And District Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh v. State of Chhattisgarh Through The P.S. Chalgali, Tahsil and Dis
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:43512-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 373 of 2022 Lakhan @ Nan Kodaku S/o Shri Heeralal Kodatu Aged About 56 Years R/o Village Duari, P.S. And Tahsil Chalgali, And District Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The P.S. Chalgali, Tahsil and District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant For Respondent/State : : Mr. Jameel Akhtar Lohani, Advocate. Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 28 .08.2025 1. Heard Mr. Jameel Akhtar Lohani, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the respondent/State. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.09.08 16:20:43 +0530 2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is 2 directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 13.01.2022, passed by the learned Additional Session Judge/Special Judge (FTC), Ramanujgang, District Balrampur (C.G.) in Special Session (POCSO) Case No. 40 of 2018, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction under Section Sentence Section 363 of the Indian Rigorous imprisonment (for short, Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) ‘R.I.’) for 05 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 03 months R.I. more. Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 03 months R.I. more. Section 5(I)/6 of the R.I. for life and fine of Rs.20,000/-, Protection of Children from in default of payment of fine, 01 Sexual Offences Act, 2012 year R.I. more. (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) All the above sentences to be run concurrently except the default sentences 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 28.09.2018, the parents of the victim (PW-1) had gone to graze the cattle. The 10-year- old victim and her two younger sisters Patrakala and Vifani were at home. At 4.00 p.m., the appellant, Lakhan alias Nan Kodaku came to the victim’s house and asked her to go to Chandaura. When the victim refused, the appellant said that if she did not go, he would beat her and 3 started pulling her out by holding her hand. The appellant did not let go when the sisters of the victim tried to intervene and the appellant forcibly took the victim to Sitachua forest and did bad things to her after removing her clothes. After this, in the evening, he took her to the barn on the edge of the forest and forcibly did bad things to her twice. When the victim’s father arrived, the appellant fled from there. Then she came home with her father and narrated the incident. On the basis of the said
Facts
complaint, a First Information Report (FIR) (Ex.P/14) was lodged in the Police Station and Case No. 77 of 2018 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376A.B of the IPC and Sections 4, 5D, 6 of the POCSO Act. During the investigation, a site map of the incident was prepared in the presence of witnesses. The medical examination of the victim was conducted. The admission-discharge register (Ex.P/7C) was seized for the verification of the age of the vicitm and the underwear and vaginal slide of the victim and the appellant were seized. The statement of the victim and witnesses was recorded. The accused was arrested after the crime was found to be proven. After completing all the formalities of investigation in the case, a charge sheet has been presented against the accused for the crime under Sections 363, 366, 376AB of the IPC and Sections 4, 5D, 6 of the POCSO Act. 4. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (FTC), Ramanujganj, District Balrampur (C.G.) against the appellant, Lakhan @ Nan Kodaku, under Sections 363, 366, 376AB of the IPC and Sections 4, 5(D), and 6 of the POCSO Act. The statements of witnesses were duly recorded. 4 5. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376AB of the IPC and Sections 4, 5(D), and 6 of the POCSO Act. 6. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses and produced 43 documents. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all incriminating evidence and claimed innocence, alleging false implication. After due appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as stated in paragraph 02 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant respectfully submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and the consequent order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are wholly unsustainable in law and on facts. It is urged that there is no cogent, reliable, or trustworthy evidence on record to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The entire case of the prosecution rests upon conjectures, surmises, and assumptions, rather than clear and convincing proof, and therefore, the conviction cannot be allowed to stand. He further submits that the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in placing implicit reliance upon the testimony of the victim, despite the fact that her statement is riddled with material contradictions, omissions, and improvements when compared with the statements of other prosecution
Legal Reasoning
prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. 8 and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate 9 order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of 10 such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 13. In the present case, according to the prosecution, the victim’s date of birth is 28.06.2006. On this basis, she was below 15 years of age at the time of the incident. To substantiate this fact, the prosecution produced the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/7C) of Class 1 of the Government Primary School, Duwari, Tehsil Wadrafnagar, District Balrampur (C.G.). The register (Ex.P/7C) was proved by PW-6, Sagar Ram, the Head Teacher of the said school. In his deposition, PW-6 clearly stated that the victim was admitted to Class 1 on 20.06.2012, and her date of birth was recorded in the register as 28.06.2006. 14. The prosecution also relied on the bone age test report (Ex.P/13), conducted by PW-11, Dr. Sarita Singh, a Radiologist with nine years of experience, posted at Medical College, District Ambikapur (C.G.). She deposed that the victim was brought before her on 09.10.2018 for age determination. After conducting an X-ray examination, she submitted her report (Ex.P/13), opining that the victim’s age was between 10 to 12 years at that time. 11 15. The victim’s father (PW-2) also testified that she was 12 years old, which is consistent with the school register entry (Ex.P/7C) recording her date of birth. The medical evidence further supports that her age was between 10 to 12 years. Based on the above, and calculating from the date of birth 28.06.2006, the victim’s age at the time of the incident would be 12 years and 03 months, clearly establishing that she was below 15 years of age at the relevant time. 16. The defence did not produce any oral or documentary evidence to challenge the recorded date of birth. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the date of birth as 28.06.2006. We concur with the learned trial Court’s finding that the victim was 12 years and 03 months old at the time of the incident and thus a minor below 15 years of age. 17. The next question for consideration before us is whether the appellant has committed penetrative sexual assault by having sexual intercourse with the victim, being a minor girl, without her free will and consent ? 18. In this regard, the victim (PW-1) stated that she knows and recognizes the appellant, Lakhan @ Nan. On the day of the incident, at around 12–1.00 p.m., she was playing near her house when the appellant, who was intoxicated, came there, caught hold of her hand, dragged her towards the forest, removed her clothes, and raped her. Later, in the evening, the appellant again took her near the threshing floor on the edge of the forest and raped her once more. She raised an alarm, but no one came to her aid. While they were still at the threshing 12 floor, her father arrived, at which point the appellant fled. Her father then brought her back home. The next day, she accompanied her father to Chalgali to lodge a report, where her father submitted a written complaint. The police obtained her consent for medical examination (Ex. P/1), after which she was taken to the hospital and examined. In her further testimony, the victim stated that the police seized her Aadhaar card under a seizure memo (Ex. P/2). The police, along with the local patwari, prepared the spot maps (Exs. P/3 and P/4, respectively). Her statement was recorded, and she was later taken to the Wadrafnagar Court, where she gave her judicial statement. During cross-examination, the victim categorically denied the suggestion that the appellant had not come to her house. She expressed ignorance regarding the suggestion of a land dispute between the appellant and her parents. She admitted that prosecution witness Jawahar Yadav (PW-5) had good relations with her father and that there were frequent disputes with the appellant. She also admitted that she and her father had gone to the police station along with Jawahar Yadav to lodge the report. When asked by the defence counsel whether Lakhan had not committed any wrongdoing, the victim reaffirmed that Lakhan had indeed taken her to the forest and raped her. She further admitted that her father and Jawahar Yadav had accompanied her to the doctor and that Jawahar Yadav had spoken to the doctor and handled the paperwork. She denied the defence suggestion that the appellant was falsely implicated at the instigation of Jawahar Yadav. 19. The victim's father (PW-2), stated that he knows the appellant, 13 Lakhan @ Nan Kodaku. The incident, involving his daughter, occurred approximately a year prior. He recounted that on the day of the incident, he and his wife were in the jungle grazing cattle, while his three daughters were at home. When he returned around 5:00 p.m., his middle daughter, aged 5-6, informed him that the appellant had taken the victim to the jungle. Immediately, he and his neighbour, Roopchand, began searching for the victim. They found the victim with the appellant at Jayshree's barn. Upon seeing them, the appellant fled, leaving the victim behind. The victim then told her father that the appellant had taken her to the jungle and raped her four times. The victim's father stated that she repeated this to the police, and the following day, he, along with the victim and Jawahar, went to the police station to file a report. The father's testimony corroborates the prosecution's case. 20. The sister (PW-3) of the victim, is a five-year-old child witness. The witness stated that she recognized the appellant because he was a resident of her village, and that the victim is her elder sister. When asked by the Court what the appellant did, she stated that the appellant came inside the house and said something to the victim. When the victim refused, he pulled her and took her towards the forest. At sunset, when her parents came home, she informed them about the incident. During cross-examination, the witness denied the suggestion that she was telling about the appellant pulling and dragging the victim at the instigation of Jawahir. The witness stated on her own that she had seen the incident. 14 21. Dr. Priyanka Gupta (PW-13), who examined the victim, stated that on 29.09.2018 at 8:00 a.m., the female Constable Sumitra Uike, No. 107, presented the victim, a 10-year-old resident of village Duwari, for a genital examination. Upon examination, a mole was observed near the victim’s left eyebrow. The victim did not provide any information regarding the incident. She was mentally sound, and no external injuries were observed on her body. There was no swelling, pallor, or redness present. Dr. Gupta further stated that the victim’s secondary sexual characteristics had not developed, and she had not yet attained menstruation. According to the victim, she had not bathed after the incident. The hymen was circular and intact, without any injury or scratch. The vaginal membrane displayed a scratch-like mark, approximately the size of a needle prick. The victim did not report any pain during the examination. A whitish vaginal discharge was observed, from which two slides were prepared, sealed for chemical analysis, and handed over to the same constable. In Dr. Gupta’s opinion, it could not be conclusively determined whether immediate sexual intercourse had occurred. For definitive results, chemical testing of the slides was advised. Additionally, a radiological test was suggested to determine the age of the victim, and a sonography examination was recommended to assess any internal injuries. The examination report prepared by her is marked as Ex.P/16A. 22. Dr. Arendra Patel (PW-7), who examined the appellant, stated that on 30.09.2018, when the underwear of the appellant, Lakhan, was 15 brought before him for examination, he inspected it. The underwear was found to have soil stains. Regarding the presence or absence of human semen stains, he recommended that chemical testing be conducted. The underwear was then sealed and returned. The examination report prepared by him is marked as Ex.P/9. Dr. Patel further stated that on the same date, when the appellant was brought before him for medical examination, he examined him and found that the appellant was not incapable of performing sexual intercourse. The examination report prepared by him is marked as Ex.P/10. 23. In the Indian society refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society and when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light, there is inbuilt assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury, which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted, is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. A woman or a girl who is raped is not an accomplice. Corroboration is not the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. The observations of Vivian Bose, J. in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, reported in (AIR 1952 SC 54) were: 16 “The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge.…” 24. Crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault - it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Court, therefore, shoulders a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the victim, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the victim inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may 17 lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the victim must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestation. This position was highlighted in State of Punjab v. Gurmeet Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384. 25. A victim of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the victim. There is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘Evidence Act’) similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the victim it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the victim must necessarily depend on 18 the facts and circumstances of each case. But, if a victim is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the victim does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, reported in AIR 1998 SC 635 has held that the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime, but is a victim of another person’s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21 held as under:- “In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any 19 hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the 20 accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 28. Applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra) to the facts of the case on hand and as observed herein- above, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the victim. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy witness. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the appellant/accused relying upon the sole testimony of the victim can be sustained. 29. The view taken by the learned trial Court that the appellant is the author of the crime is a pure finding of fact based on evidence available 21 on record and we are of the opinion that in the present case, the only view possible was the one taken by the learned trial Court. 30. From the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has been successful in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not committed any legal or factual error in arriving at the finding with regard to the guilt of the appellant/convict. 31. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 32. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. He shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 33. Registry is directed transmit the original record to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and compliance and also to send a certified copy of this order to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan
Arguments
witnesses as well as her own previous statements. It is contended that 5 such inconsistencies strike at the root of the prosecution story and render it wholly unreliable. It is also submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the age of the victim as being below the statutory age of minority in accordance with law. No conclusive documentary evidence, such as a birth certificate, has been brought on record to substantiate the claim that the victim was a minor at the relevant time. In the absence of such proof, the benefit of doubt ought to go to the appellant. In view of the above submissions, learned counsel prays that the appeal deserves to be allowed, the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Court be set aside, and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges framed against him. 8. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant, in which no interference is called for by this Court. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the learned trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 10. The first question for consideration before this Court would be, whether the learned trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victim was minor? 11. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the 6 POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 12. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows: “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or 7 otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law,