Industrial Estate Housing Board Bhilai, Durg (M.P. Now CG.) v. The State of M.P
Case Details
1 Judgment reserved on 03.04.2025 Judgment pronounced on 12.09.2025 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 356 of 2003 Ram Naresh Prasad S/o. Ramsakal Prasad aged 49 years Technical assistant grade – 1 Food Corporation of India, Durg Division Durg (M.P. Now Chhattisgarh) R/o. HIG-I-2075 Industrial Estate Housing Board Bhilai, Durg (M.P. Now CG.) ... Appellant versus The State of M.P. (Now Chhattisgarh) Through C.B.I. Jabalpur, CG ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. S.C. Verma, Sr. Counsel with Mr. Aditya Agrawal, Advocate For CBI : Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput C A V Judgment This appeal has been preferred against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.03.2003 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, CBI, Raipur in Special Criminal Case No. 21/2002 convicting the accused/appellant under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (for short “PC Act”) and sentencing him 2 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and pay fine of Rs. 40,000/-, plus default stipulation. 2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 01.01.1986 the accused/appellant was working as Technical Assistant Grade-I in the Food Corporation of India (for short the “FCI”) with posting at Rajnandgaon. On the basis of an information given by Superintendent of Police on 18.11.1997 FIR was registered and after taking permission under Section 17 of PC Act raid was laid in the residential house of the accused/appellant situated at Bhilai, Durg. Inventory of seized articles (Ex.P-1) was prepared. On the same day, raid was also conducted in his Durg office and there also the inventory of the seized articles (Ex.P-2) was prepared. Property worth Rs. 5,97,228.08 has been seized from the house of the accused/appellant which was disproportionate to his known source of income. After taking permission from the competent officer charge sheet was filed against the accused/appellant under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of PC Act followed by framing of charge accordingly. 3. Prosecution examined 08 witnesses in support of its case whereas 19 witnesses have been examined by the defence. Statement of accused/appellant under Section 313 CrPC has also been recorded in which he denied the charge, pleaded false implication. While answering question No. 13, he has stated that price of the articles has not been mentioned as per his statement. Replying to question No. 14 he has stated that the house situated at Gudhiyari is of his mother which was purchased prior to the check period. He has stated that valuation of the houses situated at Gudhiyari and Bhilai is not correct. Replying to question No. 17 he has stated that house situated at Gudhiyari was purchased by his mother for a consideration of Rs. 30,000/- prior to the check period, in which he has not invested any money. 3 Replying to question No. 18, he has stated that Ex. P-13 and enclosures Ex. P-38-A, P-38-B have not been written before him. Replying to question No. 21, he has expressed his ignorance as to whose signatures are there on Ex. P-39-A, Ex. P-39-E. In respect of question No. 22 also he has stated that valuation of the house situated at Bhilai, is made exceedingly. In respect of question No. 56, he has stated that an amount of Rs. 97,165/- was received from fixed deposit and Rs. 59,182/- was from LIC. It is also stated that his family is joint family, head of which is his uncle who works in Bhilai Steel Plant, that he has no sons and his uncle helps him in all the ways, that he has income from agriculture, that his friends and brothers also extend help to him, that he has borrowed money from his friend and brother which has not been returned, and that his brother gave him DD and cash also. 4.
Legal Reasoning
After hearing the parties, learned trial Court by the judgment impugned has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as detailed above. Hence this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant submits that learned trial Court has grossly erred in law and facts in passing the judgment impugned against the appellant. He submits that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence and documents on record in its proper perspective. He further submits that the learned trial Court has not applied its judicial mind at the time of framing charge because the prosecution has alleged that during the check period dated 1/1/86 to 26/1//97 the accused has acquired disproportionate property. He submits that the learned trial Court has erred in law in appreciating the evidence adduced before it. The trial Court ought to have held that the appellant has submitted his explanation before the Court with all relevant documents and assessed his property according to the provisions of law regarding assessment of assets/properties and his income from known 4 sources, and therefore the judgment passed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set-aside. He further submits that the learned trial Court ought to have assessed the amount taken from DW-10 (Subhash Chand Oswal) but it has not been considered, which is bad in law. Learned trial Court ought to have calculated the amount given by DW-18 as the appellant sold the ornaments and obtained Rs. 45,770/- but the prosecution has calculated and taken Rs. 9,890/- only. The defence witness DW-4, DW-16, DW-17, DW-7, DW-10, DW-19 have also given their statement before the trial Court with all official documents wherein the appellant has deposited the amount and received on maturity, which was his known source of income and ought to have been taken into account, but the trial Court has not relied the same. It is submitted that the appellant has also produced his statement of assets, income and expenditure during check period i.e. January 1986 to November 1997 and clarified in details in Annexure-1 (the articles before check period), Annexure-II (the cost of household articles) and Annexure-III (income during check period) along with synopsis but the trial Court has completely ignored and not relied upon the same. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court ought to have disbelieved the evidence of prosecution witnesses because there are number of contradiction in the same, and therefore, launching of criminal prosecution on the basis of mere presumption would not take the place of proof. It is submitted that the learned trial Court ought to have considered the rent received from the house of mother which has been shown by the prosecution at the time of calculation of disproportionate property, and thus it has committed gross legal error in calculating the income of the appellant. It is submitted that the trial Court ought to have considered the expenditure shown by the appellant at the time of extension of building situated at industrial area Housing Board, Bhilai, which has not been 5 done. It is further submitted that the trial Court has wrongly assessed the properties of the appellant during the check period and not assessed his salary properly. He submits that even the sanction to prosecute has not been granted in accordance with law. In these circumstances, the impugned judgment is stated to be not based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record, and is liable to be set aside. He placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter of P. Satyanarayan Murty v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1992) 4 SCC 39, in the matter of M. Krishna Reddy v. State Deputy Superintendent of Police Hyderabad (1992) 4 SCC 45 and in the matter of Vasant Rao Guhe v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2017) 14 SCC 442. 6.
Legal Reasoning
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent - CBI supports the impugned judgment and submits that after actual assessment of the income and expenditure learned trial Court has found that accused/appellant was having the property disproportionate to his known source of income, and the witnesses examined by the prosecution have also established the same. It is submitted that during the check period the accused/appellant’s income has been assessed on the basis of the sources disclosed by him which shows that the amount which has been found by the trial Court is more than his legally acquired property and income. According to him, the prosecution has relied upon the statement of Branch Manager of LIC (PW-1) who in the cross examination has stated that year of purchase of the articles mentioned in Ex. P-3 he has not seen the documents. He also stated that regarding price, the rate list has not been secured from the market and it is mentioned according to the disclosure made by the accused. Counsel for the respondent also relied upon the statement of Sr. Regional Manager, FCI (PW-6) who has also supported the case of the prosecution. Referring to certain documents 6 issued by the LIC and the Banks, learned counsel for the CBI has submitted that the amount of income and expenditure on certain heads varies from the ones arrived at by the trial Court. He however does not dispute that even if such variation is taken into consideration, the income found in his possession would not be disproportionate to his known source of income, and the accused/appellant would not wriggle out of the ambit of conviction. Thus relying on the evidence of other prosecution witnesses, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the findings recorded by the trial Court are fully justified and do not need any interference in this appeal, and therefore, the appeal being devoid of any substance is liable to be dismissed. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Binendra Kumar (PW-1) has stated that in the month of November 1997, he was posted as Additional Branch Manager in Life Insurance Corporation, Bhilai Branch. On 26.11.97 he and one witness who was the Deputy Manager of State Bank of India Main Branch Durg, Guard Inspector B.K. Singh and other CBI team went to the residence of accused Ramnaresh Prasad, situated at Bhilai to make a search. During search, an inventory was prepared by the CBI Inspector (Ex.P.1) under his signature. He has stated that all the documents recovered from the residence of the accused were seized. About Rs. 20,000/- were also recovered. On 26.11.97 office of the accused was also searched and an inventory (Ex.P-2) was prepared. He has stated that the year and price of the articles was mentioned. Locker of the accused in Dena Bank Bhilai was also got opened in the presence of the accused from which gold and silver ornaments, the year and price of the same mentioned in Ex.P-4 was found therein. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he did not see any document mentioning the price and year of 7 purchase of the said articles. Price list of the same was also not secured from the market and the description has been given on the basis of information provided by the accused. Purchase details of ornaments and other articles was not enquired into. Suresh Kumar Mishra (PW-3) has stated that in Saving Account of the accused in SBI the balance amount in the month of November, 1997 is Rs. 94,221.67. He has also stated that STDR (Ex. P-7) has been issued in the name of the appellant on 10.5.1996 for Rs. 42,600/-. H.L. Prasad (PW-6) – Sr. Regional Manager, FCI has stated that valuation of the immovable property was done by the CBI and not by him or by some Meghani. He however is stated to have seen the original document. L.S. Sahu (PW-7) – Assistant Engineer who conducted the valuation of house of the appellant situated at Gudiyari and as per his statement its value was Rs 46,402/- which was constructed in the year 1986. He has stated that another house of the accused/appellant is situated at Bhilai which was also inspected by him, and valuation of the said house is Rs. 2,71,958/- which was constructed in the year 1992, and Ex. P-39 is the valuation report thereof. He has further stated that in his valuation he has not added the value of land of the Bhilai House. The constructed house situated at Bhilai has been purchased and as per Ex.P-39 marked other than red ink has not been constructed by him which is about 33.07 square meter. B.K. Singh (PW-8) has stated that the FIR was lodged by the then Superintendent of Police S.R. Jaiswal vide Ex.P-40 and for enquiry it was allotted to him. In his cross- examination he has stated that it is not correct to say that the accused has got Rs. 69,279.64/- as additional arrears. He stated that accused has not informed to his department that he had given in rent the house situated at Gudihari, therefore, the rent income amounting to Rs. 1,08,000/- cannot be said to be income of the appellant. 8 9. Ramesh Chandra Mishra (DW-1) is the Senior Branch Manager, LIC has stated that an amount of Rs. 59,182/- was paid to the accused/appellant on maturity of policy during the check period. R.G. Somkunwar (DW-2) who at the relevant time was Branch Manager of SBI has stated that one DDR of Rs. 35,000/- was made on 09.05.1994 and after maturity an amount of Rs. 42644/- was given to the accused on 9.5.1996. Likewise, one VVK Rao (DW- 6) also stated that during the check period the accused/appellant had invested an amount of Rs. 20,000/- in mutual fund, which in the year 1993 came to be an amount of Rs. 3,600/- and in the year 1994 it was Rs. 4,000/- and in the year 1995 it came to be an amount of Rs. 5,280/- and in the year 1996 it came to Rs. 3,600/-, in the year 1997, it came to Rs. 2,400/-, which has been paid to the accused/appellant. In other words, a total amount of Rs. 18,880/- was paid to the accused/appellant. This payment undisputedly comes to be within the check period. Ishwar Prasad Ulsule (DW-3) has stated that the amount of Rs. 10,000/- has been deposited by the accused/appellant on 12.2.1983 and on maturity an amount of Rs. 17,205/- was given to the accused/appellant on 12.2.1988 vide Ex. D-3. T.M. Mate (DW-4) Assistant Sub Post Master has stated that on 12.11.1991 the accused/appellant had purchased an NSC certificate of Rs. 10,000/- for a period of six years, which on maturity came to Rs. 20,150/- given to the accused/appellant on 19.11.1997. This period also comes within the check period. B.K. Soni (DW- 5) and Vilayak Premdas Patil (DW-7) are the Assistant Manager (Accounts), FCI have stated that during the check period the payment on various heads was made to the accused/appellant. V. Ravindran (DW-8) has stated that the accused/appellant had invested in Fixed Deposit an amount Rs. 10,000/- on 9.1.1982 and after maturity he was given an amount of Rs. 19,965/- on 9.1.1989. This period of deposit however comes outside the check 9 period. S.K. Nande (DW-9) is the Branch Manager, Central Bank of India has stated that the accused/appellant deposited Rs. 10,000/- on 15.05.1986 and on 17.11.1992 he was given Rs. 20,245/- as per Ex. D-9. This period also comes within the check period. Subhash Chandra Oswal (DW-10) is the Technical Assistant in FCI has stated that he had given two cheques of Rs. 10,000/- each to the accused/appellant on 9.3.1995 and 20.4.3.1995 vide Ex. D-12 and D-13 respectively which was encashed by the accused but that amount has not been returned to him. DW-11 to DW-14 who though are tenants of the accused, but as the information of tenancy was not given to the department by the accused, such income has not been taken into consideration. Branch Manager of Dena Bank namely K. Paroda (DW-15) has stated that SDR worth Rs. 10,000/- was issued on 23.4.1984 in the name of accused and Smt. Laxmi Devi and after maturity amount of Rs. 7,205/- was paid to the accused on 23.4.1989 totalling to Rs. 17,205 vide Ex. D-16. This also comes within the check period. D.N. Verma (DW-16) Assistant Post Master has stated that on 30.8.1990 two NSCs were purchased by the accused worth Rs. 1,000/- each which on maturity was paid to the accused amounting to Rs. 4,030/- on 15.10.1996, and on 23.1.1991 NSC of Rs. 3000/- was purchased and on 25.1.1997 Rs. 6045/- was paid back. This also comes within the check period. J.K. Amritkar (DW-17) has deposed that NSC of Rs. 1000/- each was purchased by the accused on 25.1.1990 and on 25.1.1996 an amount of Rs. 4,030/- was paid to him and on 25.1.1990 NSC of Rs. 5000/- was purchased and on 25.1.1996 an amount of Rs. 10,075 was paid to him. This also comes within the check period. Tarachand Sandhani (DW- 18) is the goldsmith has stated that four gold bangles were sold by accused on 20.2.1988 for Rs. 9750/-, one gold half-set was sold for Rs. 10,950/-, on 26.2.1992 gold bangles for Rs. 15,180/-, two chain lockets were sold on 10 28.2.1992 for Rs. 9,890/-. Rakesh Prasad alias Jagrit Prasad (DW-19) has stated that accused was his elder brother. He has stated that he had given an amount of Rs. 20,000/- through DDs. Vide Ex. D-27. He has submitted only the certificate to that effect and not the copies of DDs. 10. Trial Court has framed three issues for consideration, which are as under:- (I) Whether the accused/appellant was a public servant during the check period and whether he was prosecuted under valid sanction therefor? (ii) Whether the accused/appellant was found in possession of Rs. 5,97,218.08 which is disproportionate to his known source of income and that he was not having any explanation for that? (iii) Conviction, offence and sentence? 11. While deciding issue No.1 and 2 jointly, learned trial Court has held that during the check period the accused/appellant was posted as Assistant Grade-I in FCI, Durg. Vide Ex. P-36, sanction to prosecute the accused/appellant was granted by Senior Regional Manager H.L. Prasad (PW-6). 12. While deciding a case pertaining to the property disproportionate to one’s known source of income, three points are necessary to be dealt with - (I) Income (ii) expenditure (iii) assets. As regards income, prosecution has examined Sub Inspector, CBI Jabalpur namely B.K. Singh (PW-8) who has stated that during check period the total income of the accused/appellant has been assessed as Rs. 7,04,436.42. The accused/appellant however has denied the same while answering question No. 37 at the time of his statement being recorded under Section 313 CrPC, but he has not produced any document regarding such denial, except giving the figure of his total income during the check period as Rs. 14,00,000/-. H.L. Prasad (PW-6) who granted 11 the sanction to prosecute, has also stood by the statement of PW-8. While calculating the income, learned trial Court taking into consideration the same from various sources has arrived at the conclusion that the total income of the accused/appellant during the check period was Rs. 7,97,071/-. From the documents on record it also appears that before the check period the accused/appellant was having immovable property worth Rs. 26,505/-, but learned trial Court instead of deducting the same from his income, has added the same, which is not correct. If the property acquired before the check period is excluded, the total income of the accused/appellant during the check period comes to Rs.7,70,566/-. 13. Having thus adverted to the factual aspect of the matter, this Court now proceeds to take a look at the decisions cited by the counsel for the appellant sequentially. 14. Relevant portion of the decision in the matter of P. Satyanarayan Murty (supra) reads as under:- 8. The next one relates to the error committed in calculating the income from the leasehold land as well as the inclusion of Rs. 29.000/- as an asset on the alleged benami transaction. These two items are mentioned as item Nos. 2 and 4 in the above note. First of all, we shall deal with the finding of the court that the landed properties, standing in the names of the father and wife of the appellant really belong to the appellant and all those purchases are benami in nature. Needless to say that this Court on a series of decisions have laid down the guidelines in finding out the benami nature of a transaction. Though it is not necessary to cite all those decisions, it will suffice to refer to rule laid down by Bhagwati, J, as he then was in Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of MP. In that case, it was contended that the amount lying in fixed deposit in the name of one Shanti Devi was an asset belonging to the appellant and that Shanti Devi was a benamidar of the appellant. The learned Judge speaking for the Bench has 12
Decision
disposed of that contention holding thus: (SCC pp. 830- 31, para 26) “It is well settled that the burden of showing that a particular transaction is benami and the appellant owner is not the real owner always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of the serious onus that rests on him nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises as a substitute for proof.” 15. Relevant portion of the decision in the matter of M. Krishna Reddy (supra) reads as under:- 6. An analysis of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act, 1947 which corresponds to Section 13(1)(e) of the new Act of 1988 shows that is not the mere acquisition of property that constitutes an offence under the provisions of the Act but it is the failure to satisfactorily account for such possession that makes the possession objectionable as offending the law. 7. To substantiate a charge under Section 3(1)(c) of the Act, the prosecution must prove the following ingredients, namely, (1) the prosecution must establish that the accused is a public servant, (2) the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property which were found in his possession (3) it must be proved as to what were his known sources of income, i.e. known to the prosecution and (4) it must prove, quite objectively, that such resources or property found in possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known sources of income. Once the above ingredients are satisfactorily established, the offence of criminal misconduct under 13 Section 5(1)(e) is complete, unless the accused is able to account for such resources or property. In other words, only after the prosecution has proved the required ingredients, the burden of satisfactorily accounting for the possession of such resources or property shifts to the accused. 16. Relevant portion of the decision in the matter of Vasant Rao Guhe (supra) reads as under:- 17. The materials on record and the rival assertions have received our due attention. The accusations on which the charge under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act were framed against the appellant have been set out hereinabove. Admittedly, having regard to the ultimate figures as calculated by the Courts below, the charge has undergone a metamorphosis. This assumes immense significance in view of the fact that no fresh charge had been framed on the allegations for which the appellant was eventually convicted and sentenced. Any adverse inference prejudicial to the appellant was thus not available in law, he not having been confronted with the altered imputations. To reiterate, the charge for which the appellant finally has been convicted wears a new complexion different from the one with which he had been arraigned at the initiation of the trial. The appellant thus for all practical purposes was subjected to a trial involving fleeting frames of accusations of which he was denied prior notice. This is clearly opposed to the fundamental precepts of a criminal prosecution. 18. Apart therefrom, both the Courts below indulged in voluntary exercises to quantify the pay of the appellant for the periods excluded by the prosecution as well as his agricultural income and that too premised on presumptions with regard to his possible expenditures/investments and his share in the agricultural receipts, having regard to the nature of the charge cast on the appellant and the inflexible burden on the prosecution to unfailingly prove all the ingredients constituting that same, there could have been no room whatsoever of any inference or speculation by the Courts below. A person cannot be subjected to a criminal prosecution either for a 14 charge which is amorphous and transitory and further on evidence that is conjectural or hypothetical. The appellant in the determinations before the Courts below has been subjected to a trial in which both the charges and evidence on aspects with vital bearing thereon lacked certitude, precision and unambiguity. 19. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act deserves extraction at this juncture: “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant –(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct, – (a)……………. (b)…………… (c)……………. (d)…………… (e) if he or any 19. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act deserves extraction at this juncture: “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant –(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct, – (a)……………. (b)…………… (c)……………. (d)…………… person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.” 15 20. As ordained by the above statutory text, a public servant charged of criminal misconduct thereunder has to be proved by the prosecution to be in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income, at any time during the period of his office. Such possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income may be of his or anyone on his behalf as the case may be. Further, he would be held to be guilty of such offence of criminal misconduct, if he cannot satisfactorily account such disproportionate pecuniary resources or property. The explanation to Section 13(1)(e) elucidates the words “known sources of income” to mean income received from any lawful source and that such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of law, rules, orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. 21. From the design and purport of clause (e) of sub-clause (1) to Section 13, it is apparent that the primary burden to bring home the charge of criminal misconduct thereunder would be indubitably on the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the public servant either himself or through anyone else had at any time during the period of his office been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income and it is only on the discharge of such burden by the prosecution, if he fails to satisfactorily account for the same, he would be in law held guilty of such offence. In other words, in case the prosecution fails to prove that the public servant either by himself or through anyone else had at any time during the period of his office been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income, he would not be required in law to offer any explanation to satisfactorily account therefor. A public servant facing such charge, cannot be comprehended to furnish any explanation in absence of the proof of the allegation of being in possession by himself or through someone else, pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. As has been held by this Court 16 amongst others in State of Maharashtra Vs. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede1, even in a case when the burden is on the accused, the prosecution must first prove the foundational facts. Incidentally, this decision was rendered in a case involving a charge under Sections 7, 13 and Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.” 20. As ordained by the above statutory text, a public servant charged of criminal misconduct thereunder has to be proved by the prosecution to be in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income, at any time during the period of his office. Such possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income may be of his or anyone on his behalf as the case may be. Further, he would be held to be guilty of such offence of criminal misconduct, if he cannot satisfactorily account such disproportionate pecuniary resources or property. The explanation to Section13(1)(e) elucidates the words “known sources of income” to mean income received from any lawful source and that such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of law, rules, orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. 21. From the design and purport of clause (e) of sub-clause (1) to Section 13, it is apparent that the primary burden to bring home the charge of criminal misconduct thereunder would be indubitably on the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the public servant either himself or through anyone else had at any time during the period of his office been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income and it is only on the discharge of such burden by the prosecution, if he fails to satisfactorily account for the same, he would be in law held guilty of such offence. In other words, in case the prosecution 20 of the Act. 17 22. In view of the materials on record and the state of law as above, we are thus of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt the charge of criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and punishable under Section 13(2) thereof against the appellant. He is thus entitled to the benefit of doubt. The prosecution to succeed in a criminal trial has to pitch its case beyond all reasonable doubt and lodge it in the realm of “must be true” category and not rest contended by leaving it in the domain of “may be true”. We are thus left unpersuaded by the charge laid by the prosecution and the adjudications undertaken (2009) 15 SCC 200 by the Courts below. The conviction and sentence, thus is set aside. The appeal is allowed.” 17. Now follows the conclusion: Since the sanction (Ex.P-36) to prosecute the accused/appellant was granted by (PW-6) who was the competent authority, it is held to be a valid one. 18. Now the next question is whether the property worth Rs. 5,97,218.08 allegedly found in possession of the accused/appellant was disproportionate to his known source of income? For convenience, it is reiterated that the check period embraces within its fold the period from 01.01.1986 to 26.11.1997. 19. Record manifestly makes it clear that before the check period the assets worth Rs. 26,505/- was already with the accused/appellant, and during check period his total income from known sources has been taken to Rs. 7,97,071/-. Out of this, movable property was worth Rs. 4,73,362.77 and immovable property was worth Rs. 3,72,142/-. Record also shows that total expenditure during the check period was Rs. 3,82,800/-. The overall value of assets in possession of the accused/appellant during the check period was 18 Rs. 7,97,071/- (total income from known sources) + 3,83,000/- (total expenditure during check period) which will make the total of the same as Rs. 11,80,071/-. If the income from the known sources is deducted from the total income, the disproportionate income comes to Rs. 3,83,000/-. However, learned trial Court has not considered the income of Rs. 34,410/- derived from the FDR taken before the check period as per statement of DW-15, and if it is done, the disproportionate income of the accused/appellant comes to Rs. 3,48,590/-. Likewise, document of Ex. D-7 goes to show that on 9.1.1982 an amount of Rs. 10,000/- was invested and on 9.1.1989 the same got matured taking the amount to Rs. 19,965/- which was paid to the accused/appellant. Since this amount was invested prior to the check period, the trial Court should have excluded the same also from his unaccountable income. If this amount is deducted, the disproportionate income comes down to Rs. 3,28,625/-. Further, in paragraph 32 of the judgment impugned, an amount of Rs. 14,410/- has been taken as income of the accused/appellant as per statement of DW-15 whereas the amount should have been 34,410/- and being so, the amount of Rs. 20,000/- has to be added in his income. If that is done, the disproportionate income comes to Rs. 3,08,625/-. Likewise, according to DW-3, an amount of Rs. 10,000/- was invested by the accused in FDR in the year 1983 i.e. before the check period and on maturity an amount of Rs. 17,205/- was paid to him on 12.02.1988, but learned trial Court has only deducted interest part and not the principal one, which is an incorrect exercise. Therefore, after after deducting the amount of Rs. 10,000/- the disproportionate income further gets down to Rs. 2,98,625/- 19. While dealing with the matter falling under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 which is pari materia to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988, in the matter of State of Maharashtra Vs. Wasudeo 19 Ramchandra Kaidalwar reported in AIR 1981 SC 1186 the Supreme Court has held that if the accused is found in possession of disproportionate assets, he is duty-bound to account satisfactorily for such possession. Relevant portion of the said decision reads as under: …...To substantiate the charge, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 5(1)(e), namely, (1) it must establish that the accused is a public servant, (2) the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property which were found in his possession, (3) it must be proved as to what were his known sources of income i.e. known to the prosecution, and (4) it must prove quite objectively, that such resources or property found in possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known sources of income. Once these four ingredients are established, the offence of criminal misconduct under s. 5(1)(e) is complete, unless the accused is able to account for such resources or property. The burden then shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for his possession of disproportionate assets 20. Having thus gone through the evidence of the witnesses very minutely, this Court finds that the accused/appellant was in possession of the property worth Rs. 02,98,625/- which was disproportionate to his known source of income. Now if 10% of this amount is further deducted, the net disproportionate income which the accused/appellant can be held to be in his possession during the check period comes to Rs. 2,68,762/- which can be rounded off at Rs. 2,68,000/-. Held accordingly. Conviction part of the judgment is thus maintained. The judicial pronouncements sought to be taken support of by the appellant, being on different factual background, do not come to the rescue of the accused/appellant. 21. As regards sentence, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the fact that by now the accused/appellant must be in his eghitees and 20 that the incident had taken place in the year 1997, meaning thereby considerable long period has rolled by since then, this Court is of the considered of opinion that the interest of justice would be served if the sentence imposed on him is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year from that of two years imposed by the trial Court. Order accordingly. 22. The appeal is thus partly allowed to the extent indicated above. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Jyotishi AVANISH JYOTISHI Digitally signed by AVANISH JYOTISHI Date: 2025.09.15 18:52:01 +0530