CHHATTISGARH , W.P.No v. The State ofChhattisgarh

Judgment

3. ^ ^

4. ^ The State ofChhattisgarh through The PrincipalSecretary, hlome Department, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Complex, Raipur (C.G,) The Director General of Police, H.Q. - Raipur (C.G.) The Inspector General ofPolice, Bilaspur Range Bilaspur(C.G.) The Superintendent of Police Distt. - Janjgir-Champa H.Q. - Janjgir (C.G.) WRITPETiTION UNDERARTICLE 226/227 OFTHE CONSTITUTION OFINDIA r* '

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR W.P.No.124of2004 Petitioner : Ramji Lal Sahu Versus Respondents The State of Chhattisgarh and others. JUDGMENT/ORDER For Pronouncement of JUDGMENT/ORDER .12.2013 Sd/- N.K. Agrawal Judge Si^^SSaf^wwS^i.WilS^SS^^Kf.'l'^SStSSffSBIgScfSSSa'W a'-*i" ^'^5-K:-A,-lK!WSS, ,,,;;-9ssr '.i1/''""'^ •I ••• -3c'^^a!t E'l '•% •i^" 1 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR W.P.No. 124 of 2004 Petitioner Ramji Lal Sahu Versus ResDondents The State of Chhattisgarh and others. WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE226/227 OF THECONSTITUTION OF INDIA ^ SB:- HON.SHRI N.K. AGARWAL, J. PRESENT:- Shri Anand Dadariya,counsel for the petitioner. Shri Bhaskar Payashi, P.L. for the State. ORDER (Passedon ^.12.2013) /

1. By this petition, the petitionerseeks tochallenge legality and validity of the order dated 30.06.2002 (Annexure P/6) passed byrespondent No.4, by which, the petitioner has been compulsorily retired from his service. The petitioner also challenges the order dated29.11.2002 (Annexure P/8) and the order dated 27.06.2003 (Annexure P/10), by which, the appeal and the mercy appeal preferred by the petitioner have been rejected maintaining the order dated 30.06.2002 (Annexure P/6)passed by respondent No.4 (Superintendent of Police).

2. The facts necessary for disposal of this petition are that the petitioner .was employee of State Police Department. At the relevant time he was posted at Nawagarh Chowki (P.S. Civil Lines). On the day of Durga Idol Visarjan, i.e.,

27.10.2001, he was on duty to maintain law and order. Whileon duty, the petitioner, who was also iri uniform, was sleeping at Choura situated in front of Siyaram's house. In-charge Sub-lnspector Chowki Nawagarh Shri Moolchand Tiwari found the petitioner in sleeping and drunken eondition and arranged to • !;•!»& send the petitioner to his house. A preliminary enquiry was held. Maving prima facie found him guilty, the charge sheet was served upon him. The charges read as under: STRtTT ^O 1. <t>(f<^ ^ ?kH q^f TTS^ ^ aiPI \3TTg' Tt V! ^KR ^ '•T?t ^' ^ TT^ '?gq"r 'eft^ ai^ll-9'1 Sit? <t)<;W'i"l q»T 'fKsPl ^-IT 1 Sn^CT ^BQ 2. <d4'i|cW ^I SRT ^RRT ^ ®f^q5t ^fvl qi^TT 1

3. In reply to the charge-sheet (Annexure P/2), the petitioner while admitting that he was sleeping on duty as he could not sleep for two nights, has denied all the allegations against him.

4. M.R.Mandavi, Reserve Inspector, Police Line, Janjgir was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who conducted the enquiry. As per enquiry report, chargeslevelled againstthe petitioner werefound proved.

5. Thereafter, vide Annexure P/4, the show-cause notice along with the copy of enquiry report was served upon the petitioner calling upon his representation. On 02.07.2002, the petitioner filed his representation (Annexure P/5). Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority,.vide order 30.06.2002 (Annexure P/6) passed the order whereby the petitioner has been compulsorily retired. The appeal and mercy appeal filed by the petitioner were also dismissed. Hence, this petition.

6. Shri Anand Dadariya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit: the charges levelled against the petitioner are vague for want of petitioner's medical examination. Even otherwise, there isno evidence available on record to prove the fact the petitioner was in drunken condition at the relevant time. The findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are perverse, not supported by any reasons, also passed.in violation of principles of natural justice and the order of petitioner's compulsory retirement deserves to be quashed. It was further contended, the punishment of compulsory retirement is also disproportionate.

7. On the otherhand.Shri Bhaskar Payashi, learned counsel appearing for the State supported the orders impugned and contended that the petitioner was employed in Police Force which requires exemplary behaviour and upholding of the highest standard of discipline and impeccable reputation before the general public, therefore, any lapse on the part of any of the employees of the Police are dealt with by the concernedauthorities withstern action. The petitioner in a highly sensitive day of mob congregation when emotions run high, i.e., on the day ofthe Durga Idol Visarjan was sleeping on duty in uniform in a drunken stage. This irresponsible and indisciplined behaviour of the petitioner not only put the entire Police Force in utter ridicule of the general public but was also a major indiscipline committed by the petitioner, especially, in view of the fact that all members of Police Force are required as per norms to adhere to strict code of conduct and are to uphold the dignity of the force in the eye of the general public so as to inspire faith f and confidence in the public for whose services they are recruited and continue in service. It was further contended, upon coming to know of the said act of utter indiscipline committed by the petitioner, a preliminary enquiry was held and after giving due opportunity of showing cause to the petitioner, the order has been passed. In the above circumstances, the punishment of compulsory retirement of the petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate and the order of punishment deserves to be upheld.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. r

9. Let me first remind the broad principles relating to scope of judicial review in such matters.

10. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is eonducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, theCourt/Tribunal is concerned to determinewhether the inquirywas held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a flnding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of facf or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proGeedings. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. When the authority accepts the evidence and the conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary t authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The disciplinary authDrity is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent pfficer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the

1. \ ]./•.. r v vA conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable personwould have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion orthe finding, and mould the reliefso as to make it appropriate to the facts of that case. (please see B.C.Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 749).

11. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another vs. Ashok KumarArora, (1997) 3 SCC 72, cited and relied upon by the petitioner, the Supreme Court held: in cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein, the Court does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority, The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is verylimited for instance whereit is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; flndings are based on no evidence, or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved T misconduct of an employee.

12. Jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well known factors. It cannotset aside a well reasoned order only on sympathy or sentiment. Once it is found that all procedural requirements have been'complied with, the Courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases, may invoke the doctrine of proportionality if the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under 1:1111 Article 227 of the Constitution of India, also cannot on the basis of sympathy or sentiment overturn a legal order.

13. In the case of Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (1999) 7 SCC 739, relied upon by the petitioner, the Supreme Court held: the scope of interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. Iffindings are perverse and not supported by the evidence on record or findings recorded at domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person f would have reached, it would be open to High Court or to the Supreme Court to interfere in the matter.

14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, is clear that all procedural requirements have been complied with. The petitioner was served with the charge-sheet. The charges levelled againsthim are serious in nature; After petitioner's reply, the enquiry was conducted. Prosecution witnesses as well as defence witnesses were examined. The Enquiry Officer, in his report, found the petitioner guilty. Thereafter, after issuing show-cause hotice with a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner and after affording him due opportunity of making representation, the order of compulsory retirement has been passed. The Appellate Authority has also passed the order after re- appreciating theentire material.

15. True, vague charges may vitiate enquiry, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Union oflndia and others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009)12 SCC 78. However, merely because due to non-availability of Doctor, if the petitioner was not subjected to medical examination, the charges levelled against the petitioner would not become vague and the above argument advanced by the petitioner's counsel cannot be accepted.

16. Indisputably, the petitioner was sleeping near Siyaram's house ih 7 uniform while on duty. This act itself amounts to serious misconduct. Moreover, the statement of in-charge Sub-lnspector Chowki Nawagarh Moolchand Tiwari regarding petitioner's drunken condition has not been controverted by the petitioner during his cross-examination and his statement remains unrebutted on the above point. The in-charge Sub-lnspector ^ Nawagarh was further not cross-examined by the petitioner regarding his allegation against him in the reply. The domestic Tribunals are also not bound by the technical rules of evidence confained in the Evidence Act and are required to decide the matters based on preponderance of probabilities.

17. After perusing the paper book, it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer reached to conclusion by taking into consideration any irrelevant fact orhas not considered the relevant facts and has passed the order on the basis of conjectures and surmises. The Disciplinary Authority has also passed the orderafter considering petitioner's representation.

18. Considering every aspect of the matter and looking to the seriousness of the charges, 1 do not find any illegality, perversity or absurdity in the concurrent finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority warranting interference of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 19 In view of above, the petition is, therefore, liable to be and is hereby dismissed.

20. No order as tocosts. sd/- N.K. Agrawal Judge ^^^ii^llii^