Nafr High Court
Case Details
ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 1 2025:CGHC:24899-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1218 of 2025 1. Varun Singh S/o Shri Ashok Singh Aged About 30 Years R/o E.W.S. 2nd House No. 325, Jaiprakash Nagar Devas Police Station Industrial Area Tahsil And District - Dewas (M.P.) Present Address House No. 52 Rajiv Nagar Anvatpura In Front Of Ambe Mata Temple Tahsil And District - Dewas (M.P.) 2. Smt. Baby Singh W/o Shri Ashok Singh Aged About 48 Years R/o E.W.S. 2nd House No. 325, Jaiprakash Nagar Devas Police Station Industrial Area Tahsil And District - Dewas (M.P.) 3. Tarun Singh S/o Shri Ashok Singh Aged About 25 Years R/o E.W.S. 2nd House No. 325, Jaiprakash Nagar Devas Police Station Industrial Area Tahsil And District - Dewas (M.P.) 4. Varsha Singh D/o Shri Ashok Singh Aged About 24 Years R/o E.W.S. 2nd House No. 325, Jaiprakash Nagar Devas Police Station Industrial Area Tahsil And District - Dewas (M.P.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Mahila Thana Durg Sector -6 Bhilai Tahsil And District - Durg (C.G.) 2. Smt. Arti Kumari Singh W/o Varun Singh Aged About 28 Years R/o 19/c Street -15 Sector - 2 B.T.C. Bhilai - 01 Post Bhilai -01 Tahsil And District - Durg (C.G.) (Complainant ) ...Respondent(s) For Petitioners For Respondent/State For Respondent No. 2 : : :
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Akash Shrivastava, Advocate. Mr. Soumya Rai, Panel Lawyer. Ms. Chetna Sharma, Advocate. 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
Decision
Order on Board 17 .0 6 .202 5 1. Heard Mr. Akash Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for respondent No. 1/State and Ms. Chetna Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer: “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the FIR bearing No. 2 of 2025 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana Durg, Sector-6 Bhilai, Tahsil & District Durg (C.G.), for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 85, 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, in the ends of justice.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent No. 2/complainant lodged an FIR on 08.01.2025 with the Police Station Mahila Thana Durg, Sector-6, Bhilai, District-Durg (C.G.) inter alia on the ground that she was married to petitioner No.1/Varun Singh on 10.03.2024 according to the Hindu rites and rituals. It was further alleged that on demand made by the petitioners, Rs. 4,50,000/- (Four Lakhs fifty thousand) in cash was given to the petitioners at the time of the marriage. Apart from the cash amount, 3 gold and other silver ornaments were also given. After marriage the parties started residing at Dewas (M.P.) where her husband, in-laws, and the brother-in-law and sister-in-law also used to reside; it was also alleged that the husband, in-laws, brother-in-law and sister-in-law used to taunt the complainant for giving insufÏcient dowry. It has been also alleged that petitioners used to demand of Rs. 2,50,000/- for the treatment of her father-in-law. On 11.07.2024, it was alleged that the petitioner No.1/husband came to Bhilai and drop her at Railway Station and thereafter, he did not come back to take her home. Thereafter, on 08.01.2025 an FIR bearing No. 2 of 2025 was registered at Police Station Mahila Thana Durg, Sector-6 Bhilai, Tahsil & District-Durg (C.G.) for the commission of offences punishable under Section 85, 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNS’) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, ‘Act of 1961’) against the petitioners. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that prior to the petitioner No. 1’s marriage with respondent No. 2/complainant, the petitioners were blindsided about the medical condition of the complainant by the complainant and her family members. The complainant is facing mental illness, she is suffering from schizophrenia, which is evident from the medical documents of the complainant. It is when the petitioners found out about the medical condition of the complainant, apprehending the consequence of their collusion, the complainant and her family members orchestrated this false crime against the petitioners. He further submits that before lodging FIR against the petitioners, petitioner No. 1 has filed a written complaint before Police Station-Industrial Area Dewas (M.P.) 4 against the respondent No. 2/complainant and her family members and alleged that they have suppressed the fact about mental condition of the complainant, but no action was taken and just for taking revenge from the petitioners this FIR lodged against the petitioners. 5. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that petitioner No. 1 on being subjected to continuous mental and emotional agony, filed a petition on 23.08.2024 under Section 13(1)(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of marriage before the competent Family Court in Dewas (M.P.). The petitioner No. 1 categorically stated that the non-applicant (respondent No. 2 herein) demonstrated extreme hostility. He also alleged that she had completely ceased any form of conjugal relations and subjected him to verbal and physical abuse, causing immense distress and strain in their marital relationship. He also contended that the petitioner No.1 has been granted anticipatory bail by this Court on 18.03.2025 and the other family members have been granted anticipatory bail on 25.01.2025 by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge District-Durg(C.G.). 6. Learned counsel for petitioner further stated that the allegations made in the FIR are manipulative and has been exaggerated by the complainant in order to implicate the petitioners in the false case. He also stated that an act to constitute offence, the allegation should demonstrate the intention and act of the present petitioners towards the respondent No.2, as the petitioners have never done any such act which falls under definition of Section 85 and 3(5) of the BNS and Section 4 of the Act of 1961. He further states that no specific act of the petitioners have been attributed in the FIR and the petitioners have been implicated in crime in 5 question only on the basis of vague, general and omnibus type statement of the complainant/wife with intent to harass the petitioners. Hence, this petition. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that considering the material available on record, it cannot be held that no prima facie case against the petitioners for offence punishable under Sections 85, 3(5) of the BNS and Section 4 of the Act of 1961 is made out. He would further submit that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) is extremely limited as FIR cannot be quashed particularly when there is sufÏcient material available on record. 8. Learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2/complainant, would submit that there are serious allegations against the petitioners for treating respondent No. 2 with cruelty. She would further submit that all submissions raised on behalf of the petitioners relate to question of fact, that can be considered during the course of trial and that cannot be considered at this stage and that too in proceeding under Section 528 of the BNSS, as such, it is the case where the petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. Learned counsel for the parties submits that in compliance of the Court’s order dated 06.05.2025, the matter has been referred to the Mediation Center of this Court for amicable settlement between petitioner No.1/husband and respondent No. 2/wife, but both the parties are not ready to compromise the matter and to settle their dispute. Hence, the mediation has failed. 6 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. In the matter of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another1, the Honb’ble Supreme Court has held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co- accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process. 12. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others 2 the Hon’ble Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out. 13. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another3, it has been held by the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal 1 2 3 (2012) 10 SCC 741 (2018) 14 SCC 452 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620 7 and others4 that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra) by holding as under:- “24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra. 4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 8 25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants.. …” 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Payal Sharma v. State of Punjab & Another {Cr.A. No. 4773/2024, decided on 26.11.2024} had, relying on the decision in Geeta Mehrotra (supra), Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Others v. State of Bihar & Others {(2022) 6 SCC 599}, Bhajan Lal (supra), and Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Another {(2013) 10 SCC 591}, had quashed the FIR and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom. 15. Very recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayan & Others v. State of Telangana & Another {Cr.A. No. 5199 of 2024, decided on 10.12.2024}, has observed as under: “25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well- recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the 9 basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them. 26. In fact, in the instant case, the first appellant and his wife i.e. the second respondent herein resided at Jollarpeta, Tamil Nadu where he was working in Southern Railways. They were married in the year 2015 and soon thereafter in the years 2016 and 2017, the second respondent gave birth to two children. Therefore, it cannot be believed that there was any harassment for dowry during the said period or that there was any matrimonial discord. Further, the second respondent in response to the missing complaint filed by the first appellant herein on 05.10.2021 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting for closure of the said complaint as she had stated that she had left the matrimonial home on her own accord owing to a quarrel with the appellant No.1 because of one Govindan with whom the second respondent was in contact over telephone for a period of ten days. She had also admitted that she would not repeat such acts in future. In the above conspectus of facts, we find that the allegations of the second respondent against the appellants herein are too far-fetched and are not 10 believable. 27. xxx xxx xxx 28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them. 29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 11 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case. 30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows: “12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.” 31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. 12 The allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. 32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.” Observing the aforesaid, the Hon’ble Apex Court quashed the FIR, the charge-sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the learned trial Court. 16. In the complaint so made, the complainant/respondent No. 2 has only made omnibus and general allegations against the petitioners without being full particulars about date and place that all the petitioners including the husband treated her with cruelty for not bringing sufÏcient dowry at the time of marriage. There is no specific allegation regarding anyone of the petitioners except common and general allegations against all the petitioners that they have demanded dowry. 17. Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, 13 material available on record, perusing the FIR in which no specific allegations have been made and only bald and omnibus allegations have been made against the petitioners, we are of the considered opinion that prima-facie no offence under Sections 85, 3(5) of the BNS and Section 4 of the Act of 1961 is made out for prosecuting petitioner No. 2-Smt. Baby Singh, petitioner No. 3-Tarun Singh, and petitioner No. 4-Varsha Singh for the above-stated offences. 18. As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis, impugned FIR bearing Crime No. 2 of 2025 registered at Police Station Police Station Mahila Thana Durg, Section-6, Bhilai, Tahsil and District Durg (C.G.) for the offences under Sections 85, 3(5) of the BNS and Section 4 of the Act of 1961 is hereby quashed to the extent of petitioner No. 2-Smt. Baby Singh, petitioner No. 3-Tarun Singh, and petitioner No. 4-Varsha Singh. 19. Accordingly, the petition under Section 528 of the BNSS filed on behalf of petitioner No. 2-Smt. Baby Singh, petitioner No. 3-Tarun Singh, and petitioner No. 4-Varsha Singh is allowed. 20. However, the petition so far as it relates to petitioner No1 – Varun Singh is concerned, the same is accordingly, dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra