P- 09). He identified his signature on both documents. 19. The mother of the victim (PW-08) submitted in her statement that on 14.08.2022 at about 7:30 p.m., she had sent her daugh- ter/victim to the grocery shop for the purchase of some articles. When the victim returned late, she appeared frightened and, upon being questioned, it was revealed that the accused/appel- lant had expressed improper intentions and tried to outrage the modesty of the victim by touching the pressing her chest and making her touch his private part. She has further stated that af- ter this disclosure she went outside but the accused had already fled away. She stated that the accused had been troubling the victim on earlier occasions as well, and the appellant again on 11.09.2022 misbehaved and threatened the victim. The mother of the victim (PW-08) did not initially inform her husband about the incident, but upon repeated incidents she told her husband (fa- ther of the victim) on 16.09.2022, and thereafter, the father of the victim (PW-07) reported the matter to the police. 20. An independent witness, Dulari Bai Verma (PW-04), stated that 11 the accused used to sit near the Nag temple in the locality and trouble children by making different sounds. She has submitted in her statement that she had seen that when the victim goes to the shop, eventually she has seen the victim going towards the back of the temple once or twice while the accused was present there, and the accused says something to the victim, but she has no knowledge that what the accused used to say the victim. Al- though this witness denied having seen the exact acts, she ad- mitted that the accused had called the victim, spoken to her, and taken her behind the temple, which she saw from her house. This part of her testimony remained unchallenged in cross-examina- tion, thereby lending support to the victim’s version. 21. Khushboo Verma (PW-09), Assistant Sub-Inspector, sent the victim for medical examination of the injuries sustained to her on 16.09.2022 at Government Hospital, Supela with respect to the written complaint (Ex.P-7A). Regarding the same, Dr. Ankita Pandey (PW-05) has stated that on 16.09.2022 at 10:34 P.M., the woman constable of Police Station - Supela, Nagina No.-293, brought the 12 year old victim girl before her for medical exami- nation. Upon examining her, she found that the victim was gener- ally fine and in her senses. Pulse-84 and B.P.-110/80. The victim had marks of redness on the front of her chest and she had pain on touching it, which she had stated to be due to a scuffle. The victim had nail scratch marks on the lower part of her waist and scratch marks on the back of the right foot, whose size was 1x 12 0.5 × 0.5 cm. Thus, the medical evidence has proved the fact that there were marks of redness on the front of the chest of the victim and there was pain on touching, this also confirms the incident al- leged by the victim that her chest was pressed by the accused, due to which there was redness and pain in her chest. 22. The victim has consistently narrated the incident in her Police statement, as well as in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate concerned, and also in her tes- timony before the learned trial Court. There are no material con- tradictions which would affect her credibility. 23. The testimony of the victim has not been substantially discredited in cross-examination, and there is no evidence of prior enmity or motive for false implication. Hence, there is no reason to disbe- lieve her statement. The conduct of the accused in holding her hand, touching and pressing her chest clearly indicates the appel- lant’s sexual intent and knowledge that such acts would outrage the modesty of the minor victim girl. 24. In the case of Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the victim is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments on conviction on the sole evidence of the vic- tim. In paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3, it was observed and held as under: “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual 13 harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay vs. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98) “9. In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 550] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome 14 of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 10. In State of U.P. vs. Pappu [State of U.P. vs. Pappu, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 594] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be 15 established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difÏcult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’ 11. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 16 384], this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. …The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating ofÏcer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over 17 the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating ofÏcer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. …The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. …Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. …Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … *** 21. …The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires 18 confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difÏcult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’ 12. In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 86], this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 622], this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the 19 evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P., reported in (2010) 2 SCC 9] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1952 SC 54]. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.” 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 130], it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufÏcient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 20 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21]. In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have 21 co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 25. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Pankaj Chaudhary, reported in (2019) 11 SCC 575, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole 22 testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by Court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it was observed and held as under: “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 283]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 30].” 26. In the case of Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts 23 should find no difÏculty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it was observed and held as under: “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difÏcult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384] (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating 24 statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difÏculty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 635)].” 27. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases (supra) to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, I see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the victim as the doctor has also given his opinion, who has medically examined the victim, that as per the medical report of the victim and the nature of injuries sustained on the chest and lower part of waist of the victim, the injuries also prove the sexual assault committed on the victim by the appellant/accused. Also considering the statement given by the 25 victim (PW-01) recorded under Section 164 of CrPC, supported by the statement of other prosecution witnesses, wherein it has stated that by taking undue advantage of the victim’s mental weakness who was a minor girl at the relevant time, committed such acts amounting to outraging her modesty, aggravated sexual assault, sexual harassment, and criminal intimidation. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the victim can be sustained. 28. Thus, it is found proved that the accused, on 11.09.2022 at about 07:30 P.M. and before that, under the jurisdiction of Police Station - Supela, by taking advantage of the mental disability of the minor victim aged 12 years and 06 months, who was a mentally challenged girl at the time of the incident, with the intention of outraging her modesty, he kissed her cheek, showed his private part to her, touched and pressed her hand, cheek and chest, committed criminal aggravated sexual assault and made physical contact and foreplay, which included explicit proposals to have unwanted and sexual intercourse, and committed sexual harassment by doing this and caused criminal intimidation by threatening the victim girl to kill her if she told anyone about the incident/molestation. 29. The view taken by the learned trial Court that the appellant is the author of the crime is a pure finding of fact based on evidence available on record and as such, I am of the opinion that in the present case, the only view possible was the one taken by the 26 learned trial Court. 30. From the above analysis, I am of the considered opinion that the prosecution has been successful in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not committed any legal or factual error in arriving at the finding with regard to the guilt of the appellant/convict. 31. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 32. The appellant/convict is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out the sentence awarded by the trial Court by means of the impugned judgment and order dated 24.04.2023. 33. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Rajshekhar