Mohan Lal Sahu S/o Shri Uday Ram Sahu Aged About 50 Years R/o Village v. State of Chhattisgarh through : Lokayukt Office Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh Branch Raipur
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:38469 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR CRA No. 134 of 2004 Mohan Lal Sahu S/o Shri Uday Ram Sahu Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Bagod, P.C No.24 Tehsil Kurud, District Dhamtari Permanent R/o Village -Borid, P.S. Arang District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh through : Lokayukt Office Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh Branch Raipur, (CG). ---- Respondent -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. YC Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Pooja Loniya, Advocate. For Respondent-State : Mr. Soumitra Kesharwani, PL. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Judgment on Board 04.08.2025 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07/02/2004 passed by learned First Additional Session Judge, Raipur, (CG), in Session Trial No.09/2001, whereby appellant stands convicted and sentence as under: Conviction Sentence 2 Under Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (for short, ‘PC Act’). U/s 7 of PC Act Rigorous imprisonment for 05 years & fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 03 months additional RI. RI for 02 years & fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 03 months additional RI. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is this that on 30/05/2000, the complainant/Tijauram lodged written complaint before the Special Police Establishment, Raipur stating that present appellant has demanded Rs.1000/- from him for doing the work of partition in the revenue record and for preparation of revenue Bhoo Adhikar Avam Rin Pustika. Based upon which, the police
Legal Reasoning
has firstly recorded the conversation between the appellant and complainant on 01/06/2000 and, thereafter, trapped the appellant on 02/06/2000 and FIR has been registered against him. 3. On completion of the investigation, the Special Police Establishment has submitted the charge-sheet/challan against the appellant before the Special Court, Raipur based upon which, trial Court has framed the charges against the appellant for offence under Section 7 & 13(1)(D) read with section 13(2) of the PC Act. 4. Prosecution in order to prove its case examined total 09 witnesses, i.e, Head Constable Sudan Ram as P.W.-1, Constable Pushpraj as P.W.-2, Panch witness S.J. Limje as 3 P.W.-3, complainant/Tijauram as P.W.-4, Kaleshwar Prasad as P.W.-5, Inspector J.S. Rang as P.W.-6, Dinesh Kumar Kadam as P.W.-7, Inspector Rakesh Bhatt as P.W.-8 and Inspector Anil Kumar Pathak as P.W.-9. Statement of appellant (accused) was also recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied all incriminating evidence appearing against him, pleaded innocence and false implication. In his defence, the appellant has examined 08 witnesses, i.e, Vijay Pratap Singh as D.W.-1, Prabhuram Kaushik as D.W.-2, Krishna Lal as D.W.-3, Rohit Kumar as DW-3 and Raghuwar Das as D.W -5. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence available on record, the trial Court vide impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants in the manner as described in Para-1 of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the evidence available on record. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that complainant is servant of PW-5/Kaleshwar Prasad and land has been encroached by P.W-5, for which, appellant has submitted the report against PW-5. The trial Court has failed to appreciate that appellant/accused has denied to receive any amount from the complainant. The trial court has ignored the technical faults in trap of the appellant, presence of third person in audio cassette and statements of the prosecution witnesses in proper manner 4 particularly the evidence of complainant/PW-4. The trial Court ignored the fact that the Police has not made any inquiry with respect to the complaint lodged by the complainant. Learned Counsel further contended that the trial Court has wrongly convicted the appellant without there being any specific evidence against him on record. The prosecution has failed to prove the necessary ingredients of the offence as alleged against the appellant. The prosecution has not been able to prove the alleged demand of bribe. Statements of the prosecution witnesses are full of contradictions, omissions and improvements. As such, conviction of the appellant is not sustainable and the appeal deserves to be allowed. In support of his contentions, he places reliance upon the orders/decision dated 19.09.2024 & 24.10.2024 passed in CRA No.148/2011 & CRA No.1615/2017. 7. On the contrary, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/State supported the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and submitted that the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant. 8. I have heard the rival contentions put-forth on behalf of the parties and perused the entire material available including the statements of the witnesses with utmost circumspection. 9. Before analyzing the evidence led by the prosecution as well as by the appellant, it would be appropriate to first refer to some of the relevant judgments of the Supreme Court relating to the 5 cases under Sections 7, 13 (1) (डी(cid:2)) read with Section 13 (2) of PC Act. 10. In case of Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1191, the Supreme Court observed thus:- "8. There could be no doubt that the evidence of the complainant should be corroborated in material particulars. After introduction of Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code making the person who offers bribe guilty of abetment bribery, the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime has to be insisted upon."...... 11. The status of person offering bribe and the caution required while assessing his evidence implicating a Govt. servant was examined by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in the case of M.O.Shamsudhin v. State of Kerla, 1995 SCC (3) 351, wherein, it was held as under: “12. Now confining ourselves to the case of bribery it is generally accepted that the person offering a bribe to a public officer is in the nature of an accomplice in the offence of accepting illegal gratification but the nature of corroboration required in such a case should not be subjected to the same rigorous test which are generally applied to a case of an approver. Though bribe givers are generally treated to be in the nature of accomplices but among them there are various types and gradation. In cases under the 6 Prevention of Corruption Act the complainant is the person who gives the bribe in a technical and legal sense because in every trap case wherever the complaint is filed there must be -a person who has to give money to the accused which in fact is the bribe money which is demanded and without such a giving die trap cannot succeed. When there is such a demand by the public servant from person who is unwilling and if to do public good approaches the authorities and lodges complaint then in order that the trap succeeds he has to give the money. There could be another type of bribe giver who is always willing to give money in order to get his work done and having got the work done he may send a complaint. Here he is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime committed and thus is an accomplice. Thus there are grades and grades of accomplices and therefore a distinction could as well be drawn between cases where a person offers a bribe to achieve his own purpose and where one is forced to offer bribe under a threat of loss or harm that is to say under coercion. A person who falls in this category and who becomes a party for laying a trap stands on a different footing because he is only a victim of threat or coercion to which he was subjected to. Where such witnesses fall under the category of "accomplices" by reason of their being bribe givers, in the first instance the court has to consider the degree of complicity and then look for corroboration if necessary as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case may vary having regard to the facts and circumstances." What therefore, emerges from the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court is that the complainant's evidence has to be 7 scrutinized carefully and the Court has to consider the degree of complicity and then look for corroboration, if necessary, as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case, may vary, having regard to the facts and circumstances. 12. In the matter of M. R. Purshotham v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 3 SCC 247, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that ‘when demand of bribe is not proved by the prosecution, mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 13(1) (d) of the Act’. 13. In case of B. Jaiyaraj v. State of Andra Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC 5, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 of the Act unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. Presumption against public servant under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only if demand for acceptance of illegal gratification is proved’. 14. Similar view has been taken in the matter of A. Subair v. State of Kerala, 2010 AIR SCC 1115 and Subhash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2003 SC 2169. 8 15. For ready reference, Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act reads as under;- “65B. Admissibility of electronic records.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any records, information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:- (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer; (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities; (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out 9 of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities. (3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether- (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or (c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly. (4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,- (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced; (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer; 10 (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it. (5) For the purposes of this section,- (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment; (b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official, information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities; (c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.” 16. In the light of the above view taken by the Supreme Court, I shall examine the facts and statements of witnesses of the present case. 11 17. It is an admitted fact that the appellant was posted as ‘Patwari’, therefore, at the relevant point of time, he was working as Public Officer. Thus, it is established, the appellant is public servant as defined in Section 21 (a) of the IPC. 18. As per Ex.P-15 to 18/transliteration (लि(cid:4)प्यं(cid:7)तरण), there is no mention that appellant has demanded Rs.1,000/- from the complainant for the purpose of ‘preparation of revenue book (rin- pustika)’, however, no doubt in the said documents/exhibit there is mention of demand of money. 19. In the Ex.D-3/agreement (इकर(cid:13)रना(cid:13)मा(cid:13)), it is specifically mentioned that complainant has borrowed Rs.1,700/- from the appellant on 16.02.2000 on the condition that he will return the said amount in the month of May-June, 2000. 20. PW-4/complainant Gajendra Prasad in his evidence has admitted the fact that he put his signature in the said agreement, which is mention as ‘B to B’ part of the said agreement. It is also admitted by the complainant that he has purchased the stamp on 15.02.2000 and appellant has demanded Rs.1,700/- from him. 21. Relevant portion of Ex.D-3/agreement (इकर(cid:13)रना(cid:13)मा(cid:13)) reproduced hereinbelow: ";g fd eq>s ?kjsyw [kpZ ,oe~ d`f"k dk;Z ds fy;s Jh eksgu yky lkgw ¼iVokjh½ gYdk uaaaa++ 17@24 xzke cxkSn ls vkt fnukad 16-02-20020 fnu cq/kokj dks 1700@00 :i;s v{kjh l=g lkS :i;s ek= m/kkjh ds :i esa ys jgk gw¡S ftls blh o"kZ ekg &twu esa 16 rkjh[k rd jfoQly dh /kku dVkbZ ds 12 rqjar ckn vnk dj nw¡xk A ;fn mDr jde le; ij vnk u dj ldk rks esjs fo:) dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djus ds fy;s l{ke gksxsaA" 22. In view of above, it is crystal clear that agreement has been executed between the appellant and complainant; complainant had borrowed sum of Rs.1700/- from the appellant/accused; appellant has demanding his money back from the complainant. Further, defence witnesses DW-1 to 5 have also supported defence of the appellant/accused. Trial Court has failed to consider the alleged agreement (Ex.D-3) in its true perspective. 23. It is also pertinent to mention here that from the evidence of the complainant and PW-5 it has come on record that complainant was servant of PW-5/Kaleshwar Prasad and land has been encroached by P.W-5, for which, appellant has submitted the report against PW-5, to which, PW-5 has threatened the appellant/accused. 24. In view of above discussion/observation, the prosecution has totally failed to establish the factum of demand of Rs.1000/- as bribe by the appellant from the complainant for the purpose of preparation of revenue book (rin-pustika). 25. Mere possession and recovery of the tented/currency notes from the accused cannot constitute the offence as alleged against the accused, unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. 13
Decision
26. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated dated 07/02/2004 is hereby set aside. The Appellant is acquitted from the aforementioned charges/offences. 27. The appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, his bail bonds shall continue for a further period of 06 months as per Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the said bonds shall stand discharged. 28. Record of the Trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for necessary compliance. (Arvind Kumar Verma) Sd/- JUDGE J/-