Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi S/o. Manmohan Mandavi, Aged About 19 Years R/o. Ward No v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer - Bemetara District Bemetara Chhattisgarh
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:44237-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.09.02 10:36:01 +0530 CRA No. 745 of 2023 Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi S/o. Manmohan Mandavi, Aged About 19 Years R/o. Ward No. 05, Brahman Para, Sweeper Basti Bemetara, P.S. And Distirct- Bemetara Chhattisgarh --- Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer - Bemetara District Bemetara Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 777 of 2023 Daulat Yadav S/o Kuntram Yadav Aged About 19 Years R/o Ward No. 07, Prabha Nirwani Lane, Mohbhatta Road, Bemetara, Police Station And District - Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Station House Officer, Police Station- Bemetara, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 836 of 2023 Shubham @ Bhima Gupta S/o Ashok Gupta Aged About 22 Years R/o Ward No. 3, Kutchari Para, Near Pandey Pond, Police Station Bemetara, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh ---Appellant 2 Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Bemetara, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh --- Respondent For Appellant-Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi : Ms.Pooja Loniya, Advocate in CRA No.745/2023 For Appellant- Daulat Yadav Mr.Vaibhav goverdhan, Advocate in CRA No.777/2023 For Appellant- Shubham @ Bhima Gupta Mr.Bharat No.836/2023 Rajput, Advocate in CRA For Respondent : Mr.Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 1.9.2025 1. Since the aforesaid three criminal appeals have been filed arising out of the judgment dated 03.03.2023 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara in Sessions Case No.22/2022, they are clubbed and heard together and being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. These three criminal appeals have been filed by the appellants against the judgment dated 03.03.2023 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara in Sessions Case No.22/2022, by which they have been convicted under Section 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life 3 and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for two months. The trial Court also convicted appellants-Shubham Gupta @ Bhima and Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi for offence under Sections 25(1) (a) and 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo RI for seven years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for two months and RI for three years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 11.03.2022 at around 10:45 P.M., complainant / informant, Tomar Yadav, along with Ganesh Sen and Shiva Verma, lodged an oral complaint at Bemetara Police Station regarding the death of Monu Yadav. The complaint stated that on 10.03.2022 at around 7:30 P.M., Monu Yadav had a dispute with Nanda Sen, father of Ganesh Sen, and Singh, a medical store owner, over drinking liquor. Later, Bhima @ Shubham Gupta came to the area with a knife and was abusing people. On 11.03.2022 at around 8:30 P.M., Monu Yadav, Ganesh Sen, Shiva Verma, and others went to Pandey Talab to talk to Bhima @ Shubham Gupta about the previous day's incident. During the conversation, a dispute arose, and Bhima @ Shubham Gupta slapped Monu Yadav. The altercation escalated, and Bhima @ Shubham Gupta stabbed Monu Yadav in the chest twice with a knife, resulting in his death. Daulat Yadav and Bauwa @ Ankit Mandavi were also present, armed with stick and rod. 4. Informant's brother, Monu Yadav, died due to the stabbing by 4 Bhima @ Shubham Gupta, Daulat Yadav, and Bauwa @ Ankit Mandavi. The body was taken to the district hospital in Bemetara. Based on the informant's statement, a morgue intimation No.
Facts
31/2022 (Ex.P-1) was registered, and after investigation, FIR in Crime No. 152/2022 was registered against the accused / appellants vide Ex.P-2. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-3. Inquest was prepared over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-5. Memorandum statement of appellant Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi was recorded vide Ex.P-7. Memorandum statement of appellant Shubham @ Bhima Gupta was recorded vide Ex.P-8 and knife was seized on production of appellant Shubham @ Bhima Gupta vide Ex.P-9. Memorandum statement of appellant Daulat Yadav was recorded vide Ex.P-10 and iron rod was seized from appellant Daulat Yadav on his production vide Ex.P-11. Fullshirt and lower stains with blood were seized from appellant Shubham @ Bhima Guopta vide Ex.P-12. Half shirt stains with blood was seized from appellant Daulat Yadav vide Ex.P-13. Appellant Shubham Gupta was arrested on 12.03.2022 vide arrest memo Ex.P-14. Appellant Daulat Yadav was arrested on 12.08.2022 vide arrest memo Ex.P-15. Appellant Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi was arrested on 19.04.2022 vide arrest memo Ex.P-16. Bloodstained and plain soil were recovered from the spot vide Ex.P-18. Postmortem of the dead body was done by Dr.Chandraprakash (PW-21) vide 5 Ex.P-27 and found following injuries:- (1) Wound present on left side of chest & medial to left nipple size length 4 cm breadth 3 cm. Depth punctured upto left ventricle of heart. (2) Wound present below left axilla size L = 3.5 cm B = 2 cm. Depth puncture upto spleen & liver. (3) Lateral aspect of right arm two wound present upper – 2x1x2 cm lower – 2x1x2 cm. Lower – 2x1x2cm. (4) Wound present on midline of interscapular space below neck on back side size LxBxwidth = 2x1x3cm. The doctor has opined that cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to punctured wound on heart, liver & spleen caused by stab wound by sharp & pointed object and manner of death was homicidal. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-44), blood was found on knife (Article A) seized from appellant Shubham @ Bhima Gupta, iron rod (Article B) seized from appellant Daulat Yadav, t-shirt (Article C) seized from deceased Monu Yadav, lower and underwear (Article D1 and D2) seized from deceased Monu Yadav, shirt and lower (Article E1 and E2) ) seized from appellant Shubham @ Bhima Gupta, shirt (Article F) seized from appellant Daulat Yadav and soil (Article G) seized from the spot. 5. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bemetara, who in turn committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Bemetara, from where the First Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara received the case on 6 transfer for trial. 6. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 23 witnesses and exhibited 47 documents Exs.P-1 to P- 47. The defence did not examine any witness nor did it lead any documentary evidence. 7. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 03.03.2023, convicted and sentenced the appellants as aforementioned, against which, these criminal appeals have been preferred. 8.
Legal Reasoning
case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 22. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh3 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in 2 (2002) 3 SCC 327 3 (2017) 3 SCC 247 13 Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must 14 be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 23. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 24. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)4 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) (ii) There must be a sudden fight; There was no premeditation; 4 (2019) 6 SCC 122 15 (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 25. The distinction between intention and knowledge in the context of Section 299 and Section 300 IPC is crucial in determining the culpability of the appellant. Intention denotes a conscious desire to bring about a particular result, whereas knowledge implies awareness that a particular consequence is likely to ensue. In the present case, while the appellant's actions were undoubtedly culpable, the circumstances suggest that he did not intend to cause the death of his wife. However, it is evident that he knew that his actions were likely to cause harm. 26. Exception 4 applies where (i) the act is committed without premeditation, (ii) in a sudden fight, (iii) in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and (iv) without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently applied Exception 4 in single-blow/limited-blow cases arising from sudden altercations lacking pre-planning, while carefully examining the seat of injury, weapon, force, and conduct before/after the event. 27. The dividing line between Part I and Part II of Section 304 turns on mens rea: Part I applies when there is intention to cause death or intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; Part II applies where intention is absent, but the accused had 16 knowledge that death was likely. 28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the following facts are salient: • No premeditation or prior motive has been proved by the prosecution. • The incident occurred on 11.03.2022 at around 8:30 P.M., when Monu Yadav, Ganesh Sen, Shiva Verma, and others went to Pandey Talab to talk to appellant Bhima @ Shubham Gupta about the previous day's incident. 29. Now coming to the application of Exception 4, to the present facts, it is observed as follows:- a). Suddenness & No premeditation: The quarrel ignited when Monu Yadav, Ganesh Sen, Shiva Verma, and others went to Pandey Talab to talk to appellant Bhima @ Shubham Gupta about the previous day's incident. There was no evidence of prior animus, surveillance, or procurement of weapon in advance. b). Heat of Passion: Verbal altercation escalated quickly; the blow followed immediately; there is no cooling-off interval. c). No undue advantage: The parties were similarly placed and there is no evidence that the appellants exploited a helpless victim or continued assault after incapacitation. d). No cruel/unusual manner: The evidence discloses limited blow and absence of stomping, repeated stabbing or torture- 17 like conduct. 30. On these facts, the matrix of Exception 4 to Section 300 is prima facie satisfied, subject to the Court’s assessment on “undue advantage” and cruelty. The baseline offence is culpable homicide, not murder. 31. Now when the matrix of Exception 4 of Section 300 is prima facie satisfied, the next question for consideration is whether the case falls under Section 304 Part I or Part II? 32. The medical opinion terms the injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The blows were aimed at heart, liver and spleen. Even in Exception 4 cases, where the seat of injury is vital and the force is forceful, Courts often infer intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death and tends toward Part I. Further, where the seat is non-vital and fatality is by complication, Courts tend towards Part II (knowledge). However, each case turns on the manner of assault and appellant’s conduct. 33. Here, the combination of (i) targeted strike to heart, liver and spleen, (ii) the depth/force evidenced by internal damage, and (iii) the doctor’s opinion that the injury was sufficient to cause death, allows a safe inference of intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. At the same time, the absence of premeditation and the sudden quarrel bring the case out of Section 302 and within Section 304 Part I via Exception 4. 18 34. The Court is, therefore, satisfied that 304 Part I and not 304 Part II correctly captures the culpability. 35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Anbazhagan v. State (2023 INSC 632), readily the matrix of Exception 4 of Section 300. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:- 20. The word "intent" is derived from the word archery or aim. The "act" attempted to must be with "intention" of killing a man. 21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:- 1. The nature of the weapon used. 2. The place where the injuries were inflicted. 3. The nature of the injuries caused. 4. The opportunity available which the accused gets. 22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986, at page 990, Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word 'intent. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision 19 Bhagwant v. Kedari, I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:- "The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.” 23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, at page 490, the following observations have been made by Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:- "6. Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.” 20 24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made by Coleridge J. in Reg. v. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating:- "The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another's head, and fire it off. without intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?" 25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies 21 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that 'intent' and 'knowledge' cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that 'intent' and 'knowledge' are the same. 'Knowledge' will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. 26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141, also the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'intention' is aptly explained. It is as under:- "Knowledge and intention must not be confused. 17. …… Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act until the contrary is proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a decision, as to an offender's intention to inquire what the - natural and probable consequences of his acts would be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person, sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted them could be presumed to have intended those 22 natural and probable consequences. His offence would fall under the third head of sec. 300, I.P.C. 18. …..A man's intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. The degree of quilt depends upon intention and the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but which the offender knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention. 19. ...Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge, that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death. Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to bring it under Sec.300. Where the injury deliberately inflicted is more than merely likely to cause death' but sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the higher degree of quilt is presumed." It has been further observed therein as under:- "26. ... Where the evidence does not disclose that there was any intention, to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty 23 under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention that in order to bring the case under the second part of sec. 304. I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable." 27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the IPC designedly used the two words 'intention' and 'knowledge', and it must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he "must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow." (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1 at page 40). 28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. 24 Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:- "To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........ It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed......... Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it." 29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41 has observed:- "In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word "intention" is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims............ Differing from intention, yet closely resembling it, there are two other attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to its stimulus, but both of which can 25 be denoted by the word "recklessness". In each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with the intention of thereby attaining an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds-(a) he would prefer that the harmful result should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur." 30. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 respectively of the IPC leaves no manner of doubt that under these Sections when it is said that a particular act in order to be punishable be done with such intention, the requisite intention must be proved by the prosecution. It must be proved that the accused aimed or desired that his act should lead to such and such consequences. For example, when under Section 299 it is said "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death" it must be proved that the accused by doing the act, intended to bring about the particular consequence, that is, causing of death. Similarly, when it is said that "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death" it must be proved that the accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. 26 31. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with regard to intention may be satisfied for holding an offence of culpable homicide proved, it is necessary that any of the two specific intentions must be proved. But, even when such intention is not proved, the offence will be culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that is, with the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may result in death. 32. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence under Section 304 Part I or we should further alter it to Section 304 Part II of the IPC? SECTIONS 299 AND 300 OF THE IPC:- 33. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of 'culpable homicide' and 'murder', respectively. In terms of Section 299, 'culpable homicide' is described as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it emphasises on the expression 'intention' while the latter upon 'knowledge'. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in 'culpable homicide', that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused 27 in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it would be 'culpable homicide'. Section 300 of the IPC, however, deals with 'murder', although there is no clear definition of 'murder' in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, 'culpable homicide' is the genus and 'murder' is its species and all 'murders' are 'culpable homicides' but all 'culpable homicides' are not 'murders'. (see Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289) 34. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under:- "12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' is species. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice- versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment. proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is what may be called 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. 28 Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304." 35. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the IPC. 'Culpable homicide' may or may not amount to 'murder', in terms of Section 300 of the IPC. When a 'culpable homicide is murder', the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishment would be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively, stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further detail. 36. The principles stated in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, are the broad guidelines for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the IPC they fall in. This Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. 'culpable homicide' and 'murder' respectively. In Phulia Tudu v. State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588, this Court noticed that confusion may arise if the courts would lose sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections. This Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of 29 these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these sections. 37. This Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:- Section 299 Section 300 A person commits Subject to certain culpable culpable homicide if the homicide is murder if the act by which the death exceptions act by which the is caused is done- death is caused is done- INTENTION (a) with the intention of (1) with the intention of causing causing death; or death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (b) with the intention of such causing bodily 30 injury as is likely to (3) with the intention of causing cause death; or bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge (4) with the knowledge that the that the act is likely to act is so imminently dangerous cause death that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, recently in the matter of Hare Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in 2024 INSC 936, has held that in cases of a sudden fight without premeditation, where the accused acted neither cruelly nor with undue advantage, the conviction under Section 302 IPC may be reduced to Section 304 Part I IPC. The Court directed immediate release of the appellant who had already served nearly 9 years and 10 months in prison as the period sufficed for the offense. Relevant paras of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow: 12. Having said so, the next question that will be 31 required to be considered is as to whether the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC needs to be maintained or altered to a lesser offence. 13. From the evidence of the first informant, which is on similar lines to the other witnesses, it would reveal that someone had taken out a brick from the pile of bricks. Those pile of bricks belonged to the appellant. Angered by this, the appellant started abusing the wife of Ranglal Yadav (PW-5). The wife of PW-5 objected and warned the appellant not to abuse her. It is further seen from the evidence of Bidya Sagar Yadav (PW-4) that the deceased told the appellant that if he has courage, he may dare to kill her. Thereafter, the appellant assaulted the deceased with the knife. 14. A perusal of the evidence would therefore, reveal that there was no premeditation. The incident occurred on account of a quarrel that erupted between the deceased and the appellant on a trivial issue. The appellant appears to have lost his control and assaulted the deceased with the knife. 15. We find that the incident has occurred on account of a grave and sudden fight in the heat of anger due to the provocation by the deceased. A perusal of the evidence would also reveal that it is a case of a single injury. There is no evidence to show that the appellant has acted in a cruel manner or has taken undue advantage of the situation. 16. In that view of the matter, we find that the appellant would be entitled to have the benefit of exception under Section 300 of the IPC. 32 37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Ashan (supra) has held as under:- “13. From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses themselves, it would reveal that there is no premeditation. The incident occurred since the appellant believed that the utterances by deceased Vikrant @ Chintu were aimed at him and, therefore, he retaliated by abusing the deceased. This was followed by a heated exchange between them. They grappled out of the building of the Dhaba. Though the witnesses were successful in separating them, the accused-Appellant rushed to his car, pulled out a bottle from the driver’s seat side, broke it on the bumper of the car and attacked the deceased. 14. It is thus clear that the incident occurred without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion and upon a sudden quarrel. The evidence would also not show that the accused-Appellant had either taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. We therefore find that the present case would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC.” 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan & Another v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 69, while considering analogous circumstances, has categorically held that where the incident arises out of a sudden fight, without premeditation, in the heat of passion, and without the offender having taken undue advantage, the case falls within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. In paras 14 to 17, the Court explained the 33 absence of pre-planning and the suddenness of the incident. In para 19, the Court reiterated the legal position that such cases constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Finally, in paras 21 and 22, the Court altered the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC and imposed a sentence of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment. Relevant paras of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow: “14. The High Court, after a detailed analysis of the evidence on record, repelled the contentions of the appellants and convicted them while acquitting Accused No. 3, their father, Chintaram, giving him benefit of doubt about his participation in the crime. 15. Thus, the two appellants before us are impugning the judgment passed by the High Court upholding their conviction. 16. The pleas of the appellants before us summarized as below: (i) Since the third accused namely Chintaram, who is the father of the two appellants had been acquitted by the High Court on the same set of evidence on which the two appellants had been convicted, the two appellants should have also been acquitted on the ground of parity since there is no material difference in the nature and quality of evidence qua all the three accused. (ii) That otherwise also, conviction could not have been sustained on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of a sole eye witness, who is also an interested witness namely, Lata 34 Bai (PW10), the mother of the deceased. (iii) The Sessions Court had convicted the appellants primarily on the testimony of the Lata Bai (PW-10), the alleged eyewitness, though she could not have been an eye witness, as Santosh (PW-6), in his FIR mentioned that he informed about the incident to the mother and father of Suraj, which shows that Lata Bai (PW- 10) only after being informed of the incident after the incident had occurred, came to know of the incident and hence, could not have seen the incident. (iv) Further, the statement of Lata Bai (PW-10) was recorded after 5 days of the incident and the Prosecution has not explained the delay in recording her statement under Section 161 of the Code and in absence of a proper explanation, her statement is not reliable in connection with which the defence relied upon on the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Brahmananda Nanda, (1976) 4 SCC 288 wherein this Court held that failure to mention the names of the accused for one and half days is fatal. (v) It was also contended that according to the Prosecution, the mother (PW-10) and father (PW-5) of the deceased were present but they made no attempt to intervene or try to rescue the victim which shows that, they did not witness the incident and hence the statement of Lata Bai is highly doubtful. In this regard, the defence had cited the decision of this Court in State of 35 Punjab v. Sucha Singh, (2003) 3 SCC 153 wherein, it was observed by this Court that any father, worth the name, who was claiming to be present at the place of incident would not remain a mute spectator when his son is being inflicted as many as twenty-four injuries under his very nose. (vi) It was also contended that there have been improvements, and embellishments in the testimony of Lata Bai (PW-10), thus rendering her evidence unreliable and not credible. (vii) The appellants also have contended that almost all the non-official prosecution witnesses, except the mother, had turned hostile and had not supported the prosecution case including the informant Santosh (PW-6) and seizure witnesses, PW-2 and PW-12. 17. On the other hand, before us also, it has been contended on behalf of the Prosecution that as far as the two appellants are concerned, it can be said that the conclusion drawn by the Trial Court as well as the High Court is based on admissible and relevant evidence and as such their conviction cannot be said to be suffering from any illegality, and since there is no perversity in the finding arrived at by the two courts below, this Court ought not interfere with the judgment of the High Court. 19. As per Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a fact can be said to have been proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the 36 circumstances of the particular case, to act up on the supposition that it exists. The court undertakes this exercise of examining whether the facts alleged including the particular criminal acts attributed to the accused are proved or not. 21. It will be relevant to discuss, at this juncture, what is meant by "reasonable doubt". It means that such doubt must be free from suppositional speculation. It must not be the result of minute emotional detailing, and the doubt must be actual and substantial and not merely vague apprehension. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense as observed in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 wherein it was observed as under: "24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overly emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case." 22. While applying this principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt the Court has to undertake a candid consideration of all the evidence in a fair and 37 reasonable manner as observed by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC 96 as follows: "8. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to prove all the elements with a scientific precision. A criminal court could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the range of a reasonable doubt. Of course, the expression 'reasonable doubt is incapable of definition. Modern thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords moral certainty to the Judge. 9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal law in the United States has quoted from judicial pronouncements in his book Wharton's Criminal Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1 of the 12th Edn.) as follows: 'It is difficult to define the phrase "reasonable doubt". However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of the term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or followed is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the Webster case [Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush 295: 59 Mass 295 (1850)]. He says:"It is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that consideration that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge."" 38 10. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored by H.C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th Edn.) thus: The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as an honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with reason, entertain consistent with a conscientious desire to ascertain the truth. An honestly entertained doubt of guilt is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an inference of the possibility of the innocence of the accused is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one which arises from a consideration of all the evidence in a fair and reasonable way. There must be a candid consideration of all the evidence and if, after this candid consideration is had by the jurors, there remains in the minds a conviction of the guilt of the accused, then there is no room for a reasonable doubt." 39. The record satisfies the four-part test of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC: (i) sudden quarrel; (ii) absence of premeditation; (iii) act committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) no undue advantage or cruelty. As held in the matter of Goverdhan (supra), such circumstances convert the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 40. Thus, the occurrence happened without premeditation, during a sudden quarrel, in the heat of passion when Monu Yadav, Ganesh Sen, Shiva Verma, and others went to Pandey Talab to talk to appellant Bhima @ Shubham Gupta about the previous 39 day's incident. The blows on a vital part impute intention to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. Accordingly, the case of the appellants falls under Section 304 Part I IPC. Balancing these, and to mark societal censure while acknowledging mitigating factors, we consider rigorous imprisonment for 10 years under Section 304 Part I IPC to be just and proportionate. 41. Accordingly, conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC is set aside. However, they are convicted under Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. However, considering the evidence available on record and recovery of weapon, conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court upon appellants Shubham Gupta @ Bhima and Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi under Sections 25(1) (a) and 27 of the Arms Act are hereby affirmed. They are directed to serve out the sentence as modified by this Court. 42. The criminal appeals are partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 43. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the 40 Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 44. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Chief Justice (Ramesh Sinha) Bablu
Arguments
Mr.Vaibhav Goverdhan, learned counsel for appellant-Daulat Yadav appearing in CRA No.777/2023 submits that learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is, then also the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased in spur of moment and inebriated condition. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, in inebriated condition, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that: (a) there was no premeditation; (b) the incident ensued during a sudden quarrel; (c) the appellant was inebriated; and (d) intention to 7 cause death is absent; at best knowledge can be imputed. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Ahsan v. State of Haryana1. 9. Ms.Pooja Loniya, learned counsel for appellant-Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi in CRA No.745/2023 and Mr.Bharat Rajput, learned counsel for appellant Shubham @ Bhima Gupta in CRA No.836/2023 adopted the submissions made by Mr.Vaibhav Goverdhan. Additionally, Ms.Pooja Loniya submits that from perusal of the FIR, it appears that there is no any role played by appellant Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi in crime in question and he has been falsely implicated in the present case as no any weapon has been seized from him. 10. On the other hand, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellants have caused murder of deceased Monu Yadav by deadly attacking him with knife and iron rod due to which, he succumbed to his injuries, therefore, learned trial Court has 1 AIR 2024 SC 2533 8 rightly convicted the appellants under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and appellants-Shubham Gupta @ Bhima and Ankit @ Bauwa Mandavi under Sections 25(1) (a) and 27 of the Arms Act. As such, the instant criminal appeals deserve to be dismissed. 11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 12. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record particularly relying upon the statement of Dr.Chandraprakash (PW-21), has come to the conclusion that cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to punctured wound on heart, liver and spleen caused by stab wound by sharp and pointed object and manner of death was homicidal. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that cause of death of the deceased was hypovolemic shock due to punctured wound on heart, liver and spleen caused by stab wound by sharp and pointed object is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 13. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellants herein are the perpetrator of the crime in question. 14. In the present case, Mukesh Kumar Sahu (PW-2), Ganesh Sen 9 (PW-5), Sanjay Yadav (PW-6), Jitvrat Verma @ Shiva Verma and Birendra Sarthi @ Chintu (PW-13) are eyewitnesses. 15. Mukesh Kumar Sahu (PW-2) has stated in para 2 of his evidence that on 11.03.2022, he along with deceased Monu Yadav, Shiva Verma, Chintu alias Birendra, Sai alias Sanjay Yadav, and Ganesh Sen went to Pandey Talab on KTM motorcycle and scooty. There, they found accused Shubham Gupta sitting with his friends, Daulat Ram Yadav and Ankit Mandavi alias Bauwa. Monu Yadav was trying to reason with Shubham Gupta alias Bhima, asking him not to use abusive language. However, Shubham Gupta alias Bhima slapped Monu Yadav two or three times, and then suddenly pulled out a knife and stabbed Monu Yadav in the chest two or three times. After that, Ankit Mandavi alias Bauwa snatched the knife from Shubham Gupta and stabbed Monu Yadav in the chest and stomach two or three times. Monu Yadav fell to the ground, bleeding profusely. Daulat Ram Yadav then hit Monu Yadav on the head with an iron rod, causing him to lose consciousness. The three accused then fled the scene. They were frightened by the incident and could not intervene because Shubham Gupta was holding a knife. They took Monu Yadav to the district hospital in Bemetara, where the doctor declared him dead after examination. 16. Ganesh Sen (PW-5) has stated in para 3 of his evidence that on 11.03.2022, at around 8:30 P.M., he along with his friends 10 deceased Monu Yadav, Shiva Verma, Chintu alias Birendra, Sai alias Sanjay, and Mukesh Sahu went to Pandey Talab on motorcycles and scooty. There, they found accused Shubham alias Bhima sitting with his friends, Daulat Yadav and Ankit alias Bauwa. He and Monu Yadav asked the accused/appellants why they were using abusive language near their homes, and Monu Yadav was trying to reason with them. However, Shubham alias Bhima slapped Monu Yadav two or three times and then suddenly pulled out a knife and stabbed him in the chest and abdomen two or three times. After that, Ankit Mandavi snatched the knife from Shubham alias Bhima and started stabbing Monu Yadav in the chest, stomach, and back. Meanwhile, Daulat Ram Yadav hit Monu Yadav on the head with an iron rod, causing him to bleed profusely and lose consciousness. The three accused then fled the scene, leaving Monu Yadav behind. They were frightened by the incident. They took Monu Yadav to the district hospital in Bemetara, where the doctor declared him dead after examination. He along with Shiva Verma, Sai alias Sanjay Yadav, Chintu alias Birendra, and Mukesh Sahu, witnessed the entire incident, where the three accused attacked Monu Yadav with a knife and iron rod with the intention of killing him. 17. Sanjay Yadav (PW-6) has stated in para 2 of his evidence that Monu Yadav was his friend. The incident occurred on 11.03.2022 at around 8:30 P.M. near Pandey Talab, Kuthari Para, Bemetara. He along with his friends Monu Yadav, Ganesh Sen, Shiva 11 Verma, Chintu, and Mukesh, went to Pandey Talab on motorcycles and scooty. There, they found accused Shubham alias Bhima sitting with his friends, Daulat Yadav and Ankit alias Bauwa. Monu Yadav was trying to reason with the accused, asking them not to use abusive language. However, Shubham alias Bhima slapped Monu Yadav two or three times and then stabbed him in the chest and abdomen two or three times with a knife. After that, Ankit Mandavi stabbed Monu Yadav in the chest, stomach, and back with the same knife. Meanwhile, Daulat Ram Yadav hit Monu Yadav on the head and body with an iron rod, causing him to bleed profusely and lose consciousness. The three accused then fled the scene, leaving Monu Yadav behind. 18. Jitvrat Verma @ Shiva Verma (PW-7) and Birendra Sarthi @ Chintu (PW-13) have also stated the same thing as stated by other eyewitnesses. 19. On the basis of evidence of the eyewitnesses, it is clear that the appellants themselves killed deceased Monu Yadav by hitting him with knife and iron rod, by which Monu Yadav died. 20. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellants is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants ? 12 21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana2 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the