State of Chhattisgarh v. Dinesh Kumar and others) by the Sessions Judge, Janjgir, Janjgir
Case Details
AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2025.09.27 16:54:51 +0530 1 2025:CGHC:49367-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR • Guruwari Bai, Wd/o Lt. Panch Ram Shrivas, aged about 46 years, ACQA No. 105 of 2011 R/o Village Rajapara, Champa, P.S. Champa, Distt.-Janjgir- Champa, C.G versus ...Appellant 1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Police Station Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh. 2. Dinesh Kumar, S/o Shir Janak Ram Shrivas, aged about 24 years, Resident of Bargawan, Police Station Akaltara, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh.
Legal Reasoning
3. Pardeshi Alias Karan, S/o Shri Ram Kumar Shrivas, aged about 19 years, R/o Nawapara, Police Station Akaltara, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. 4. Leelu Das Alias Milan, S/o Shri Bhau Das Manikpuri, aged about 21 years, Resident of Village Nawapara, Police Station Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa, C.G. 5. Raju Patel, S/o Shri Shiv Patel, aged about 21 years, R/o Village Arasmeta, Police Station Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Champa, C.G. 6. Mani Ram, S/o Shri Kunj Ram Sahu, aged about 26 years, Resident of Village Matiya, Police Station Bilaigarh, District Raipur, C.G. For Appellant ... Respondents Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate appeared as Amicus Curiae. For Respondent No.1 Mr. H.A.P.S. Bhatia, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent Nos. 3 & 5 None. 2 Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ. Judgment on Board (26.09.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. By this acquittal appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the “Cr.P.C.”), the appellant, who is the wife of the deceased, challenges the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 10.06.2011, passed in Sessions Trial No. 138/2010 (State of Chhattisgarh vs. Dinesh Kumar and others) by the Sessions Judge, Janjgir, Janjgir-Champa C.G., whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused persons of the charges under Sections 120-B, 364, 147, 302, 201 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) on the basis of benefit of doubt. However, this Court, vide order dated 27.08.2011, granted leave to appeal against respondent No. 3 – Pardeshi Alias Karan and respondent No. 5 – Raju Patel only. Accordingly, this appeal is prosecuted against respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 5 pursuant to such grant. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that in between 02.04.2010 and 03.04.2010, the accused persons, in furtherance of their common object, kidnapped the deceased-Panchram Shrivas (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’) and committed his murder by strangulation. In order to conceal the evidence, the accused persons threw the dead body of the deceased in the 3 forest and thereby committed the aforesaid offences. During the investigation, the dead body of the deceased was recovered vide Ex.P-16, pursuant to which, Merg intimation (Ex.P-1) was recorded. FIR (Exs.P-23 and P-24) was registered against the accused persons and the spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-18. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-3 and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by PW-4 Dr. K.K. Dahire, who proved the postmortem report Ex.P-17. According to the postmortem report, no opinion could be given due to the decomposed condition of the body. During the investigation, the accused persons were taken into custody vide Exs.P-34 to P-38 respectively. Memorandum statement of respondent No. 3-Pardeshi Alias Karan was recorded vide Ex.P-7, pursuant to which, a Nokia mobile phone, scissors, and comb were seized vide Ex.P-8. Similarly, the memorandum statement of respondent No. 5-Raju Patel was recorded vide Ex.P-5, consequent to which, HMT watch was seized vide Ex.P-6. 3. After due investigation, accused persons were charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the offence. 4 4. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 13 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 42 documents Exs.P-1 to P-42 as well as Article A-4(2), receipt of Nokia Set 1209 and Article A-4, receipt of watch. However, the accused persons, in support of their defence, have not examined any witness and not exhibited any document. 5. The trial court, after hearing the counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, acquitted the accused persons/respondents of the charges leveled against them by the impugned judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant-wife of the deceased has filed the instant appeal; however, this appeal has been admitted only against respondent No. 3- Pardeshi Alias Karan, and respondent No. 5- Raju Patel. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the respondent Nos. 3 & 5 as there is ample evidence available on record to connect them with the offences in question. He would further submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts. He would also submit that pursuant to the memorandum statements of respondent Nos. 3 and 5, a Nokia mobile phone and an HMT watch respectively, both allegedly belonging to the deceased, were seized, which is sufficient to sustain the conviction of respondent Nos. 3 and 5. Despite this, the learned trial Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons/respondent Nos.3 & 5 without properly 5 appreciating the evidence on record. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal is perverse and illegal, and is liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the State/respondent No.1 would support the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as the State and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. At the very outset, we would firstly consider the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, for which, it would be profitable to notice the relevant principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 1, whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 2025 INSC 114 6 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the 7 basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of 8 acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 10. Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffer from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 11. In the present case, the trial Court, while recording the finding of acquittal against respondent No. 3-Pardeshi Alias Karan, in paragraph 50, observed that although only a mobile phone was seized from his possession, but the seizure took place two months after the incident. Further, in paragraph 63, the trial Court noted that despite the seizure of the mobile phone, it was not established that the said mobile phone belonged to the deceased or that respondent No. 3 had used it for communication. Accordingly, the trial Court held that solely on the basis of the seizure of a mobile phone recovered two months after the incident and in the absence of any other evidence on record against respondent No. 3, he cannot be convicted for the aforesaid offences and as such, acquitted him of the charges levelled against him. The said finding of the learned trial Court acquitting respondent No. 3-Pardeshi Alias Karan of the charges levelled against him is just and proper and requires no interference by this Court. 9 12. Similarly, pursuant to the memorandum statement of respondent No. 5-Raju Patel, HMT watch was seized; however, it was not subjected to identification proceedings, and even the deceased’s son/PW-9-Raju Shrivas, did not identify the said HMT watch as belonging to the deceased. 13. The Supreme Court in the mater of Prakash vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2014) 12 SCC 133, held that mere investigation and alleged recovery of ornaments from the accused do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the seized ornaments belong to the deceased. 14. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Thammaraya and Anr. vs State of Karnataka reported in (2025) 3 SCC 590 has held in para 25 which reads as under:- “25. Furthermore, another very crucial missing link in the prosecution case that it failed to conduct the test identification parade (TI Parade) of the recovered articles, thereby bringing the identification of the material objects in Court for the first time, is under a cloud of doubt. It is a case of sheer negligence and dereliction of duty on the p art of the investigating agency and the Public Prosecutor for not conducting test identification parade (TI Parade). This Court shed light on the purpose of test identification parade (TI Parade) in Ramakishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay, (1954) 2 SCC 516, wherein it held as follows : (SCC p. 532, para 20) “20.... These parades are held by the police in the course of their investigation for the purpose of enabling witnesses to identify the properties which are the subject-matter of the offence or to identify the persons who are concerned in the Office.... the identifying witnesses are explained the purpose of holding these parades and are asked to identify the properties which are the subject-matter of the offence or the persons who are concerned in the offence.” (emphasis supplied) 10 15. When the present case is examined in light of the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court, it is evident that recovered articles must be subjected to test identification by the relatives of the deceased, which is absent in the present case. The HMT watch was not subjected to any identification proceedings, and the deceased’s son also did not identify the watch as belonging to the deceased. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the acquittal of respondent Nos. 3 and 5 by the trial Court is neither perverse nor contrary to the material on record. Therefore, we are unable to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and do not find any merit in the appeal.
Decision
16. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant against the acquittal of accused/respondent Nos. 3 and 5 is hereby dismissed. 17. Before we part, we place on record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate, who appeared as Amicus Curiae to assist this Court. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Akhilesh