Raipur, Chhattisgarh v. 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Amanaka, Raipur
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:6454-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 655 of 2021 1 - Bhuwan Lal Kshatriya S/o Padmalal Kshatriya, Aged About 43 Years R/o Badpuri Guda, Police Station Jay Patna, District Bhawani (Odisha) At Present R/o Satnami Para, Tatibandh, District Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Amanaka, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Rahul K. Mishra, Advocate. For State : Mr. N. K. Jaiswal, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. 05-02-2025 1. Present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 04-03-2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Second Fast Track Special Court, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal (POCSO) Case No.183/2018 Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as below: Conviction Sentence Under Section 376(2)(f) punishable R.I. for 14 years and fine of Rs.5000/-, in under Section 376(2) of the IPC default of payment of fine, further imprisonment for six months, U/s 506 Part-II of IPC R.I. for 2 years and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, further imprisonment for 2 months 2. Brief facts of the case are that, on 31-08-2018 the victim PW-1 made a written complaint to the police Ex.-P/1 that appellant, who is her father, has made forceful physical relation with her since 1 year back at Orissa. She is presently residing along with her parents and brother at Raipur. The appellant has again made forceful physical relation with her since 15-20 days back at Tatibandh, Raipur and threatened her not to disclose the incident to anyone, otherwise he would kill them. On 31-08- 2018 itself he threatened her elder mother and their children to kill them and then she disclosed the entire incident to her parents and lodged the
Facts
report. On the basis of written complaint the FIR Ex.-P/2 was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 376 and 506 of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital Raipur where she was medically examined by PW-8 Doctor Rajani Chourasiya who after her medical examination gave her report Ex.-P/11. While examining her medically the doctor has not noticed any external injuries on her body, however her hymen was old torn. The doctor has opined that sexual act might have been taken place, no definite opinion can be given about sexual act. Two slides of vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and 3 handed over to police for its chemical examination. Spot map Ex-P/3 was prepared by the police and Ex.-P/10 was prepared by the Patwari The underwear of the victim was seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/5. Copy of Adhar Card of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/6. The victim was also sent for her counseling to Bal Kalyan Samiti, Raipur and its report is Ex.-P/7. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim police seized school register from Shakti Vidya Mandir vide seizure memo Ex.-P/18 and after retaining attested true copy of the same the original school register was returned back to the school. The appellant was arrested on 02-09-2018 and he too was sent for his medical examination to District Hospital, Raipur where he was medically examined by Doctor V.K. Jha who gave his report Ex.-P/26 and found the appellant capable to perform sexual intercourse. The underwear of the appellant has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/17. The underwear of the victim, vaginal slides and underwear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL Raipur from where report Ex.-P/29 was received and semen and sperms were not found on the underwear of the victim as well as her vaginal slides, however, semen and sperms were present on the underwear of the appellant. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. have been recorded. After completion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Section 376 and 506 of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. 4 3. The learned trial Court has framed charge on 22-11-2018 against the appellant under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 Part II of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. After recording of the evidence of witnesses, on 10-02-2020 the charge against the appellant was amended and in place of earlier charges, new charges for the offence under Section 376(2)(n)/376(2), 376(2)(p)/376(2) and Section 506 Part II of the IPC and Section 5(l)/6 and Section 5(n)/6 of POCSO Act. After amending the charge, the opportunity has been provided under Section 217 of the Cr.P.C. to the parties to examine/re-examine or cross- examine/re-cross-examine the witnesses, but they stated that they do not want to lead further evidence or re-examine/ re-cross-examine the witnesses who have already examined/cross-examined. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. Highly belated FIR has been lodged by the victim only to settle her personal grievance with the appellant. He would further submit that the mother of the victim was having dispute 5 with the appellant and the victim is also resided with her mother who made the victim instrumental to settle her personal grievance. Had the appellant been committed offence with the victim, she would have lodged the report immediately or to inform any of her family member. The victim herself has admitted dispute between the appellant and her mother. Therefore, false implication cannot be ruled out against the appellant. No injuries have been found on the body of victim. He would further submit that there is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to the age of the victim that on the date of incident she was minor. The school record produced by the prosecution has not been proved in accordance with law and therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove its case that the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. Considering the over all incident available in the case the conduct of the victim itself is suspicious and therefore, the appellant cannot be convicted in such inconsistent evidence made by the victim and her mother. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 5. On the other hand, learned counel for the State opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the victim is daughter of the appellant and due to the family relation she could not lodge the report on earlier point of time and when the appellant threatened her repeatedly she constrained to lodge report against her own father. The strained relation between the appellant and his wife does not affect the credibility of 6 evidence of the victim that she was subjected to sexual intercourse by her own father. From the school record the victim was found to be minor on the date of incident and therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence available on record and convicted and sentenced the appellant which is absolutely justified and need no interference. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 7. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be whether on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age or not. 8. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register Ex-P/26C which is sought to be proved by PW-7 who is the Head Master of the school and the Adhar Card of the victim Article A. PW-7 who is the Head Master of Shakti Vidya Mandir, Khamhardih, Raipur has stated in his evidence that police has seized the school register vide seizure memo Ex.-P/18 and after retaining true copy of the same, the original register was returned back to the school and he brought the original register with him. The attested true copy of the school register is Ex.-P/26C and according to the school register the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 25-11-2000. In cross-examination he admitted that he is not the author of the school register Ex.-P/26C. He also admitted that on what basis the entries have been made in the school register is not there in Ex.-P/26C. He also admitted that his signature is also not there in the school register Ex.-P/26C and he has given evidence on the 7 basis of the entries made in it. From the evidence of this witness it is quite vivid that he is not the author of the school register and on basis of which the entries have been made in the school register have not been produced by the prosecution. 9. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register is considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 10. In paragraphs 40, and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 8 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 11. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as 9 to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal
Legal Reasoning
court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 10 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 12. In case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of 11 birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 12 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 13. Reverting to the fact of the present case, PW-1 victim has stated that her date of birth is 25-11-2000. She admitted in her cross- examination that she has got admitted in the school by her father. She denied the suggestion given by defence that she is more than 18 years of age on the date of incident. 14. PW-2 who is mother of the victim, has stated that the date of birth of the victim is 25-11-2000. In cross-examination she stated that she is having three children and the victim is eldest one. She could not 13 remember as to when and how many years back she has got married. She admitted that she has got married since 20-22 years back. Though she denied that after 1-1 ½ years of their marriage her first child was borne, but the evidence given by her with respect to the age of the victim is not of that sterling quality which inspires confidence of this Court that the victim is less than 18 years of age. PW-1 and PW-2 are the witnesses of seizure of her Adhar Card Article A. In the Adhar Card of the victim Article A her date of birth is mentioned as 11-02-2002 which is a different date than the date of birth recorded in her school record Ex.-P/26C. 15. No other evidence like kotwari panji, birth certificate or ossification test report has been produced by the prosecution to determine the age of the victim that she was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. The evidence of school register is not sufficient to determine the age of the victim as the author of the school register has not been examined and the basis on which the entries have been made in it has also been not produced by the prosecution, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor. 16. So far as the offence of rape upon the victim is concerned, we again examine the evidence of victim PW-1. She has stated in her evidence that her father was having evil eyes upon her. She was residing at Tatibandh along with her younger brother and appellant. Her mother was residing separately from her father due to dispute between them. She could not remember the date of day when her father has committed rape upon her after giving threatening to her and the next 14 day she informed her mother and elder mother about the incident and then she made written report Ex.-P/1 to the police. In cross-examination she admitted that the written complaint of Ex.-P/1 has been drafted in the police station Amanaka. She admitted that she is residing with her father (the appellant) and her mother is residing separately from him at Pandari. She further admitted that when she had gone to her mother then she lodged the report against the appellant. She further admitted that her father had provided the meals, clothing etc. and he used to take her to visit places. She further admitted that there was a dispute between her father and mother. Her father used to drink liquor and commit marpeet with her mother. 17. PW-2 mother of the victim has stated in her evidence that the victim was residing along with her father and her younger brother at Tatibandh. Since she was thrown out from his house, she is residing separately from her husband and along with her elder sister at Pandari. On the next day of the date of incident the victim informed her about the incident The appellant had also given threatening to them to send the victim back and then they have lodged the report. In cross-examination she admitted that quarrel took place between her and the appellant. 18. PW-9 is maternal aunt of the victim with whom the mother of the victim is residing. She stated in her evidence that her sister was left by her husband at bus stand, Raipur. At that time she was carrying pregnancy for about 7 months and the appellant took the victim and her younger brother with him. The appellant used to make telephonic call to her sister and threaten her. On 27-08-2018 the victim has informed her 15 that she wanted to reside with them and not with her father. The victim came to her house and informed that the appellant is harassing her and threatened her to kill them. She also stated that the victim had informed them that the appellant had committed rape upon her since last 1 and ½ months. She along with the victim and her mother had gone to the police station and lodged the report. At this stage, leading question was asked from this witness with respect to the incident of 1 year back and she denied that she has given such statement to the police in her police statement Ex.-P/28. In cross-examination she admitted that the mother of the victim is residing with her since July, 2018 and the victim is residing with her since 27-08-2018. She admitted that the appellant is driver and he occasionally came in the interval of 15-20 days at some time. She stated that the victim and her father were residing at Orissa and she was residing at Raipur. She admitted that she advised the victim and her mother to lodge the report and she accompanied the victim and her mother when they had gone to police station for lodging of the report. She voluntarily stated that on the dictation of the victim she inscribed the written report. She further admitted that when the victim was residing along with her father she regularly talked to her by mobile phone, but the victim had not disclosed about any incident during that period. She further admitted that the appellant has provided her necessary articles for her nurture and he used to take her to visit places. 19. From these evidence it appears that the victim has not disclosed in her deposition about the incident of 1 year back from the date of 16 lodging of the report and she stated in para 3 of her deposition that she informed the incident to her mother on one day back of the lodging of the report. PW-9 has also denied that the victim had informed her about the incident of one year back and she has not disclosed it before the police in her police statement Ex.-P/28. From the written complaint Ex.-P/1 lodged by the victim the allegation of rape was leveled by the victim that her father had committed rape upon her one year back and 15-20 days back from the date of lodging of the report also, but this part of written complaint is missing in her evidence and in the evidence she stated that a day before the date of lodging of the report the appellant has committed rape upon her. 20. It is not in dispute in the present case that the dispute was going on between the mother and the father of the victim and the mother of the victim is residing with her elder sister PW-9. As per the evidence of PW-9 when she was having telephonic conversation with the victim regularly she has not disclosed about any incident to her and as per the evidence of the victim on the date when she had gone to her mother she lodged report against the appellant. From 164 Cr.P.C. statement of the victim Ex.-P/8 there is no mention of any incident of 1 year back and only the incident of 15-20 days back has been mentioned which has been informed to her mother and her maternal aunt after 5-6 days of the incident. 21. All these evidence of the victim PW-1, her mother PW-2 and her maternal aunt PW-9 are inconsistent which makes the evidence of the 17 victim doubtful and she cannot be put in the position of sterling witness to the incident. 22. From all these evidences, it cannot be said that the victim is having a status of the witness of that sterling quality on which the appellant can be convicted. The sterling witness has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2020 (3) SCC 443, which is reproduced herein below: “5.4.2 In the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider who can be said to be a “sterling witness”. In paragraph 22, it is observed and held as under: “22 In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of 18 the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 23. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim’s evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents/relatives. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. 19 However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 24.
Decision
In view of the above, it would not safe to hold that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence laid by the prosecution, the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. 25. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the alleged offence. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 02-09-2018. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 26. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Bhuwan Lal Kshatriya is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 20 27. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil