Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:16292 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 169 of 2024 • Badri Prasad, S/o Gulu Sao, Aged About 49 Years, R/o Village Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.) and Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. (Plaintiff No.2) ... Appellant
Legal Reasoning
1. Ramdas Gond, Through Legal Heirs Nil. (Defendant No.1) versus 1(A) Sambhu Gond, S/o Late Ramdas Gond, Aged About 50 Years, R/o Village Piparpan, Police Station Sanaval, Tahsil Ramchandrapur, District Balrampur – Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. 1(B) Phagu Gond, S/o Late Ramdas Gond, Aged About 47 Years, R/o Village Piparpan, Police Station Sanaval, Tahsil Ramchandrapur, District Balrampur – Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. 2. Bigan, S/o Gulu Sao, Aged About 53 Years, R/o Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.), Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramnujganj, Chhattisgarh. (Plaintiff No.1) 3. Harihar, S/o Late Ramsahai (Died), through legal heirs. (Plaintiff No.3) 3(A) Sambhu, S/o Late Harihar, Aged about 60 years, R/o Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.), Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramnujganj, Chhattisgarh. 3(B) Kailash, S/o Late Harihar, Aged about 50 years, R/o Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.), Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramnujganj, Chhattisgarh. 3(C) Kedarnath, S/o Late Harihar, Aged about 47 years, R/o Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.), Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramnujganj, Chhattisgarh. 4. Ramprasad, S/o Bihari Sao (Died), Through Legal Heirs. (Plaintiff No.4) 4(A) Shiv Prasad, S/o Late Ramprasad, Aged about 49 years, Occupation Agriculturist, R/o Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.), 2 Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramnujganj, Chhattisgarh. 4(B) Nand Lal, S/o Late Ramprasad, Aged About 59 years, Occupation Agriculturist, R/o Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.), Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramnujganj, Chhattisgarh. 4(C) Gopal, S/o Late Ramprasad, Aged About 57 years, Occupation Agriculturist, R/o Machbandhwa, Tahsil Duddi, District Sonbhadra (U.P.), Present R/o Village Chhunapathar, Tahsil Pal, District Balrampur – Ramnujganj, Chhattisgarh. 5. State of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Balrampur – Ramanujganj, District Balrampur – Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. (Defendant No.2) ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Malay Jain, Advocate. For State/Respondent No.5 : Ms. Mukta Tripathi, P.L. 1. 2. Hon'ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi Judgment on Board 07/04/2025 Heard. Vide judgment and decree dated 28.11.2007 (Annexure-A/2), learned Civil Judge Class-I, Ramanujganj, District Surguja (C.G.) has dismissed the Civil Suit No.3-A/1998 (Bigan & Others Versus Ramdas Gond & Another). Thereafter, first appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs bearing Civil Appeal No.31-A/2012 was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ramanujganj (C.G.) vide judgment and decree dated 02.02.2013 (Annexure-A/1) and the same was challenged by the present applicant/appellant, Badri Prasad by filing instant second appeal before this Court along with I.A. No.1/2024, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the second appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant would submit that appellant is a poor person, he could not arrange the fund to file the second appeal and he was also not aware about the law and procedure of the Court to file the 4. 5. 6. 3 second appeal, therefore, the delay of 3244 days occurred in filing the instant second appeal. Further, he submits that though, there is a huge delay of 3244 days in filing the appeal, but the said delay is bonafide. Hence, he prayed that the delay of 3244 days in filing the second appeal may be condoned. State counsel submits that instant second appeal has been filed after lapse of more than 11 years from the date of passing of the judgment and decree dated 02.02.2013 (Annexure-A/1) passed by the first appellate Court, therefore, the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. Though, it is settled proposition of law that while condoning the delay in filing the appeal, liberal view ought to have been adopted by the Court, but there must be bonafide cause, because after a lapse of a long time, interest of various other persons may have been created over the disputed property. In instant case, appeal has been filed by the appellant after lapse of 3244 days, which is a huge one and the reasons mentioned in the application to condone the delay is not found to be sufficient, as, if, the appellant was having any financial crunches, then he might have filed an appropriate application for permission to file appeal, as an indigent person, but no such application has been filed by the appellant. 7. The learned Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. & Ors. Versus The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 513 has held in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21, as under:- “17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder 4 treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. 18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramla, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 19. In Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the 5 High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.” 8. Reverting into the facts of the instant case, as has been mentioned in preceding paragraphs that since second appeal has been filed by the applicant/appellant after lapse of 3244 days, which is inordinate and no sufficient cause has been mentioned in the application by the applicant/appellant, therefore, considering the inordinate delay of 3244 days in filing the appeeal, I do not feel inclined to allow I.A. No.1/2024, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the second appeal. 9. Accordingly, I.A. No.1/2024, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the second appeal is hereby rejected. 10. Consequently, instant second appeal also stands dismissed. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge DEEPTI JHA NIRALA Digitally signed by DEEPTI JHA NIRALA