Deepchand Alias Amirchand Pasi S/o Late Aganu Pasi Aged About 66 Years R/o v. 1. Steel Authority Of India Limited Through - The Chairman, Having Its Registered Office
Case Details
1 SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.03.07 10:17:01 +0530 2025:CGHC:10656 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 43 of 2025 Deepchand Alias Amirchand Pasi S/o Late Aganu Pasi Aged About 66 Years R/o Quarter Number 217/c, Risali Sector, Bhilai, Police Station- Nevai, District - Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Steel Authority Of India Limited Through - The Chairman, Having Its Registered Office At Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, New Delhi – 110003 2. Bhilai Steel Plant Unit Of The Steel Authority Of India Limited, Through The Director-In-Charge, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, District - Durg, Chhattisgarh 490021 3. The Deputy General Manager (M. And S.), Coke Ovens And C.C.D., Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, District - Durg, Chhattisgarh 490025 (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner For Respondents
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Ashwin Panickar, Advocate : Mr. P.R. Patankar, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 05. 03.2025 1. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the State Industrial Tribunal, Chhattisgarh, Raipur in Civil Appeal No. 4/CGIRACT/A/II/2024 dated 29.11.2024, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order passed by the learned Labour Court has been 2 affirmed. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 12.12.2007 issued by the Deputy General Manager, Bhilai Steel Plant, whereby he was removed from services with immediate effect. 2. The facts, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was initially employed with Bhilai Steel Plant as an Emergency Labourer vide order dated 16.11.1988; he was promoted to the post of Technician Level S-5 in the year 2007. On 22.06.2006, the sister-in-law of the petitioner, namely, Shyama Devi, made a complaint to Bhilai Bhatti Police Station to the effect that the real name of the petitioner is ‘Amirchand Pasi’ and he is working under the Bhilai Steel Plant in the name of her deceased husband, Late ‘Deepchand Pasi.’ An FIR No. 80/2006 was registered against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 419 and 420 of IPC. 3. An article of charge was issued to the petitioner by Bhilai Steel Plant with an allegation that he submitted false information regarding his name to secure employment. The Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed. A full-fledged enquiry was conducted and the penalty of removal was inflicted by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 12.12.2007. 4. Based on FIR No. 80/2006, a Criminal Case No. 16716/2006 was instituted before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg against the petitioner. In the trial, the petitioner was acquitted from all charges vide judgment dated 13.09.2019 and he attained the age of superannuation on 31.01.2018. 5. The petitioner sent a legal notice through his counsel on 21.11.2020 claiming therein back-wages and consequential benefits. He filed an application under Section 33 (c)(2) of the C.G. Land Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1947”) before the learned Labour Court, Durg for 3 payment of back-wages and retiral benefits. The application so moved by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Labour Court vide order dated 05.08.2022 on the ground that the same was not maintainable. 6. The petitioner filed an application under Section 31 (3) read with Section 61 of the C.G. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short “Act, 1960”) before the learned Labour Court, Durg on 14.03.2023 and the application was dismissed by the said Court on the ground of limitation vide order dated 19.10.2023. 7. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned State Industrial Court, Raipur according to the provisions of Section 65 of the Act, 1960. The learned State Industrial Court, Raipur dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay vide order dated 29.11.2024. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the C.G. State Industrial Court dated 29.11.2024 along with the order of removal dated 12.12.2007 by filing this petition. 8. Mr. Ashwin Panickar, counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is a layman and has passed the second standard only; therefore, he could not challenge the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 12.12.2007 within limitation. He would further submit that on the same set of allegations, a criminal case was also lodged against the petitioner and he was pursuing that case. He would also submit that after acquittal in the criminal case on 13.09.2019, the petitioner approached the respondent authorities for reinstatement, back-wages and other consequential benefits. He would contend that the learned Labour Court as well as the learned State Industrial Court committed an error of law in dismissing the claim of the petitioner on the ground of limitation. In support thereof, he has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Full Bench of the Madhya 4 Pradesh High Court in the matter of Mohammad Sagir vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals And Ors. decided on 24.02.2004 in Writ Petition No. 3993 of 2002. 9. On the other hand, Mr. P. R. Patankar, counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the petitioner impersonated himself and secured employment by producing false identification. He would further submit that an FIR was lodged against the petitioner and a criminal case was also lodged. He would also submit that on the same set of allegations, a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner. The departmental enquiry was initiated according to the provisions of Clause 29 (iv) of the Standing Orders of the Plant which states that “giving false information regarding his name at the time of employment.” He would contend that in the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was afforded full opportunity and there is no allegation in the present petition with regard to violation of the principles of natural justice. He would further contend that the penalty was inflicted on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 12.12.2007 and the petitioner kept mum for a long 13 years. He would also contend that for the first time, a legal notice dated 21.11.2020 was served upon the respondents. He would argue that the petitioner moved an application under Section 33 (c) (2) of the Act, 1947 on 08.06.2022, which was dismissed vide order dated 05.08.2022. It is stated that the petitioner moved an application under Section 31 (3) read with Section 61 of the Act, 1960 on 14.03.2023 which was dismissed vide order dated 19.10.2023. It is further stated that the petitioner failed to explain the delay in filing the application under Section 31 (3) read with Section 61 of the Act, 1960 before the learned Labour Court; therefore, his application was dismissed and the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court have 5 been affirmed by the learned Industrial Court, Raipur. 10. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 11. The allegation against the petitioner was that he secured employment under the respondents by furnishing false information with regard to his name. An FIR was registered and a Criminal Case was lodged. A departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner and after full fledged enquiry, the disciplinary authority inflicted the punishment of removal from services. 12. Section 62 of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 reads as under:- “62. Commencement of proceedings— Proceedings before a Labour Court shall be commenced- (i) in respect of a dispute falling under clause (a) of paragraph (A) of subsection (1) of Section 61 within two years from the date of the dispute; Provided that— (a) if the dispute is connected with the termination of the services of an employee, such proceedings shall commence within a year from the date of termination of the services of the concerned employee; (b) nothing contained in the foregoing provision shall apply if the concerned employee had made an approach before the 30th day of July, 1976 in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 31 as it stood before the said date and in that case the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 31 and clause (1) of this section shall be applicable as they had been before the said date; (c) Where an employee has preferred an appeal or representation against an order of termination under any rule, regulation or standing orders to the competent authority within the period prescribed for such appeal or representation or where no such period is prescribed within three months of the order of termination, such proceedings may be commenced within one year from the date of the disposal of the appeal or representation, as the case may be. (ii) in respect of matters specified in clause (c) of paragraph (A) of subsection (1) of section 61, within three months of the 6 commencement of the strike, lockout, stoppage, closure or of the making of the change on an application made by the employer, the representative of employees, any employee directly affected thereby or by Labour Officer; Provided that the Labour Court may, for sufficient reasons, admit any application for a declaration that a change is illegal under the Act, after the expiry of three months from the date on which such change was made.” 13. According to the provisions of Section 62 of the Act, 1960, an application can be moved before the competent Court within a period of one year from the accrual of cause of action. 14. In the present case, the cause of action accrued on 12.12.2007, when the petitioner was removed from services by the disciplinary authority. Though the Criminal Case was pending against the petitioner, but the petitioner slept over his rights for more than 15 years and the first application under Section 33 (c)(2) of the Act, 1947 was filed on 08.06.2022, which was dismissed being not maintainable. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application under Section 31 (3) read with Section 61 of the Act, 1960 on 14.03.2023 but he failed to explain the delay properly. The pendency of the criminal case cannot be a ground to condone the delay when the cause of action arose in the year 2007 itself. Though the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case vide judgment dated 13.09.2019, but on this ground alone, the delay cannot be condoned. The petitioner ought to have explained the delay properly in the application moved before the learned Courts below. 15. In the matter of Mohammad Sagir (supra), in para 31 (iv), the Hon’ble Full Bench of the High Court of M.P. has held that an employee who prefers an application under Section 62 of MPIR Act beyond the limitation prescribed 7 therein can always file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Such an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was moved by the petitioner before the learned Labour Court, but he failed to explain the delay properly. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 17. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85 , it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable 8 consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50 , wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of 21. Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 , this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of 9 the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 18. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; 10 (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 19. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a 11 matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 21. Taking into consideration the facts of the present case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself. Sd Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant