Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2025.03.20 15:50:54 +0530 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 119 of 2018 Judgment Reserved on 07.03.2025 Judgment Delivered on 20.03.2025 • State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station Dongargarh District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. versus ...Appellant 1. Lilesh Kumar Dewangan, S/o Gadpat Dewangan, aged about 29 Years, 2. Durjanlal Dewangan, S/o Gadpat Dewangan, aged about 35 Years, 3. Okesh Kumar Dewangan, S/o Goverdhan Dewangan, aged about 39 Years, 4. Leelaram Dewangan, S/o Gadpat Dewangan, aged about 31 Years, Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 all are presently R/o Achankpur Bhatgaon, Police Station Lalbagh, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are Permanent R/o Village Sonsai Tola, Police Station Ambagarh Chowki, District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. For Appellant ... Respondents
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. R.S. Marhas, Additional Advocate General along with Ms. Smita Jha, Panel Lawyer. For Respondents : Mr. Deepak Diwakar, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Abhishek Sharma, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal & Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal C A V Judgment Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J. 2 1. This acquittal appeal preferred by the Appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 05.09.2017 passed by the Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.57/2016, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 4 herein of the charge under Section 304-B in alternative 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC'). 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 02.05.2016, PW-2 Tejram Dewangan, father of the deceased, lodged a written report (Ex.P-8) stating therein that marriage of her daughter-Soniya Bai (hereinafter called as 'deceased') was solemnized with respondent No.1 Lilesh Kumar Dewangan on 20.04.2014 according to Hindu Rites and Rituals. Soon after the marriage, deceased-Soniya Bai joined her matrimonial home and after some time of marriage, accused persons started torturing and harassing her mentally and physically for bringing insufficient dowry, assaulted her and thereafter committed her murder by setting her ablaze. On the basis of written report (Ex.P-8), FIR (Ex.P-9) has been registered against the accused persons for the offence under Section 304-B read with 34 of IPC. Merg intimation vide Ex.P-1 was recorded and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-15 and dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination where PW-14 Dr. Nitin Gupta conducted the postmortem examination and gave his report vide Ex.P-18. According to PW-14 Dr. Nitin Gupta, cause of death of deceased was shock due to burn. During investigation, vide Ex.P-16, spot map was prepared and vide Ex.P-21, burnt hair and other articles were seized. Accused persons were taken into custody vide 3 Exs.P-2 to P-5. After due investigation, police filed final report before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajnandgaon, C.G. for the offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC against the applicants. 3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and the learned trial Court framed charge against the accused persons/respondents for the offence under Sections 304-B in alternative 302/34 of IPC. The accused persons/respondents abjured their guilt and prayed for trial. 4. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 18 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 29 documents connecting the respondents No.1 to 4/accused persons to the crime in question. However, in their defence, respondents No.1 to 4/accused persons have examined none, but exhibited six documents i.e. Exs.D-1 to D-6. 5. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons/respondents No. 1 to 4 herein of said charges leveled against them. 6. Learned counsel for the Appellant/State would submit that the trial Court is unjustified in acquitting the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 4 herein of said charges by recording perverse findings. He would further submit that the evidence available on record clearly shows that deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of dowry by the respondents No.1 to 4 and despite that the learned trial Court has committed grave error in acquitting the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 4 without appreciating the evidence on record in its correct perspective. Thus, the impugned 4 judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 4 would support the impugned judgment and submit that it is not proved by the prosecution that any demand of dowry was ever made by the respondents No.1 to 4 and even soon before her death. Thus, impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is well merited and needs no interference by this Court. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- 25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 10. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression 5 "soon before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is present with the idea of proximity test. 11. As regards the principles concerning the above-referred provisions, this Court wishes to refer to the decisions reported in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao 1 & Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. 2 . 12. In K. Prema S. Rao (supra) it has been held as under:- “16. … To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that 'soon before her death' she was subjected to cruelty and harassment 'in connection with the demand for dowry'.” 13. In Kaliyaperumal (supra) relevant portion reads as under:- “5. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to the expression 'soon before' used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come 1(2003) 1 SCC 217 2(2004) 9 SCC 157 6 within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 14. Now, the question is whether one of the ingredients of the offence is established that soon before the death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by accused persons in connection with demand of dowry or not? 15. PW-2 Tejram Dewangan, father of the deceased, has stated that after marriage, her daughter/deceased remained happily in her matrimonial home for two months and after that, accused persons started torturing and harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry, used to harass her for food and committed marpeet with her and also used to taunt her by saying that she did not bring fridge and money from her parental home, however, the said the fact has not been mentioned in the written report (Ex.P-8) lodged by PW-2 Tejram Dewangan. In cross- examination, he (PW-2) admitted that before the incident, he did not lodge any report in any police station or community against the accused persons with regard to demand of dowry. He also admitted that respondent No.1 Lilesh Kumar Dewangan used to live at Achankpur, Bhatapara along with her daughter/deceased, whereas respondents No.2 Durjanlal and respondent No.4 Leelaram Dewangan used to live at Chandrapur. He also admitted that after 8 days of the incident, he lodged written report (Ex.P-8) against the accused persons. He also admitted that after taking advice from the Society 7 President, Village Sarpanch and other people, he lodged written report (Ex.P-8). This apart, PW-1 Dushyant Kumar Dewangan, brother of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 4 and nephew of respondent No.3, admitted in his cross-examination that at the time of incident, respondent No.1 Lilaram was not present in the village and had gone to another village to attend marriage. He also admitted that respondent No.2 Durjanlal and respondent No.4 Lilaram were living at Chandrapur along with their family. He has also stated that after getting information from his uncle over phone, he went to the house of respondent No.1 Lilesh where respondent Nos. 1 & 2 told him that deceased-Soniya set herself ablaze. Moreover, PW-3 Gwalin Bai, mother of the deceased, has stated that there used to be quarrel between the respondent No.1 Lilesh and deceased-Soniya with respect to preparation of food. She has further stated that respondent No.1 Lilesh used to taunt her daughter/deceased by saying that she does not know how to cook food. She has further stated that respondent No.1 Lilesh used to pressurize her daughter/deceased for not bringing gas and fridge, but this specific demand made by respondent No.1 Lilesh has also not been mentioned in the written report (Ex.P-8). This witness was subjected to cross-examination and in cross-examination, she admitted that prior to 7-8 months of incident, deceased- Soniya and respondent No.1 Lilesh were living at Achanakpur, Bhatapara. She further admitted that there used to be quarrel between deceased- Soniya and respondent No.1 Lilesh with respect to preparation of food and household matter. She also admitted that deceased- Soniya was 8 stubborn in nature and did not listen to anyone, therefore, respondent No.1 Lilesh used to tell her to make her understand. She also admitted that there are five members in her family and 10 members in her son- in-law's family and for avoiding the dispute, although deceased-Soniya and respondent No.1 Lilesh used to live in the same house, but used to have meals separately. Apart from this, she did not state anywhere about the demand of dowry made by the accused persons. 16. Thus, from perusal of above evidence, it is quite vivid that there are material inconsistencies in the statements of PW-2 Tejram Dewangan, father of the deceased and PW-3 Gwalin Bai, mother of the deceased, with respect to demand of dowry made by accused persons and their statements do not corroborate with each other and other prosecution witnesses and the contents of written report (Ex.P-8), rather it appears that the allegations leveled by them (PW-2 & PW-3) are bald and omnibus, therefore, credibility of their evidence is doubtful. Apart from this, PW-2 Tejram Dewangan also admitted in his cross-examination that before the incident, he did not lodge any report against the accused persons with regard to demand of dowry in any police station or community. Moreover, contents of written report (Ex.P-8) would show that the incident occurred on 23.04.2016, but PW-2 Tejram Dewangan, father of the deceased, lodged written report on 02.05.2016, for which, no explanation has been offered by him for delay in lodging the written report (Ex.P-8). Furthermore, no dying declaration of the deceased was brought on record by the prosecution so that the real factum of incident could emerge. The learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence led by the prosecution 9 and after analyzing the entire evidence come to the conclusion that there is no cogent and clinching evidence on record to show that soon before the death, accused persons subjected the deceased to harassment for demand of dowry and as such, acquitted them of the said charge as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 17. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the trial Court, we are of considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 4 herein of the said charge is just and proper and does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this appeal by the appellant/State against the acquittal of the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 4 herein is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh