08.05.2025 Criminal Revision No. 293 of 20 25 • Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (Balco) v. • State Of Chhattisgarh
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:21359 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Judgment reserved on: 07.04.2025 Judgment delivered on: 08.05.2025 Criminal Revision No. 293 of 20 25 • Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (Balco) A Company Incorporated Under The Companies Act, Registered OfÏce At Aluminium Sadan, Core 6, Scope Complex, 7 Lodhi Road, New Delhi, 110003, India, Through Its Authorised Signatory And Power Of Attorney Holder Shri Soumya Banerjee S/o Late Indra Nath Banerjee Age 42 Years, Associate Gen- eral Manager, Legal Balco, Balco Nagar Korba Chhattisgarh. ---applicant (s) versus • State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House OfÏcer / Investigating OfÏ- cer Police Station Balco Nagar Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent(s) C riminal Revision No. 305 of 2025 • Gannon Dunkerley And Co. Ltd., Head OfÏce At Mumbai, Registered OfÏce Address - New Excelsior Building, 3rd Floor, A. K. Nayak Marg, Fort, Mumbai - 400001, Through Its Manager- Legal, C.E.D., New Delhi Division Namely Thakur Vishwaranjan Kumar Sinha, Aged About 49 Years, S/o Thakur Manoranjan Kumar Sinha, R/o R.Z.-48, Syndicate Enclave, New Delhi - 110045 ---applicant (s) Versus • State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station Balco, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) 2 C riminal Revision No. 318 of 2025 • Bureau Veritas (India) Private Limited (Bvil) A Company Incorporated Under The Companies Act, 1956. Registered OfÏce At- 72, Business Park, Ground Floor, Marol Industrial Area, Cross Road, C, Midc, And- heri (East), Mumbai City, Mumbai- 400093, Maharashtra, India Through The Authorised Signatory Manoj Kumar Nair (Presently Business Man- ager Chhattisgarh In applicant Company), S/o Late Shri K.N. Muraleed- haran Nair, Aged About 49 Years, R/o Block No. H-1, Flat No. 1, Chouhan Town, Junwani, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) ---applicant (s) Versus • State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House OfÏcer/investigating OfÏ- cer, Police Station Balco Nagar, District Korba C.G. ---- Respondent CRR No. 293/2025 For Appellant : For Respondent/State : CRR No. 305/2025 For Appellant : For Respondent/State : CRR No. 318/2025 For Appellant : For Respondent/State : Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Advocate Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, A.G. along with Mr. R.S. Marhas, Additional A.G. Mr. Sunil Otwani along with Mr. Anshul Tiwari, Advocates. Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, A.G. along with Mr. R.S. Marhas, Additional A.G. Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Prateek Sharma, Advocates Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, A.G. along with Mr. R.S. Marhas, Additional A.G. Hon'ble S hri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge C.A.V. Judgment 1. Since the impugned order and facts are similar in all the criminal revisions, these revisions are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The present criminal revisions under Section 438 and 442 of Bhartiya 3 Nagrik Surksha Sanhita, 2023 preferred by the applicants against the impugned order dated 21.02.2025 passed in Session Trial No. 26/2010 by the learned Special Judge SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act)
Legal Reasoning
District Korba (C.G.), whereby learned trial Court, exercising the powers under Section 319 of Cr.P.C., directed the impleadment of BALCO, SEPCO, GDCL, BVIL and DCPL companies as accused and summons were issued through their authorized ofÏcers. 3. The facts briefly stated are that on 23.09.2009, a tragic incident wherein occurred due to strong winds accompanied by heavy rain and lightning, Chimney 1 collapsed resulting into the unfortunate demise of 40 workers and injuries to several employees working at that time at the construction site. In pursuance of the above unfortunate incident on 25.09.2009, FIR No. 377/2009 was lodged under Section 304/34 by the police ofÏcers of PS Balco Nagar against the ofÏcers of BALCO Management and GDCL by Police Station Balco Nagar. After investigation, a charge-sheet dated 04.01.2010 and a supplementary charge-sheet dated 08.04.2010 was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class against 17 accused persons, wherein certain high-ranking ofÏcials of the applicants including the Project Head
Legal Reasoning
(Accused No. 2 Viral Mehta) who was also vice president, projects, Mr. Deepak Narang and Mr. Mahapatre who are alleged to be supervising the construction on behalf of BALCO are arrayed as accused. Apart from the ofÏcials of BALCO, other ofÏcials of the EPC contractor SEPCO and GDCL who were constructing the chimney were charge-sheeted and are facing trial on the ground that sub-standard material was used and there was a technical defect under construction chimney which led 4 to the collapse and the concerned ofÏcials had the knowledge of sub- standard material being used and therefore, a charge-sheet under Section 304 was filed against the accused to put to trial. Therefore, the criminal case No. 78/2010 has been committed by the learned JMFC, Korba, District Korba and now it is pending before the learned Additional Session Judge, Korba District Korba (C.G.) as S.T. No. 26/2010 captioned as “State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Manoj Sharma and Others”. 4. Thereafter, charge under Section 304/34 of IPC was framed by the learned trial Court against the accused persons vide its order dated 19.06.2013. Being aggrieved by both the orders dated 15.04.2013 and 19.06.2013 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Korba, District Korba (C.G.) petitions under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and revision petitions under Sections 397/401 of Cr.P.C., were filed by the accused persons and the same was dismissed and it was directed by Hon’ble High Court in CRR No. 450/2013 vide order dated 15.09.2023 to conclude the trial within a period of one year from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. 5. Thereafter the trial was again resumed in compliance of the order passed by the Hon’ble Court vide order dated 15.09.2023 and as many as 46 witnesses have examined and the Investigating OfÏcer namely Vivek Sharma (PW-46) was examined by the prosecution and the trial Court has put some questions with I.O. and he has given answer as under:- U;k;ky; }kjk ijh{k.k %& izå Øå&01 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh dk fuek.kZ fdl daiuh }kjk ,oa fdlds LokfeRo ifjlj esa djok;k tk jgk Fkk \ 5 SEPCO daiuh }kjk fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk mi Bsdk mRrj %& ckydks daiuh }kjk ,d EPC (Errection Procurement Commission- ing) dkaVªsDV ds rgr ckydks daiuh ds LokfeRo ds ifjlj esa lsIdks daiuh dks 1200 esxk okV ds ikoj IykaV fuek.kZ dk Bsdk fn;k x;k Fkk] ftlesa fpeuh dk fuek.kZ Hkh lfEefyr FkkA izåØå&02 ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh dk fMtkbZu fdl daiuh ls rS;kj djok;k x;k Fkk \ mRrj %& fpeuh dk fMtkbZu lsIdks daiuh }kjk GDCL daiuh ls rS;kj djok;k FkkA izåØå&03 ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk Bsdk fdl daiuh dks fn;k x;k Fkk\ mRrj %& ckydks daiuh }kjk ,d EPC (Errection Procurement Commission- ing) dkaVªsDV ds rgr ckydks daiuh ds LokkfeRo ds ifjlj esa lsIdks daiuh dks 1200 esxk okV ds ikoj IykaV fuekZ.k dk Bsdk fn;k x;k Fkk] ftlesa fpeuh dk fuekZ.k Hkh lfEefyr FkkA izåØå&04 mDr Bsdsnkj lsIdks@ (sub contract) fdl daiuh dks fn;k x;k Fkk \ mRrj %& Bsdsnkj lsIdks @SEPCO daiuh }kjk fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk mi Bsdk (suv contract) GDCL daiuh dks fn;k x;k FkkA izåØå&05 fpeuh ds fuekZ.k esa GDCL daiuh dks D;k dk;Z djuk Fkk \ mRrj %& GDCL daiuh dks fpeuh dk fuekZ.k Mªkbax fMtkbZu ds rduhdh iSjkehVj ds vuqlkj fuekZ.k djuk FkkA izåØå&06 fpeuh ds fuekZ.k esa BVIL daiuh ,oa DCPL daiuh dks D;k dk;Z djuk Fkk \ mRrj %& ckydks daiuh }kjk BVIL daiuh ,oa DCPL daiuh dks izkstsDV dh Dok- fyVh ,oa fuekZ.k ds lqijfotu ds fy, FkbZ ikVhZ daiuh ds rkSj ij vuqcaf/kr fd;k x;k FkkA izåØå&07 D;k fuekZ.kf/ku@nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh okyk ckydks dk ifjlj uxj fuxe dksjck ds {ks=f/kdkj esa vkrk Fkk \ mRrj %& th ;g ifjlj uxj fuxe dksjckds {ks\f/kdkj esa vkrk FkkA izåØå&08 D;k ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh dk fuekZ.k izkjaHk djus ls iwoZ fpeuh dh fMtkbZu dksjck uxj fuxe esa izLrqr dj vizqoy@vuqefr yh xbZ Fkh ,oa le;≤ ij vko’;d gksus ij uohuhdj.k djok;k x;k Fkk \ mRrj %& ckydks daiuh }kjk dksbZ vizqoy@vuqefr ugh yh xbZ FkhA izåØå&09 D;k ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh dk fuekZ.k izkjahk djus ls iwoZ QsDVªhl ,DV ds varxZr lacaf/kr foHkkx ls vizqoy@vuqefr yh xbZ Fkh ,oa le;≤ ij vko’;d gksus ij uohuhdj.k djok;k x;k Fkk \ mRrj %& eq>s tkudkjh ugha gSaA izåØå&10 D;k ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh dk fuekZ.k izkjaHk djus ls iwoZ fpeuh dh fMtkbZu Town & Country Planning Department esa izLrqr dj vizqoy@vuqefr yh xbZ Fkh ,oa le;≤ ij vko’;d gksus ij uohuhdj.k djok;k x;k Fkk \ mRrj %& ckydks daiuh }kjk dksbZ viqzoy@vuqefr ugha yh xbZ FkhA izåØå&11 D;k ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh dk fuekZ.k izkjaHk djus ls iwoZ NŸkhlx<+ Hkwfe fodkl fu;e 1984 ds fu;e 14 ds varxZr ftyk dysDVj dh v/;{krk esa xfBr vuqek- snu lfefr ls HIGH RISE BUILDING’ Åpsa Hkou ds fuekZ.k gsrq vizqoy@vuqefr yh xbZ Fkh ,oa le;≤ ij vko’;d gksus ij uohuhdj.k djok;k x;k Fkk \ mRRkj %& eq>s tkudkjh ugha gSa A izåØå&12 D;k ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh dk fuekZ.k izkjaHk djus ls iwoZ vU; fdlh fu;e dkuwu ds varXkZr lacaf/kr foHkkxksa ls viqzoy@vuqefr yh xbZ Fkh ,oa le;≤ ij vko’;d gksus ij uohuhdj.k djok;k x;k Fkk \ mRrj %& ckydks daiuh }kjk esjs le{k fdlh Hkh izdkj ds viqzoy@vuqefr ds nLrkost is’k ugha fd, x,A izåØå&13 ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh dk fuekZ.k dk;Z fdl frfFk dks izkjaHk fd;k x;k Fkk ,oa fdl frfFk dks fpeuh nq?kZVukxzLr gqbZ \ mRrj %& fpeuh fnukad 23-09-2009 dks nq?kZVukxzLr gqbZ Fkh ,oa ckydks daiuh }kjk yxHkx 06 ekg igys bldk fuekZ.k dk;Z ’kq: fd;k x;k FkkA izåØå&14 nq?kZVuk gksus ds le; rd fpeuh dh ÅapkbZ fdruh gks xbZ Fkh ,oa fdruh nwjh ls fn[kkbZ nsrh Fkh \ mRrj %& nq?kZVuk ds le; fpeuh dh ÅapkbZ yxHkx 250 ehVj igqap xbZ Fkh ,oa fpeuh dbZ fdyksehVj ls fn[kkbZ nsrh FkhA izåØå&15 fpeuh fxjus ds dkj.k fdrus O;fä;ksa dh e`R;q gqbZ ,oa fdrus yksx ?kk;y gq, \ 6 mÙkj %& fpeuh fxjus ds dkj.k 40 yksxksa dh e`R;q gqbZ ,oa yxHkx 8&10 yksx ?k;y gq, FksA izåØå&16 D;k ihfMrks dks izfrdj iznku fd;k x;k] ;fn gk¡ rks izR;sd e`rd ds ok- fjlku dks fdruh jkf'k iznku dh xbZ Fkh ,oa ?kk;yksa dks fdruh jkf'k iznku dh xbZ Fkh ,oa izfrdj dh jkf'k fdlds }kjk iznku dh xbZ Fkh \ mÙkj %& e`rdksa ds ifjokjtuksa dks ,oa vkgrksa dks daifj;ksa }kjk izfrdj dh jkf'k iznku dh xbZ Fkh] ftldh jkf'k esa ugha crk ldrkA izåØå&17 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuhj ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa D;k ckydks daiuh ds izca/ ku }kjk lHkh ekudks dk ikyu djrs gq, fpeuh dk fuekZ.k djk;k x;k ,oa D;k muds }kjk lHkh lqj{kk ekudks dk ikyu fd;k x;k \ mÙkj %& ckydks daiuh }kjk fpeuh ds fuekZ.kdk;Z esa r; ekudks dk ikyu ugha fd;k x;kA izåØå&18 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa D;k Bsdsnkj lsIdks daiuh ds izca/ku }kjk lHkh ekudks dk ikyu djrs gq, fpeuh dk fuekZ.k djk;k x;k ,oa D;k muds }kjk lHkh lqj{kk ekudks dk ikyu fd;k x;k \ mÙkj %& lsIdks daiuh }kjk fpeuh ds fuekZ.kdk;Z esa r; ekudks dk ikyu ugha fd;k x;kA izåØå&19 nq/kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa D;k mi Bsdsnkj thåMhålhå,yå daiuh ds izca/ku }kjk lHkh ekudks dk ikyu djrs gq, fpeuh dk fuekZ.k djk;k x;k ,oa D;k muds }kjk lHkh lqj{kk ekudks dk ikyu fd;k x;k \ mÙkj %& GDCL daiuh }kjk fpeuh ds fuekZ.kdk;Z esa r; ekudks dk ikyu ugha fd;k x;kA izåØå&20 D;k fpeuh ds fuekZ.k esa ckydks daiuh] lsIdks daiuh ,oa thåMhålhå,yå daiuh }kjk fu;eksa dk mYya?ku fd;k x;k ,oa ykijokgh dh xbZ \ mÙkj %& th gk¡A izåØå&21 D;k nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa uxj fuxe dksjck ds vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk fuekZ.k LFky dk fujh{k.k fd;k x;k] ;fn fujh{k.k fd;k x;k rks D;k&D;k dk;Zokgh dh xbZ \ mÙkj %& eq>s tkudkjh ugha gSaA izåØå&22 D;k nq?kVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa NÙkhlx<+ Hkwfe fodkl fu;e 1984 ds fu;e 4 ds varxZr ftyk dysDVj dh v/;{krk esa xfBr vuqeksnu lfefr ds vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk fuekZ.k LFky dk fujh{k.k fd;k x;k] ;fn fujh{k.k fd;k x;k rks D;k&D;k dk;Zokgh dh xbZ \ mÙkj %& eq>s tkjdkjh ugha gSA izåØå&23 D;k nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa dksjck ds vfXu 'keu foHkkx }kjk fuekZ.k LFky dk fujh{k.k fd;k x;k] ;fn fujh{k.k fd;k x;k rks D;k&D;k dk;zokgh dh xbZ \ mÙkj %& eq>s tkudkjh ugha gSA izåØå&24 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa dksjck ds ftyk dysDVj dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& ml le; Jh v'kksd vxzoky ftyk dysDVj FksA izåØå&25 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa uxj fuxe dksjck ds dfe'kuj@vk;qä dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& eq>s ;kn ugha gSA izåØå&26 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa ftyk iapk;r dksjck ds eq[; dk;Zdkjh vf/kdkjh dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& eq>s ugha irkA izåØå&27 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa dksjck ds iqfyl v/kh{kd dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& Jh jru yky Mkaxh ml le; ftyk iqfyl v/kh{kd FksA izåØå&28 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx ¼Hkou ,oa lM+d½ dksjck ds dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& 'kk;n pUnzkdj lkgc Fks] iwjk uke ;kn ugha gSA izåØå&29 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa dksjck ds vfXu 'keu foHkkx ds eq[; vf/kdkjh dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& eq>s ;kn ughas gSA izåØå&30 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa lsIdks daiuh ds ps;jesu] eS- uftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& eq>s vkt ;kn ugha gSA izåØå&31 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa GDCL daiuh ds ps;jesu] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO dkSu Fks \ mÙkj %& eq>s vkt ;kn ugha gSA 7 izåØå&32 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa daiuh ds ps;jesu] BVIL daiuh ds ps;jesu] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO dkSu Fks ? mÙkj %& eq>s vkt ;kn ugha gS A izåØå&33 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa DCPL daiuh ds ps;jesu] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO dkSu Fks ? mÙkj %& eq>s vkt ;kn ugha gS A izåØå&34 nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa ckydks daiuh ds ps;jesu] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO dkSu Fks ? mÙkj %& eq>s vkt ;kn ugha gS A izåØå&35 vkids }kjk ckydks daiuh] lsIdks GDCL daiuh BVIL daiuh ,oa DCPL daiuh dks vfHk;qDr D;ks ugh cuk;k x;k ? mÙkj %& foospuk ds vuqlkj mDr daifu;ka vfHk;qDr ugh gSA izåØå&36 vkids }kjk ckydks daiuh lsIdks GDCL daiuh BVIL daiuh ,oa DCPL daiuh ds ps;jesu] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO dks vfHk;qDr D;ksa ugh cuk;k x;k ? mÙkj %& foospuk ds vuqlkj eSus mDr ofj"B vf/kdkfj;ks dks vfHk;qDr gksuk ugh ik;k Fkk 6. On the basis of evidence of the Investigating OfÏcer Vivek Sharma (PW- 46), on 21.02.2025 the Court has observed in its order in paragraph 31, 36, 37 & 38 as under:- 31- U;k;ky; }kjk iwNs x, iz’uks ds mRrj esa foospd }kjk ;g Hkh dFku fd;k x;k gSS fd ckydks daiuh }kjk mlds le{k fdlh Hkh izdkj ds vizqoy @ vuqefr ds nLrkost is’k ugh fd;s x;s Fks A ckydks daiuh] lsIdks daiuh] GDCL daiuh] BVIL daiuh ,oa DCPL }kjk fpeuh ds fuekZ.kdk;Z esa r; ekudks dk ikyu ugh fd;k x;kA fpeuh ds fuekZ.k esa ckydks daiuh] lsIdks daiuh ,oa th-Mh-lh-,y- daiuh }kjk fu;eksa dk mYya?ku fd;k x;k fd mldks ugh irk gS fd nq?kZVukxzLr fpeuh ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dh vof/k esa ckydks daiuh] lsIdks daiuh] GDCL daiuh] BVIL daiuh ,oa DCPL daiuh ds ps;jesu] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO dkSu&dkSu Fks A 36- vk’p;Ztud :i ls foospd }kjk ckydks daiuh] lsIdks daiuh] GDCL daiuh] BVIL daiuh ,oa DCPL daiuh dks vfHk;qDr ugh cuk;k x;k gS ,oa mDr daifu;ksa ds lapkyu esa lfdz; :i ls dk;Zjr ofj"B vf/kdkjhx.k tSls fd ps;jesu] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] egkizca/kd ,oa CEO bR;kfn ds ckjs esa tkudkjh ,df=r ugh dh xbZ gS ,oa mudks vfHk;qDr ugh cuk;k x;k gS A blh izdkj foospd }kjk 'kkldh; vf/ kdkfj;ksa ds fo:} muds voS/k yksi ds laca/k esa lk{; ladyu ugh fd;k x;k gS mudks vfHk;qDr ugha cuk;k x;k gSA 37- vkijkf/kd U;k; dk ;g fl}kar gS fd fdlh funksZ"k dks ltk ugh gksuh pkfg;s ,oa dksbZ Hkh nks"kh O;fDr n.M ls cpuk ugh pkfg;s] tSlk fd ihfMrks ,oa lekt ds vf/kd- kjksa ds laca/k esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk U;k; n~"Vkar State of Haryana V. Ram Mehar, (2016) 8 SCC 762 esa vfHkO;Dr fd;k x;k gS A ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd bl izdj.k esa xgu ,oa lw{e tkap dh vko’;drk Fkh] D;ksafd ;g ,d ,slh nq?kZVuk gS ftlus iwjs lekt ,oa ns’k ij vlj Mkyk gS A blds dkj.k iwjk lekt vkgr gqvk gSA blfy;s e`rdksa ds vkfJrksa ,oa vkgrks ds vfrfjDr iwjk lekt gh ihfMr dh Js.kh esa vkrk gS A blfy;s U;k;ky; dk drZO; gS fd ;fn foospuk vf/kdkjh }kjk lHkh yksxksa dks vfHk;qDr ugh cuk;k x;k gS rks ftu yksxksa ds fo:} lk{; miyC/k gS mudks vfrfjDr vfHk;qDr cukrs gq;s lekt ds vf/kdkjks dh j{kk djsa A izdj.k esa vHkh Hkh mijksDr dafMdk 35] 36 ds laca/k esa vfrfjDr foospuk dh vko’;drk gSA ;g Hkh tkap dk fo"k; gS fd foospuk vf/kdkjh }kjk foospuk esa lHkh vko’;d vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:} lk{; ladyu D;ks ugh fd;k x;k ,oa D;ks lHkh dks vfHk;qDr ugh cuk;k A D;k foospuk vf/kdkjh }kjk foospuk esa ykijokgh dh xbZ vFkok vKkurko’k dk;Z fd;k x;k vFkok mlds }kjk Hkh vius 'kkldh; drZO; dk voS/k yksi fd;k x;k A 38- ;g ,d vkS|ksfxd nq?kZVuk Fkh A ;gkaW ij Res Ipsa Loquitur dks fl}kr ykxw gksrk gS ftlds vuqlkj ifjfLFkfr;kW Lo;a cksyrh gS A ;g fl}kar ykijokgh dks vizR;{k :i ls lkfcr djus dh vuqefr nsrk gS A 8 7. The entire issue revolves around Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. is reproduced as under:- Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. (1)Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.(2)Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.(3)Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4)Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub- section (1), then -(a)the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re- heard;(b)subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. 8. In CRR No. 293/2025, Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Advocate for the applicants contended that for the first time, in the Impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court holds that the applicants would also be responsible, since certain required permits from authorities were not obtained. There is no evidence on record, or material collected during Trial to suggest any causal link between grant of permissions from Municipal Corporation of Korba and/or Department of Town & Country planning and the accident. This is relevant since, a building with all the requisite permissions may still collapse if built with sub-standard material and a building which is built illegally but with good quality material, will not collapse. He further submits that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the Investigating OfÏcer had stated that he was in fact, not aware whether the applicants had various requisite permissions to construct the 9 Chimneys and that he had only not received such permissions from the applicants. In fact, there is also no finding of the Ld. Trial Court connecting the non-grant of any such approval to the cause of the accident. In other words, there is no material to suggest that the alleged lack of approvals had any causal link with the use of sub-standard material/technical deficiencies which are alleged to have led to the incident in question. The Trial Court is aware of the above lacuna and has therefore, relied on the doctrine of res Ipsa Loquitor which has no bearing in a criminal trial: the Trial Court has relied on the principle of res ipsa loqnitor in view of the fact that this was a case of an industrial accident. In fact, the reliance on this doctrine itself shows that there is no material/evidence to connect the applicants to the incident in question. However, even otherwise, the Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor has no application in criminal law, where each allegation and circumstance linking the accused to the offence must be proved. the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the principle of res ipsa loquitor has no application in criminal law. In support of this contention, he placed his reliance upon decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Syed Akbar V. State of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30 and Nanjundappa V. State of Karnataka (2022) SCC OnLine SC 628. 9. Mr. Krishnan, Sr. Advocate further submitted that S. 319 application filed in this case, would show that there are no averments that any fresh evidence against the applicant s has been recorded. Moreover, learned trial Court failed to apply the high standard of evidence required to summon an accused under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. i.e. the evidence 10 recorded during trial if unrebutted would lead to the conviction of the accused to be summoned. Under Section 319 of CrPC, the Court must record a satisfaction that the evidence has been recorded against the proposed accused if unrebutted would lead to a conviction. The trial Court must rely on evidence recorded in the trial and cannot rely on material which is already a part of the chargesheet. In support of this contention, he placed his reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hardeep Singh V. State of Punjab, (2014 3 SCC 92) and Hetram @ Babli Vs. State of Rajasthan 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3509. 10.Mr. Krishnan, Sr. Advocate further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court has misapplied the law on corporate criminal liability in summoning the applicants to face trial for the said offence and the trial Court has failed to apply the tests to array a company as an accused in a trial i.e. there must be an active role prescribed to the person controlling its affairs. The evidence/material is totally missing in this case and is not to be found either in the material before Court or referred to in impugned order. In support of this contention, he placed his reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609). He further submitted that the accused persons employed by the applicant were only Project Level ofÏcers, and certainly did not have the capacity to control the affairs of the entire company. Even otherwise, the applicant is an organization with over 4000 employees, and therefore, the Board of Directors and Executive Management cannot be expected to know the minute details of each Project being carried out by the applicants. There is no evidence, either 11 in the Chargesheet or led before the Court to ascertain the involvement of the Directors or other high-ranking ofÏcials of the applicant in the construction of the chimney in question. In fact, the Chargesheet filed alleges responsibility on the Project OfÏcials of the applicant who were working on site There is no question, therefore, of there being material to satisfy the Trial Court that it was the actions of the management of the applicants which contributed directly and unerringly to the incident in question. The Ld. Trial Court has in Para 36 of the Impugned Order observed that further investigation is required into the role of the Management of the applicants However, the Ld. Trial Court has in Para 40 concluded that the applicants and its Management must be made accused in the Trial. If the role of the Management requires further investigation, then there is no ground to record a conclusion that they are required to be summoned as accused, especially under S. 319, Cr.P.C.
Decision
For the abovesaid reasons, the impugned Order is passed in excess of jurisdiction exercisable under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. of jurisdiction liable to be set aside under Section 438 r/w 442 of BNSS. 11.In CRR No. 305/2025, Mr. Sunil Otwani, learned counsel for applicant supported submission of Mr. Krishnan, Sr. Advocate for applicant- BALCO and submitted that prosecution alleged GDCL’s involvement in the construction of the chimney under a turnkey contract with SEPCO, however, GDCL was not named in the original FIR(2009) or the chart- sheet. After 15 years, during the examination of witness No. 46, the prosecution sought GDCL’s impleadment under Section 319 CrPC claiming “new evidence” of corporate culpability. The investigating ofÏcer’s testimony admitted that no material existed against the GDCL at 12 the chargesheet stage. The learned trial Court ignores settled legal principles under Section 319 of CrPC and binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. No evidence links GDCL’s management to acts of negligence or mens rea under Section 304 of IPC. He further submit that according the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92, the Court must have “more than prima facie satisfaction” from trial evidence that the accused committed the offence. Mere doubt or suspicion is insufÏcient. He further submitted that for implicating a company, the prosecution must prove the active role of its directing mind. He further submitted that the principle of res ipsa loquitur from external forces and shared responsibilities among multiple entities, not GDCL’s exclusive negligence. The prosecution’s reliance on presumptive inferences, without direct evidence of GDCL’s culpability, violates settled legal principles. The criminal charges under Section 304 IPC must fail for lack of mens rea and causation. In support of this contention, he placed his reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Akbar V. State of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30 Therefore, impugned order is liable to be set aside. 12. In CRR No. 318/2025, Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Sr. Advocate for applicant has argued on the same set of facts as has been argued by the learned counsel for applicant in CRR No. 293/2025 and submitted that as per the agreement with BALCO, BVIL had very limited third party role to inspect and make observations to BALCO but has no power, authority, or control to either bound to comply with its direction or to stop the work. BVIL is not a construction contractor and was never involved in the actual 13 construction of the chimneys or any other structure at the site. Its role was strictly limited to third-party inspection services, as per the terms of the Agreement dated April 03, 2008. In Questions 17, 18 and 19 of the IO’s examination, the IO was asked whether safety standards were followed by BALCO, SEPCO, and GDCL. The applicant was not mentioned at all in these critical inquiries. Further, in Questions 35 and 36 of the IO’s examination, it is explicitly stated that the IO did not consider the applicant , or its Chairman, Managing Director, General Manager, and CEO as accused based on the evidence. In fact, BVIL employees have been made as witnesses right from the beginning. The impugned Order is perverse regarding BVIL. Therefore, learned trial Court has passed the illegal order and committed jurisdictional error and perverse finding, which is likely to be set aside. 13.Per Contra, Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Advocate General for State submitted that since the names of Senior OfÏcers of these companies who are involved in the management, are not available, therefore they were not impleaded. However, exercising the powers under Section 319 of CrPC, these companies are impleading and the summons were issued through their authorized ofÏcers. The discretion exercised by the trial Court by exercising the power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was within the four corners of law, the order of the trial Court is not an unreasonable order and there is neither any non-consideration of any relevant material or misreading of records, therefore the impugned order cannot be interfered in exercise of the limited power under Section 397 and 401 of CrPC. 14. Learned Advocate General for State further submitted that a bare 14 perusal of Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. would show that there is no such bar that the said power cannot be exercised at the fag end of the trial. On the contrary the prescription of Section 319 of Cr.P.C., prescribes that whenever during the course of any inquiry or trial, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused, has also committed any offence, for which he could be tried together, the Trial Court can proceed against such person. In the matter of "Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. State of Punjab" reported in (2023) 1 SCC 289, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given a detailed guidelines that how the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in following manner :- “41.1. If the competent court finds evidence or if application under Section 319 CrPC is filed regarding involvement of any other person in committing the offence based on evidence recorded at any stage in the trial before passing of the order on acquittal or sentence, it shall pause the trial at that stage. 41.2. The Court shall thereupon first decide the need or otherwise to summon the additional accused and pass orders thereon. 41.3. If the decision of the court is to exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and summon the accused, such summoning order shall be passed before proceeding further with the trial in the main case. 41.4. If the summoning order of additional accused is passed, depending on the stage at which it is passed, the court shall also apply its mind to the fact as to whether such summoned accused is to be tried along with the other accused or separately. 41.5. If the decision is for joint trial, the fresh trial shall be commenced only after securing the presence of the summoned accused. 41.6. If the decision is that the summoned accused can be tried separately, on such order being made, there will be no impediment for the court to continue and conclude the trial against the accused who were being proceeded with. 41.7. If the proceeding paused as in para 41.1 above, is in a case where the accused who were tried are to be acquitted, and the decision is that the summoned accused can be tried afresh separately, there will be no impediment to pass the judgment of acquittal in the main case. 41.8. If the power is not involved or exercised in the main trial till its conclusion and if there is a split up (bifurcated) case, the power under effect, pointing to the involvement of the additional accused to be summoned in the split up (bifurcated) trial. 15 41.9. If, after arguments are heard and the case is reserved for judgment the occasion arises for the court to invoke and exercise the power under Section 319 Cr.PC, the appropriate course for the court is to set it down for rehearing. 41.10. On setting it down for re-hearing, the above laid down procedure to decide about summoning; holding of joint trial or otherwise shall be decided and proceeded with accordingly. 41.11. Even in such a case, at that stage, if the decision is to summon additional accused and hold a joint trial the trial shall be conducted afresh and de novo proceedings be held. 41.12. If, in that circumstances, the decision is to hold a separate trial in case of the summoned accused as indicated earlier - (a) the main case may be decided by pronouncing the conviction and sentence and then proceed afresh against summoned accused. (b) In the case of acquittal the order shall be passed to that effect in the main case and then proceed afresh against summoned accused.” 15.Learned Advocate General for State relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of "Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others" reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :- "12. Section 319 Cr.P.C. springs out of the doctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used as a beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit underlying the enactment of Section 319 Cr.P.C. 13. It is the duty of the Court to do justice by punishing the real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The question remains under what circumstances and at what stage should the court exercise its power as contemplated in Section 319 Cr.P.C.? 17. Section 319 Cr.P.C. allows the court to proceed against any person who is not an accused in a case before it. Thus, the person against whom summons are issued in exercise of such powers, has to necessarily not be an accused already facing trial. He can either be a person named in Column 2 of the chargesheet filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. or a person whose name has been disclosed in any material before the court that is to be considered for the purpose of trying the offence, but not investigated. He has to be a person whose complicity may be indicated and connected with the commission of the offence. 38. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that as 'trial' means determination of issues adjudging the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing 16 of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the 'trial' commences only on charges being framed. Thus, we do not approve the view taken by the courts that in a criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being taken. 52. In Dharam Pal (CB), the Constitution Bench approved the decision in Kishun Singh (Supra) that the Sessions Judge has original power to summon accused holding that "37...... the Sessions Judge was entitled to issue summons under Section 193 Code of Criminal Procedure upon the case being committed to him by the Magistrate. 38.. The key words in Section 193 are that "no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code." The above provision entails that a case must, first of all, be committed to the Court of Session by the Magistrate. The second condition is that only after the case had been committed to it, could the Court of Session take cognizance of the offence exercising original jurisdiction. Although, an attempt has been made to suggest that the cognizance indicated in Section 193 deals not with cognizance of an offence, but of the commitment order passed by the learned Magistrate, we are not inclined to accept such a submission in the clear wordings of Section 193 that the Court of Session may take cognizance of the offences under the said Section". 55. Accordingly, we hold that the court can exercise the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. only after the trial proceeds and commences with the recording of the evidence and also in exceptional circumstances as explained herein above. 57. Thus, the application of the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C., at the stage of inquiry is to be understood in its correct perspective. The power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only on the basis of the evidence adduced before the court during a trial. So far as its application during the course of inquiry is concerned, it remains limited as referred to hereinabove, adding a person as an accused, whose name has been mentioned in Column 2 of the charge sheet or any other person who might be an accomplice. Question No.(iii): Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?" 16.Learned Advocate General for State further relied a similar view which was also taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "Juhru and others Vs. Karim and another" reported in (2023) 5 SCC 406 holding as under:- "16. It is, thus, manifested from a conjoint reading of the cited decisions that power of summoning under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised routinely and the existence of more than a prima facie case is sine quo non to summon an additional 17 accused. We may hasten to add that with a view to prevent the frequent misuse of power to summon additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and in conformity with the binding judicial dictums referred to above, the procedural safeguard can be that ordinarily the summoning of a person at the very threshold of the trial may be discouraged and the trial court must evaluate the evidence against the persons sought to be summoned and then adjudge whether such material is, more or less, carry the same weightage and value as has been testified against those Page 19 who are already facing trial. In the absence of any credible evidence, the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. ought not to be invoked. 6. The question of nature of evidence as annunciated in Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "S. Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak and others" reported in (2017) 16 SCC 226 holding as under :- "28. Insofar as power of the Court under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. to summon even those persons who are not named in the charge sheet to appear and face trial is concerned, the same is unquestionable. Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. is meant to rope in even those persons who were not implicated when the charge sheet was filed but during the trial the Court finds that sufÏcient evidence has come on record to summon them and face the trial. In Hardeep Singh's case, the Constitution Bench of this Court has settled the law in this behalf with authoritative pronouncement, thereby removing the cobweb which had been created while interpreting this provision earlier. As far as object behind Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, the Court had highlighted the same as under. "19. The court is sole repository of justice and a duty is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with the courts in our criminal justice system where it is not uncommon that the real accused, at times, get away by manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong that an accused makes efforts at times to get himself absolved even at the stage of investigation or inquiry even though he may be connected with the commission of the offence." 29. At the same time, the Constitution Bench has clarified that the power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. can only be exercised on 'evidence' recorded in the Court and not material gathered at the investigation stage, which has already been tested at the stage under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. This principle laid down in Hardeep Singh's case has been explained in Brjendra Singh and Others v. State of Rajasthan in the following manner: 10. It also goes without saying that Section 319 CrPC, which is an enabling provision empowering the Court to 6 (2017) 7 SCC 706 Criminal Appeal No. 1720 of 2017 & Ors. take appropriate steps for proceeding against any person, not being an accused, 18 can be exercised at any time after the charge-sheet is filed and before the pronouncement of the judgment, except during the stage of Sections 207/208 CrPC, the committal, etc. which is only a pre-trial stage intended to put the process into motion. 11. In Hardeep Singh case, the Constitution Bench has also settled the controversy on the issue as to whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) CrPC has been used in a comprehensive sense and indicates the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial. It is held that it is that material, after cognizance is taken by the court, that is available to it while making an inquiry into or trying an offence, which the court can utilise or take into consideration for supporting reasons to summon any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the court. The word "evidence" has to be understood in its wider sense, both at the stage of trial and even at the stage of inquiry. It means that the power to proceed against any person after summoning him can be exercised on the basis of any such material as brought forth before it. At the same time, this Court cautioned that the duty and obligation of the court becomes more onerous to invoke such powers consciously on such material after evidence has been led during trial. The Court also clarified that " evidence" under Section 319 CrPC could even be examination-in-chief and the Court is not required to wait till such evidence is tested on cross-examination, as it is the satisfaction of the court which can be gathered from the reasons recorded by the court in respect of complicity of some other person(s) not facing trial in the offence. 12. The moot question, however, is the degree of satisfaction that is required for invoking the powers under Section 319 CrPC and the related question is as to in what situations this power should be exercised in respect of a person named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted. These two aspects were also specifically dealt with by the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh case and answered in the following manner: (SCC pp. 135 & 138, paras 95 & 105-106) "95. At the time of taking cognizance. the court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. Under Section 319 CrPC, though the test of prima facie case is the same, the degree of satisfaction that is required is much stricter. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vikas v. State of Rajasthan [Vikas v. State of Rajasthan, held that on the objective satisfaction of the court a person may be "arrested" or "summoned", as the circumstances of the case may require, if it appears from the evidence that any such person not being the accused has committed an offence for which such person could be tried together with the already arraigned accused persons. 105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be 19 established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if "it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence" is clear from the words for which such person could be tried together with the accused. The words used are not "for which such person could be convicted". There is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused." (emphasis supplied) 13. In order to answer the question, some of the principles enunciated in Hardeep Singh case may be recapitulated: power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised by the trial court at any stage during the trial i.e. before the conclusion of trial, to summon any person as an accused and face the trial in the ongoing case, once the trial court finds that there is some "evidence" against such a person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered that he appears to be guilty of the offence. The "evidence" herein means the material that is brought before the court during trial. Insofar as the material/evidence collected by the IO at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC. No doubt, such evidence that has surfaced in examination-in-chief, without cross-examination of witnesses, can also be taken into consideration. However, since it is a discretionary power given to the court under Section 319 CrPC and is also an extraordinary one, same has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. The degree of satisfaction is more than the degree which is warranted at the time of framing of the charges against others in respect of whom charge-sheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than probability of his complicity." 17.Learned Advocate General further submitted that the court has emphasized that "evidence" under Section 319 the word "evidence" is the evidence recorded in the court and not the material gathered at the investigating stage because the material has already been tested at the stage of Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. He submitted that in the matter of "Hardeep Singh" case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also 20 settled the controversy on the issue of "evidence" used in Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the word "evidence" used in Section 319 CrPC is, has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during the investigation or the word "evidence, is limited to the evidence recorded during the trial. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that it is that material after cognizance is taken by a court, that is available to it while making an inquiry or trying an offence, which the court utilizes or takes into consideration for supporting reasons to summon any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the Court. In Hardeep Singh case (supra), it has further been held that the "evidence" under Section 319 Cr.P.C. could even be examined-in-chief and the court is not required to wait till such evidence is tested on cross-examination as it is the satisfaction of the court which can be gathered from the reasons recorded by the court in respect of complicity of some other persons, not facing the trial in the offence. So far as the satisfaction which is required to invoke under Section 319 CrPC is concerned, the Constitutional Bench in "Harideep Singh case (supra), had answered the same in the following manner: - “95. At the time of taking cognizance, the court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. Under Section 319 Cr.P.C., though the test of prima facie case is the same, the degree of satisfaction that is required is much stricter. A two- Judge Bench of this Court in Vikas v. State of Rajasthan, held that on the objective satisfaction of the court a person may be 'arrested' or 'summoned', as the circumstances of the case may require, if it appears from the evidence that any such person not being the accused has committed an offence for which such person could be tried together with the already arraigned accused persons. 105. Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and an extra- ordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions 21 Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. the purpose of providing if it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused." The words used are not for which such person could be convicted. There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused.” 18. Learned State Counsel submitted that the evidence herein means the material that is brought before the court during the trial. The evidence /material collected by the IO at the stage of inquiry can be utilized for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the Court. Since a discretionary power is given to the court under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. and the same is extraordinary one, the word of caution has been made that it has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. The degree of satisfaction is a little more than the degree which is warranted at the time of framing of the charges, but, it should not be equivalent to the evidence required for conviction. A prima facie opinion would not intend the court to exercise the said power. However, if the evidence is stronger then applies at the stage of framing of charges, the court has discretion to exercise the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In the above context, if we examine the conclusion recorded by the Trial court in para 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the order, the learned Trial Court had minutely examined the evidences 22 available on record, not only this, the learned Trial Court has also taken support from the entire law pertaining to Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. After considering the evidences of the IO, wherein he had specifically stated that a high rise construction of Chimney admeasuring about 250 meters is collapsed on account of use of sub-standard materials and lack of proper care and cautions. The Trial Court has also considered the evidences of the IO where he had stated that no approval or sanction was taken for construction of the said Chimney under the provisions of law, as these companies had not submitted any document to demonstrate that any permission / approval was taken by them. The Trial Court has further concluded that the Chimney was being constructed in the premises of BALCO company, for its construction, the SEPCO and GDCL companies were engaged. The BALCO had entrusted the work of supervision, quality control and safety parameters, drawing, designing and checking, appointed the BVIL and DCPL companies. All of these companies had not taken into consideration regarding the construction, craftsmanship, safety parameters etc. The Trial Court has further concluded that all these companies who were engaged in construction of Chimney at different levels, had not only violated the construction parameters, and despite having no approval, raised the construction due to which mishaps had occurred and many persons had not only died but also suffered injuries. The learned Trial Court further concluded that the court has to see that an innocent person should not be punished, however, the guilty should not be escaped. The entire incident shows the recklessness of the accused companies and the persons involved in construction of Chimney. In view of the provisions contained in Section 23 319 of the Cr.P.C. and also in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of "Hardeep Singh" case (supra), the evidence deposed by the IO particularly in para 169 to 173, not only this, the learned Trial Court had also questioned the 10 and during the said examination, while replying to the question nos. 2, 3, 4. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20 the IO had specifically answered the question that due to lapses on the part of these companies, the incident occurred. Not only this, they were not having the requisite approval /sanction. 19.Learned State Counsel further submitted that from the judgment which has been referred in the previous part, a common line which travels through all the judgments is that while exercising the power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C, the learned Trial Court has to look only the evidence which is recorded by him. The said evidence should be more than a prima facie case, the cross-examination is not required, the satisfaction of the court is the prime consideration and the evidence so collected should be of the said standard which is more than a prima facie case. After considering the aforesaid prescriptions, the learned Trial Court had passed the impugned order. In view of the judgments pronounced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the instant revisions are bereft of any merit and are liable to be dismissed. One another important aspect which has to be considered by this Hon'ble Court is that the present revision petitions have been filed under the provisions contained in Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. The powers under Section 397 are only for the purpose of satisfying the court regarding correctness, legality or propriety of any finding or order. Like the court of appeal, the Revisional Court cannot be re-appreciate the entire evidences. It is 24 respectfully submitted that while exercising the powers under Section 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. the Revisional Court cannot set aside the order merely because another view is also possible Unless the order passed by the Trial Court is perverse or the view taken by the Court is wholly unreasonable or there is non consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court would not be justified in setting aside the order merely because another view is also possible. Unless the order passed by the Trial Court is perverse or the view taken by the Court is wholly unreasonable or there is non consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court would not be justified in setting aside the order. Throughout the revision petitions and even during the course of arguments, it was not the case of the applicantss that any relevant material was not considered by the learned Trial Court or there is a misreading of records. Neither it is the case of the revisionist that the order is unreasonable on any point of law. There is only grievance appearing to be that at the fag end of the trial, the power under Section 319 of the Cr.PC has been exercised. The language of Section 319 of Cr.P.C. itself stipulates that the said power can be exercised at any stage of trial. The judgments on issue further clarify the intent of the legislature that even at the time of passing of final order, the Trial Court can exercise the power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. and can summon the additional accused and thereafter to decide whether the judgment of the accused, who already had faced the trial, has to be pronounced or the new added accused has to be tried separately. In the present case, during the course of production of evidence, the evidence of the 25 Investigating OfÏcer, the sufÏcient evidence as defined in the matter of Hardeep Singh case (supra) has been surfaced before the Trial court, therefore, the discretion exercised by the Trial Court by exercising the power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was within the four corners of law, the order of the learned Trial court is not an unreasonable order and there is neither any non consideration of any relevant material or misreading of records, therefore, the impugned order cannot be interfered in exercise of the powers under Section 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. In view of the aforesaid, the present revisions petitions deserve to be dismissed being sans merit. 20.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 21. The challenge in all three revisions is based on the ground that the incident occurred on 23.09.2009, charge-sheet was filed on 04.01.2010 and supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 08.04.2010. 46 witnesses have been examined and after examination of Investigating OfÏcer (Vivik Sharma PW-46), who is normally the last prosecution witness to be examined before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court had exercised the powers under Section 319 of Cr.P.C., only on the basis of I.O. evidence and summon the applicants herein to face the trial on the ground that the applicants did not obtained certain building approvals from the relevant authorities prior to constructing the said Chimney. 22. The scope and parameters for exercise of power under S. 319, Cr.P.C. are no longer res integra, and have been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matters of Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 26 (2014) 3 SCC 92, Para 105-106 and Hetram @ Babli v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC, para 7 held as under:- *105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if "it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence" is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused". The words used are not "for which such person could be convicted". There is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused." (emphasis supplied) Hetram @ Babli v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC "7. This Court in the case of Hardeep Singh has observed that the test to be applied for dealing with the application under Section 319 of the CrPC is of more than a prima facie which is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge. The test to be applied is that if the evidence goes unrebutted, whether it would lead to conviction. The Court has to record satisfaction in such terms and if such satisfaction cannot be recorded, the Court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 of the CrPC." 23.On perusing the impugned order, there is no evidence on record, or material collected during trial to suggest any casual link between grant of permission from Municipal Corporation of Korba and/or Department of Town & Country planning. The Investigating OfÏcer in his cross- examination had stated that he was in-fact, not aware whether the 27 applicants had various requisite permissions to construct the chimneys, even, the prosecution has neither cited nor examined any witness from the Town and Country Planning Department or Municipal Authorities or any other competent person to depose in respect of the building and other permissions. However, the trial Court has applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 24. The Supreme Court has on multiple occasions clarified that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor would not apply to criminal proceedings, since in such proceedings, the prosecution is expected to prove cach element of the offence and the connection of the accused with each such element. In the matter of Syed Akbar . State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30, the, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 28, 30 as under:-, "28. In our opinion, for reasons that follow, the first line of approach which tends to give the maxim a larger effect than that of a merely permissive inference, by laying down that the application of the maxim shifts or casts, even in the first instance, the burden on the defendant who in order to exculpate himself must rebut the presumption of negligence against him, cannot, as such, be invoked in the trial of criminal cases where the accused stands charged for causing injury or death by negligent or rash act. The primary reasons for non-application of this abstract doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to criminal trials are: Firstly, in a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of the charge against the accused always rests on the prosecution, as every man is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and criminality is never to be presumed subject to statutory exception. No such statutory exception has been made by requiring the drawing of a mandatory presumption of negligence against the accused where the accident "tells its own story" of negligence of somebody. Secondly, there is a marked difference as to the effect of evidence viz. the proof, in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings, a mere preponderance of probability is sufÏcient, and the defendant is not necessarily entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt; but in criminal proceedings, the persuasion of guilt must amount to such a moral certainty as convinces the mind of the Court, as a reasonable man beyond all reasonable doubt. Where negligence is on essential ingredient of the offence, the negligence to be established by the prosecution must be culpable or gross and not the negligence merely based upon an error of judgment. As pointed out by Lord Atkin in Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) 2 All ER S52: 1937 AC 28 576), "simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability, is not enough"; for liability under the criminal law "a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved. Probably, of all the epithets that can be applied 'reckless' most nearly covers the case". 30. Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact, is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. These are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances shown make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt." Nanjundappa v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 628, Para 9: Here it would be useful to advert to the dictum in the case of Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known. In Syad Akbar (supra), this Court opined 29. Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. These are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence, and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt." 25.The Supreme Court in the cae of Sunil Bharati Mittal v. СВІ, (2015) 4 SCC 609 has held in the following terms: "38. First case which needs to be discussed is Iridium India [Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201]. Before we discuss the facts of this case, it would be relevant to point out that the question as to whether a company could be prosecuted for an offence which requires mens rea had been earlier referred to in a Constitution Bench of five Judges in Standard Chartered Bank o. Directorate of Enforcement 29 (2005) 4 SCC 530 2005 SCC (CH) 961] The Constitution Bench had held that a company can be prosecuted and convicted for an offence which requires a minimum sentence of imprisonment. In para 8 of the judgment, the Constitution Bench clarified that the Bench is not expressing any opinion on the question whether a corporation could be attributed with requisite mens rea to prove the guilt." "40. It is abundantly clear from the above that the principle which is laid down is to the effect that the criminal intent of the "alter ego" of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the company/corporation. The legal proposition that is laid down in the aforesaid judgment in Iridium India case [Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74:(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201) is that if the person or group of persons who control the affairs of the company commit an offence with a criminal intent, their criminality can be imputed to the company as well as they are “alter ego” of the company." 26.The Ld. Trial Court has summoned the appellants alleging therein that construction of the chimney was allegedly being carried out without required permissions. The findings of the Ld. Trial Court in the Impugned Order as is clear from the following: (I) In Para 28 and 29, the Ld. Trial Court records a finding that during investigation it is found, that the construction was carried out totally ignoring the standard control, with sub-standard material ignoring the technical parameters by the person of the applicants and other companies involved in the construction work, which led to the incident and the same is in the statement of IO [PW-46] in court. Thus, the conclusion arrived at with respect to absence of permission and construction being illegal is perverse and contrary to the evidence recorded during trial. (II) In Para 35, the Ld. Trial Court finds that further investigation is required into the question of whether the construction of the chimney 30 was illegal. (iii). In Para 36, the Ld. Trial Court finds that there is no information relating to the management of the applicants at the relevant time. (IV). In Para 37, the Ld. Trial Court has recorded that there is a requirement for further investigation in terms of Para 35 & 36 of the Impugned Order. (V). In Para 39 of the Impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has recorded that there exists evidence that the construction of the Chimney was an illegal act. (VI). In Para 40, the Ld. Trial Court has held that the higher ofÏcials of the applicants Company are required to be summoned to face trial, which is without any disclosure of offence against them or their role in the construction of the collapsed chimney. (VII) In Para 31, the Ld. Trial Court notes that the Investigating OfÏcer was not aware about whether any permissions under the High-Rise Building Rules was taken by the applicants or not. 27.Upon reading of the above finding of the trial Court, there is no any disclosure of offence against them for their role in the construction of the collapsed chimney, even otherwise, there is no evidence that the Investigating OfÏcer ever requested the allegedly required permissions and these permissions were not furnished by the applicants and there is no evidence by any ofÏcial of the concerned departments that the permissions required by the applicants were not obtained. No questions pertaining to the alleged lack of permissions was put to PW-47 (Mr. Gunjan Guptal who was the erstwhile CEO of the applicant BALCO. In 31 fact, the testimony of PW-47 has not even found mentioned in the Impugned Order. Though, there is no substantive evidence that applicants did not have the permissions for construction, as required by the judicial pronouncements for summoning an accused, except the uncertain and contradictory answers by the IO particularly Answer no. 35 and 36, wherein it specifically states that the Company or other director, CEO were not found to be accused. 28.A reading of the Impugned Order shows that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to record a satisfaction that the evidence against the applicants is of a degree higher than charge but less than conviction as required u/S. 319, Cr.P.C. In this case, the Ld. Trial Court has proceeded to summon the applicants based only on the opinion evidence recorded by the IO. There is no observations in the Impugned Order that what is the evidence recorded against the applicants which would lead to a particular offence, much less the offence under S. 304, IPC. The Impugned Order is silent on how the evidence of the IO discloses an offence under S. 304, IPC for which the Trial is proceeding or under any other offence under the relevant municipal law. Though the power u/S. 165, Cr.P.C. is wide, the consequence of exercising such power must be consistent with other provisions of the Cr.P.C., including S. 319, Cr.P.C. wherein the Ld. Trial Court must be satisfied that a particular offence has been committed. There is no discussion on the logical consequence of the questions posed under S. 165, Cr.P.C. on the exercise of the power u/S. 319. Cr.P.C. 29. Further trial Court ignored the strict legal threshold for invoking section 319, CrPC. The trial Court, in paragraph 37 of its order dated 21.02.2025 32 categorically observed that “further additional investigation would be necessary in the present case” this finding underscores the absence of conclusive evidence to establish the applicant ’s culpability. However, in paragraph 38, the Court paradoxically invoked the principle of res ipsa loquitur to presume negligence against applicants’ company. This reasoning is internally inconsistent and legally untenable, as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur presupposes that the facts are so clear that negligence is self-evident, eliminating the need for further investigation. By simultaneously holding that “additional investigation is necessary” and applying res ipsa loquitur , the Trial Court committed an error in law, rendering its findings perverse. On the other hand, the Court has observed that there is a requirement of further investigation and on the other hand the learned Court has allowed the application under Section 319 of CrPC which is absured and perverse and contrary to the settled principle of law envisaged under Section 319 CrPC. Therefore, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case and the applicants can not be summoned/tried for framing of charge under Section 304 of IPC when there is no mens rea of the company. 30. Applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and upon perusing the order of the trial Court and also considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the prosecution after 15 years of filing the charge-sheet, filed an application summon the applicants as an accused under Section 319 of Cr.P.C., further the impleadment after 15 years of trial, even the High Court had earlier directed to conclude the trial within one year vide order dated 15.09.2023 and also no details are mentioned in the application under Section 319 of 33 Cr.P.C. filed by the prosecution as to how the role of the applicants have emerged based on the evidence recorded in trial requiring the applicants to be summoned under S. 319, Cr.P.C., moreover against the applicants there is also no mention as to the evidence which has come during trial disclosing the ingredients of an offence under Section 304 of IPC or any other offence under the Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force and reliance is placed only on the opinion of the IO based on the charge-sheet and according to the well settled position of law that the evidence of an Investigating OfÏcer is not substantive evidence but is only his opinion, even otherwise his statement or the answer to the question put to him in no manner discloses the ingredients of any cognizable offence under the IPC or any other provision of law against the applicants, even in the impugned order, there is no whisper as to what offence has been disclosed to have been committed from the statement of the investigating ofÏcer much less any reference to a particular section or the law under which the offence is disclosed and made out and the impleadment application, filed at the far end of the trial, appears aimed at restarting proceedings de novo, causing irreparable prejudice to the applicants. The power to summon new accused requires sufÏcient evidence during trial, not mere suspicion or charge-sheet material under Section 319 CrPC. As such, so far as present applicants are concerned, the trial Court has committed a grave illegal error to pass the order under Section 319 of CrPC. Thus, the impugned order dated 21.02.2025 passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside. 31. Accordingly, the present three criminal revisions are allowed and dis- posed of. 34 32. It is needless to mention herein that the observations made hereinabove are only for the purpose of exercising the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the learned trial Court to decide and dispose of the trial in accordance with the law and on its own merits and on the basis of the evidence to be laid before it. 33. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned trial Court for necessary compliance and follow up action. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Jyoti Digitally signed by JYOTI JHA Date: 2025.05.14 11:08:04 +0530