1. Dukhwa S/o Late Daddi Singh, Aged About 58 Years, 2. Phoolmatiya, Wd/o Late v. 1. Kaushilya Devi W/o Ramkumar Singh, Aged About 43 Years, D/o Late Bhondal, R/o
Case Details
Digitally signed by AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI DN: cn=AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, ou=HIGH COURT, o=HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, st=Chhattisgarh, c=IN Date: 2025.09.25 17:01:01 +0530 1 2025:CGHC:48943 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 193 of 2022 1. Dukhwa S/o Late Daddi Singh, Aged About 58 Years, 2. Phoolmatiya, Wd/o Late Daddi Singh, Aged About 78 Years, Both R/o Village Chanti (Dongri), Tehsil Janakpur, District Korea, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants. versus 1. Kaushilya Devi W/o Ramkumar Singh, Aged About 43 Years, D/o Late Bhondal, R/o Village Chanti (Pipartola), Tehsil Bharatpur, District Korea, Chhattisgarh. 2. Sushila, D/o Late Bhondal, Aged About 46 Years, R/o Village Chanti, Tehsil Bharatpur, District Korea, Chhattisgarh. 3. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Korea, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents. (Cause title downloaded from CIS periphery) For Appellant
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate. For Respondent No.3/State : Ms. Mandwi Bhardwaj, Advocate. SB : Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Judgment on Board 24.09.2025 1. This Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellants/ defendants under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the CPC”) against the judgment and decree dated 22.12.2021 passed by the First Additional District 2 Judge, Manendragarh, District Koriya (CG) in Civil Appeal No. 52-A/2018, which, in turn, arises out of the judgment and decree dated 04.02.2017 passed by the Civil Judge, Class-II, Janakpur, District Koriya (CG) in Civil Suit No.2-A/2010. 2. By the impugned judgment and decree, the First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendants and confirmed the findings arrived at by the trial Court, whereby, the trial Court has partly decreed the suit and declared that Kaushilya Devi respondent No.1 (plaintiff No.1 therein) and Sushila respondent No.2 (defendant No.3 therein) both are title holder of half share of suit property which is situated at Village Chanti (Dongritola), Tahsil Bharatpur, District Koriya. 3. In this appeal, the short question that arises for consideration is whether this Second appeal involves any substantial question law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC and whether such appeal should be admitted for final hearing? 4. Henceforth, the parties shall be referred to as per their description before the Court below. 5. Facts of the case, in brief, are that plaintiff/respondent No.1 Kaushilya Devi and her mother Sundariya had filed a civil suit on 26.06.2010 for declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction in respect of suit property situated at Village Chanti (Dongaritola), Tahsil Bharatpur, District Koriya. During the pendency of said suit, mother of the plaintiff Sundariya died. It 3 was averred that plaintiffs and defendants belong to one and same family and suit property was originally owned by Jailal Gond who has two sons namely Daddi and Bhondal. Bhondal has two wives, however, one wife, namely, Manmatiya died issueless and from the second wife Sundariya Bai, two daughters were born namely Kaushilya (plaintiff) and Sushila (defendant No.3). Further, appellant No.1/defendant No.1 Dukhwa is son of late Daddi Singh, and appellant No.2/defendant No.2 Phoolmatiya is widow of late Daddi Singh. By way of such suit, the plaintiffs have claimed that they are entitled for half share in the suit property of late Bhondal. 6. In the written statement, the defendants/appellants herein had pleaded that plaintiffs have no possession over the suit property as Sundariya Bai was not legally wedded wife of late Bhondal and no legal marriage was solemnized between them as per Gond rituals and customs. It was also pleaded that since the parties belong to Gond community, they are not governed by Hindu marriage law. It was also pleaded that in their community daughters have no legal right over property. 7. Learned trial Court after hearing the parties framed as many 8 issues and after analysis of evidence reached to the conclusion that plaintiff Kaushliya and defendant Sushila Bai specifically proved the fact that they are the daughters of late Bhondal and both of them were born out of relation between Bhondal and Sundariya as the earlier wife Manmatiya Bai has died issue less and she has also 4 performed marriage of both the daughters. In consequence, the trial Court has declared half share of suit property in favour of the branches of Bhongal i.e. both the daugthers namely Kaushilya and Sushila. 8. Thereafter, on appeal, preferred by the appellant/defendants the First Appellate Court has affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. It is this judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, which is impugned in the Second Appeal filed by the appellants/defendants. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the trial Court and the First Appellate Court have committed an error by not appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective so the finding recorded by both the Courts below is perverse. When query has been put that there are concurrent finding of fact that both the daughters are of late Bhondal and Sundariya Bai and earlier wife of Bhondal, namely Manmatiya Bai died issueless, learned counsel for the appellant fairly admits that appellants/defendants have not brought on record any evidence with regard to their custom to draw a conclusion that female legal heirs of tribal community are not entitled for share in suit property. 10. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 11. In the matter of Ram Charan & Ors. Vs. Sukhram & Ors (2025 INSC 865), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined the situation 5 when neither any particular law of a community nor any custom was proved by either side. In such circumstances, it was observed that principle of natural justice should be served on the basis of principle of justice, equity, and good conscience which find statutory force in view of Section 6 of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, and following was observed at para 14 and 15 which are reproduced hereunder:- 14. The Chhattisgarh High Court in Mst. Sarwango and others v. Mst. Urchamahin and others (2013 SCC OnLine Chh 5) has observed : “10. In the present case, both the parties have failed to prove any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in their Gond caste i.e. member of Scheduled Caste whom Hindu law or other law governing inheritance is not applicable. In absence of any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in their caste governing the inheritance the Courts are required to decide the rights according to justice, equity and good conscience in term of Section 6 of the Act. Plaintiffs Sawango and Jaituniya are daughters of Jhangal, nearest relative rather the respondents, who were daughter-in-law of brother of Jhangal and legitimate or illegitimate son of Balam Singh, son of Dakhal. 11. In these circumstances, plaintiffs Sawango and Jaituniya would be the 6 persons' best entitlement to inherit the property left by their father. The Courts below ought to have decreed the suit for partition to the extent of share of Jhangal, but the Court below i.e. the lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit in absence of any law or custom for inheritance for a member of Schedule Tribe. The Courts below are required to decide their rights of inheritance in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh and undivided State of Madhya Pradesh” (Emphasis supplied) 15. Given the above situation that neither any particular law of a community nor custom could be brought into application by either side, we now proceed to examine the argument advanced before the High Court that is the principle of justice, equity, and good conscience. These principles find statutory recognition in the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, Section 6 whereof is extracted herein below : “6. In cases not provided for by section five, or by Rule in cases any other law for the time being in force, the Courts shall act according to justice, equity and good conscience.” 7 12. Eventually, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment observed that unless otherwise prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out and also held that the daughter has right in her father's property. The following was materially observed at Para 27 and 28 which reads thus:- "27. Similarly, we are of the view that, unless otherwise prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out. 28. Granted that no such custom of female succession could be established by the appellant- plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case, denying Dhaiya her share in her father’s property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin." 13. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, there is concurrent finding of fact by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court that plaintiff Kaushliya and defendant No.3 Sushila both are daughters of Bhondal. Further, no custom has been proved by the defendants that plaintiff are not entitled for share of their father's property. So both Courts below have rightly concluded that they 8 have right of inheritance on the property of their father and, as such, declared the half share of subject property in their favour which was earlier left by late Jailal Gond between two branches of Gaddi and Bhondlal equally. 14. It is well established that when there is concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in light of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the two Courts below appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded by both the Courts are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they do not call for any interference. 16. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Ajay Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge