Alok Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh and others), whereby the writ petition filed by the writ p
Case Details
1 ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.08.25 17:54:43 +0530 2025:CGHC:42924-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR The Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, Through Its Commissioner, District WA No. 238 of 2022 Bilaspur versus ... Appellant 1 - Alok Lal S/o Late Shyam Bhushan, Aged About 50 Years R/o Magarpara Chowk, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 2 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Its Secretary, Urban Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Collector, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Tehsildar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Harsh Wardhan, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Siddhant Kumar Das and Mr. Bennon, Advocates
Legal Reasoning
For Respondents-State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, Shri Bibhu Datta Guru Chief Justice , Judge Ramesh Sinha Per 25.08.2025 Judgment , Chief Justice on Board 1. Heard Mr. Harsh Wardhan, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Siddhant Kumar Das and Mr. Bennon, learned counsel 2 appearing for respondent No.1 and Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondents No.2 to 4. 2. By way of this writ appeal, appellant has prayed for following relief(s):- “(i) That, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 22.06.2021 passed in W.P. (C) No. 4770/2019 to the extent it directs for allotment of 30% of land to the respondent No. 1 and allow the appeal filed by the Appellant. (ii) Any other reliefs which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 22.06.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No.4770/2019 (Alok Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh and
Decision
others), whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner has been allowed. 4. The brief facts of the case projected before the learned Single Judge were that the writ petitioner, through his predecessor in title, owned a piece and parcel of land bearing Khasra No. 671/1 and 674, admeasuring 0.56 acres and 0.40 acres respectively, situated at Patwari Halka No. 23, Tifra, Vyapar Vihar, Bilaspur. The said lands were recorded in the name of the writ petitioner's father, who died on 02.02.2007. Subsequently, when the writ petitioner came to know about the ownership of the lands, he 3 enquired into the matter and discovered that the appellant was in possession of the said lands without any proper legal acquisition. As a result, the writ petitioner was deprived of his property. He had initially filed a detailed representation on 16.11.2015. In response, the appellant stated that the father of the writ petitioner, late Shyam Bhushan, had executed an agreement on 15.01.1988 in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 671/1 and that the acquisition was made on the basis of mutual consent. However, by letter dated 24.09.2019, the Corporation admitted that no agreement had been executed with respect to Khasra No. 674 admeasuring 0.56 acres. According to the writ petitioner, even if an agreement had been executed, it was only with respect to Khasra No. 671/1 for an area of 0.34 acres, but no consideration was ever paid. With respect to Khasra No. 674, no agreement had been executed at all. 5. Being aggrieved with the inaction on the part of the Corporation, the appellant/writ petitioner has filed a writ petition bearing Writ Petition (C) No.4770/2019 before the learned Single Judge, which was allowed vide order dated 22.06.2021 6. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 22.06.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petition, the instant appeal has been filed by the appellant/respondent No.2 in the writ petition. 7. Mr. Harsh Wardhan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant– Corporation respectfully submitted that the learned Single Bench 4 has committed grave error both on facts as well as in law while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent No.1. Therefore, the impugned order under appeal deserves to be set aside. It is submitted that the direction issued by the learned Single Bench regarding grant of compensation or alternatively grant of 30% of the municipal/Government land in lieu thereof is wholly contrary to the pleadings and records of the case as the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that, as per the respondent’s own admission and representation, he was entitled for only 20% of the land in lieu of compensation and not 30%. He further argued that respondent No.1’s father or any other similarly placed landowner was entitled only to 20% of land in alternate to monetary compensation. The agreement dated 15.01.1988 executed by the father of respondent No.1 clearly provided for allotment of only 20% of the land in lieu of compensation. The standard terms and conditions of the Corporation also contained a uniform stipulation for allotment of 20% of the land to all affected landowners, and no landowner could claim more than the agreed percentage. It is further contended that the writ petition itself was hopelessly barred by limitation. Respondent No.1’s father, since the year 1988, never pursued any remedy in law, nor did he raise any objection during his lifetime. The belated writ petition filed by his son in 2019, nearly three decades later, was clearly hit by delay and laches. Learned counsel also submitted that non- payment of compensation, if any, was attributable to genuine and 5 bona fide issues, which were never objected to by respondent No.1’s father. Thus, respondent No.1 cannot be allowed to reopen such settled issues after an inordinate lapse of time. Lastly, it is urged that the direction issued by the learned Single Bench for allotment of 30% of the land in lieu of compensation, apart from being against the record, would also open floodgates for fresh claims against the appellant–Corporation, which happens to be a public body. Such a direction is bound to cause serious prejudice to the Corporation and result in avoidable litigation. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be quashed ex debito justitiae. 8. Per contra, Mr. Siddhant Kumar Das, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has fairly submitted that the respondent No.1 is ready and willing to accept allotment of 20% of the land in lieu of compensation. It is submitted that such acceptance is in consonance with the agreement dated 15.01.1988 executed by the father of respondent No.1, as well as with the uniform policy of the Corporation which prescribes allotment of only 20% of the acquired land to affected landowners in substitution of monetary compensation. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as materials available on record. 10. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge while placing reliance upon the judgments rendered by the 6 Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of D.B. Basnett (dead), through legal representatives Vs. Collector, East District, Gangtok Sikkim, (2020) 4 SCC 572, Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. (2020) 2 SCC 569 and Delhi Airtech Services Private Limited and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 9 SCC 354, has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “8. Following the aforesaid principle the issue of delay and laches cannot be made a ground to dismiss the petition specially when the Corporation had admitted by it's letter 1st August, 2019 agreed to grant compensation. The Corporation too before this Court admitted the fact that without payment of compensation petitioner was deprived of his land. 9. The Supreme Court in case of Delhi Airtech Services Private Limited and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354 has held that the authorities are instrumentalities of the State and the officers are empowered to exercise the power on behalf of the State and such exercise of power attains greater significance when it arises from the statutory provisions. The level of expectation of timely and just performance of duty is higher, as compared to the cases where the power is executively exercised in discharge of its regular business. Therefore the administrative norms and principles of fair 7 performance are applicable to the like nature of cases with equal force, as they are to the government department. The well established precepts of public trust and public accountability are fully applicable to the functions which emerges from the public servants or even the persons holding public office. It further observed that the doctrine of full faith and credit applies to the acts done by the officers. There is a presumptive evidence of regularity in official acts, done or performed, and there should be faithful discharge of duties to elongate public purpose in accordance with the procedure prescribed. 10. Here in this case it would show that Municipal Corporation which is statutory body constituted under the Act while dispossessing father of the petitioner did not adhere to the prescribed statute and without payment of any compensation, the petitioner through his predecessor was dispossessed of his right to hold the property which is against the mandate of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 11. Under the circumstances, following the principles so laid down by the Supreme Court and the facts of this case, it is directed that the respondent/Municipal Corporation shall grant compensation to the petitioner in lieu of the land acquired as he has been deprived of the property without due course of law or in 8 alternate if there is municipal/government land available he may be allotted 30% municipal/government of total acquired area of 0.96 acres. 12. With such observation, the petition stands allowed to the above extent. ” 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that certain new facts have now come to light to the effect that respondent No.1 was not the owner of the property in question at the relevant point of time. However, on a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the appellant as to whether any such plea was specifically raised in the return filed in the writ petition, it has been fairly conceded that no such plea was taken therein. Moreover, even in the present writ appeal, the stand of the appellant-Corporation has only been that respondent No.1 was entitled to 20% of the land in lieu of compensation and not 30%, which is a distinct plea altogether. 12. At the outset, we may observe that the plea now sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that respondent No.1 was not the owner of the property in question at the relevant point of time, cannot be permitted to be entertained at this belated stage. It is an admitted position that no such ground was taken in the return filed before the learned Single Judge. 13. The law is well settled that a party cannot be allowed to raise a completely new plea for the first time in appeal, particularly when 9 such a plea involves questions of fact which were neither pleaded nor urged before writ Court. [See: Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44; State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht, (2007) 6 SCC 586]. Hence, the said contention stands rejected. 14. Turning to the merits of the matter, upon careful consideration of the rival submissions and the materials placed on record, we are of the considered view that the direction issued by the learned Single Judge, directing the appellant–Corporation to allot 30% of the acquired land to respondent No.1 in lieu of compensation, is unsustainable. The agreement dated 15.01.1988 executed by the father of respondent No.1, coupled with the uniform policy of the Corporation, clearly stipulates that the entitlement is restricted to 20% of the acquired land by way of substitution of monetary compensation. 15. We also take note of the fair concession made by respondent No.1 before this Court that he is agreeable to receive allotment of 20% of the land, and not 30%, in substitution of compensation. This concession not only brings the claim in conformity with the binding agreement and policy but also obviates the need for further adjudication on this limited aspect. 16. In light of the above, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is modified to the extent that the appellant– Corporation shall allot 20% of the acquired land to respondent No.1 in terms of the agreement dated 15.01.1988 and the uniform 10 policy of the Corporation. In case of any practical difficulty in making such allotment, the Corporation shall be at liberty to discharge its obligation by paying monetary compensation in accordance with law. 17. Having regard to the aforesaid modification and particularly in view of the fair stand taken by respondent No.1, we find no necessity to interfere with the matter any further. The writ appeal is, accordingly, disposed of with the above directions. There shall be no order as to costs. 18. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to notice the specific submission made on behalf of the appellant–Corporation that the present adjudication may not be treated as a precedent in other cases. It has been contended that if the direction in the present case is read as a binding principle, it may give rise to multiple claims in other matters which are not legally sustainable. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and particularly the concession made by respondent No.1 before this Court, we find merit in such a submission. 19. It is, therefore, clarified that the present adjudication has been rendered on the peculiar facts of this case, keeping in view the agreement dated 15.01.1988, the uniform policy of the Corporation, and the fair stand taken by respondent No.1. Accordingly, this judgment shall not be treated as laying down a general principle of law or as a binding precedent for other cases, 11 and shall remain confined to the present dispute inter se between the parties. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Judge Anu / Amardeep