Afr High Court
Case Details
YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2025.09.25 13:55:10 +0530 1 2025:CGHC:48917-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 555 of 2019 Judgment Reserved on : 12.09.2025 Judgment Delivered on : 24.09.2025 1 - Sarita Bai Anant W/o Fotolal Anant Aged About 28 Years R/o Bhilai Bazar, Outpost- Hardibazar, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Smt. Resham Bai Kurre W/o Ram Nihora Kurre Aged About 40 Years R/o Chorhadevri, Police Station- Kota, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Dhirendra Kumar Baghel S/o Rajkumar Aged About 27 Years R/o Village- Budgahan, Pantorapara, Police Station- Baloda, District- Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellants Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station- Kusmunda, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent CRA No. 576 of 2019 Raju Das Mahant S/o Manghan Das Mahant Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Devgaon, Police Station- Deepka, District Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Kusmunda, District Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent 2 CRA No. 848 of 2019 Raja @ Ramashankar Patel S/o Jagatram Aged About 20 Years R/o Reki Salihapara, Chowki- Hardibazar, District Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer Police Station- Kusmunda, District Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent CRA No. 1855 of 2019 Dinesh Kumar Chouhan S/o Mohan Singh Chouhan Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Reki, Lalmatiyapara, Chowki, Hardibazar, District Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Kusmunda, District Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Advocate (in CRA No.555/2019) For Appellant : Mr. Aditya Khare, Advocate (in CRA No.576/2019) For Appellant : Mr. Atul Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate (in CRA No.848/2019) For Appellant : Mr. Aditya Khare, Advocate on behalf of Mr. (in CRA No.1855/2019) Basant Kaiwartya, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Devesh G. Kela, Panel Lawyer 3 Hon'ble Smt. Rajani Dubey, Judge Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge C A V Judgment Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. Regard being had to the similarity of the questions of fact and law involved, and since all these appeals arise out of a common crime and challenge the impugned judgment dated 13.03.2019 passed by the learned Additional Judge to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.15/2018, they have been clubbed, heard analogously, and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. It is an admitted position that accused Mahetrin Bai (A-3) expired during the pendency of the Sessions Trial before the learned Trial Court. So far as accused Sonu Das Mahant (A-9) is concerned, he has been acquitted by the Trial Court on the finding that no charge stood proved against him. 3. It is further an admitted fact that accused Photo Lal Anant (A-1) expired during the pendency of the criminal appeal pending before this Court. In consequence thereof, the appeal preferred on his behalf, being CRA No.778/2019, stood abated by order dated 12.09.2025 passed by this Court. 4. In the aforesaid background, it is clear that out of the total nine accused persons who were arraigned before the learned Trial 4 Court, two have expired and one has been acquitted. Thus, at present, only six accused persons remain before this Court for consideration of the present appeal. 5. Appellants - Sarita Bai Anant (A-2), Smt. Resham Bai Kurre (A-4) and Dhirendra Kumar Baghel (A-5) have preferred CRA No.555/2019, appellant - Raju Das Mahant (A-8) has preferred CRA No.576/2019, appellant - Raja @ Ramashankar Patel (A-7) has preferred CRA No.848/2019 and appellant - Dinesh Kumar Chouhan (A-6) has preferred CRA No.1855/2019 under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) questioning the impugned judgment dated 13.03.2019 passed by the learned Additional Judge to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.15/2018, by which appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under :- Photo Lal Anant (A-1), Sarita Bai Anant (A-2), Smt. Resham Bai Kurre (A-4) and Dhirendra Kumar Baghel (A-5) Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 read : Life imprisonment and fine of with Section 120B of the Rs.500/-, in default of payment of Indian Penal Code, 1860 fine, additional imprisonment for one month to each of the appellants. 5 Raju Das Mahant (A-8) Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 read : Life imprisonment and fine of with Section 120B of the Rs.500/-, in default of payment of Indian Penal Code, 1860 fine, additional imprisonment for one month to each of the appellants. Under Section 201 of the : Rigorous imprisonment for three Indian Penal Code, 1860 years and fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine, additional imprisonment for one month. It was directed that both the sentences were run concurrently. Dinesh Kumar Chouhan (A-6) and Raja @ Ramashankar Patel (A-7) Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of the : Life imprisonment and fine of Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional imprisonment for one month to each of the appellants. Under Section 302 read : Life imprisonment and fine of with Section 120B of the Rs.500/-, in default of payment of Indian Penal Code, 1860 fine, additional imprisonment for one month to each of the appellants. Under Section 201 of the : Rigorous imprisonment for three Indian Penal Code, 1860 years and fine of Rs.100/-, in 6 default of payment of fine, additional imprisonment for one month to each of the appellants. It was directed that all the sentences were run concurrently. 6. The case of the prosecution, in brief, was that on 10.07.2017 at about 11:30 a.m., in village Bhilai Bazaar, the accused persons, in furtherance of their common intention and pursuant to a criminal conspiracy, intentionally caused the death of Vinod Kumar Anant by assaulting him with a rod and a stick. Thereafter, in order to screen themselves from legal punishment, they concealed the dead body of the deceased, as also the rod, stick, and motorcycle used in the incident, and further attempted to destroy the evidence by covering the bloodstains at the place of occurrence with cow dung. 7. It was alleged that on the said date, the deceased had gone to collect compensation amount of ₹2,00,000/- from his father, accused Photo Lal Anant (since deceased), but he did not return. Consequently, on 11.07.2017, Smt. Santara Bai (PW-2), mother of the deceased lodged a missing person report at Hardi Bazaar Outpost, Police Station Kusmunda. During the course of investigation, on 24.09.2017, the memorandum statement of accused Photo Lal was recorded, wherein he confessed to having committed the murder of the deceased along with the other co-accused. On the basis of the said disclosure, Crime 7 No.189/2017 was registered, and further investigation was undertaken. 8. Pursuant thereto, the skeleton of the deceased was recovered from the place pointed out by the accused, and a panchnama was prepared. The skeleton were subjected to postmortem examination, and the bones were seized and forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, for DNA analysis. From the spot, other incriminating articles, including the rod, stick, and motorcycle, were seized. The site map was prepared, and statements of material witnesses were recorded. The DNA report
Facts
received from the FSL confirmed the identity of the deceased, and on completion of the investigation, the police found sufficient material to establish the commission of offences under Sections 302, 201, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). Accordingly, a charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, on 04.12.2017. 9. Since the offence was triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the learned Judicial Magistrate, by order dated 05.02.2018, committed the case to the Court of Session, Korba, where it was registered as Sessions Trial No.553/2017. The case was thereafter transferred to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Korba, on 06.03.2018. 8 10. On consideration of the charge-sheet and accompanying documents, charges under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 and Section 120B of the IPC were framed against the accused. The charges were read over and explained to the accused, who abjured guilt and claimed to be tried. 11. During trial, the accused were examined under Section 313 of the CrPC, wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances put to them, asserted their innocence, and alleged false implication, while also declining to adduce any defence evidence. 12. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses; such as PW-1 to PW-16 and exhibited 86 documents i.e. Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/86 as well as 48 articles being Article A/1 to Article A/48. In defence, the accused persons/appellants have not examined any witness, but exhibited two documents i.e. Ex.D/1 and Ex.D/2 13. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 13.03.2019, proceeded to convict the aforesaid accused persons for the aforesaid offences and sentenced them as aforementioned, against which, these criminal appeals have been preferred.
Legal Reasoning
this Court in Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156, had cautioned against: “45. The principle for basing a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidences 19 has been indicated in a number of decisions of this Court and the law is well settled that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. This Court has clearly sounded a note of caution that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot, in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has been held that the Court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof for sometimes, unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainty and legal proof. It has been indicated by this Court that there is a long mental 20 distance between “may be true” and “must be true” and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions. (Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa (1991) 3 SCC 27)” (emphasis supplied) 31. It is not necessary that there must be a clear, categorical and express agreement between the accused. However, an implied agreement must manifest upon relying on principles established in the cases of circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, in the majority opinion of Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641, this Court had held: “354. ... For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient...” 32. In view of the clear enunciation of law on the criminal conspiracy by this Court, we find that the prosecution has failed to produce any evidence whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior meeting of minds between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. There is no physical manifestation of such a concurrence extractable from surrounding circumstances, declarations, or the conduct of the Appellant. The evidence is shorn of even a passive acknowledgment of conspiracy of the 21 Appellant with the accused, let alone heralding a clear and conscientious participation of the Appellant in the conspiracy. As noted above, this Court has cautioned against replacing mere suspicion with the legal requirement of proof of agreement.” 31. In Raja Khan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “25. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the entire case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence, as there is neither any eye-witness nor any judicially admissible confession. It is well settled law that where the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must be so far complete, such that every hypothesis is excluded but the one proposed to be proved and such circumstances must show that the act has been done by the Appellant-accused within all human probability (See Hanumant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 2 SCC 71). 26. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, this Court outlined five essential principles, often referred to as five golden principles, which must be satisfied for circumstantial evidence to conclusively establish the guilt of the Appellant- accused: (SCC p. 185, para 153) 22 “153. …. (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established… * * * (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 32. In Abdul Nassar (supra,) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows :- “30. We deem it essential to enunciate the principles that courts must adhere to while appreciating and evaluating evidence in cases based on circumstantial evidence, as follows: 23 (i). The testimony of each prosecution and defence witness must be meticulously discussed and analysed. Each witness's evidence should be assessed in its entirety to ensure no material aspect is overlooked. (ii). Circumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact. Thus, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the testimony of each witness must be explicitly delineated. (iii). Each of the links of incriminating circumstantial evidence should be meticulously examined so as to find out if each one of the circumstances is proved individually and whether collectively taken, they forge an unbroken chain consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. (iv). The judgment must comprehensively elucidate the rationale for accepting or rejecting specific pieces of evidence, demonstrating how the conclusion was logically derived from the evidence. It should explicitly articulate how each piece of evidence contributes to the overall narrative of guilt. (v). The judgment must reflect that the finding of guilt, if any, has been reached 24 after a proper and careful evaluation of circumstances in order to determine whether they are compatible with any other reasonable hypothesis.” 33. Having dealt with the issue pertaining to criminal conspiracy, it would now be appropriate to reproduce Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which reads as under :- “[120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.--(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, 2[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.]” 34. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it becomes apparent that the offence of criminal conspiracy is made punishable in two distinct categories, namely: firstly, where the conspiracy is to commit a grave offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or more, and 25 secondly, where the conspiracy is to commit any other offence, in which case the punishment is comparatively lesser. 35. While dealing with the issue of criminal conspiracy, in Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “25. Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of the criminal conspiracy but it may not be possible to prove the agreement between them by direct proof. Nevertheless, existence of the conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. But the incriminating circumstances must form a chain of events from which a conclusion about the guilt of the accused could be drawn. It is well settled that an offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence and renders the mere agreement to commit an offence punishable even if an offence does not take place pursuant to the illegal agreement.” 36. In S. Arul Raja (supra), while dealing with the case of Nalini (supra), has held as follows :- “27. In State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini & Others, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253, it was held that: - 26 "583. .......... (1).............Offence of criminal conspiracy is an exception to the general law where intent alone does not constitute crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not only the intention but there has to be agreement to carry out the object of the intention, which is an offence. The question for consideration in a case is did all the accused have the intention and did they agree that the crime be committed. It would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely entertained a wish, howsoever horrendous it may be, that offence be committed................." 28. In this instance, mere circumstantial evidence to prove the involvement of the appellant is not sufficient to meet the requirements of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A of the IPC. A meeting of minds to form a criminal conspiracy has to be proved by placing substantive evidence and the Respondent has not adduced any evidence which underlines the same. The issue of whether A1's statement, recorded after his arrest, may be used to implicate the appellant in the said conspiracy shall be dealt with subsequently.” 37. Further in R. Shaji (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the similar issue, has held as follows :- 27 “54. A criminal conspiracy is generally hatched in secrecy, owing to which, direct evidence is difficult to obtain. The offence can therefore be proved, either by adducing circumstantial evidence, or by way of necessary implication. However, in the event that the circumstantial evidence is incomplete or vague, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to provide adequate proof regarding the meeting of minds, which is essential in order to hatch a criminal conspiracy, by adducing substantive evidence in court. Furthermore, in order to constitute the offence of conspiracy, it is not necessary that the person involved has knowledge of all the stages of action. In fact, mere knowledge of the main object/purpose of conspiracy, would warrant the attraction of relevant penal provisions. Thus, an agreement between two persons to do, or to cause an illegal act, is the basic requirement of the offence of conspiracy under the penal statute. (Vide: Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, AIR 2010 SC 528; Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC Supp. 1629; State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai, AIR 2009 SC Supp. 1744; R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, AIR 2010 SC 1812; S. Arul Raja v. State of T.N., (2010) 8 SCC 233; Monica Bedi v. State of A.P., (2011) 1 SCC 284; and Sushil Suri v. CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1713).” 28 38. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the similar issue in Somasundaram alias Sonu (supra) has held as follows :- “146. Now I take up effect of acquittal of appellants under section 120B IPC. The accused appellants have been convicted for commission of offence under section 365 read with section 109 IPC, under sections 387, 302 read with section 109, under section 347 read with section 109; under section 364 read with section 109 and section 201 IPC. In the facts and circumstances of the case when charge under section 109 has been found established, mere their acquittal under section 120B is of no avail to them. Charges which were framed were specific ingredients of section 109 have been rightly found to proceed by both the courts below. Their acquittal under section 120B of IPC cannot help them as offences of both sections are separate. Section 120B found established against A-1 and A-2 and other charges against accused/appellants. 147. This Court has considered the abduction under section 109 and the conspiracy and the explanation thereof and compared with the same under section 120B. This Court held that under section 109 the abettor is liable to the same punishment which may be inflicted on the principal 29 offender if the act of the latter is committed in consequence of the abetment. The offence of conspiracy under section 120B is different. Section 120A is bare agreement to commit an offence which has been made punishable under section 120B. The punishment for these two categories of crimes is also quite different. Section 109 IPC is concerned only with punishment of abetment for which no express provision has been made in the IPC. An offence of criminal conspiracy on the other hand is an independent offence which is made punishable under section 120B IPC for which a charge under section 109 is unnecessary and inappropriate. In Ranganayaki v. State by Inspector of Police (2004) 12 SCC 521, this Court has held thus : “10. Motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for prosecution. One cannot normally see into the mind of another. Motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act. Such impelling cause need not necessarily be proportionally grave to do grave crimes. Many a murder has been committed without any known or prominent motive. It is quite possible that the aforesaid impelling factor would remain undiscoverable. Lord Chief Justice Campbell struck a note of caution in Red v. 30 Palmer [Shorthand Report at p. 308, May 1856] thus: “But if there be any motive which can be assigned, I am bound to tell you that the adequacy of that motive is of little importance. We know, from experience of criminal courts that atrocious crimes of this sort have been committed from very slight motives; not merely from malice and revenge, but to gain a small pecuniary advantage, and to drive off for a time pressing difficulties.” Though, it is a sound presumption that every criminal act is done with a motive, it is unsound to suggest that no such criminal act can be presumed unless motive is proved. After all, motive is a psychological phenomenon. Mere fact that prosecution failed to translate that mental disposition of the accused into evidence does not mean that no such mental condition existed in the mind of the assailants. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 it was held: (AIR p. 810, para 6) “6. ….. That is true, and where there is clear proof of motive for the crime, that lends additional support to the finding of the court that the accused was guilty, but absence of clear proof of motive does not 31 necessarily lead to the contrary conclusion.” In some cases it may be difficult to establish motive through direct evidence, while in some other cases inferences from circumstances may help in discerning the mental propensity of the person concerned. There may also be cases in which it is not possible to disinter the mental transaction of the accused which would have impelled him to act. No proof can be expected in all cases as to how the mind of the accused worked in a particular situation. Sometimes it may appear that the motive established is a weak one. That by itself is insufficient to lead to an inference adverse to the prosecution. Absence of motive, even if it is accepted, does not come to the aid of the accused. These principles have to be tested on the background of factual scenario.” 39. While dealing with the issue with regard to recovery from an open place as also the memorandum of the accused, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaikam Khan (supra), has held as follows :- “75. Though there are serious infirmities on various counts in the judgment of the trial court, we refer to only one paragraph of the said judgment: 32 “The above mentioned recovery of blood- stained clothes of the accused Momin, Jaikam, Sajid and Nazra also proves the involvement of them in the crime. The above recovery also indicates to this fact that the entire episode of the murders was a pre-planned one and that a comprehensive strategy was chalked out for it. All the accused gathered at the house of the accused Momin prior to committing the murders. They already knew that on committing murders by sharp weapons, the splashes of blood would hurl at their clothes because of which, if they don’t change their clothes, they would be not be able to hide their crime during being absconded. That is why, they had already managed additional clothes for them in the house of the accused Momin. After committing the crime, they as per the planning, went to Momin’s house, changed their clothes and ran away. Opening the lock of their home by sons and daughters of Momin on the third day of the occurrence also indicates that either Momin’s all sons and daughters were at home at the time of the occurrence and they left from the house with the accused after the occurrence or Momin’s and Nazra’s kids were not at all present there in the house at the time of occurrence and that all the kids were sent to their grand parent’s house prior to the occurrence. Since the crime was 33 committed in a well and pre – planned way, it seems more probable that the kids were sent to their grandparent’s home prior to the occurrence. If this probability is accepted, the arrest of the accused Nazra after the occurrence, and the arrest of the remaining three accused viz Momin, Sajid and Jaikam at the Rajghat Chauraha at 2.00 ‘O’ clock at night not taking place but in the morning at 6.30 ‘O’ clock becomes important. It indicates that Nazra, after the occurrence, was gone to her kids for meeting them and delivering them the keys of home. Thereafter, as per the preplanned program, she had to reach the same Rajghat Chauraha, where the remaining three accused had already been arrested at night. All the accused may have planned to gather at the same Chauraha and run away together from here and that is why, they kept on waiting for Nazra at the same place till 2.00 o’ Clock at night. It is impossible because of this reason also that if the occurrence took place around 8.30 pm, the three accused Momin, Zaikam and Sajid had sufficient time after perpetrating this crime, to run away very far. However, standing at Rajghat Chauraha till 2.00 am, indicates that they were waiting there for Nazra to come.” 76. To say the least, we are shocked at the aforesaid finding. The narration makes for an 34 interesting reading as a story. However, all the observations are nothing but conjectures and surmises, without there being any evidentiary support to them. It is really surprising, as to how the Additional Sessions Judge could have dealt with the present case in such a casual manner when he was considering the question of life and death of four accused. 77. At this stage, we would like to remind ourselves as well as all the Courts in the country the golden principle to be followed in criminal jurisprudence. This Court, speaking through legendry H.R. Khanna, J., in the case of The State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, Baljit Singh and Karam Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 277 observed thus: “23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. 35 Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the ac cused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 78. We are amazed by the manner in which the High court has dealt with the present matter. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of the High Court with regard to the recovery of clothes. “63. It has been urged that in order to prove the recovery of the clothes, no independent witness was produced. It is correct that the prosecution only produced the formal witness to prove the recovery, but on the other hand the disclosure of this fact about the room having been opened by the keys provided by Hina, the daughter of accused Momin was not rebutted by the defence which could have been done by producing Hina in order to deny any such recovery.” 79. The finding is not only contrary to the well settled law interpreting Section 27 of the Evidence Act but also attempts to put a burden on the accused, which does not shift unless prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 36 80. The following observations of the High Court would also fall in the ambit of conjectures and surmises: “65. There is yet another dimension which deserves mention namely, with the multiple nature of injuries and six persons being slaughtered simultaneously, the same cannot be an act of a single assailant. The presence, therefore, of the three assailants Momin, Jaikam and Sajid cannot be ruled out as there is no doubt that such nature of assault in the natural course of things would be carried out by more than one person.” 40. In Desh Deepak Kumar Vihangam Alias Deepak Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2022) 7 SCC 721, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- 19. At this stage it is imperative to discuss the settled position of law with regard to the ingredients and the standard of proof to be achieved by the prosecution for conviction under Section 120-B IPC. In Mond. Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7SCC 334, this Court had elucidated the elements of criminal conspiracy which are reproduced as under: (SCC p. 351, para 17) 37 "17.... The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed." 20. Elaborating upon the standard of proof the prosecution has to meet in establishing criminal conspiracy, this Court in State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan, (2000) 8 SCC 203, held as under: (SCC p. 211. para 12) "12. We are aware of the fact that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy is generally not available and its existence is a matter of inference. The inferences are normally deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in common between the conspirators. This Court in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1980) 2 SCC 665, held that to prove criminal conspiracy there must be evidence 38 direct or circumstantial to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. There must be a meeting of minds resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred from circumstances, the prosecution has to show that the circumstances give rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an a offence. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should indicate the meeting of the minds between the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied on for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in time than the actual 39 commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy." 21. This Court in CBI v. K. Narayana Rao (2012) 9 SCC 512, held: (SCC p. 530, para 24) "24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly. the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy, Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an 40 offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.” 41. In Mohd. Naushad v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2024) 12 SCC 494, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- 89. Conspiracy being a major charge, we take note of the legal position on the point of conspiracy between accused persons, we place reliance on the judgment of this Court in Kehar Singh v. State (UT of Delhi), (1988) 3 SCC 609 (three- Judge Bench), wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 731- 35, paras 271-77 & 280) “271. Before considering the other matters against Balbir Singh, it will be useful to consider the concept of criminal conspiracy under Sections 120-A and 120-B of IPC. These provisions have brought the Law of Conspiracy in India in line with the English law by making the overt act unessential when the conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. The English law on this matter is well settled. The following passage from Russell on Crime (12th Edn., Vol. I, p. 202) may be usefully noted: 41 “The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough.” 272. Glanville Williams in the Criminal Law (2nd Edn., p. 382) explains the proposition with an illustration: “The question arose in an Iowa case, but it was discussed in terms of conspiracy rather than of accessoryship. D, who had a grievance against P, told E that if he would whip P someone would pay his fine. E replied that he did not want anyone to pay his fine, that he had a grievance of his own against P and that he would whip him at the first opportunity. E whipped P. D was acquitted of conspiracy because there was no agreement for ‘concert of action’, no agreement to ‘co-operate’.” 273. Coleridge, J., while summing up the case to jury in R.v. Murphy (1837) 8 Car & P 297, pertinently states: (ER p. 508) “…….I am bound to tell you, that although the common design is the root of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that 42 these two parties came together and actually agreed in terms to have this common design and to pursue it by common means, and so to carry it into execution. This is not necessary, because in many cases of the most clearly established conspiracies there are no means of proving any such thing, and neither law nor common sense requires that it should be proved. If you find that these two persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part of an act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object which they were pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. The question you have to ask yourselves is, ‘Had they this common design, and did they pursue it by these common means — the design being unlawful?’ ” 274. It will be thus seen that the most important ingredient of the offence of conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. The illegal act may or may not be done in pursuance of agreement, but the very agreement is an offence and is punishable. Reference to Sections 120-A and 120-B IPC would make these aspects clear beyond doubt. Entering into an agreement 43 by two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal means is the very quintessence of the offence of conspiracy. 275. Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial. But the court must enquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together in the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter does. It is, however, essential that the offence of conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. Gerald Orchard of University of Canterbury, New Zealand explains the limited nature of this proposition: [1974 Criminal Law Review 297, at p.299] 44 “Although it is not in doubt that the offence requires some physical manifestation of agreement, it is important to note the limited nature of this proposition. The law does not require that the act of agreement take any particular form and the fact of agreement may be communicated by words or conduct. Thus, it has been said that it is unnecessary to prove that the parties ‘actually came together and agreed in terms’ to pursue the unlawful object; there need never have been an express verbal agreement, it being sufficient that there was ‘a tacit understanding between conspirators as to what should be done’.” 276. I share this opinion, but hasten to add that the relative acts or conduct of the parties must be conscientious and clear to mark their concurrence as to what should be done. The concurrence cannot be inferred by a group of irrelevant facts artfully arranged so as to give an appearance of coherence. The innocuous, innocent or inadvertent events and incidents should not enter the judicial verdict. We must thus be strictly on our guard. 277. It is suggested that in view of Section 10 of the Evidence Act, the relevancy of evidence in proof of conspiracy in India is wider in scope than that in English law. Section 10 of the Evidence Act introduced 45 the doctrine of agency and if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied, the acts done by one are admissible against the co- conspirators. Section 10 reads: “10. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.-Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.” * * * 280. The decision of the Privy Council in Mirza Akbar case [1940 SCC Online PC 27,] AIR at p. 180, has been referred to with approval in Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Bombay [(1957 SCC Online SC 15) SCR at p. 193 where Jagannadhadas, J., said: (SCC OnLine SC Para 29) 29. “The limits of the admissibility of evidence in conspiracy cases under Section 10 of the Evidence Act have been 46 authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in Mirza Akbar v. King Emperor [AIR 1940 PC 176, 180] . In that case, Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that Section 10 of the Evidence Act must be construed in accordance with the principle that the thing done, written or spoken, was something done in carrying out the conspiracy and was receivable as a step in the proof of the conspiracy. They notice that evidence receivable under Section 10 of the Evidence Act of ‘anything said, done, or written, by any one of such persons’ (i.e., conspirators) must be ‘in reference to their common intention’. But Their Lordships held that in the context (notwithstanding the amplitude of the above phrase) the words therein are not capable of being widely construed having regard to the well known principle above enunciated.” (emphasis supplied) 90. Furthermore, in State v. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC 253 (three-Judge bench), this Court culled out principles governing the law of conspiracy, though exhaustive in nature, and held: (SCC pp. 515-18 paras 581-83) “581. It is true that provision as contained in Section 10 is a departure from the rule of hearsay evidence. There can be two objections to the admissibility of evidence under Section 10 and they are (1) the 47 conspirator whose evidence is sought to be admitted against the co-conspirator is not confronted or cross- examined in court by the co-conspirator and (2) prosecution merely proves the existence of reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence and that brings into operation the existence of agency relationship to implicate co- conspirator. But then precisely under Section 10 of the Evidence Act, statement of a conspirator is admissible against a co- conspirator on the premise that this relationship exists. Prosecution, no doubt, has to produce independent evidence as to the existence of the conspiracy for Section 10 to operate but it need not prove the same beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal conspiracy is a partnership in agreement and there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency for the execution of a common object which is an offence or an actionable wrong. When two or more persons enter into a conspiracy any act done by any one of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution of or in reference to their common intention is deemed to have been said, done or written by each of them. A conspirator is not, 48 however, responsible for acts done by a conspirator after the termination of the conspiracy as aforesaid. The court is, however, to guard itself against readily accepting the statement of a conspirator against a co-conspirator. Section 10 is a special provision in order to deal with dangerous criminal combinations. Normal rule of evidence that prevents the statement of one co-accused being used against another under Section 30 of the Evidence Act does not apply in the trial of conspiracy in view of Section 10 of that Act. When we say that court has to guard itself against readily accepting the statement of a conspirator against a co-conspirator what we mean is that court looks for some corroboration to be on the safe side. It is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence bordering on law. All said and done, ultimately it is the appreciation of evidence on which the court has to embark. 582. In Bhagwandas Keshwani v. State of Rajasthan [(1974) 4 SCC 611, SCC at p. 613, this Court said that in cases of conspiracy better evidence than acts and statements of co-conspirators in pursuance of the conspiracy is hardly ever available. 583. Some of the broad principles governing the law of conspiracy may be summarized though, as the name implies, a 49 summary cannot be exhaustive of the principles. (1). Under Section 120-A IPC offence of criminal conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal means. When it is a legal act by illegal means overt act is necessary. Offence of criminal conspiracy is an exception to the general law where intent alone does not constitute crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not only the intention but there has to be agreement to carry out the object of the intention, which is an offence. The question for consideration in a case is did all the accused have the intention and did they agree that the crime be committed. It would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely entertained a wish, howsoever horrendous it may be, that offence be committed. (2.). Acts subsequent to the achieving of the object of conspiracy may tend to prove that a particular accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy has been achieved, any subsequent act, which may be unlawful, would not make the accused a part of the conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder. 50 (3). Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused. (4). Conspirators may for example, be enrolled in a chain – A enrolling B, B enrolling C, and so on; and all will be members of a single conspiracy if they so intend and agree, even though each member knows only the person who enrolled him and the person whom he enrols. There may be a kind of umbrella- spoke enrolment, where a single person at the centre does the enrolling and all the other members are unknown to each other, though they know that there are to be other members. These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell which conspiracy in a particular case falls into which category. It may however, even overlap. But then there has to be present mutual interest. Persons may be members of single conspiracy even though each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse roles to play. It is not a part of the crime of conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the same or an active role. 51 (5). When two or more persons agree to commit a crime of conspiracy, then regardless of making or considering any plans for its commission, and despite the fact that no step is taken by any such person to carry out their common purpose, a crime is committed by each and every one who joins in the agreement. There has thus to be two conspirators and there may be more than that. To prove the charge of conspiracy it is not necessary that intended crime was committed or not. If committed it may further help prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy. (6.). It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to when a conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left. (7). A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it forces them into a joint trial and the court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every accused. Prosecution has to produce evidence not only to show that each of the accused has knowledge of the object of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the 52 charge of conspiracy the court has to guard itself against the danger of unfairness to the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the conviction of all, which is to be avoided. By means of evidence in conspiracy, which is otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any other substantive offence prosecution tries to implicate the accused not only in the conspiracy itself but also in the substantive crime of the alleged conspirators. There is always difficulty in tracing the precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then there has to be cogent and convincing evidence against each one of the accused charged with the offence of conspiracy. As observed by Judge Learned Hand “this distinction is important today when many prosecutors seek to sweep within the dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main offenders”. (8.) As stated above it is the unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy. Offence of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement which is the gravamen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to a conspiracy 53 need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in and inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the conspirators. The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the same time, but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy. (9.) It has been said that a criminal conspiracy is a partnership in crime, and that there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency for the prosecution of a common plan. Thus, if two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done or written by each of them. And this joint responsibility extends not only to what is done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to collateral acts incidental to and growing out of the original purpose. A conspirator is not responsible, however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after termination of the conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy by a new member does not create a new conspiracy nor does it change the status of 54 the other conspirators, and the mere fact that conspirators individually or in groups perform different tasks to a common end does not split up a conspiracy into several different conspiracies. (10). A man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However, criminal responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive attitude towards an existing conspiracy. One who commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while the others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no active part in the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 91. Lastly, In Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585, (two-Judge Bench), this Court observed: (SCC p. 607, paras 38-39) “38……...The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should indicate the meeting of minds between the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be 55 adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied on for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point of time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. 39. Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is seldom available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about the object, which the objectors set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of inference.” (emphasis supplied) 42. Further in Madhav (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- 56 “29. Apart from the fact that the witnesses in whose presence the seizure of the weapons was allegedly effected, had turned hostile, there was also one more thing. There is nothing on record to show that the blood stains said to have been present in those weapons, matched with the blood of the deceased. Unfortunately, the High Court proceeded on a wrong premise that there was scientific evidence to point to the guilt of the accused, merely because as per Exhibit P-25 (FSL Report), the knife and lathis said to have been seized by the police, contained stains of human blood. The prosecution has not established either through the report of FSL or otherwise, that the blood stains contained in the knife and lathis were that of the deceased. 30. We are conscious of the fact that there is a divergence of views on this aspect. In Raghav Prapanna Tripathi vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1963 SC 74, a Constitution Bench of this Court by a majority held that, “…that it would be far-fetched to conclude from the mere presence of blood- stained earth that that earth was stained with human blood and that the human blood was that of the victims…”. In Kansa Behera vs. State of Orissa (1987) 3 SCC 480, this Court acquitted the appellant on the ground that though the Serologist report found the shirt and dhoti recovered from the possession of 57 the appellant to be stained with human blood, there is no evidence to connect the same with the blood of the deceased. In Surinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1989) Supp.(2) SCC 21, the blood stains found on the knife allegedly used for the commission of the offence, were established to be human blood. But this Court rejected the prosecution theory, on the ground that those blood stains on the knife were not shown to be of the same group as the blood of the deceased. In Raghunath, Ramkishan & Ors. vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 this Court held that the blood stain, though of a human blood, is not conclusive evidence to show that it belongs to the blood group of the deceased. In Sattatiya vs. State of Maharashtra (2008) 3 SCC 210, this Court found the credibility of the evidence relating to the recovery of the object used for the commission of the crime, substantially dented, on account of the fact that the blood stains, though found to be of human source, could not be linked with the blood of the deceased. 31. In contrast, this Court held in State of Rajasthan vs. Teja Ram and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 507, that at times the Serologist may fail to deduct the origin of the blood, either because the stain is too insufficient or because of hematological changes and plasmatic coagulation. After referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Raghav 58 Prapanna Tripathi (supra), this Court held in Teja Ram (supra) that it is not as though the circumstances arising from the recovery of the weapon would stand relegated to disutility, in all cases where there was failure of detecting the origin of the blood. This Court indicated in Teja Ram (supra) that, “…the effort of the Criminal Court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts…” and that the doubts should be of reasonable dimension, which a judicially conscientious mind entertains with some objectivity. 32. The decision Teja Ram (supra) was followed in Gura Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 and in Prabhu Dayal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127. 33. In R. Shaji vs. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266, this Court took note of almost all previous decisions starting from Prabhu Babaji Navle vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 51 and including those in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi (supra); Teja Ram (supra), Gura Singh (supra); John Pandian vs. State, (2010) 14 SCC 129; and Sunil Clifford Daniel vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 205 and came to the conclusion that once the recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by the accused, the matching or non-matching of blood groups loses significance. 59 34. Therefore, as pointed out by this Court in Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 7 SCC 781, there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove that the blood groups match. But the judicial conscience of the Court should be satisfied both about the recovery and about the origin of the human blood.” 43. In Raya Naykar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “18. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 44. Having set out the factual background and the material evidence collected during the investigation, we shall now proceed to examine the statements of the key witnesses in these cases. 45. PW-1, Ramkumari Anant, deposed that she is the wife of the deceased, Vinod Kumar Anant. She knew accused Photo Lal Anant as her father-in-law and also knew Sarita Bai, Mehatrin Bai, and Resham Bai, who are her maternal aunt-in-law, paternal grandmother-in-law, and maternal aunt-in-law, respectively. She did not know the other co-accused. She stated that her husband was called by the accused Photo Lal Anant, Sarita Bai, Mahetrin Bai, and Resham Bai to Umedibhatha to receive his share of 60 compensation for land acquired by SECL. Her husband went to their house on his Platina bike but did not return. Throughout the day, he did not call her, causing concern. PW-1 sent her mother- in-law, Santara Bai, to inquire, but the accused misled her by stating that Vinod would visit the bank the next day and giving false explanations for his absence. When her husband did not return by night, she repeatedly tried to contact him and her relatives but could not locate him. Early the next morning, the accused visited her house and falsely stated that Vinod had left for the bank. Ramkumari Anant and her mother-in-law filed a missing report at Hardi Bazaar police station. She further deposed that after searching for 2–3 days with villagers, she learned that Photo Lal Anant had withdrawn ₹3.5 lakh from the bank. About three months later, the police informed her that her husband had been murdered. She was told that he was beaten to death by his family members and that his body had been buried in a sack in Dipka forest. She identified the body during recovery proceedings, after which the last rites were performed. 46. In cross-examination, Rajkumari Anant (PW-1) largely reiterated her lack of knowledge regarding the precise interactions between her husband and the accused on the day of the incident. She stated that she was at home when her husband went to Umedibhatha and did not know what the accused said to him. She confirmed that her mother-in-law filed the missing report and 61 that she had visited the house of accused Photo Lal Anant only once after her marriage. She had no knowledge of any threats or statements made by Photo Lal Anant to the police and was unaware of the involvement of accused Dhirendra. She admitted that her husband occasionally consumed alcohol but denied knowing whether he had done so on the day of the incident. She did not witness any quarrels or disputes between her husband and his family, nor was she aware of any political or organizational disputes he may have been involved in. She confirmed that her father-in-law retained other property and was unwilling to give her husband the compensation received by her grandmother-in-law. PW-1 clarified that she did not personally witness her husband’s disappearance, nor did she see the exact events at Photo Lal Anant’s house. She stated that her knowledge was largely based on what her mother-in-law or villagers told her. She also confirmed that she could not explain certain details recorded in her police statement. 47. PW-2, Smt. Santara Bai, stated that she knew the deceased, Vinod Kumar Anant, who was her son, and that the accused present in court, including Photo Lal Anant, were responsible for his death. She deposed that on 10.07.2017, her son Vinod Kumar Anant was called to the house of the accused Photo Lal Anant, along with Mahetrin Bai, Resham Bai, and Sarita Bai, to receive a share of the SECL land compensation amounting to ₹2,00,000/-. 62 Vinod Kumar Anant left for Umendibhantha on his motorcycle around 11:00 a.m., but did not return home. She visited the house of the accused in the evening, where Photo Lal Anant, Mahetrin Bai, Resham Bai, and Sarita Bai were present. Upon inquiry about Vinod’s whereabouts, they stated that due to Mahetrin Bai’s ill health, Vinod Kumar Anant had returned home. She returned home but Vinod Kumar Anant did not come back by 9:00 p.m. She then went again to the accused’s house with Laxmin Bai, where the door was closed. She entered by kicking the door and found all the accused sitting together in one room. When asked why they were sitting together, they replied that a snake had entered the room. She further deposed that the following morning, at 4:00 a.m., Photo Lal Anant, Mahetrin Bai, Resham Bai, and Sarita Bai came to her house. Subsequently, she called a village meeting and filed a missing person report at Hardi Bazaar Police Station (Ex.P/2). The accused Photo Lal Anant was later apprehended by police and made statements implicating himself and the co-accused in the murder of Vinod Kumar Anant. He admitted that Vinod Kumar Anant was struck on the head, that Mahetrin Bai, Sarita Bai, and Resham Bai cleaned the blood, and that the body was placed in a sack, kept temporarily, and later buried in Korai Forest. PW-2 accompanied the police and accused Photo Lal Anant to the burial site, where she identified her son’s body. A panchnama (inquest report) was prepared, and she identified the body by his clothing and shoes. 63 She also consented to the collection of her son’s blood sample for DNA testing (Ex.P/3) and was present during a search of Mahetrin Bai’s house, which was documented in a search panchnama (Ex.P/4). 48. In cross-examination, PW-2, Smt. Santara Bai confirmed that she had filed the missing report of her son, Vinod Kumar Anant, and that it was not true that she had not submitted a written report (Ex.P/2). She stated that she studied up to Class IV and prepared the report herself. She could not recall exact dates of giving statements to the police but confirmed that statements were given on different days and not in one sitting. She denied the suggestion that she was exaggerating or giving false evidence in Court. She stated that she was present during the search of Mahetrin Bai’s house, including rooms, roof, water pit, and other areas, and denied that no search panchnama was prepared in her presence. She confirmed that Photo Lal Anant gave statements in her presence, and denied that the statements were not recorded. She admitted that she did not accompany Vinod Kumar Anant when he went to Umendibhatha, and she did not know his exact movements. She confirmed that she had seen the accused sitting together in one room and reported the snake incident, although she did not know whether this was recorded in her police statement. She denied the suggestion that she had misrepresented these events to the police. She confirmed 64 attending the village meeting, filing the missing report at Hardi Bazaar Police Station, and participating in searches conducted by the police. She identified her son’s body when recovered from Korai Forest, and confirmed witnessing the seizure of his clothes and shoes, but did not know the brand or number of the items. She denied knowing any discussions between Photo Lal Anant and Dhirendra regarding the murder and denied witnessing any exchange of money for the killing. She maintained that she acted truthfully in reporting and assisting the police and that all actions were voluntary and factual. 49. Likewise, PW-3, Anil Patle, has stated that the incident occurred on 10.07.2017 between Bhilai Bazaar and Umedibhantha, and that Vinod Kumar Anant’s mother, Santara Bai, had reported that her son had gone to his grandmother Mahetrin Bai’s house and had not returned. He deposed that on 24.09.2017, he, along with Gorelal Patle, Mangaluram, Kailash, and others, went to Hardi Bazaar Police Outpost where the accused Photo Lal Anant’s statement was recorded in their presence. Photo Lal admitted giving a contract to Raju Patel and Dinesh Kumar Chouhan to kill Vinod Kumar Anant. The memorandum of the statement was prepared as Ex.P/5, on which PW-3’s signature appears. Similarly, Sarita Bai was questioned and admitted her involvement in hiring someone to kill Vinod Kumar Anant, though she did not disclose the person’s name. He further stated that 65 after Santara Bai filed the missing report, a village meeting was held which he attended along with 40–50 villagers, including the accused Photo Lal Anant, Sarita Bai, Resham Bai, and Mahetrin Bai. No suspicion of murder was discussed at that meeting. He confirmed that he witnessed the police search the houses of Photo Lal Anant, Sarita Bai, and Mahetrin Bai, and that the search panchanama was prepared as Ex. P/4. He also witnessed the preparation of the site plan of Photo Lal Anant’s house, Ex.P/6, and the seizure of the State Bank of India passbook from Mahetrin Bai, Ex P/7. 50. In cross-examination, Anil Patle (PW-3) stated that he was present when the police seized land acquisition documents from Lal Singh of SECL, prepared seizure memo Ex.P/8, and when the accused Photo Lal Anant, Sarita Bai, Mahetarin Bai, and Resham Bai were arrested (Ex.P/9 – Ex.P/12). He confirmed signing the arrest memos and the search panchnama (Ex.P/15) and site plan (Ex.P/6), and witnessing the seizure of Mahetarin Bai’s bank passbook (Ex.P/7). He deposed that Photo Lal admitted in his presence to giving a contract to Raju Patel and Dinesh Kumar Chouhan to kill Vinod Kumar Anant and described the murder, including moving Vinod’s body in a sack and blood cleanup by Sarita Bai and Mahetarin Bai. He confirmed attending the village meeting called by Santara Bai the day after the missing report was filed, and that the accused were present. He stated that he 66 signed all documents in the police station on 24.09.2017 in the presence of other villagers and that the site plan and memorandum (Ex.P/5, Ex.P/6 and Ex.P/15) were prepared by police in-charge Grahan Singh Rathore. He denied all suggestions that the police did not question him, did not prepare panchnamas or site plans in his presence, or that he was unaware of the documents he signed. He also confirmed that Photo Lal’s statements in his presence were recorded correctly, and that he was informed verbally by the Kotwar to appear at the police station. He also stated that he could not recall exact times for signing some documents but confirmed all proceedings, seizures, and arrests occurred in his presence. 51. PW-4, Gorelal Patle deposed that he recognizes the accused Photo Lal Anant, Mahetrin Bai, Sarita Bai, Resham Bai, and other accused present in court, and knew Vinod Kumar Anant, who is deceased. On 10.07.2017, Vinod went missing after visiting his grandmother Mahetrin Bai’s house. His mother, Santara Bai, informed PW-4 that Vinod Kumar Anant had not returned, and the villagers suggested reporting the matter to the police, following which a missing report was lodged. PW-4 stated that disputes arose between Photo Lal Anant and Vinod Kumar Anant regarding the division of Rs. 28 lakh received by Mahetrin Bai as SECL land compensation. On 24.09.2017, PW-4 and other villagers were called to Hardi Bazaar outpost, where accused 67 Photo Lal Anant admitted in his statement to the police, in PW-4’s presence, that he had arranged the murder of Vinod Kumar Anant through Raja Patel and Dinesh Kumar Chouhan, with the assistance of other accomplices, and described the beating, cleaning of blood, and concealment of Vinod’s body behind his house. Sarita Bai corroborated this statement. Subsequently, guided by the accused, PW-4 accompanied the police to Korai forest where Vinod’s body was recovered and identified. In his presence, the police also seized various items and documents, including SECL land papers (A/1 to A/36, Ex.P/8), Mahetrin Bai’s bank passbook (A/37, Ex.P/7), motorcycles from Dinesh Kumar Chouhan (Ex.P/17) and Raja Patel (Ex.P/22), sticks, and a ramp and spade used in the crime (Exs.P/21, P/24, P/25). He further confirmed that he was present during the arrest of 32 accused and signed the relevant arrest memos (Ex.P/9 – Ex.P/13, Ex.P/26). He affirmed that all recoveries, seizures, and statements were made in his presence and correctly identified Vinod’s body and the recovered items. 52. In cross-examination, Gorelal Patle (PW-4) stated that he met Santara Bai at the court premises after tea and confirmed that after Vinod’s disappearance, villagers and women approached the SP and Collector’s office as no action was initially taken. He confirmed visiting Hardi Bazaar Police Station multiple times between 24–27.09.2017, and Dipka Police Station on 68 29.09.2017, including accompanying the police to Korai forest for the recovery of Vinod’s body. PW-4 recognized the accused, including Raju Das Mahant, Dinesh Kumar Chouhan, and Raja Patel, and confirmed identifying them during the proceedings. He stated that he witnessed the interrogation of Sarita Bai and Dhirendra, and affirmed that statements were recorded in his presence, though they were dictated by the police and not read out fully to him. He could not recall all details of the seized motorcycles, spade, and sticks, or exact contents of some police statements, but confirmed the seizure of Mahetrin Bai’s SECL papers and passbook. PW-4 stated that he had no personal knowledge of conversations between Photo Lal Anant and other accused outside his presence, and he denied receiving any inducement to provide his testimony or making false statements against the accused. He also clarified that he did not witness Photo Lal Anant during the preparation of the Nazri map by the Patwari. 53. Investigating Officer, PW-12, Grahan Singh Rathore, has deposed in his evidence that on 11.07.2017, Santara Bai lodged a written report regarding her missing son, Vinod Kumar Anant, who had gone to his father and grandmother’s house and did not return (Ex.P/2). A missing report was registered (Diary No. 25/11.07.2017, Ishan No. 22/17, Ex.P/40), and wireless alerts were sent to all police stations (Ex.P/4). During the investigation, 69 Santara Bai repeatedly complained that Vinod Kumar Anant had been murdered by Photo Lal Anant, Sarita Bai, and others. On 24.09.2017, Photo Lal Anant was apprehended near Bhilai Bazar and, in his memorandum statement under Section 27, confessed to having his son murdered through Dhirendra and four other accomplices for ₹3 lakh (Ex.P/5). Based on this, FIR No. 16/17 under Sections 302, 201, 120B, and 34 IPC was filed (Ex.P/43, 43C), and Photolal, Sarita Bai, Mahetarin Bai, Resham Bai, and Dhirendra were arrested in the presence of witnesses (Ex.P/9– 13,; Exs.P/44 and P/45). A site plan of the incident was prepared (Ex.P/6). Subsequently, Dinesh Kumar Chouhan, Raja alias Ramashankar, Raju Das Mahat, and Sonu Das Mahant were located, arrested, and their statements recorded in the presence of witnesses (Exs.P/16, P/20, P/23, P/52). On 26.09.2017, in Korai forest, a pit was dug as per their statements, and Vinod’s body was recovered and identified (Esx.P/28, P/29, P/35, P/37). During the investigation, weapons and motorcycles used in the crime were seized from the accused (Exs.P/7, P/19, P/22, P/24, P/25, P/54), and notices of arrest and seizures were issued to family members (Exs.P/49, P/51, P/53). Postmortem forms were sent to CHC Dipka (Exs.P/47, P/48). The investigation confirmed the involvement of all accused in the murder conspiracy and the recovery of evidence. 54. In cross-examination, Grahan Singh Rathore (PW-12), the 70 Investigating Officer has stated that accused Photo Lal Anant was first arrested, and based on his statement, Dhirendra, Sarita Bai, Dinesh, and Raja Patel were made accused. On 24.09.2017, Sarita Bai and Dhirendra Satnami, along with Mahetarin Bai and Resham Bai, were arrested the same night. He clarified that while he did not personally interrogate Sarita Bai and Dhirendra, their involvement in the conspiracy was established from Photolal’s statement, which detailed the ₹3 Lakh murder contract and their roles in covering up the crime. No items were seized from Sarita Bai and Dhirendra. Dhirendra is Photolal’s brother-in-law’s son-in- law. The case originated from the missing person report (Ex.P/2), and evidence from Photo Lal Anant, Sarita Bai, Mahetarin Bai, and Resham Bai confirmed Vinod Kumar Anant’s murder. He conducted spot visits, prepared panchnama (Ex.P/4), and recorded statements of all accused in the presence of witnesses. Weapons and motorcycles used in the crime were seized (Exs.P/7, P/19, P/21–P/25). Arrests of Dinesh, Raja, Raju, and Sonu Das were made, and notices were given to their families. He also pursued bank correspondence regarding the ₹3 lakh transaction and CCTV footage but did not seal Vinod’s room due to the lapse of time. All actions, statements, and seizures were done under witness supervision, and no evidence was fabricated. 55. PW-15, Dr. Anshul Lal, stated that he was working as a Medical 71 Officer at the Community Health Center, Dipka, District Korba, Chhattisgarh, from 2016 until November 2017. On 26.09.2017, at approximately 3:00 PM, the body of the deceased, Binod Anant, aged about 30 years, son of Photo Lal Anant, was brought before him for postmortem examination by Constable Marut Mahendra Jagat, No. 197 of Hardi Bazaar Police Station, along with the requisite postmortem application. Upon examination, Dr. Anshul Lal observed that the body was in an advanced state of decomposition and infested with maggots. The body was so decayed that the bones were exposed, the features of the deceased were completely mutilated, and the body was unrecognizable. He noted that the bones present appeared to belong to an adult male. The body had been exhumed for the postmortem examination, and based on the state of decomposition, he opined that the death had occurred approximately two to three months prior to the examination. 56. Regarding the external appearance, the body was of normal stature. The skull bones were visible, and Dr. Anshul Lal advised that the right tibial bone be removed, sealed, and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for further examination. At the time of examination, the deceased was wearing a vest and a pair of black shoes, which were sealed and handed over to the constable. Upon detailed examination of the bones, no marks of 72 injury were observed. Dr. Anshul Lal opined that the exact cause of death could not be determined due to the advanced state of decomposition of the body. However, he estimated that the death had occurred approximately two to three months prior to the postmortem. The postmortem report prepared by him in this regard is Ex.P/47. Further, on 07.11.2017, Dr. Anshul Lal examined a curie application from Hardi Bazaar Police Station, accompanied by a stick and rod (Ex.P/72). Upon examination, he provided his opinion that it was possible that injuries caused by the said stick and rod could have resulted in the death of the deceased. However, he clarified that due to the decomposition of the body, it was not possible to ascertain the exact cause of death with certainty. His opinion was recorded in the curie report, Ex.P/72. 57. In summary, Dr. Anshul Lal confirmed the advanced state of decomposition of the body of Vinod Kumar Anant, the inability to determine the exact cause of death from the postmortem, and his professional opinion that the stick and rod could have contributed to the death, as recorded in the curie report. 58. In cross-examination, Dr. Anshul Lal (PW-15) stated that it was not possible to identify the dead body presented before him, though a DNA test could have confirmed identity. The insects on the body were naturally present, not brought by the police. He could not determine the age of the body with certainty but 73 confirmed it was that of an adult male. The body had soil consistent with freshly dug earth, and no blood sample was taken as it was not possible. The lathi and rod presented were not sealed, and the rod was solid. He agreed that being struck with the rod could cause injury to bone. 59. The principles governing the law of circumstantial evidence, the Court observes the following: (a) Circumstantial Evidence: The prosecution’s case is primarily built upon circumstantial evidence. While certain circumstances have been highlighted, including the alleged motive of the accused, purported confessions, and recovery of various objects, the Court finds that the chain of circumstances is neither complete nor wholly convincing to lead to the inevitable conclusion of guilt. There are significant lacunae in the prosecution’s narrative: • No direct evidence connects the appellants to the actual commission of the offence. • Several memorandum statements of the accused and statements of witnesses contain inconsistencies, which cast doubt on the reliability of the purported admissions. 74 • The circumstantial evidence relied upon does not exclude all possible hypotheses other than the guilt of the accused, which is an essential requirement in cases dependent on circumstantial proof. • In view of these factors, the circumstantial evidence, when scrutinized in its entirety, fails to establish a coherent, unbroken chain of events pointing conclusively to the guilt of the appellants. (b) Seizure and Recovery: Although certain recoveries were effected during the course of investigation, the Court notes several deficiencies: • Some recoveries, including rods, sticks, motorcycles, and documents, were made long after the alleged incident, raising doubts as to their provenance and evidentiary value. • The identification of recovered articles suffers from gaps and inconsistencies. • Procedural safeguards in effecting recoveries were not consistently adhered to, weakening the evidentiary weight of such materials. • The postmortem examination could not conclusively determine the cause of death owing to the 75 advanced decomposition of the body, which prevented identification of specific injuries. • Scientific evidence, including the DNA and FSL reports, while relied upon by the prosecution, does not independently establish a connection between the deceased and the accused in a manner sufficient to discharge the burden of proof. • Thus, the evidentiary value of the seizure and recovery is limited and cannot independently support the conviction of the appellants. (c) Deficiencies in Investigation: The Court also notes notable procedural and investigative deficiencies: • There were substantial delays in recording statements of several key witnesses, which diminishes the reliability of their testimonies. • Critical circumstantial elements, such as the alleged financial transactions and conspiracy among certain accused, were not corroborated by independent documentary or oral evidence. • Certain investigative steps, including verification of alleged payments or contracts, were either 76 incomplete or inadequately documented, thereby weakening the prosecution’s case. (d) Acquittal of Co-Accused: Accused Sonu Das Mahant, who was tried on the same set of evidence, has been acquitted by the Trial Court. In the absence of strong, independent evidence linking the present appellants to the crime, the principle of parity militates in favour of the appellants, supporting their claim for acquittal. 60. Having considered the rival submissions and upon careful scrutiny of the entire evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered view that the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained. The prosecution case, as presented, suffers from serious infirmities. 61. Firstly, the arrest and implication of the appellants primarily on the basis of the memorandum statement of accused Photo Lal Anant is contrary to the settled principles of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, inasmuch as only that portion of the statement which leads to discovery of a fact is admissible in evidence. The reliance placed by the prosecution and the learned Trial Court upon inadmissible portions of the memorandum was wholly erroneous. 62. Secondly, the chain of circumstances relied upon by the 77 prosecution has not been proved in its entirety. The presence of all appellants at the house of accused Photo Lal Anant on the relevant date has not been established. The Trial Court itself has recorded a finding in para 49 of the impugned judgment that the prosecution failed to prove that the murder took place inside the house of accused Photo Lal Anant. The alleged recovery of weapons is also not linked to the crime, as the FSL report does not confirm that the bloodstains were of human origin, and the medical evidence is inconclusive as to whether the death was homicidal. Thus, the essential link in the chain of circumstances is missing. 63. Thirdly, the discovery of the dead body cannot be attributed to the appellants. The record clearly demonstrates that the police were aware of the burial site prior to the alleged discovery at the instance of appellants Dinesh Kumar Chouhan, Raju Das Mahant, and Raja @ Ramashankar Patel. PW-3, Smt. Santara Bai has categorically deposed that accused Photo Lal had himself pointed out the place of burial. Hence, the alleged discovery at the instance of other appellants is irrelevant and inadmissible. 64. Fourthly, the prosecution has failed to establish a consistent and credible motive. Two conflicting motives have been projected, one relating to harassment on account of the second marriage of 78 accused Photo Lal Anant, and another relating to a monetary demand of ₹2,00,000/- from the land acquisition compensation. These contradictory versions create a serious doubt about the prosecution case and render the alleged motive unreliable. 65. This Court shall now deal with the charges under the respective provisions of law separately, namely, Section 302 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A. Regarding Section 302 IPC (Murder): The offence of murder under Section 302 IPC requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally caused the death of the deceased. On careful examination of the evidence on record, it is apparent that: • The prosecution case is primarily based on circumstantial evidence. While certain circumstances, including alleged motive, memorandum statements, and recoveries, have been highlighted, the chain of circumstances is neither complete nor wholly convincing to lead to the inevitable conclusion of the guilt of the appellants. • There is no direct evidence connecting the appellants to the actual act of causing death. 79 • The postmortem examination (Ex.P/47) could not conclusively establish the cause of death due to the advanced state of decomposition of the body. The curie report (Ex.P/72) only speculates that injuries caused by sticks or rods could have contributed to death, without certainty. • Several key witnesses’ statements were recorded after a substantial delay, raising concerns about reliability and accuracy. • The alleged discovery of the body and recoveries at the instance of certain appellants cannot be attributed to them, as the burial site was already known to the police from the statement of accused Photo Lal Anant. • Contradictory versions of motive further weaken the prosecution case. In light of the above, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants caused the death of Vinod Kumar Anant. Therefore, the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained. B. Regarding Section 120B IPC (Criminal Conspiracy) : Section 120B IPC requires the establishment of a pre- 80 arranged common intention among the accused to commit an unlawful act. On scrutiny of the evidence: • The alleged conspiracy is primarily inferred from the memorandum statements of accused Photo Lal Anant. However, reliance on these statements is misplaced, as only that portion which leads to the discovery of a fact is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The remaining portions relied upon by the prosecution are inadmissible. • No independent, cogent, and reliable evidence corroborates the existence of a conspiracy involving all appellants. Alleged financial transactions and agreements between accused persons remain unsubstantiated. • The acquittal of co-accused Sonu Das Mahant on the same set of evidence highlights the lack of a consistent, independent basis to link the appellants to the criminal conspiracy. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants acted in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy. The conviction of the appellants under Section 120B IPC also cannot be sustained. 66. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered 81 opinion that the prosecution has manifestly failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. On a careful and holistic appraisal of the evidence, it is evident that the chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is incomplete, fragmented, and riddled with inconsistencies. The essential circumstances, which must be established in accordance with the five golden principles governing circumstantial evidence — namely, (i) the circumstance relied upon must be conclusive of the guilt of the accused, (ii) it must be fully established, (iii) all the circumstances must be connected so as to form a chain, (iv) the chain must be complete, and (v) the circumstances must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of the accused are conspicuously absent in the present case. The alleged confessions, recoveries, motive, and other circumstantial links suffer from gaps, delays, and procedural infirmities, such that they do not form a coherent and unbroken chain pointing solely to the guilt of the appellants. The scientific evidence, including the DNA and FSL reports, fails to independently corroborate the prosecution’s narrative, and the identification of the deceased and the recovery of alleged incriminating articles are fraught with inconsistencies. The conflicting versions of motive, lack of direct evidence and deficiencies in investigation collectively render the prosecution case infirm. Consequently, 82 benefit of doubt must necessarily enure to the appellants, no conviction can be sustained in such circumstances. 67. Accordingly, the appeals being CRA No.555/2019, CRA No.576/2019, CRA No.848/2019 and CRA No.1855/2019, succeed and are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 13.03.2019 passed by the learned Trial Court is set aside. The appellants, namely Sarita Bai Anant (A-2), Smt. Resham Bai Kurre (A-4), Dhirendra Kumar Baghel (A-5), Dinesh Kumar Chouhan (A-6), Raja @ Ramashankar Patel (A-7) and Raju Das Mahant (A-8) are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. 68. It is stated at bar that the appellants are on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellants, namely Sarita Bai Anant (A-2), Smt. Resham Bai Kurre (A-4), Dhirendra Kumar Baghel (A-5), Dinesh Kumar Chouhan (A-6), Raja @ Ramashankar Patel (A-7) and Raju Das Mahant (A-8) are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition 83 against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 69. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action forthwith. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) Judge (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh
Arguments
14. Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Mr. Aditya Khare and Mr. Atul Kumar Kesharwani, learned counsel appearing for the respective appellants have vehemently contended that the present cases 9 are one of false implication and the appellants have been wrongly convicted by the learned Trial Court. It is urged that the entire case of the prosecution rests upon circumstantial evidence and there is no direct evidence connecting the appellants with the commission of the alleged crime. According to the learned counsel, the prosecution has failed to establish the chain of circumstances in such a manner as to lead to the sole inference of guilt of the appellants. It is submitted that the deceased Vinod Kumar Anant was the step-son of accused Photo Lal Anant (since deceased during the pendency of the appeal) and that certain compensation amounts were received on account of acquisition of land in the name of Mahetrin Bai, the mother of said accused. The allegation that the deceased had gone to demand his share of such compensation and that accused Photo Lal Anant, in conspiracy with co-accused Dhirendra Kumar Baghel, engaged contract killers Dinesh Kumar Chouhan and Raja @ Ramashankar Patel to eliminate him, was asserted to be unsubstantiated and bereft of any cogent evidence. 15. Learned counsel further submitted that the alleged withdrawal of ₹3.5 lakhs by accused Photolal and the alleged payment of ₹3 lakhs to accused Dinesh Kumar Chouhan are not supported by any documentary proof. No bank record or independent witness has been adduced to prove such withdrawal or payment. Likewise, the alleged conspiracy between accused Dhirendra 10 Kumar Baghel and accused Photo Lal has not been proved by any clinching evidence. It is also pointed out that the dead body of the deceased was recovered almost three months after the incident on the basis of the memorandum of accused Photo Lal Anant, and by that time the body was completely decomposed. The identification of the deceased was sought to be established through the shoes allegedly worn by him and by the DNA profiling. However, the DNA report, as well as the FSL report, did not conclusively establish the case of the prosecution, as the blood group could not be confirmed. 16. Learned counsels highlighted that the statements of several witnesses were recorded after a delay of nearly two months, which renders their testimony doubtful. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, namely the memorandum statements, seizure of articles, alleged motive, and the conduct of the accused under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, were asserted to be insufficient and not proved in accordance with law. It is further urged that the conviction of the appellants was recorded on the basis of suspicion and conjecture, which cannot take the place of legal proof. It is emphasized that in order to bring home the charge of criminal conspiracy, the prosecution was required to prove the same by clear and convincing evidence, which is conspicuously absent in the present case. Lastly, it is argued that accused Sonu Das Mahant, who was tried 11 on the same set of evidence, has already been acquitted by the trial Court. On the principle of parity, the appellants also deserved acquittal. Accordingly, it was submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside and the appellants deserve to be acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. 17. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Ram Sharan Chaturvedi v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 16 SCC 166, Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 314 and Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 111 to buttress their submissions with regard to circumstantial evidence. 18. Further, reliance has been placed upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of State Through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and others, (1999) 5 SCC 253, Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394, S. Arul Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 8 SCC 233, R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266 and Somasundaram alias Somu v. State Represented by Deputy Commissioner of Police, (2016) 16 SCC 355 to buttress their submissions with regard to conspiracy. 12 19. Also, reliance has been placed upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jaikam Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 13 SCC 716 to buttress their submissions with regard to recovery from an open place. 20. With regard to serologist report, they have placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Madhav v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 17 SCC 600. 21. With regard to suspicion, reliance has also been placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481. 22. Per contra, Mr. Devesh G. Kela, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent has opposed the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the appellants and supported the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court and has contended that the findings recorded therein are well reasoned, based on proper appreciation of evidence, and do not call for any interference by this Court. It is submitted that although there is no direct eye-witness account of the incident, the prosecution has been able to establish the case against the appellants by leading cogent and convincing circumstantial evidence, and the chain of circumstances so proved is complete, consistent, and points only towards the guilt of the appellants. It is that the motive for the crime stood clearly established, inasmuch as the deceased Vinod 13 Kumar Anant was the step-son of accused Photo Lal Anant and there existed a dispute with regard to the share of compensation money received from land acquisition in the name of Mahetrin Bai, the mother of accused Photo Lal Anant. The deceased had gone to collect his share, but instead of giving him the same, accused Photo Lal Anat, in conspiracy with co-accused Dhirendra Kumar Baghel, engaged contract killers Dinesh Kumar Chouhan and Raja @ Ramashankar Patel for committing his murder. 23. Learned State counsel further contended that pursuant to the memorandum statement of accused Photo Lal Anant recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the dead body of the deceased was recovered from a place pointed out by him in the Dipka forest. The fact of recovery at the instance of the accused is a strong incriminating circumstance which firmly establishes their involvement in the crime. The recovery of the rod, stick, motorcycle, and other incriminating articles further corroborates the prosecution version. It is also argued that the identity of the deceased was duly established. Though the body was in a decomposed state, the same was identified by the articles recovered from the spot and further confirmed through DNA profiling. The FSL and DNA reports form an important scientific link in the chain of circumstances. Learned State counsel submitted that the delay in recording the statements of some witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case in the facts of the 14 present matter, particularly when the overall evidence, both oral and documentary, corroborates the prosecution version. The conduct of the accused, the motive attributed to them, the recovery of incriminating articles, and the scientific evidence collectively establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the acquittal of co-accused Sonu Das Mahant does not inure to the benefit of the present appellants, as the evidence against him was different in nature, whereas the appellants stand connected to the crime through several strong incriminating circumstances. Accordingly, learned State counsel prayed that the appeals deserve to be dismissed and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants by the learned Trial Court be affirmed. 24. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 25. The question that falls for consideration would be whether the appellants are the perpetrators of the crime in question. 26. The offence allegedly occurred on 10.07.2017 at about 11:30 a.m. at the house of accused Photolal in Village Bhilai Bazar. On the following day, a missing report was lodged by PW-2, Smt. Santara Bai, regarding the disappearance of the deceased Vinod Kumar Anant (Ex.P/2). Subsequently, the FIR was registered on 15 26.09.2017 by PW-12, Grahan Singh Rathore (Ex.P/38), and the investigation was conducted by PW-14, Sharad Chandra. The prosecution case is that the appellants, in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, murdered Vinod Kumar Anant using rods, wooden clubs, and other implements, and subsequently disposed of the dead body and other evidence. The postmortem examination of the deceased was carried out by PW-5, Dr. Anshul (Ex. P/47). 27. During the investigation, memorandum statements were recorded from the accused at different points in time. From accused Photo Lal Anant on 24.09.2017 at 17:00 hours (Ex.P/5); from Dinesh Kumar Chouhan on 26.09.2017 at 08:00 hours (Ex.P/16); from Raju Das Mahant on 26.09.2017 at 08:40 hours (Ex.P/23); from Raja @ Ramashankar Patel on 26.09.2017 at 08:30 hours (Ex.P/20); and from Sonu Das Mahant on 27.09.2017 at 17:30 hours (Ex.P/52). 28. Several recoveries were effected pursuant to these memorandum statements, which were proved by documentary and oral evidence. From accused Photo Lal Anant, seizure of dead body was made. From Dinesh Kumar Chouhan, a Pulsar Motorcycle bearing No. CG-12-AB-4244 was seized (Ex.P/17). From Raja @ Ramashankar, a wooden Tendu club (Ex.P/21) and a TVS Apache Motorcycle bearing No. CG-12-AE-4361 (Ex.P/22) were seized. From Raju Das Mahant, a pick-axe, an iron hoe, and a 16 wooden stick were recovered (Ex.P/24). From Sonu Das Mahant, a wooden Tendu club was seized (Ex.P/25). From Mahetrin Bai, a bank passbook was recovered (Ex.P/2), and from witness Lal Singh Kanwar, land records were seized (Ex.P/8). 29. Further, the identification of the dead body was conducted on 26.09.2017 (Ex.P/72), and the dead body supurdnama was prepared on the same date (Ex.P/30). The postmortem report was recorded on 26.05.2017 (Ex.P/47), while the FSL report was prepared on 31.01.2018 (Ex.P/81), followed by the DNA report on 13.03.2019 (Ex.P/82). 30. While dealing with the issue of circumstantial evidence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Sharan Chaturvedi (supra), has held as follows :- “27. The principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC is an agreement to commit an offence. Such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. Court has to necessarily ascertain whether there was an agreement between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. 28. In the decision of State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr., (2000) 8 SCC 203, this Court noted that an agreement forms the core of the offence of conspiracy, and it must 17 surface in evidence through some physical manifestation: “12. ...As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. ...A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy... 13. ...The most important ingredient of the offence being the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient…” (emphasis supplied) 29. The charge of conspiracy alleged by the prosecution against the Appellant must 18 evidence explicit acts or conduct on his part, manifesting conscious and apparent concurrence of a common design with A-1 and A-2. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, this Court held: “101. One more principle which deserves notice is that the cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution.” (emphasis supplied) 30. In accepting the story of the prosecution, the Trial Court, as well as the High Court, proceeded on the basis of mere suspicion against the Appellant, which is precisely what