High Court of Chhattisgarh
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:17064-DB NAFR MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.04.21 16:49:41 +0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 227 of 2025 Chhattisgarh Pathya Pustak Nigam Haribhumi Parisar Dhamtari Road Tikrapara Raipur- 492001 Chhattisgarh (M/s Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Orders) ... Appellant(s) versus M/s Chhattisgarh Packagers Pvt Ltd Through Shyam Lal Gupta S/o Ganesh Prasad Gupta Aged About 85 Years 4/1 Nehru Nagar West Bhilai District Durg Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s)
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Parth Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent(s) : None Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 15.04.2025 1. Proceedings of this matter have been taken through video conferencing. 2. Heard Mr. Parth Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant. 2 3. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 01.08.2024 passed in W.P. (227) No. 879/2017 (M/s Chhattisgarh Packagers Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Chhattisgarh Pathya Pustak Nigam) by which, vide order dated 01.08.2024, learned Single Judge allowed the petition preferred by the writ petitioners/ respondent herein and order dated 25.02.2025 passed in REVP No.40/2025, by which, the learned Single Judged rejected the review petition filed by the appellant herein. 4. Brief facts of the case are that the writ petitioner / respondent herein is a small scale industry registered under the Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and was engaged in business of printing. The appellant/Department issued work orders
Decision
to the writ petitioner for printing of books. However, on account of non payment of some dues, a dispute arose between the parties and writ petitioner preferred an application under Section 18 (1) of the MSME Act before the Micro and Small Industries Facilitation Council for resolution of dispute. When the conciliation failed, the Council has passed an judgment/award dated 25.06.2016 issued on 15.12.2016 in favour of the writ petitioner and claim raised by the writ petitioner for an amount of Rs.11,93,000/- was allowed. In addition to the said claim, the Council has also directed the appellant herein to pay interest 3 times as per rate prescribed by the Reserve Bank which comes to Rs.22,14,841/-, thereby, in aggregate, Rs.34,07,841/- was directed to be paid to the writ 3 petitioner within a period of 30 days. Against the said order, the appellant herein preferred Writ Petition bearing WPC No.2093/2017 before this Court on 21.07.2017 which was withdrawn by him on 28.07.2017 with liberty to file duly constituted appeal under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Thereafter, the appellant herein preferred an application under Section 34 (2) of the Act 1996 before the District Judge Raipur and also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the said application which was allowed by the impugned order dated 05.10.2017. Being aggrieved by the said order, the writ petitioner / respondent herein preferred WP227 No. 879/2017, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 01.08.2024. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant herein preferred REVP No. 40/2025 by which, the learned Single Judge rejected the said review petition. Hence this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the issue involved in the instant case is whether the limitation period prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would be applicable to proceedings initiated under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act), or whether such proceedings would be governed by the limitation provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Single Judge ought to have considered that the relief sought by the 4 Respondent in W.P. (227) 879/2017 was mainly to quash the verdict passed by the learned Single Judge and hence the interference exercised by this Court was only to be under Article 226 and not in term of Article 227 (Supervisory Jurisdiction) and also there is gross violation of the principles of natural justice as the opportunity of hearing ought to have been provided to the Appellant, to secure ends of justice. The Hon'ble Court also ought to have duly considered that the appellant had earlier filed W.P.(C) No. 2093/2017 before this Court, wherein the appellant had challenged the award passed by the Facilitation Council of Industrial Directorate (constituted under the MSMED Act, 2006) on 25.06.2016, which was received on 24.12.2016. The Hon'ble Court, vide its order dated 28.07.2017, while disposing of the said writ petition, expressly granted liberty to the Appellant to file an appeal under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Respondent, at that stage, did not raise any objection to the grant of such liberty. Subsequently, within a period of seven days, the appellant filed the application on 04.08.2017 in accordance with the liberty granted by this Hon'ble Court. Thus, the Hon'ble Court ought to have considered that the application was made within the permissible time frame as per the direction of this Hon'ble Court, and accordingly, the learned District Judge had rightly entertained and considered the said application. Further, the learned Single Judge ought to have considered that the respondent has suppressed and mislead this Court by suppressing 5 the material fact that in compliance of the Section 19 of the MSMED, Act 2006 the Appellant has deposited the 75% mandatory decretal amount and the respondent has moved an application for withdrawal of the amount and the learned District Judge has allowed the said application and granted permission for withdrawal of the amount. On the one hand in the same proceeding, they have withdrawn the amount and after withdrawing the amount the respondent have challenged that the application is time barred. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with the writ appeal. 7. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner relying upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Limited vs. Maheshbhai Tinabhai Rathod and Ors (2022) 4 SCC 162 and holding that undisputedly, in the present case, arbitration award dated 25.06.2016 was published on 15.12.2016 and as per the order dated 05.10.2018, WPC No. 2093 of 2017 was filed on 21.07.2017. This chronology itself shows that the petition was preferred beyond prescribed period of limitation as defined under Section 34 of the Act 1996. As such, the learned 6 Single Judge concluded that the learned District Judge has committed error in exercising its jurisdiction while condoning the delay and set-aside the order dated 05.10.2017 while allowing the petition preferred by the writ petitioner. 8. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge dismissed the review petition filed by the petitioner / appellant herein holding that there is specific provision in the special Act (MSME Development Act, 2006) under Section 18(3), which in clear terms, provides that the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 7 of that Act. Hence, for the dispute under the MSME Development Act, 2006 also, procedure of the Act, 1996 shall apply. However, under the Act, 1996, the law of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay under Section 5 does not apply and only provisions under Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996 shall be applicable. 9. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, we notice that the same has been rendered with cogent and justifiable reasons. In an intra-court appeal, no interference is usually warranted unless palpable infirmities are noticed on a plain reading of the impugned order. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on a plain reading of order, we 7 do not notice any such palpable infirmity or perversity, as such, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 10. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet