High Court of Chhattisgarh
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:8408-DB NAFR BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.02.22 11:13:25 +0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 744 of 2023 1 - Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade S/o Shivratan Rajwade Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Katkalo, Police Station Darima, District Surguja Chhattisgarh 2 - Pushpa Panna W/o Late Tej Panna Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Khala, Dafapara, Police Station Darima, District Surguja Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Darima, District Surguja Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant No.1- Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade For Appellant No.2- Punna Panna : Mr.Dheerendra Pandey, Advocate : Mr.Deepak Jain, Advocate For Respondent- : Mr.Sanghrash Pandey, Government State Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 18/02/2025 2 1. This criminal appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.01.2023 passed by the Special Judge (Atrocities), Surguja, Ambikapur in Session (Atrocities) Case No.49/2019, whereby appellant No.1-Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade and appellant No.2-Pushpa Panna have been convicted and sentenced in the following manner : Conviction Sentence Sl. No. 1. Under Section RI for life and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default 302 of the IPC of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one year. 2. Under Section RI for life and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default 120B of the IPC of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one year. 3. Under Section RI for five years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in 201 of the IPC default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for six months. Appellant No.1- Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade has also been convicted for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter called as “Act of 1989”) and sentenced him to undergo RI for life and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one year. 2. The prosecution story, in brief, is that appellant No.2 lodged a report at Police Station Darima alleging therein that deceased Beronika, who is the elder sister-in-law of the complainant, is a widow and issueless lady and she is living alone. She and her 3 sister-in-law Beronika both went to a wedding at a relative’s place in Bartikra at around 7.30 P.M. and returned home at around 9.30 P.M. She went to her house with the children. Her sister-in-law Beronika went on the motorcycle of Rajesh Rajwade of Nawabandh, a relative of Babulal Rajwade of Panna Kanthi. Rajesh left in the same vehicle after dropping her sister-in-law at her house. Babulal was at her sister-in-law Beronika’s house. About 5 minutes later, her sister-in-law Beronika came to her house and told her who was standing in the dark in he open courtyard outside her house. Then she said that she will come after putting her daughter to sleep. At the same time, Babulal was shouting loudly from inside Beronika’s house that Pushpa open the door, someone has locked it from outside and who is killing Beronika, then she left her house and came towards Beronika’s house and saw that the outside door of Beronika’s house was locked and Babulal was shaking the door from inside, it was dark outside. Her daughter Khushboo came from behind and when she lit the torch, she saw that outside Beronika’s house there was blood on the ground near the door outside Beronika’s house and there were marks of dragging. The key was there, then she opened the door of Beronika’s house with the key and then Babulal came out. On hearing the noise, her sister-in-law Mayati, her son Mahender, Jitender and Ramesh Kerketta from the neighbourhood and many other people reached there. She told them about the incident. Then all of them went searching for 4 Beronika and reached the house of Sarpanch Dharam Kishore to the west of his house and saw that the dead body of her sister-in- law Beronika was lying in Ajay Kanwar’s field under a Neem Parsa tree. She was dead. There were marks of injury and dragging on her head and a lot of blood had come out. Her sister- in-law Beronika has been murdered by unknown persons. On the
Facts
information of appellant Pusha Panna, First Information Report (Ex.P-20) was registered against unknown accused. The statements of Babulal Rajwade and Yashmati were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC vide Exs.P-1 and P-2. Memorandum statement of appellant Ayodhya @ Ramfal Rajwade was recorded vide Ex.P-3 and on the basis of his memorandum statement, gadasa and one phone were seized from appellant Ayodhya @ Ramfal Rajwade vide Ex.P-4. Memorandum statement of appellant Pushpa Panna was recorded vide Ex.P-5 and on the basis of her memorandum statement, nighty and one phone were seized from her vide Ex.P-6. Spot map was prepared by patwari vide Ex.P-7. Inquest was prepared over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-9. Bloodstained soil, plain soil and other articles were seized from the spot vide Ex.P-12. Sari, blouse, bra and petticoat were seized vide Ex.P-15. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to Primary Health Center, Darima where Dr.Janeshwar Singh (PW-14) conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-16 and found that the deceased was of average hight. The deceased was 5 lying on her back in a mute state. Both her eyes were closed and the pupils were dilated and still. The mouth was closed and the tongue was inside the mouth. There was stiffness in the body. The nail of the finger of the hand was blue. There was a bruise on the stomach, which was red in colour. There were two wounds on the right occipital part of the head, whose size was 6 ½ x 1 ½ x 2 cm. And (2) 7 x 2 x 1 ½ cm, the shape of the wound was spindle shaped, which was caused by a sharp object. There was swelling on the right palm of the dead body, whose size was 7 ½ x 4 ½ cm. There was a contusion on the right thigh of the dead body, whose size was 12 ½ x 7 ½ cm. There was blood present in the nose of the dead body. The doctor has opined that mode of death is haemorrhagic shock due to head injury leading to cardio respiratory arrest and homicidal in nature. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-23. Appellant Ayodhya Rajwade was arrested on 2.6.19 vide arrest memo Ex.P- 27 and appellant Pushpa Panna was arrested on 2.6.19 vide arrest memo Ex.P-28. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-35), human blood was found on Article A (soil), Article C (soil), Article F(sari of the deceased), Article G (blouse of the deceased), Article H (bra of the deceased), Article I (petticoat of the deceased), Article J (Gadasa seized from appellant-Ayodhya @ Ramfal Rajwade) and Article K (nighty seized from appellant Pushpa Panna). 6 3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) and after completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed in the Court of Special Judge (Atrocities), Surguja, Ambikapur. 4. Learned Special Judge framed the charges for offences under Sections 120B, 302 & 201 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 against appellant Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade and for offences under Sections 120B, 302 & 201 of the IPC against appellant-Pushpa Panna. Moreover, the appellants denied the charge and face trial. 5. In order to prove the guilty of the accused/appellants, the prosecution has examined as many as 17 witnesses. Statement of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the Code where they denied the circumstances appearing against them and claimed innocence and false implication in the crime in question. 6. After affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, learned Special Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment.
Legal Reasoning
available on record, which may prima facie constitute the offence against the appellants. They contended that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that there are material contradictions and omissions in the case diary statement and the Court deposition of the prosecution witnesses, which cannot be relied upon and the same cannot be made the basis for conviction of the appellants. 8 As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed. 8. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court after considering all incriminating materials and circumstances available against the appellants rightly convicted them for the aforesaid offences. He would further submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the instant criminal appeal being bereft of merits is liable to be dismissed looking to the commission of offence done by the accused persons. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10.The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased Beronika was homicidal in nature ? 11. On behalf of the prosecution, Dr.Janeshwar Singh who conducted postmortem on the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-16 has been examined as PW-14 and opined that mode of death was haemorrhagic shock due to head injury leading to cardio respiratory arrest and death was homicidal in nature. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding 9 recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Beronika was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 12. It is the case of no direct evidence, rather conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. 13. We may also make a reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus: “In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence....”. 14. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 79, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; 10 (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 15. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ 1104), it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. 16. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book “Wills’ Circumstantial Evidence” (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; 11 (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted”. 17. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must 12 show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Suresh and Another v State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 654 has observed that cases of circumstantial evidence, the courts are called upon to make inferences from the available evidence, which may lead to the accused's guilt. The court at paras 41 and 42 has observed thus : “41. The aforesaid tests are aptly referred as Panchsheel of proof in Circumstantial Cases (refer to Prakash v. State of Rajasthan). The expectation is that the prosecution case should reflect careful portrayal of the factual circumstances and inferences thereof and their compatibility with a singular hypothesis wherein all the intermediate facts and the case itself are proved beyond reasonable doubt. 42. Circumstantial evidence are those facts, which the court may infer further. There is a stark contrast between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. In cases of circumstantial evidence, the courts are called upon to make inferences from the available evidence, which may lead to the accused's guilt. In majority of cases, the inference of guilt is usually drawn by establishing the case from its initiation to the point of commission wherein each factual link is ultimately based on evidence of a fact or an inference thereof. Therefore, the courts have to identify the facts in the first place so as to fit the case within the parameters of “chain link theory” and then see whether the case is made out beyond reasonable doubt. In India we have for a long time followed the “chain link theory” since Hanumant 13 case, which of course needs to be followed herein also.” 19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sailendra Rajdev Pasvan and Others vs. State of Gujarat Etc., AIR 2020 SC 180 observed that in a case of circumstantial evidence, law postulates two-fold requirements. Firstly, that every link in the chain of circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and secondly, all the circumstances must be consistent pointing out only towards the guilt of the accused. We need not burden this judgment by referring to other judgments as the above principles have been consistently followed and approved by this Court time and again. 20. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis 14 except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. 21. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 22. On a perusal of the judgment of the trial Court, it would reveal that the main circumstance on which the Trial Judge found the appellants guilty of the crime is the recovery of Gadasa stains with blood from appellant Ayodhya @ Ramfal Rajwade vide Ex.P-4 and nighty stains with blood from appellant Pushpa Panna vide Ex.P-6 and as per FSL report (Ex.P-35), human blood was found on Gadasa seized from appellant Ayodhya @ Ramfal Rajwade and nighty seized from appellant Pushpa Panna. 23. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: - “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 15 Obje 24. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Asar Mohammad and others v. State of U.P., AIR 2018 SC 5264 with reference to the word “fact” employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has held that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. It has been further held that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. Their Lordships relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 observed as under: - “13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 1 SCC 253, 16 in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus: “23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (supra) has held thus: (IA p. 77) “… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” 26. The Supreme Court in the matter of Perumal Raja alias Perumal v. State, Rep. By Inspector of Police, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 12 has defined the ‘custody’. It held that the expression “custody” under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even 17 surveillance by the police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police. 27. The Supreme Court in the matter of Boby v State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 held that the basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. Section 27 puts a bar to use the confessional statement, but the fact that discovery and information which proved to reliable would be a circumstantial evidence. 28. From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear that homicidal death was proved by the prosecution as per postmortem report (Ex.P-16) of Dr.Janeshwar Singh (PW-14) who conducted autopsy. Babulal Rajwade (PW-1) has stated in his evidence that the incident happened 5-6 months ago. At that time, he had gone to the house of deceased Bhairi @ Beronika to get liquor, then deceased Bhairi @ Beronika told her to sit at home she is coming from Pushpa’s house. After about 15-20 minutes when he was sitting at deceased Bhairi @ Beronika’s house, at that time, someone closed the door of the house from outside, 18 after that he raised an alarm, then after about 10-15 minutes appellant Pushpa Panna came and opened the door and told him that someone has taken her sister deceased Bhairi @ Beronika or killed her, then Pushpa was crying. Then he asked Pushpa what happened, then she did not tell anything and she was going towards the field with a torch, then he was following Pushpa, then he saw that Mahendra and his mother were coming from the field, and Mahendra slapped him two-three times. In para 4 of his evidence, he has denied that he had love affair with deceased Beronika. He has also denied that he used to go to her house because he had love affair with the deceased. The witness says that he used to go to her house to drink alcohol. He has denied that he went to Pushpa’s house with Pushpa to search for deceased Beronika. He has admitted that Beronika had kept a white coloured gamacha with her while going to the wedding. He has denied that he came to know that accused / appellant Ramfal @ Ayodhya and Pushpa Panna both conspired to lock him inside Bhairi’s house and kill Bhairi and hide the evidence. Bhairi’s body was taken to the field and thrown there. 29. The trial Court in para 40 of its judgment has held that on the night of 27.04.2019, before the incident, Babulal was at the house of deceased Beronika and deceased Beronika went to Pushpa Panna’s house after informing Babulal. After that, Babulal was sitting at the deceased’s house for about 15-20 minutes, then someone closed the door of the house from outside and after 10- 19 15 minutes i.e. when the deceased went to Pushpa Panna’s house, about 30-35 minutes later, the door of deceased Beronika Panna’s house which was closed from outside was opened by appellant Pushpa Panna and in the meantime, the deceased was found to have died and the flowers planted outside near the house of appellant Pushpa Panna were found fallen and broken. The seizure of Gadasa from appellant Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade and nighty from appellant Pushpa Panna has been found to be credible and human blood has been found on both the articles. No explanation has been given by the appellants regarding the human blood found on gadasa and nighty seized from them. Medical evidence has confirmed that the injury found on the head of the deceased was caused by the seized gadasa and the deceased died due to the said injury. Appellant Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade contacted appellant Pushpa Panna several times on mobile before 9.06 P.M. and after 10.09 P.M. on the incident date 27.04.2019, but on the incident date 27.04.2019, between 9.06 P.M. to 10.09 P.M., appellant Ayodhya Rajwade did not contact appellant Pushpa Panna over mobile, which provides a strong basis for the presence of the appellants together during the incident. The existence of love/illicit relationship between appellant Ayodhya Rajwade and appellant Pushpa Panna and appellant Pushpa Panna being jealous of deceased Beronika Panna due to appellant Ayodhya Rajwade coming to her house have also been found relevant as motive. 30. From the above facts, it is clear that on 27.04.2019 at about 9 20 P.M. when Babulal was at the house of deceased Beronika Panna and deceased Beronika Panna went to Pushpa Panna’s house after informing Babulal, then appellant Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal was already present at Pushpa Panna’s house and when appellant Pushpa Panna was cooking food, during that time, appellant Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal was doing wrong things with deceased Beronika Panna, since appellant Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal had love/illicit relationship with appellant Pushpa Panna, seeing which appellant Pushpa Panna felt bad, then Pushpa Panna quarreled with him and appellant Pushpa Panna locked the house of the deceased from outside and the appellants together killed deceased Beronika Panna @ Bhairi by assaulting her head with gadasa. 31. The prosecution has proved the following circumstances against the appellants:- (i) Appellant Ayodhya @ Ramfal Rajwade and appellant Pushpa Panna together on 27.04.2019 at between 9.30 P.M. to 9.45 P.M. at village Khala Dafapara under Police Station Darima formed a criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of deceased Beronika Panna in the house of the deceased. (ii) The appellants on the said date, place and time in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy killed deceased Beronika Panna @ Bhairi by assaulting her on the head with an iron gadasa at the entrance of the courtyard of the house of the deceased. 21 (iii) The appellants on the said date, time and place took the dead body of the deceased to another place in the field and hide it near a Neem tree in order to cover themselves from legal punishment. (iv) Appellant Ayodhya Rajwade @ Ramfal Rajwade on the said date, time and place caused the murder of deceased Beronika @ Bhairi, Scheduled Tribe woman, on the ground that she belonged to the said caste. 32. Applying the aforesaid well settled principles of law and taking into consideration the facts in totality and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in our considered view, the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is just and proper warranting no interference of this Court.
Arguments
7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that after the death of Beronika, her brother Robert Pradeep Tirkey (PW-3) has obtained the entire property and household article of the deceased and he has also tried to withdraw the LIC amount of Rs.2,00,000/-. Learned trial 7 Court has failed to appreciate that Robert Pradeep Tirkey (PW-3) has obtained the copy of charge-sheet from the Court and perused the entire records and on the basis of said records, he has made statement before the trial Court only for convicting the appellants in this false case. They further submit that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that there is no direct or reliable evidence to connect the appellants in commission of murder of the deceased and the conviction of the appellants is based upon the assumption and presumption. Learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellants only on the basis of circumstantial evidence, though the chain of circumstances are missing and not completed to each other. They also submit that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that no motive or intention alleged against the appellants and in absence of any motive or intention, the impugned conviction of the appellants under Sections 302, 201 and 120B of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 being unsustainable in law, deserves to be quashed. Learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that there is no direct or indirect material
Decision
33. In the result, the criminal appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 34. It is stated at the Bar that the the appellants are in jail, they shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 35. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. 36. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail term, to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment 22 passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Judge Bablu