Shaskar Das Saliu v. State of Chhattisgarh

Shri Vivek Sharma, Advocate fbr the oetitioaer. Shri Ajit Singh, Panel Lawyer for the State/i Shri R.S.Patel, Advocate for tlie respondent No. 2 (Passed on 08m day of Augiist, 2009) . By tliis petition, the petitioner seeks a writ in the nature ofmandamus 1 to correet the date of birth of the directins the resoondent No. petitioner m the mark sheet ofclass 10 . The facts, in nutshell, as projected by the petitioner is a student of in tlie year 1996 Bacheior of A-ts (Part II). He passed class 8 from Govemment Primary School Maliud (B) (Annexiire P/l) Guaderdehi. In the niark-sheet of class 8 , the date of bu-fli of the petitioner was mentioned as 10 July, 1985. Thereafter, tiie petitioner passed c!ass 10 in tiie year 2001 therem iii his mai'k-sheet, the date of biilh was meatioiied as 10 August.1985. The petitioner passed the Hieher Secondan' School Certificate exaiiunation in the year 2004. Later on, when the petitioner applied for soms service in the year 2006, he could come to know that there is some mistake in recordins date of bhlh oftlie petitioiier in tlie mark -sheet of class 10 dated March-April, 2001.

Shri Shanna, leamed counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the date of birth of the petitioner was vvrongly mentioaed as 10 Juh',1985. Shri Shamia submits that ia August, 1985 iiistead of 10 tlie class 8 niark-sheet asd in the Dakl-ula Kharij register, the date of birth ofthe petitioaer was mentioned as 10 July, 1985. He furtlier submits that the petitioner had approached the respondent No. 2 for correction ofhis date ofbirth in tlie mark-sheet afler a period ofthi'ee vears. According to the petitioner, the application was made after a period of in support of the aforesaid three years. However, no docutnent statement has been filed. It appears fhat no application has been made to the respondent No. 2. Per contra, Shri Patel, leamed counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 subinits that the petitioner has taken 5 vears to raise tliis issue when the Board has decided not to entertain any application for correction ofdate ofbirth ifthe same is made after a period ofthree years.

Accordmgly, no amendment/corTection can be made after a period of 5 years. In support of his contention, leamed counsel relies on a decision offhe Hi^i Court of Madhya Pradesh, i.e. Rajbal' Smgh v. Board of Secondan'Education. Bkopal.^' I have heard leamed counsel appearing for the parties, pemsed the plsadings and documents appended thereto. On perusal of the pleadings, it is found that the petitioner has not indicated any date as to when the petitioner has made the application to the authorities after he received the mark-sheet of class 10 (Annexure P/2). The petitioner iadicated am'thing whether he has received any has fuilfaer not response from any authority at any point of time. Further, petitioner has filed this petition on 26.6.2006 afier about 6 years seekingthe above-stated.reliefs. v

li'i.Rajbal' (sv.pra), leamed Single Judge oftlie High Court of Madhya Pradesh has observed as under: "7. On bare reading ofthe aforesaid Rules it is absolutely clear that certam stages ai'e provided for correctioa or change in the date of birth. Ru!e 9 makes it ca'tegorically clear that 110 application iii regard to' date of birth shall be entertamed eilfaer under Rule 7 or 8 after the fomi for the level of Board's exammation at the ead of secondan' education has been sent to the Board or aftei- the student has left the school, ifthe student has not pursued education upto the eud of secondary standard. Thus, the school authorities have no power to reetify the mistake after the forms are sent to the Board. On a perusa! of thc Rules, it is grap!iically 20Q1 t'2's MFLJ 276 ~"^s~^^ ^-"- ye"'^ \ I 1 clear that there is ao provision for correction ofdate ofbirth by flie Board. Iii absence of any provision in tlie Rules flie Board is entitled under law to provide guidelines for correction ofdate ofbirth. Tlie Boai-d has frained guidelines which have been brought on record as Annexure P-2. Tfae said guidelmes providc that on eompliaiice of certam formalities there can be rectification of the date of birth. It has been laid down therein that the prayer for rectification or correction of date of birtli would not be acceoted after three years. Subinission ofMr. Jain, leaiTied Senior Counsel is fliat in absence of aiiv limitatioti iii tlie Rules the Board could not have provided a period of limitation in the guidelmes. Iii i-iiy considered opu-iion as tiie Ruies do not deal with the period of limitation the Board has the autliority to stipulate a time iimit for con'ection oftSie date ofbirth and I do not perceive any error in such a provision. " On bare perusal of the provisions of Rule 7, 8 and 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Date of Birth (Entries inthe School Register) Rules, 1973 (for fhat no request 'the Ruies, 1973'), chaage/correction of date of birth would be entertained after expin' of three vears from the date of issue of the mark-sheet. In the case on hand, class 10 mark-sheet was issued in March-April 2001.

A Constiti.rtion Bench ofthe Supreme Court in Chandra BJwshan and . another vs. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Uttar Pradesh (Regional) Lucknow and Oihers^, obser'/ed that "normally the aziestion whether a petition under Art. 226 ofthe Constittition for the issite of a writ of certioran had been presented without undue dekiy or laches is a question for the High Court to decide and this Coiirt would not interfere with the exercise of the discretion oftheHigh Court. "

Fiirther, other Constitution Bench of fhe Supreme Court Rabindranath Bose and Others vs. The Union oflndia and Others, observed as under: "31. But ia so far as fhe attack is'based on the 1952 Seniority Rules, it must fail on another ground. The ground being tiiat this petition under Article 32 ofthe Constitution has been brought about fifteen years after the 1952 Rules were promulgated atid effect given to thein in the Seniority List prepared on August 1, 1953. Leamed counsel for the petitioners says tliat tliis Court has no diseretion and camiot - 31970(15SCC84 AiR-1967 SC 1272 :~:'y' Ivv—' dismiss the petition under Article 32 on the ground that it has been brouglit after mordinate delay. We are unablc to accept this contention..... The leamed counsel for the petitioners strongly urges 32. iu wf/s. Tilokchand tlie decisioa of friis Court Motichand's case (supra) needs review. But after carefiiily considerinR the matter, we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reMonable explanatioii, approacfa this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delav. The higtiest Court in this land has beeii given original jurisdiction to enteftain petitions iinder Article 32 offhe Constitation. It could not have been the intention tliat this Court would go mto stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guarantecd riglit. So it is, but it does not follow froiii this that it was the intention ofthe Constitution makers that this Court should diseard all principles and grant relief in petitions fiied after inordinate delay.

Later, a Constitution Bench offlie Supreme Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others (Bhagw'ati, J. in para 10) observed as under : "10..... .It mav also be noted that the principle on wliich the Court proceeds in refusiiig reiiefto tlie petitioner on ground Coui of laches and delay is that the rights which have accmed to othefs by reason ofthe delay in filing tlie petrtion should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. This principle was stated in the following tenns by Hidayatullali, C.J. in Tilok Chanci vs. H.B. Munshi (supra) : "The paity claiining Fundamental Rights must riglits come iiito move the Court before otlier exiatence. The action ofcourts cannot hanii innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part ofthe person moving the Court. "

The Hish Court in exereise of its diseretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the mdolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. Ifthers is inordinate delay on the part ofthe petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorv expiained, the Hi.eh Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ (See State ofM.P. vs. Nandlaf', U.P. Jal Nigam and jurisdiction. another vs. Jashwant Singh and anolher , Yiimis (Baboobhai) A \ (1974) 1 SCC317 ::(AiR1987SC251) Bf2006)11 SCC464 Hamid Padvekar v. State of Maharashtra , Tridip Kwnar Dingal andothers Vs. State ofV/est Bengal and otSters).

Having regard to the statutory provisions enshrined in Rule 7, 8 and 9 ofthe Rules, 1973, no correction can be made after expiry of three years. Even otherwise, fhe mistake if any which crept m the mark-sheet issued in Mareh-April, 2001caimot be con-ected at this stage by issuing a -wrvt in favour ofthe petitioner.

This Court in Smt. Shashibala Gandhrala vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others on 3-1-2007 obsen'ed that "the cazise ofaction arose on 6-6-1995. when the commumcation was sent bv the State Government. to the authorities for grant ofrevised pay-scale. The petitioner has not taken any steps ever since till these petitions were filed m December, 2006 and remained tardy and indolent. This belated approach wcndd certainly cav.se hardship and inconvemence to other side.

Thus, ao relief can be granted to the petitioner at tiiis stage and the writ petition is accordmgly dismissed. However, on tlie request of leamed couusel appearing for the petitioner, liberty is reser\7ed to the petitioner to take recourse to the competent civil jurisdiction, for declaration ofhis date ofbirth, ifso advised. —— Sd/- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge Y Anrit 1 (JT 2009 (3) SC 487) ° (2009) 1 SCC 768)